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ATTACHMENT A 
TRANSPORTATION OF 
NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
A.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This attachment provides an evaluation of the radiological and non-radiological risks 
associated with the transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens that originate from 
Navy and commercial shipyards, prototypes, and related Department of Energy laboratories. This 
evaluation covers all past shipments through May 1995 and shipments planned in the 4Q-year period 
from June 1995 through the end of 2035. This attachment evaluates the radiological risks associated 
with the five alternatives described in Section 3. 
A.2 BACKGROUND 
The transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens covered in this attachment 
falls into the following four categories: 
• Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and Prototypes 
• Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage Following Examination 
• Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between the Examination Facility and the 
Test Reactor Area 
• Shipments of Naval Test Speci mens to Examination and Testing Facilities. 
Each category is described in more detail below. 
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A.2.1 Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and 
Prototypes 
Since 1956, spent nuclear fuel has been removed from Navy nuclear·powered ships and 
prototypes as a routine part of their operational cycle. The spent nuclear fuel has been transported to 
the Expended Core Facility (ECF) for examination and eval uation. ECF is part of the Naval Reactors 
Facility (NRF) within the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (lNEL). The examinations of the 
spent nuclear fuel and irradiated test specimens have provided and will continue to provide 
engineering data for materials and designs used in technology development for naval nuclear reactors. 
In the past, shipments have originated from two prototype sites, nine shipyard locations, and 
the Shippingport Atomic Power Station (SAPS), located in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. The two 
prototype locations are the Kenneth A. Kesselring Site (KSO), located in West Milton, New York and 
the Windsor Site Operation (WSO), loc.ted in Windsor, Connecticut. The nine shipyard locations are 
Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), located in Newport News, Virginia; the Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
(NOR), located in Portsmouth , Virginia; the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS), located in Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii ; the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNS), located in Kinery, Maine; the Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard (PSNS), located in Bremerton, Washington; the Charleston Naval Shipyard (CNS), 
located in Charleston, South Carolina; the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (MINS), located in Vallejo, 
California; the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics (EB), located in Groton, Connecticut, and 
Ingalls Shipbuilding (lNGL), located in Pascagoula, Mississippi . Figure A·I provides a map of the 
United States showing the transportation origins for naval spent nuclear fuel. No future shipments 
from the Electric Boat Division, Ingalls Shipbuilding, and Shippingport Atomic Power Station 
facilit ies are planned . The Mare Island Naval Shipyard , Charleston Naval Shipyard, and Windsor 
Sit~ Operations facili ties are being phased out. 
The naval spent nuclear fuel has been shipped in M·130. M·140, M·I60, and S2W/S2Wa 
shipping containers. Only the M·130, M·140, and M-I60 shipping containers will be used in the 
future . A detailed description of the shipping containers to be used for naval spent nuclear fuel 
shipments from shipyards and prototype sites is provided in Section A.4.1. 
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Figure A-I. Transportation o rigins for naval spent nuclear fuel. 
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BEST COPY AVAILABLE 
The naval spent nuclear fuel is primarily shipped by rail. However, for the two prototype 
sites, rail spurs to the sites are not available. Therefore, the shipping containers are transported by 
heavy-lift transporter to a nearby commercial rail line where the containers are then transported by 
rail. For the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, the containers are transported by ship to the Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard where the containers are then transported to ECF by rail. Since 1956, 599 containers 
of naval spent nuclear fuel have been shipped to ECF. An additional 16 containers of spent nuclear 
fuel were shipped (12 from Shippingport Atomic Power Station to Hanford and 4 from ECF to 
Hanford); however, these shipments are covered by the DOE historic shipment calculations in 
Appendix I, Volume 1 of this Environmental Impact Statement. Table A-I provides a list of these 
shipments made by year and originating facility . 
A.2.2 Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage Following 
Examination 
In the past, following examinations at ECF, the spent nuclear fuel has been prepared and 
transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (lCPP), also located on the INEL. A detailed 
description of the operations performed in the Expended Core Facility is provided in Attachment B. 
Naval spent nuclear fuel is currently being held at ICPP until permanent disposition becomes possible. 
Since 1956, approximately 5400 transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel have been made from 
ECF to ICPP in shipping casks transported by truck dedicated to performing only such shipments 
(exclusive-use). For alternatives inVOlving continued transfers to storage, the transfers would be 
made in the NFS-IOO, Peach Bottom, and Large Cell casks in exclusive-use trucks. A detailed 
description of the shipping casks used for naval spent nuclear fuel transfers to storage is provided in 
Section A.4.2. 
A.2.3 Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between the 
Examination Facility and the Test Reactor Area 
In addition to naval spent nuclear fuel from ships and prototypes, irradiated test specimen 
assemblies (fuel and non-fuel) have also been transported to ECF for examination. Test specimens, 
which are constructed of plant materials, reactor structural materials, and fuels used in naval reactor 
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Table A-I. Number of past naval spent nuclear fuel containers shipped to ECF by origin . 
Origin 
Year EB SAPS KSO MINS PHNS PSNS NNS PNS CNS 
1957 I 
1958 I 
1959 I I 
1960 
1961 I 2 2 
1962 5 I I 
1963 3 I I 
1964 2 I 2 
1965 2 I 2 33 I 2 
1966 4 2 I I I 
1967 2 I 2 8 3 3 
1968 2 4 4 2 3 2 
1969 8 2 3 I 2 4 2 
1970 4 7 2 32 2 2 
1971 4 2 8 4 2 
1972 2 4 2 2 4 
1973 2 I I 2 I 6 4 2 2 
1974 2 I 6 6 2 3 
1975 2 I 4 I 4 2 2 
1976 4 3 7 2 4 2 
1977 4 I 2 2 2 2 
1978 2 3 I 4 4 2 
1979 I 2 "2 
1980 2 6 4 I I 
5 
WSO NOR INGL TOTAL 
I 
I 
2 
0 
5 
7 
5 
5 
I 42 
I to 
4 23 
17 
22 
49 
20 
I 15 
21 
2 22 
1 2 19 
2 24 
2 15 
2 18 
5 
14 
< o 
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Table A-I (Cont). 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994(1) 
1995(1) 
TOTAL 
EB 
SAPS 
KSO 
MINS 
PHNS = 
PSNS 
NNS 
PNS = 
eNS 
WSO 
NOR 
INGL 
EB SAPS KSO MINS PHNS 
I 
I 
3 2 
7 1 
2 I 
1 
4 I 
4 I 
3 4 
4 2 
3 3 2 
2 
2 4 
2 
48 23 21 84 20 
Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics 
Shippingport Atomic Power Station 
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site Operations 
Mare Island Naval Shipyard 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
Newport News Shipbuilding 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Charleston Naval Shipyard 
Windsor Site Operations 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
Ingalls Shipbuilding 
PSNS 
6 
6 
2 
4 
4 
5 
7 
10 
4 
7 
8 
I 
I 
115 
(I) Shipments in these years cover those authorized by the court injunction. 
Origin 
NNS PNS eNS WSO NOR INGL TOTAL 
4 3 8 
6 3 10 
4 2 I 18 
4 2 20 
2 2 2 8 
4 2 2 15 
2 6 13 
3 4 17 
2 4 18 
4 4 3 28 
I 7 18 
4 4 23 
12 22 
5 4 16 
3 
150 43 72 3 10 10 599 
plants are tested and qualified to characterize their performance for the lifetime of the plant. Part of 
this qualification program is to perform various irradiation lests of the materials for lifetime effects 
prior to cenification. Along with those tests are pre- and post-examinations that provide the 
necessary data for subsequent analysis of the material in question. This work is considered a 
fundamental requirement for the design and safe operation of naval reactor plants. Therefore. the 
transfers of test specimen assemblies to the examination facil ity and shipments of the test specimens to 
the test facilities are included in the transponation evaluation. The test specimens have been 
assembled into test specimen assemblies and irradiated at the Test Reactor Area (TRA) on the INEL. 
The irradiated test specimen assemblies are returned to ECF for disassembly and examination . 
Since 1956. approximately 3600 transfers of naval test specimen assemblies have been made 
between ECF and TRA in shipping casks transponed by exclusive-use truck. For alternatives 
involving future transfers of this type. the transfers would be made in the NR-I . ATR-2. NR-3. 
NR-4. and Test Train casks . A detailed description of the shipping casks used to transfer irradiated 
test specimen assemblies is provided in Section A.4.3. 
A.2.4 Shipments of Naval Irradiated Test Specimens to Examination 
and Testing Facilities 
Following disassembly and examination of the test specimen assemblies at ECF. some 
specimens are shipped to off-site facilities for funher testing or examination. These tests and 
examinations are generally very specialized and ECF does not have the capability to perform them or 
cannot perform them in a timely manner due to other examination priorities. Specimens are also 
shipped back to ECF for examination or funher irradiation at TRA. 
Test specimen shipments have been shipped to or from several laboratories and test facilities. 
They are the Benis Atomic Power Laboratory (Benis). located in West Mifflin. Pennsylvania; the 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL). located in Niskayuna. New York; the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (ORNL). located in Oak Ridge. Tennessee; the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)-East. 
located in Argonne. Illinois; the Battelle Memorial Institute. located in Columbus. Ohio; the Chalk 
River Nuclear Laboratories. located in Chalk River. Ontario. Canada (I shipment only); the Hanford 
Site. located in Richland. Washington; and the ANL-West. Central Facilities Area (CFA). TRA. and 
ICPP facilities. all located on the INEL. Based on current schedules. Benis and KAPL will be the 
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only origins for future shipments. Figure A-2 provides a map of the United States showing the 
transponation origins and destinations for the test specimen shipments. 
Since 1956. approximately 850 shipments of naval test specimens have been made between 
ECF and on- and off-site testing and examination facilities. in shipping containers transponed by 
exclusive-use truck. The shipments have been made in NRBK-4I. -42. -43. and -44 shipping 
containers and the WAPD-39 and -40 shipping containers. For alternatives involving future 
shipments of this type. the shipments would be made in the NRBK-41 and WAPD-40 shipping 
containers. A detailed description of the shipping containers used to ship irradiated test specimens 
between off-site facilities and the examination facility is provided in Section A.4.4. 
A.3 ALTERNATIVES TO BE EVALUATED 
A detailed description of the alternatives is provided in Section 3. The specific impacts on 
each of the four types of naval shipments (described in Section A.2) are described below for each 
alternative. 
A.3.1 Alternative 1 - No Action 
Under this alternative. after implementation. there would be no funher shipments of naval 
spent nuclear fuel from the shipyards and prototypes. The Expended Core Facility would be shut 
down. Naval spent nuclear fuel would be stored at a facility at the site where it was removed during 
reactor servicing. with the exception of naval spent nuclear fuel removed at Newpon News 
Shipbuilding. a commercial shipyard. which would be transponed to Norfolk Naval Shipyard for 
storage. All naval spent nucle3l" fuel currently at ECF would be transferred to ICPP prior to the start 
of the 4O-year period with the exception of the fuel saved for future examinations. referred to as 
reference specimens. The reference specimens and the naval spent nuclear fuel which originated at 
the prototype sites at NRF would be shipped from ECF to ICPP sometime during the 4O-year period. 
The TRA facility would perform any work associated with the assembly. disassembly. and routine 
examination of the test train assemblies; therefore. no transfers would be required. Specimens 
shipped off-site would remain at the destination following examination. Table A-2 summarizes the 
shipments for the No Action alternative. 
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Figure A-2. Transportation origins and destinations for test specimen shipments. 
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Table A-2. Summary of shipments for the No Action alternative. 
Type of Shipment 
Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and 
Prototypes 
- Shipyards and Prototypes to ECF 
- Newport News to Norfolk 
Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP 
Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between ECF and 
TRA 
Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens Between Off-Site 
Facilities and ECF 
- Shipments from ECF 
- Shipments back to ECF 
A.3.2 Alternative 2 • Decentralization 
None 
Yes 
Reference Specimens and 
Prototype Only 
None 
Yes 
None 
As described in Section 3.4, this alternative also involves storage of the naval spent nuclear 
fuel near the point of origin. An evaluation of each of the three subalternatives defined in Section 3 
was performed . The impact of the transportation related to each subalternative is briefly described 
below. 
A.3.2.1 Alternative 2a . Store Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel at or Close to Locations Where 
Removed Without Examination. From the standpoint of transportation, this subalternative is 
equivalent to the No Action alternative. 
A.3.2.2 Alternative 2b - Examine a Limited Amount of Naval Fuel in the Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard Water Pit Facility and Store All Naval Fuel at Navy Facilities. For this 
alternative. the Expended Core Facility at NRF would be shut down and only high priority spent 
nuclear fuel would be transported to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for examination. For the naval 
spent nuclear fuel, approximately 10 percent of the total spent nuclear fuel for the 40-year period 
would be shipped . Following examination. the fuel would remain at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard . 
As in the No Action alternative, only the reference specimens would remain at ECF after June 1995. 
Ten percent of the reference specimens would be transferred from ECF to Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard . The remainder of the reference specimens and the naval spent nuclear fuel which 
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originated at the prototype sites at NRF would be transferred to ICPP. The TRA facility would 
perform any work associated with the assembly, disassembly, and routine examination of the test 
specimen assemblies; therefore, no transfers would be required. Shipments of test specimens to 
off-site facilities for specialized examinations would continue. Test specimens shipped off-site would 
remain at the destination following examination. Table A-3 summarizes the shipments. 
Table A-3. Summary of shipments for the Decentralization - Limited Inspection alternative. 
Type of Shipment 
Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and 
Prototypes 
- Shipyards and Prototypes to Puget Sound 
- Newport News to Norfolk 
Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP 
Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between 
Puget Sound and TRA 
Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens to Off-Site Facilities 
- Shipments from TRA 
- Shipments back to TRA 
Approximately 10% 
of spent fuel 
Yes 
Reference Specimens and 
Prototype Only 
None 
Yes 
None 
A.3.2.3 Alternative 2c - Examine All Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel at the INEL and Return to 
Navy Facilities for Storage. For this alternative, all naval spent nuclear fuel would be shipped to 
ECF and examined as it has been in the past. Only non-<iestructive examinations would be 
performed . The spent nuclear fuel would be returned in the same condition as originally shipped . 
Following examination, the fuel would be returned to the originating shipyard or prototype site for 
storage in the same type of container with the exception that naval spent nuclear fuel which originated 
at Newport News Shipbuilding would be shipped to Norfolk Naval Shipyard for storage. New 
equipment would have to be designed and procured to handle the spent nuclear fuel which returns to 
the shipyard . As in the No Action alternative, only reference specimens would remain at ECF after 
June 1995. The naval spent nuclear fuel which originated in the prototype sites at NRF (AIW and 
S5G) would be transferred to ICPP. Transfers of the irradiated test specimen assemblies would 
continue, along with the shipments of test specimens from ECF to off-site testing or examination 
facilities . Specimens shipped off-site would remain at the destination following examination. Table 
A-4 summarizes the planned shipments for this alternative. 
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Table A-4. Summary of shipments for the Decentralization - Full Examination alternative. 
Type of Shipment 
Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and 
Prototypes 
- Shipyards and Prototypes to ECF 
- Newport News to Norfolk 
Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP 
Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between ECF and 
TRA 
Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens to Off-Site Facilities 
- Shipments from ECF 
- Shipments back to ECF 
A_3.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis 
Yes 
To Norfolk from ECF 
NRF Prototypes 
Yes 
Yes 
None 
This alternative plans on making the same types of shipments described in Section A.2 of this 
attachment. The only difference is that some of the historical origins of naval spent nuclear fuel and 
some destinations for the test specimen shipments will not be used. Table A-5 summarizes the 
planned shipments for this alternative. 
Table A-S. Summary of shipments for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. 
Type of Shipment 
Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and 
Prototypes 
- Shipyards and Prototypes to ECF 
- Newport News to Norfolk 
Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP 
Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between ECF and 
ATR 
Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens to Off-Site Facilities 
- Shipments from ECF 
- Shipments back to ECF 
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Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
A.3.4 Alternative 4 • Regionalization 
As described in Section 3.4, this alternative would distribute existing and new spent nuclear 
fuel between various sites either on the basis of the fuel type or on the basis of dividing storage 
between the eastern and western par;,; of the United States. An evaluation of each of the options for 
this alternative described in Section 3.4 was performed . The impact of the transportation related to 
each option under this alternative is briefly described below. 
A.3.4.1 Altemative 4a • Regionalization Using Storage at Three Sites. From the standpoint 
of transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens, this alternative is equivalent to the 
1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. 
A.3.4.2 Altemative 4b . Regionalization Using Storage at Two Sites. This alternative would 
utilize an existing DOE site in the eastern part of the United States and another existing DOE site in 
the western part of the country for storage of spent nuclear fuel. From the standpoint of 
transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens, this alternative is equivalent to the 
Centralization alternative at each of the DOE sites because the Navy would operate a facility for 
examining naval spent nuclear fuel at only one of the DOE sites and the naval spent nuclear fuel 
would be stored at the same site where it was examined. 
A.3.S Alternative S • Centralization 
This alternative considers consolidating all naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens at the 
INEL, Hanford Site, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, or Nevada Test Site. 
Centralization at INEL is identical to the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. For the other 
centralization sites, the type and number of shipments would be identical to the 199211993 Planning 
Basis alternative with the only difference being the destination. The naval spent nuclear fuel will be 
shipped to the centralization site for examination and subsequently transferred to a storage facility at 
the centralization site which would be equivalent to ICPP. Naval spent nuclear fuel shipments from 
Newport News Shipbuilding to Norfolk Naval Shipyard would not be necessary. As in the No Action 
alternative, only reference specimens would remain at ECF after June 1995. All reference specimens 
would be shipped to the centralization site. The naval spent nuclear fuel which originated in the 
prototype sites at NRF would also be transferred to the centralization site. The test specimen 
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assembly shipments would be shipped between TRA and the alternate site. The test specimen 
shipments would originate at the centralization site and all specimens would ultimately return to that 
site for storage. 
A.4 GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS 
The following general information is common to all of the alternatives evaluated. 
A.4.1 Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipping Containers 
For naval spent nuclear fuel , the M·130, M-I40, and M-I60 shipping containers would be 
used for all alternatives. The shipping containers are primarily transported by railcars used only for 
this purpose as part of general-use freight trains. Section A.2. 1 describes the special circumstances 
where the shipping containers are transported by ship or heavy-lift transporter. A brief description of 
each shipping container follows . 
A.4.1. 1 M-130 Shipping Container. The M-130 shipping container is a large, lead-lined, steel-
shelled shipping container that is transported in the vertical position on a depressed center railcar 
(Figure A-3). The major components of the M-130 shipping container include the shielded container, 
closure head, and dust cover. Module holders are installed inside the container to hold the irradiated 
fuel modules in place and can be modified to accept different sized fuel modules. The container is 
shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the outside of 
the container are designed to dissipate the heat generated by the spent nuclear fuel. 
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The M-130 shipping container weighs approximately 214,500 pounds in the standard loaded 
configuration. The container is approximately 13 feet tall and 7 feet in diameter. The container is a 
closed bottom cylindrical lead shell that is covered both on the inside and the outside with a I-inch 
thick layer of steel. The lead on the cylindrical sides is about 10 inches thick and is a minimum of 
9.5 inches thick on the bottom. In the standard configuration, the closure head at the top of the 
container is primarily constructed of 5.25 inches of lead and 7 inches of steel. 
A.4.1.2 M-140 Shipping Container. The M-I40 shipping container is a large, stainless steel 
shipping container that is transported in the vertical position on a specially designed well-type railcar 
(Figure A-4). The major components of the M-I40 shipping container include the shielded container, 
closure head, and protective dome. Module holders are installed inside the container to hold the 
irradiated fuel modules in place and can be modified to accept different sized fuel modules. The 
container is shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the 
outside of the container are designed to dissipate the heat generated by the fuel. 
The M-I40 shipping container weighs approximately 375,000 pounds in the loaded condition. 
The container is approximately 16 feet tall with a maximum diameter of 10.5 feet. The container 
body is made from stainless steel forgings with 14-inch thick walls and a 12-inch thick bottom. The 
closure head and protective dome have a total thickness of 17.5 inches of stainle:;s steel. 
A.4.1.3 M-160 Shipping Container. The M-l60 shipping container is a large, lead-lined, steel-
shelled shipping container that is transported in a horizontal position on a support structure mounted 
on a modified flat bed railcar (Figure A-5). The major components of the M-l60 shipping container 
include the shielded container, closure head, and dust cover. Module holders are installed inside the 
container to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place. The container is shipped dry with the 
exception of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the outside of the container are 
designed to dissipate the heat generated by the fuel. 
Volume 1, Appendix D A-16 
> , 
< 2-
c 
3 
~ 
Figure A-4. M-l40 shipping container mounted on railcar. 
11 
BEST COpy AVAILABLE 
<: 
£ 
c 
3 
('\l 
:> 
I 
00 
Figure A-S. M-I60 shipping container mounted on railcar. I~ 
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The M-I60 shipping container weighs approximately 235,500 pounds in the loaded condition. 
The container is approximately 16.5 feet long and 6.5 feet ill diameter. The container consists of two 
concentric bottom closed steel cylinders with a 9.4-inch annulus between the cylinders that is filled 
with lead. The outer shell is made from 1.5-inch thick steel, and the inner shell is made from I-inch 
thick steel. The bottom plate is approximately 7 inches thick, and the closure head is approximately 
15 inches thick. 
A.4. 1.4 GOllemment Escorts for Spent Nucleer Fuel. Commercial railroads, exclusive-use 
heavy-lift transporters, or exclusive-use ships are used to transport the naval spent nuclear fuel from 
the prototypes and shipyards. The specific routes used to transport the spent nuclear fuel are selected 
by the rail or shipping companies . All naval spent nuclear fuel shipments are accompanied by 
government escorts. The escorts perform the duties necessary to ensure the safe, expeditious 
transportation of the naval spent nuclear fuel. 
The government escorts receive specialized training in shipment safety procedures, 
radiological controls, security, and emergency response. Routine shipment escort procedures involve 
processing of authorization and shipping documentation, pre-shipment inspections, tracking shipment 
progress and schedules, enroute inspections, shipment observation and surveillance, and periodic 
communication checks. The government escorts have been trained to use and are equipped with the 
necessary radiological monitoring equipment to verify the shipping container integrity. 
A large amount of the government escorts' training involves emergency response. This 
training involves emergency procedures for notification of technical and safeguards support personnel. 
The government escorts are equipped to immediately notify emergency assistance personnel , 
immediately assess the containment status of the shipping container, and communicate this information 
to emergency support personnel. Depending on the situation, the technical and support personnel 
may activate various emergency control centers that are prepared to provide the government escorts 
wi th the necessary support to quickly and safely bring an emergency situation under control. All 
rai lroads, which handle escorted shipments, also have specific emergency response procedures to 
safely expedite recovery for shipments that are involved in a rail line accident. Continually manned 
railroad operat ion centers maintain the capability to contact personnel from a combination of 
resources which provide appropriate equipment and manpower at the accident scene. 
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A.4,2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipping Casks for Transfers to Storage 
Following Examination 
For naval spent nuclear fuel being transferred from the examination facility to storage (e.g., 
ECF to ICPP), the Nuclear Fuel Services Model 100 cask (NFS-IOO), Peach Bottom cask, and the 
Large Cell cask will be used for all alternatives. These shipping containers are transported by 
exclusive-use truck. A brief description of each cask follows . 
A .4 .2. 1 NFS-100 Cesk. The NFS-IOO cask is a large, lead-lined, steel-shelled shipping cask that 
is transported in the horizontal position on a skid assembly attached to a tandem axle trailer (Figure 
A-6). The major components of the NFS- IOO cask include the shielded cask and ~Iosure head. A 
fuel holding insert is installed inside the cask to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place. The 
container is shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water. The cask is enclosed 
on the truck by a metal cover during shipment. 
The NFS-IOO cask weighs approximately 110,000 pounds in the loaded configuration . The 
cask is approximately 10.5 feet tall and 7 feet in diameter. The cask is a closed bottom cylinder of 
lead with a 0.375-inch thick steel inner shell and a 2-inch thick outer shell . The lead on the 
cylindrical sides is about 8.75 inches thick and the leaQ on the bottom is 8.8 inches thick. The 
closure head at the top of the cask is constructed of 9 .75 inches of lead and 2 inches of steel. 
A.4.2.2 Peech Bottom Cask. The Peach Bottom cask is a large, lead-lined, steel-shelled shipping 
cask that is transported in the horizontal position on a skid assembly attached to a tandem axle trailer 
(Figure A-7). The major components of the Peach Bottom cask include the shielded cask and closure 
heads. A fuel holding insen is installed inside the cask to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place. 
The cask is shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water . The cask is enclosed 
on the truck by a metal cover during shipment. 
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Figure A-6. NFS-IOO cask mounted on truck. Figure A-7. Peach Bottom cask mounted on truck . 
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The Peach Bottom cask weighs approximately 68,400 pounds in the loaded configuration. 
The cask is approximately 16 feet tall and 3.5 feet in diameter. The cask is a stepped cylinder of lead 
with a 0.25 .. inch thick steel inner shell and a I. 75-inch thick steel outer shell. The lead on the 
cylindrical sides ranges from 5.25 to 6 .25 inches thick. The closure heads on each end of the cask 
are essentially identical and are constructed of 8.5 inches of steel. 
A.4.2.3 LBrgB Cell CBsk. The Large Cell cask, currently being designed for larger fuel types, will 
be a large, stainless steel shipping cask that is transported in the vertical position on a low-boy tractor 
trailer (Figure A-8). The major components of the Large Cell cask will include a shielded cask, 
closure head, shipping cask, and external impact limiters . Fuel-holding inserts will be installed inside 
the cask to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place. The cask will be shipped dry with the exception 
of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the outside of the shipping cask are designed to 
dissipate the heat generated by the fuel. 
The Large Cell cask will weigh approximately 220,000 pounds in the loaded condition. The 
shielded cask wiil be approximately 14 feet tall and 7 feet in diameter. The shielded cask body will 
be a closed bottom cylinder made from stainless steel forgings with 13.5-inch thick walls and a 
l3-inch thick bottom. The closure head will be a 14-inch thick stainless steel forging. The shielded 
cask will be assembled to the shipping cask during transport. The shipping cask will be a 2-inch 
thick aluminum closed bottom cylinder with fins extending to a total d;ameter of 93.6 inches. The 
external impact limiter assemblies, located on both ends of the cask, will be constructed of encased 
bi.<Jirectional aluminum honeycomb and are approximately 10 feet in diameter. The total Large Cell 
cask height will be approximately 17 feet. 
A.4.2.4 Shipment Controls. All spent nuclear fuel transfers to a storage facility at the same site 
as the examination facility will be accompanied by escorts. The escorts are personnel who are 
specially ~rained to perform the duties necessary to ensure the safe transportation of the spent nuclear 
fuel. The escorts are in vehicles located in front of and behind the truck carrying the shipping cask. 
The escorts receive specialized training in shipment safety procedures, radiological controls, 
security, and emergency response. The escort vehicles are equipped with distinctive warning flashers, 
and the escorts are capable of radio contact with each other, the driver of the transport vehicle, and 
on-site emergency coordinating personnel. 
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INSERTS 
A large amount of the escons' training involves emergency response. This training involves 
emergency procedures for notification of site technical and safeguards support personnel. The escorts 
are equipped to immediately notify emergency assistance personnel, immediately assess the 
containment status of the shipping cask, and communicate this information to emergency support 
personnel. Depending on the situation, the technical and support personnel may activate various 
emergency control centers that are equipped with the equipment and manpower to provide the escorts 
with the necessary support to quickly and safely bring an emergency situation under control. 
Additional administrative controls are imposed on the transfers to further minimize risks. For 
example, the transfers are not allowed to travel during heavy traffic periods such as shift changes, and 
the convoy travels at reduced speeds. The route itself also enhances safety, since the route is 
essentially flat and the highest possible drop distance in the event of an accident is approximately 5 
meters (16.5 feet) at the location where the highway crosses a river bed . 
A.4.3 Naval Test Specimen Assembly Casks for Transfers Between 
TRA and the Examination Facility 
For naval test specimen assemblies being transferred on-site between TRA and the 
examination fac il ity, the NR- I, ATR-2, NR-3, NR-4, and Test Train casks will be used . These casks 
are transported by exclusive-use truck. For off-site shipments to the examination facility at the 
centralization sites , only the Test Train cask will be used . A brief description of each cask follows . 
A .4.3.1 NR and ATR Casks. The NR and ATR casks are large, lead-lined , steel-shelled casks 
that are transported approxi mately 10· off horizontal in a cradle assembly attached to a tandem trailer 
(see Figure A-9). The major components of the casks include the shielded body, mast , and bottom 
closure/shield . 
The shielded bod ies of the casks are all approximately 32 inches in diameter. The outer steel 
shell thickness ranges from 0.5 inch 10 1.0 inch. The thickness of the inner steel shell is 
approximately 0.4 inch for each cask. The lead ranges from approximately 10 inches to II inches for 
the various casks. The height of the shielded body ranges from approximately 6 feet to 12 feet. The 
mast is a tower section formed of reinforced aluminum and serves to support the structural end of the 
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Figure A-9. NR/ATR cask mounted on truck . 
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spedmen assemblies which require very little shielding. A winch and platform are also attached to 
each cask. The bottom .:Iosure/shield is constructed of 1.0 to 1.75 inches of steel and 7.0 to 
8.75 inches of lead. 
The NR and ATR casks range in weight from approximately 19,000 to 48 ,000 pounds. The 
overall cask height ranges from approximately 20 to 30 feet. 
A.4.3.2 Test Train Casks. A new test specimen container would be required to transport 
irradiated test specimen assemblies between TRA and the examination facility located at the sites other 
than INEL for the Centralization alternative. A new cask is currently being designed to replace the 
current casks used to transport the test specimen assemblies between ECF and TRA. which are 
approaching the end of their design lifetime. The basic concept for this new cask is a thick-walled, 
stainless steel body with stainless steel closures on each end . Energy absorbers will be attached to the 
cask to prevent damage to the test specimens . The current estimated size of this cask is 34 feet long 
by 5 feet in diameter, weighing approximately 40 tons. This cask would be shipped by exclusive-use 
truck. 
A.4.3.3 Shipment Controls. All spent nuclear fuel transfers to an examination facility at the same 
site as the irradiation facility will be accompanied by two escorts. The escorts are personnel who are 
specially trained to perform the duties necessary to ensure the safe transportation of the spent nuclear 
fuel. The escorts are in vehicles located in front of and behind the truck carrying the shipping cask. 
The escorts receive specialized training in shipment safety procedures . radiological cont rols. 
security, and emergency response. A large amount of the escorts' training involves emergency 
response. This training involves emergency procedures for notification of site technical and 
safeguards support personnel. The escorts are equipped to immediately notify emergency assistance 
personnel, immediately assess the containment status of the shipping cask, and communicate this 
information to emergency support personnel. Depending on the situation, the technical and support 
personnel may activate various emergency control centers that are equipped with the equipment aJ'ld 
manpower to provide the escorts with the necessary support to quickly and afely bring an emergency 
situation under control. The escort vehicles are equipped with dist inctive warning flashers. and the 
escorts are capable of radio contact with each other, the driver of the transport vehicle. and 
emergency coordinating personnel . 
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Additional administrative controls are imposed on the shipments to further minimize risk. For 
example, the transfers are not allowed to travel during heavy traffic periods such as shift chang , and 
the convoy travels at reduced speeds. The route itself also enhances safety, since the route is 
essentially flat and the maximum possible drop in the event of an accident is from the bed of the truck 
to the road bed. 
For the Centralization alternative, the casks would be shipped off-site. In this instance, only 
casks certified for over-the-road transportation in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission regulations would be used for shipments of the test trains. No escorts or additional 
administrative controls would be used . 
A.4.4 Test Specimen Shipping Containers 
For test specimens, the WAPD-40 and NRBK-41 shipping containers would be used to 
transport the specimens between ECF and the off-site laboratories and test facilities for all 
alternatives. These shipping containers are transported by an enclosed truck using a commercial 
carrier. A brief description of each container follows. 
A.4.4.1 WAPD-40 Shipping Container. The WAPD-40 shipping container (Figure A-IO) is a 
cylindrical , lead-shielded, steel-clad container that is shipped in a horizontal position. The inner steel 
shell is O.25-inch thick, and the outer steel shell is O.5-inch thick with 9.875 inches of lead shielding 
in between. The container is approximately 13 feet long and 2 feet in diameter. Steel clad , lead-
shielded end plugs bolt onto each end , and O.5-inch thick plates are bolted over the end plugs . The 
specimens are placed into special sealed inner containers prior to placement into the W APD-40 
shipping container. The weight of the container and skid assembly is approximately 28,000 pounds. 
The container and skid assembly are mounted into a special holddown cradle on the truck. This 
holddown cradle weighs approximately 5,000 pounds . 
A.4.4.2 NRBK-41 Shipping Container. The NRBK-41 shipping container (Figure A-I I) is a 
cylindrical, lead-shielded , steel-clad container that is shipped in the vertical position. The inner steel 
shell is O.25-inch thick, and the outer steel shell is O.5-inch thick lO inches of lead shielding in 
between. The container has a I-inch thick steel plate welded to the bottom with a second I-inch thick 
steel plate welded to the first plate with a O.125-inch deep recess to provide a thermal break for the 
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bottom of the container. The container also has a 0.25-inch th ick steel outer thermal shield attached 
that provides a 0.125-inch air gap between the outer shell and the thermal shield . The container is 
approximately 4 feet tall and 2.25 feet in diameter. The container is bolted to a welded 48-inch 
square I-beam skid that is used to distribute the container load. The specimens are placed into a 
special sealed inner container prior to placement into the NRBK41 shipping container. The weight of 
the loaded container is approximately 9.000 pounds. 
A.4.5 Shipping Container Design Requirements 
The M-130, M-I40, M- I60, NRBK41 . and WAPD40 shipping containers have been 
designed and built to meet the regulations specified in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Pan 173 
(49CFR I73), entitled " Shippers - General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings" (CFR 1991). 
Shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens are further regulated by Title 10, Code of 
Federal Regulations, Pan 71 (IOCFR71), entitled "Packaging of Radioactive Material for 
Transponation and Transpon ation of Radioactive Material Under Cenain Conditions" (CFR 1993). 
These regulations require the shipping container to meet specific criteria under normal transpon and 
accide~t conditions . The shipping container must be evaluated under free drop, puncture, heat , cold. 
pressure, water spray, and vibrat ion for normal conditions and a series of severe hypothetical accident 
conditions with the results compared against the criteria provided in IOCFR71. 
The M-130, M-I40. M-I60, WAPD40, and NRBK41 shipping containers have undergone 
rigorous engineering evaluations to assure compliance with 49CFRI73 and IOCFR71 requ irements . 
In addition, actual scale model or mock-up tesls have been performed 10 verify selected engineering 
evaluations. This compliance has been cenified by the U. S. Depanment of Energy and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. The new Tesl Train and Large Cell casks will also be designed in 
accordance with the requirements of 49CFRI73 and IOCFR71 and will undergo the same rigorous 
engineering evaluations and tesling . 
The safety analyses for the NFS-IOO, Peach Bonom. NR, and ATR casks demonstrale 
compliance with the requ irements specified by Ihe Department of Energy (DOE) in DOE Order 
5480.3, entitled "Safety Requirements for the Packaging and Transportalion of Hazardous Malerials, 
Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes " (DOE 1985) and supplemented by DOE Idaho 
Operations Office Order ID 5480.3 . enlilled "Hazardous Malerials Packag ing and Transportalion 
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Safety Requirements" (DOE 1991). These requirements are similar to the requirements of IOCFR71 
with the major difference being that a worst credible accident can be defined based on site-specific 
information. 
The NFS-IOO, Peach Bonom, NR, and ATR casks have undergone rigorous engineering 
evaluations to assure compliance with the DOE requirements . In addition, actual scale model or 
mock-up tests have been performed to verify selected engineering evaluations. The shipping casks 
comply with the requirements of DOE 5480.3 and DOE ID 5480.3 and this compliance is 
demonstrated by approval from the Idaho Operations Office of the Department of Energy. 
A_S TECHNICAL APPROACH· GENERAL 
Several computer codes were used to assess the radiological risks associated with the 
transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens. Specifically, the RADTRAN 4 risk 
analysis model , developed by Sandia National Laboratories (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992), was used 
to calculate the general population and transponation crew (occupational) radiological risks associated 
with the transponation of radioactive materials. This computer code was used extensively in the 
incident-free and accident risk assessments. In some cases, other methods were more appropriate 
than the RADTRAN 4 computer code for naval spent nuclear fuel. In these cases, other calculational 
models were used and are specifically identified. 
The RISKIND computer code, developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Yuan et al. 1993), 
also specifically analyzes radiological consequences and health risks to individuals from exposure 
associated with transponation. For incident-free evaluations, RISKIND uses a generic truck cask and 
does not allow adjustments for different sized casks which is not appropriate for naval spent nuclear 
fuel and test specimen casks; therefore, this code was not used. RISKIND (a version which accepts 
fuel-specific isotopes) was fou nd to be the best code for calculat ion of the maximum individual and 
general population consequences for the accident scenario and was used for that purpose. 
Several other computer codes were used to provide input for the RADTRAN 4 and R1SKIND 
computer codes. The codes include INTERLINE, HIGHWAY, SPAN4, and ORIGEN2. A 
description of each computer code and how the code was used is provided below. 
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The INTERLINE computer code, developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Johnson 
et al . 1993a), was used to evaluate the rail routes used for the spent nuclear fuel shipments. 
The HIGHWAY computer code, also developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Johnson 
et al. 1993b), was used to evaluate the truck routes used for the test specimen shipments. 
The SPAN4 computer code (Wallace 1972) was used to perform gamma exposure rate 
calculations for the various shipping containers to assess the effect of increased distance from the 
source on exposure. SPAN4 is a point kernel code where appropriate exponential kernels are 
integrated over a source distribution. SPAN4 was developed by the Benis Atomic Power Laboratory 
specifically for naval spent nuclear fuel. 
The ORlGEN2 is a computer code, developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(Croff 1980), that is used to simulate radiation and decay of materials that are irradiated in a nuclear 
reactor. The ORIGEN2 computer code is widely accepted in the public domain and was used to 
independently confirm the fission product inventory for naval fuel developed using the standard Benis 
Atomic Power Laboratory method. In addition, the standard Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory method 
has been used in Safety Analysis Repons for Packaging, reviewed and accepted by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
The radiological risks associated with the transponation of spent nuclear fuel and irradiated 
test speci mens have been assessed for the general population , transponation workers (occupational), 
and hypothetical maximum exposed individuals under incident-free and accident condit ions for the 
alternatives presented in Section A.3. The maximum consequences for an accident are also provided 
for each alternative. The radiation exposure to the government escons for sh ipments was considered 
occupational in nature and was included with the transponation worker results. 
The radiological impacts are first expressed as the calculated total exposu re for the exposed 
population, occupational workers, and the maximum exposed individuals . The calculated total 
exposures are then used to estimate the hypothetical health effects, expressed in terms of estimated 
cancer fatalities. The health risk conversion factors used in this evaluation are taken from the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (IC RP Publication 60) which specifies 0.0005 
fatal cancer cases per person-rem for members of the public. 0 .0004 fatal cancer cases per 
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person-rem for workers (ICRP 1991). To calculate the estimated health detriment, the calculated 
exposure would be multiplied by the conversion factors of 0 .00073 health detriments per person-rem 
for members of the public, and 0.00056 health detriments per person-rem for workers (ICRP 1991). 
The numerical estimates of cancer deaths and other health detriments presented were obtained 
by the practice of linear extrapolation from the nominal risk estimate for lifetime total cancer 
mortality at 10 rad . Other methods of extrapolation to the low-dose region could yield higher or 
lower numerical estimates of cancer deaths. Studies of human populations exposed at low doses are 
inadequate to demonstrate the actual level of risk. There is scientific uncertainty about cancer risk in 
the low-dose region below the range of epidemiologic observation, and the possibility of no risk 
cannot be excluded (CIRRPC 1992). In this appendix, the doses have been provided in all cases to 
allow independent evaluation using any relation between exposure and health effects . 
Non-radiological risks related to the transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel are also 
est imated . The non-radiological risks are associated with vehicle exhaust emission for incident-free 
transportation and fatalities resulting from transportation accidents. The non-radiological risks 
associated with shipments that return empty containers to the origin are also included. Risk factors 
for vehicle exhaust emissions and state-level accident fatality rates were obtained from 
"Non-Radiological Impacts of Transporting Radioactive Material" (Rao et aI . 1982), "Transportation 
Impacts of the Commercial Radioactive Waste Management Program" (Cashwell et al. 1986), and 
"Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers of Interstate Freight" (Saricks 
and Kvitek 1994), respectively. 
The shipments of radioactive waste at shipyards are not addressed . The exposure related to 
incident-free transportation would be small and would be the same for all alternatives which would 
not affect the decision-making process. The consequences of an accident would also be insignificant 
compared to the accidents analyzed for spent nuclear fuel. 
For the ocean-going portion of the shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from shipyards and 
prototypes , there would be no exposure to the general population . The basis for this conclusion is 
that the ship's hull provides a considerable amount of additional shielding and that there would be no 
members of the general population close enough to the ship to receive appreciable exposure during 
these shipments . The consequences of an accident during the ocean-going portion have also not been 
eval uated because the forces on the container during an accident aboard the ship would not be large 
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enough to cause damage to the container or fuel inside it since the ship itself would sustain the direct 
impact. This is substantiated by the fact that the impact forces to the container would be less than the 
regulatory criteria. Therefore, no release would occur. 
A.S.1 Technical Approach for the Assessment of 
Incident·free Transportation 
For incident-free transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel, the RADTRAN 4 computer code 
was used to calculate the radiological exposure for the general population and a portion of the 
occupational exposure. 
Included in the RADTRAN 4 computer code incident-free risk calculations for transport are 
models describing (I) exposures to persons (e.g., residents) adjacent to the transport route (off-link 
exposures), (2) exposures to persons (e.g., passengers on passing trains or vehicles) sharing the 
transport route (on-link doses), (3) exposures to persons at stops (e.g., residents or rail and truck 
crew not directly involved with the shipment), and (4) exposures to transportation crew members 
(occupational). The exposures calculated for the first three groups were added together to estimate 
the general population exposure estimates for rail and truck transport; the exposure calculated for the 
fourth group represents occupational exposure to the rail crew exposures during inspections and truck 
crew during transit and inspections. Table A-6 summarizes the calculational methods used for each 
group for the shipment of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens. 
As shown in Table A-6, simple calculations were performed to account for situations where 
the RADTRA N 4 computel code was not the best calculational model with respect to the 
transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel. The information used in the simple calculations was based 
on historical information . The results obtained using these simple calculations are expected to be 
equal to or greater than any exposures which might actually occur. 
The maximum possible radiological exposure to an individual for the routine transport of 
naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens off-site was estimated for transportation workers, as well 
as members of the general population . For rail shipments, the three general population scenarios 
were: (I) a railyard worker who might be working at a distance of 10 meters (32.8 feet) from the 
shipping container for 2 hours, (2) a resident who might live 30 meters (98 .4 feet) from the rail line 
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<: Table A-6. Calculational methods used to obtain exposures for population groups of interest. 
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(1) 
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(1) 
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Co 
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a 
General Population Occupational 
Shipment Off-Link and Maximum 
Type Origin Destination(a) Mode On-Link Stops Individual Workers Escorts 
Kesselring Ballston Spa Truck (I) (3) (6) (3) (3) Site 
Spent 
Shipyard/Rail Nuclear Fuel Various Rail (I) (I) (6) (2) (5) 
to ECF or Siding 
Equivalent Windsor Site Griffen Siding Truck (I) (3) (6) (3) (3) 
Pearl Harbor Puget Sound Ship N/A N/A N/A (4) (4) 
Spent 
Nuclear Fuel ECF or Various Truck (I) (I) (6) (I) (I) 
to Equivalent 
Storage 
Test 
Specimen TRA Various Truck (I) (I) (6) (I) (I) 
Assemblies 
Test ECF or Bettis/ Truck (I) (I) (6) (I) N/A Specimens Equivalent KAPL, etc. 
Calculational Methods: 
RADTRAN 4 calculations. (1) 
(2) RADTRAN 4 rail calculations for inspection exposure and simple calculations based on rail transportation data supplied by the government escorts 
for rail transit exposure. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(I ) 
Simple calculation model based on truck transportation data supplied by site personnel. 
Simple calculation model based on ship transportation data supplied by Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. 
Exposures based on historical TLD readings. 
Simple calculation model based on scenarios provided in RISKIND. 
The methods provided in this table apply to the destination for all the alternatives evaluated. 
30 
where the shipping container was being transponed, and (3) a resident who could be living 
200 meters (656.2 feet) from a rail stop where the shipping container was sining for 20 hours. The 
government escons and crew members from the rail , heavy-lift transponer, and ship were evaluated 
for the transponation workers (occupational). Based on records of past esconed rail shipments. the 
government escon might be the same individual for as many as two-thirds of the shipments in a 
5-year period. The crew members were postulated to be the same individuals for all shipments in the 
4O-year period. 
For off-site truck shipments, the three scenarios for the general population were: (I) a person 
who might be caught in traffic and located 1 meter (3 feet) away from the surface of the shipping 
container for one-half hour, (2) a resident who might be living 30 meters (98.4 feet) from the 
highway used to transpon the shipping container, and (3) a service stat ion worker who might be 
working at a distance of 20 meters (65.6 feet) from the shipping container for 2 hours. The 
hypothet ical maximum exposed individual radiological exposures were accumulated over the 4O-year 
period. However, for the situation involving an individual who might be caught in traffic next to a 
truck transponing spent nuclear fuel , the radiological exposures were only calculated for one event 
since it was considered unlikely that the same individual would be caught in traffic next to all 
containers for all shipments. For truck shipments, the occupational maximum exposed individual is 
the driver. For each of the categories of truck shipments described in Sections A.4.2 through A.4.4, 
the calculations used a single individual as the driver for all shipments made in the past. For 
shipments in the 4O-year period being evaluated, a singl e person was also used in the calculations as 
the driver for all shipments of each category. 
The hypothetical maximum exposed individual scenarios fo r the general population described 
above were not applicable for on-site shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens for two 
reasons . The first is that there are no members of the general population in the vicinity during the 
on-site shipments. The second reason is that an obstruction, if encountered, would be safely avoided 
under the direction of the escons. Two alternate scenarios were developed . They were: (I) a site 
employee in a disabled vehicle along the transpon route. located 10 meters (32 .8 feet) from the 
container and (2) a site employee trailing the slow-movi ng transpon vehicle for the entire trip . These 
scenarios were considered to be single-event occurrences . 
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As noted in Table A.{i, simple methods were also used to calculate radiological exposures. 
For radiological exposures to personnel at a fixed distance from the shipping container, the following 
equation was used . 
where: 
Exposures to personnel at a fixed distance from the contajner: 
= N X NBA x T x SF x K x Tl I 0 ' 
N 
NBA 
T 
SF 
K 
TI 
o 
number of people 
factor to account for exposure decrease at increased distance from the source 
(anenuationlbuildup). (Refer to Neuhauser and Kanipe 1993.) 
time 
shielding factor 
transport index to exposure rate conversion factor 
transpon index (see Section A.7.1.1.2) 
distance from the centerline. 
For the radiological exposures associated with the ship transpon of spent nuclear fuel from 
the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard , the following general equations 
were used: 
where: 
Exposures to personnel ahoard ship during transport: 
= N x NBA x T x SF x K x TI x (I/(X, + X,)' + I/X,') 
X, 
X, 
distance between the centerlines of the two shipping containers 
distance between centerline of the nearest shipping container and the exposed 
individual 
Exposures to personnel aboard ship during inspections; 
= (N x T x T I) + (N x NBA x T x K x SF x TI I (X, - R - I),) 
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where: 
R = effective radius to account for the exposure from the second shipping container. 
Table A-7 provides an estimate of the number of people included in the analyses . To 
determine this number, the basic equation used was : 
(Dist:mce Traveled) x (Exposure Path Width) x (Density of People). 
In each alternative, there are many shipments from several different origin/destination 
combinations. Since the route would be the same for each shipment from the same origin/destination 
combination, the people along the route would also not change, therefore, the distance used was from 
one trip for each origin/destination combination. The exposure path width is 1.6 kilometers (1 mile), 
consistent with the RADTRAN 4 computer code methodology for incident-free calculations. The 
population density was calculated by summing the product of the fraction of travel times the density 
in each population area (rural, suburban, and urban) . The fraction of travel and density were 
obtained from HIGHWAY and INTERLINE. The total number of people was then calculated by 
summing the results of all origin/destination combinations for each alternative. 
Table A-7. Estimated number of people included in incident-free transportation analyses . 
Alternative 
No Action 
Decentralization - No Examination 
Decentralization - Limited Examination 
Decentralization - Full Examination 
1992/1993 Planning Basis 
Regionalization or Centralization at INEL 
Regionalization or Centralization at Hanford 
Regionalization or Centralization at Savannah River 
Regionalization or Centralization at Oak Ridge 
Regionalization or Centralization at Nevada Test Site 
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Number of People 
890,000 
890,000 
9,240,000 
6 ,820,000 
7,290,000 
7,290,000 
8,370,000 
6,950,000 
5 ,660,000 
8,320,000 
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A.S.2 Technical Approach for Transportation Accidents 
The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to calculate the radiolog ical risk to the general 
population and transportation (occupational) crew under accident conditions. The RADTRAN 4 
computer code evaluates six pathways for radiation exposures resulting from an accident. The six 
potential pathways are: 
• Direct Radiation Exposure from the Damaged Container 
• Inhalation Exposure from the Plume of Radioactive Material Released from the Damaged 
Container 
• Direct Radiation Exposure from Immersion in the Plume of Radioactive Material 
Released from the Damaged Container 
• Direct Radiation Exposure from Ground Deposition of the Radioactive Material Released 
from the Damaged Container 
• Inhalation Exposure from Resuspension of the Radioactive Material Deposited on the 
Ground 
• Ingestion Exposure trom Food Products Grown on the Soil Contaminated by Ground 
Deposition of Radioactive Material Rele><ed from the Damaged Container. 
For each pathway, a specific formula is used to determine an estimate of the radiological risk, 
expressed in exposure, from that particular pathway with the total radiat ion exposure equal to the sum 
of ihe exposure for each pathway . The total accident radiation exposure accounts for the probability 
of an accident occurring and the probabil ity of an accident of a particular severity . It should be noted 
L~at all consequences are included in the risk assessment, regardless of the probability. The general 
equation for the population exposure from all pathways is: 
D. = E,., (N, x L .. x P, x L,j., (Pj x RFj x D;j.J) 
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where: D. population exposure from the accident 
N, number of naval spent nuclear fuel modules shipped of fuel type c 
L,., shipment distance for fuel type c shipped through state r 
P, frequency of traffic accidents 
Pj probability of occurrence of accident severity category j 
RFj fract ion of curies released from shipping container by severity category j 
radiation exposure resulting from accident severity category j through pathway i in 
population density zone k. 
The accident risk evaluation was perfo rmed using neutral and stable atmospheric conditions 
(pasquill Stability Classes 0 and F, respectively). The neutral atmospheric condition results provide a 
best estimate of the risk. Stable atmospheric conditions resulted in values approximately twice the 
neutral conditions, ignoring the lower probability of occurrence. 
In addition to the estimation of the radiological risk of an accident described above, an 
evaluation of the consequences of an accident of the highest severity was performed . The 
consequences, expressed as radiological exposure, are calculated for the maximum exposed individual 
and the general population. Exposures to the general population were calculated for each of the three 
population density regions (rural , suburban, and urban). The maximum exposed individual was 
placed in the population "rea which resulted in the highest exposure. 
The RISKIND computer code, mod ified by its authors to accept the fission product inventory 
unique to naval spent nuclear fuel, was used to calcul ate the max imum consequences. The pathways 
evaluated by RISKIND are identical to those used in the RADTRAN 4 computer code for the risk 
evaluation. 
The maximum consequence evaluation presents the consequences for design basis accidents , 
defined as those accidents wh ich have a probability of greater than I x 10-' per year, and beyond 
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design basis accidents, defined as those which have a probability of I x 10-' to I x 10-' per year. 
Accidents with a probability of less than I x 10-' were not analyzed in the maximum consequence 
evaluation. 
To determine the overall probabilities, the probability of an accident, the probability of the 
consequences, fraction of travel in each population area, and probabil ity of the meteorological 
conditions had to be determined . 
The probability of the accident was calculated by multiplying the accident rates for each state 
times the distance traveled in each state times the number of shipments . The results were summed for 
each combination of origin and destinat ion for the alternative. 
As described later in Section A.7, a study performed by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory entitled 'Sh ipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident 
Conditions ' (NU REG 1987) grouped accidents inte categories by strain and container mid-wall 
temperatures and calculated the probabilities of accidents of each category. Section A.7 also 
describes the consequences associated with each accident category for the naval spent nuclear fuel and 
test specimen shipments. The probabilities were summed for the categories which have the same 
consequences . 
The fraction of travel in each population area (rural, suburban, and urban) was obtained from 
INTERLINE and HIGHWAY for each origin /destination combination. Each alternative consists of 
many shipments from various origin/destination combinations; therefore, an overall fraction was 
calculated . The overall fraction , by alternative, was calculated by multiplying each o rigin/destinat ion 
fnction (from INTERLINE and HIGHWAY) by the number of shipments from that particular 
orig in/destination combination, summing the results and dividing by the total number of shipments . 
To calculate the probability of the meteorological conditions, Pasquill Class D was considered 
to be equivalent to 50% meteorology; that is, 50% of the time, conditions are expected to be more 
severe, and 50% of the time, conditions are expected to be less severe. Pasquill Class F was 
considered to be equivalent to 95% meteorology ; that is , 5% of the time, it is more severe, and 95% 
of the time, it is less severe. Since the difference in 50% (I chance in 2) and 95% (I chance in 20) 
is a factor of 10, the probability of encountering Pasquill Class F was concluded to be a factor of 10 
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less than Pasquill Class D. Analyses performed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (Doty et aI . 1976) confirm that this assumption is reasonable. 
The overall probability of the consequence of an accident for each population area was then 
calculated by multiplying the accident probability times the consequence probability times the fraction 
of distance traveled . Starting with the highest consequences, the probabililles were then compared to 
the 1 x 10-' per year criterion for the design ba<is accidents and 1 x 10-' per year criterion for the 
beyond design basis accidents . If the probability was greater than 10 times the criterion (1 x 10-' or 
1 x 10-,), the most severe Pasquill Class F results were presented. If not , and the probability was 
greater than the criterion (1 x 10-' or I x 10-,), Pasquill Class D was presented . If the probability 
was less than the cutoff, the probabilities having the next most severe consequences were compared to 
the same criterion and th is step was repeated until all consequences were evaluated . As a minimum, 
the consequences resulting from release of I % of the corrosion products (pasquill Class D) were 
presented. 
Careful attention was paid to ensure that the probabilities were not calculated for such small 
categories that the resulting probabilities were less than the criterion and results would inadvenently 
present less severe consequences. When the highest consequence accident did not meet the critorion, 
the probability of the next highest accident was determined by summing both the accident 
consequence being evaluated and the probability of the higher consequence accidents previously 
shown to have a probability less than the criterion. This same technique was applied to the fraction 
of travel (urban fraction is equivalent to highest consequence, suburban fraction is next highest , etc.) 
as demonstrated in the following example. 
Probability of the accident of Consequenc~ A 
Fraction of distance traveled in rural area 
Fraction of distance traveled in suburban area 
Fraction of distance traveled in urban area 
1.17 x 10-' 
0.85 
0. 11 
0.04 
The urban fraction was multiplied by the probability, and the resultant probability of an 
accident of Consequence A in an urban area was 4 .68 x 10-'. The consequences of this accident 
would not be evaluated. For the suburban area, the suburban and urban fractions were added and 
then multiplied by the probability (1.75 x 10-,). Again, the consequences of this a.;cident would not 
be evaluated since the probability is less than I x 10-' . Likewise, for the rural area, the rural, 
suburban, and urban fractions were added and multiplied by the probability . Using this technique, 
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the probabilities would indicate that the rural probability was 1.17 • 10- ', which is greater than the 
I • 10- ' criterion and the Consequence A results would be presented. If the fractions were used at 
face value, however, the probability of an accident of Consequence A would have been 4.68 • 10- ' in 
an urban area, 1.29. 10- ' in a suburban area, and 9.95 • 10- ' in a rural area . When individually 
compared to the I • 10- ' criterion, this accident would not have been presented for any area . 
Accident results are presented for both the m .. imum .. posed individual and the general 
population . These results include members of the transponation crew. 
A.S ROUTING ANALYSIS 
In order to assess the radiological risks associated with transponation, it was necessary to 
determine route characteristics based on the origin and destination of each shipment. 
For naval spent nuclear fuel shipments, the origin is the prototype or shipyard location where 
the naval spent nuclear fuel is removed from a prototype or shipboard reactor. The destination is 
ECF, Savannah River Site, Hanford Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Nevada Test Site, or Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard, depending on the alternative. For each origin and destination pair, the potential rail 
routes have been generated and analyzed using the INTERLINE computer code (Johnson 1993a). For 
shipments originating from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, the containers travel by ship to Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard , where they are transferred to rail for shipment to the destination following the same 
routes as the naval spent nucl ear fuel shipments originating from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard . The 
shipment travel time by ocean was based on historical data on the time in transit, independent of the 
actual route. For heavy-li ft transponer shipments from the Kesselring and Windsor prototype sites to 
the closest rail siding, the actual street routes and shipment duration times based on previous 
shipments were used. 
INTERLI NE is an interactive computer program designed to simulate routing using the U.S. 
rail system. The INTERLI NE code used is the latest available from Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
and contains the 1990 census data. The INTERLINE data base consists of networks representing 
various competing rail companies in the U. S. The routes used for the transponation evaluation use 
the standard INTERLINE model which simulates the selection procedure that railroad companies 
would use to direct shipments of spent nucl ear fuel. The code is updated periodically to reflect 
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current track conditions and has been benchmarked against reponed mileages and observations . 
INTERLINE also provides the weighted population densities for rural, suburban, and urban 
populations for each state and averaged over all states along the shipment route and the percentage of 
mileage traveled in each population density. The distance traveled, weighted population density, and 
percentage of distance in each population density are input variables in the RADTRAN 4 code. 
For the off-site transponation of the test specimen assemblies and test specimens, all 
shipments are made by .. clusive-use truck which includes no other freight. The destinations are 
ECF, Savannah River Site, Hanford Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Nevada Test Site, Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard, Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory for the 
various alternatives. For each origin and destination pair, the potential truck routes have been 
generated and analyzed using the routing model HIGHWAY. 
HIGHWAY is an interactive computer code designed to simulate routing using the U.S. 
highway system. The HIGHWAY code used for this report is the latest available from Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory. The code is updated periodically as new roads are added . HIGHWAY provides 
the distance between the origin and destination, the weighted population densities along the route, and 
the percentage of distance traveled in each population density, all input variables for the 
RADTRAN 4 computer code. 
For the on-site transportation , HIGHWAY only has two of the sites on the INEL. This 
origin/destination pair was run using HIGHWAY to determine the population densities and percentage 
of travel in each population density . The actual distance between sites on the INEL was measured. 
A.7 INPUT PARAMETERS 
The major input parameters and models used to evaluate the radiological risks associated with 
the five alternatives described in Section A.3 are provided in this section. Standard RADTRAN 4 
computer code values, as well as actual data gathered from historical naval spent nuclear fuel and test 
specimen shipments, were used as the bas is for the input parameters. For those situations where 
historical data were ava ilable, the actual data were used in place of the standard RADTRAN 4 
computer code values to provide the best est imate of the radiological risks associated with each 
alternative. 
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A.7.1 Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and 
Prototypes 
A . 7. 1. 1 Incident·free Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards end 
Prototypes. This section provides the input parameters used to determine the radiological impacts 
associated with the routine, incident-free (i .e. , no accident) transportat ion of spent nuclear fuel for 
each of the five alternatives. 
A.7. 1.1. 1 Planned Shipments. The list of planned shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel 
by origin is provided in Table A-S. 
Table A-8. Planned shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from shipyards and prototypes. 
Alternative 
No Action, Decenlrtolization -
No Enm 
Decentnlization -
Limited Exam 
Decentralization -
Full Exam 
I99V l 993 Plannin, Ba.i., 
Rc,iol'llia.tion I' lNEL .nd 
CenlralilAlion I' INEl 
All other Rc,ion.l lizalion .nd 
Ccnlnlliulion Altc mativc. 
East Coul 
204 
53 
ill 
234 
314 
ill 
628 
314 
314 
Genet'lling Site 
Welt Coast 
261 
ill 
522 
261 
261 
NRF 
Origin 
TOTAL Dcsti l"lliion 
204 To Norfolk 
54 To Puael Sound 
181 To Norfolk 
ill 
575 To ECF 
575 From ECF 
IIS0 
575 To ECF 
578 To Rcgionala.lion or 
Ccnlraliulion .ite 
A . 7. 1. 1. 2 Transport Index. Historical information from prior shipments was used to 
estimate the expected external radiation exposure rates for future shipments. This information 
included actual measured radiation levels and the recorded Transport Indexes (fls) from past 
shipments. The TI used in this anal ysis is the sum of the maximum neutron and gamma radiation 
measured at 1 meter (3.3 feet) from the surface of the cask . The Tis that were used ranged fro m 0.1 
to I .S. 
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A. 7. 1. 1.3 Transportation Distances and Population Densities. Section A.6 provided a 
description of the general methodology used for determining transportation distances and the 
population densities along the transportation routes. Historical data were obtained on the distance 
traveled for shipments fro m the shipyards and prototype sites to ECF. These data were averaged by 
origin and compared to the value calculated by INTERLINE. The actual data were approximately 
11 % higher than the distance predicted by INTERLINE on average. In order to provide the best 
estimate exposure, which is based on the distance traveled , the INTERLINE distances were increased 
by 11 % for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. One of the primary reasons the actual distances 
traveled were judged to be longer than the INTERLINE prediction was the escort responsibility to 
avoid potential delays due to track or security problems . The shipments to the alternative sites will 
also be escorted and therefore the same increased travel distance is expected . The 11 % increase in 
distance traveled was also applied to all other alternatives. This technique allowed for comparison of 
the alternatives on an equal basis. The percentages of distance traveled in each population density 
calculated by INTERLINE were applied to the distances increased by 11 %. 
A . 7.1. 1.4 Train Speed. The RADTRAN 4 computer code provides standard values for 
train speeds that are dependent on the population density. For rural areas. the standard value is 
64.4 kilometers per hour (40 miles per hour (mph» . For suburban areas, the standard value is 
40.2 kilometers per hour (25 mph), and for urban areas. the standard value is 24.1 kilometers per 
hour (15 mph). However, naval spent nuclear fuel shipments are required to be transported at speeds 
not to exceed 56.3 kilometers per hour (35 mph). Government escort logs from historical spent 
nuclear fuel Shipments support use of 24. 1 kilometers per hour (15 mph). This 24. 1 kilometers per 
hour (15 mph) train speed estimate was used to evaluate all five alternatives . 
A.7. 1. 1.5 Train Stop Time. The RADTRAN 4 computer code provides standard values 
for train stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . For naval 
spent nuclear fuel transported by rail. the government escorts are responsible for ensuring that the 
shipments are made in the most efficient and safe manner. The government escort logs for historical 
spent nuclear fuel shipments were reviewed , and actual stop times were determined to be much 
shorter than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values . The recorded stop times were divided 
by the actual distance traveled from historical data over the last 3 years and an average of 0 .02 hour 
per kilometer (0.032 hour per mile) was calculated . This value was used to evaluate all five 
alternatives since the rail transportation of spent nuclear fu el will always be accompanied by 
government escorts and all alternatives origi nate from the same locations. 
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A. 7. 1. 1.6 Number of Train Crew Members. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code 
value for the number of train crew members is five . For all shipments to NRF, all rail companies 
with the exception of Burlington Northern have two crew members during shipments, located in the 
locomotive. Burlington Northern adds a third crew member in a caboose immediately behind the 
government escon caboose. In the RADTRAN 4 computer code, exposure to the crew members is 
not calculated since the distance to the crew members is large. In actuality, the distance to the 
Burlington Northern crew member located in the caboose is less than that used in the RADTRAN 4 
computer code and therefore simple calculations were performed to determine the radiological 
exposure. In addition, naval spent nuclear fuel shipments also are shipped periodically by "special 
train." In the special train configuration, the two crew members in the locomotive are one car from 
the railcar with the shipping container. Historically, these shipments occur approximately 42 percent 
of the time. The majority of shipments by "special " train are arranged by the railroad companies to 
meet railroad schedules . On occasion, the Navy requests "special" train service for shipments with 
high-priority examination material. Simple calculations were also performed to determine the 
radiological exposure during these special shipments. For shipments to the sites other than NRF, 
there was no experience with all railroad companies which would have to be used; however, there is 
no reason to expect the rail companies to change their standard practices. In these cases, there would 
be two train crewmen, both located in the engine area. Fony·two percent of the shipments would be 
shipped by special train to the alternate sites. When applicable, the third Burlington Northern crew 
member was also accounted for. 
A. 7. 1. 1. 7 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Container transpon 
index to exposure rate conversion factors for the M- 130 and M-I40 shipping containers were 
calculated using the standard equation in the RADTRAN 4 computer code. The results were 
compared to detailed computer anal yses performed using SPAN4, and the RADTRAN 4 results were 
fou nd to overestimate the exposure by a factor of two to three. Using the SPAN4 computer code 
results. the effective package dimensions of the containers used in the RADTRAN 4 calculations were 
adjusted to provide a conservative yet more realistic value of the transpon index to exposure rate 
conversion factor. Due to similarities in the construction and fuel shipped, the M-130 conversion 
factor was applicable to the M-I60. The values used are provided in Table A-9 . 
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Table A-9. Transpon index to exposure rate conversion factors for the M-130, M-I40, and M-I60 
shipping containers. 
Container 
M-130/M-I60 
M-I40 
Effective Package Dimension 
(meters) 
2.50 (8.2 feet) 
3.20 (10.5 feet) 
Transpon Index to Exposure 
Rate Conversion Factor 
5.06 
6.76 
A.7. 1. 1.8 Train Stop Shield Factors. For train stops, the standard RADTRAN 4 
computer code gamma and neutron radiation shield factors are both assigned as 0. 1. This value 
includes the presence of substantial rail yard steel structures equivalent to approximately 4 inches of 
steel. Four inches of steel reduces gamma radiation by more than a factor of 10; however, the steel 
only reduces neutron radiation by a factor of approximately 2. Therefore, a shield factor of 0.5 was 
conservatively used for neutron radiation . In order to incorporate this shielding into the 
RADTRAN 4 computer code, separate gamma and neutron radiation exposure calculations were 
performed . However, since RADTRAN 4 does not permit separate shielding factors to be used for 
different types of radiation, the stop times for the neutron radiation evaluations were increased by a 
factor of 5 to provide an equivalent increase in neutron exposure. These more realistic changes to the 
standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values were incorporated for all five alternatives. 
A.7. 1. 1.9 Radiation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The RADTRAN 4 computer 
code provides standard values for determining the gamma and neutron radiation exposure decrease at 
increasing distance from the source. For gamma radiation, the RADTRAN 4 computer code uses the 
IIx' decrease due to distance. The RADTRAN 4 computer code also specifically calcul ates the 
decrease in neutron exposure at increased distances. The adequacy of the RADTRAN 4 radiation 
exposure decrease was evaluated. The gamma radiation decrease factor used by RADTRAN 4 was 
consistent with the results predicted for naval fuel. The RADTRAN 4 prediction for neutron 
radiation slightly overpredicts the decrease in exposure at far distances for the shipping containers 
used for naval shipments. Using the same basic equat ion used by RADTRAN , a value of 2.0 x 10- 10 
was used for the RADTRAN 4 constant a, in lieu of O. The value of 2 x 10- 10 produces results 
which are slightly higher than the standard method and agree with measurements of neutron exposure 
rates from naval spent nuclear fuel shipments . 
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A . 7.1.1.10 Shipment Storage Time. As noted previously, the government escorts 
accompanying Ihe rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel are responsible for ensuring that the naval spent 
nuclear fuel shipments are made in the most efficient and safe manner. Naval spent nuclear fuel is 
not stored while being shipped; therefore, there was no intermediate shipment storage time associated 
with any of the alternatives . There is also no intermediate storage time during the heavy-lift transport 
shipments from the prototype sites and the ocean shipments from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard . 
A.7. 1. 1. 11 Heavy·lift Transporter Transportation Crew. Information from records of 
naval spent nuclear fuel shipments was reviewed to determine a realistic estimate of the number of 
people involved, the amount of time required , and the distances between individuals and the shipping 
container. The number of hours worked ranged from I to 10 and the distance from the container 
ranged from 1.5 to 91 meters (5 to 300 feet) . For simplicity , weighted averages of the number of 
hours and distances from the shipping container were calculated and are provided in Table A- IO. 
Table A-IO. Summary of the number of people involved and distance from the container during 
heavy-lift transporter shipments to the rail siding at the prototype sites. 
Prototype 
Windsor Site 
Kesselr ing Site 
Number of Hours 
Number of People per Worker 
37 
36 
5.08 
5 .11 
This information was used to evaluate all five alternatives. 
Distance from 
the Shipping Container 
(meters) 
25 .0 (82 feet) 
32 .3 (106 feet) 
A. 7. 1. 1. 12 Time to Ship by Heavy-lift Transporter. Based on discussions with 
personnel at the prototype facilities who have made shipments and a review of records, the average 
duration of the heavy-lift transporter shipment from the prototype sites to the local rai l siding is 2 
hours . 
A. 7. 1. 1. 13 Number of Heavy-lift Transporter Inspections. The shipments are 
inspected prior to eaving the prototype's site boundaries, and no additional inspections are performed 
dur ing the short heavy-lift transporter shipment. As a result , there are no inspections during the 
heavy-lift transporter shipment in the evaluation of the five alternatives . 
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A. 7. 1. 1. 14 Heavy-lift Transporter Stop Time. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel from the 
two prototype locations are first transported by heavy-lift transporter to the nearest rail siding. 
Information from records of naval spent nuclear fuel shipments was reviewed to determine a realistic 
estimate of the heavy-lift transporter stop times . For naval spent nuclear fuel heavy-lift transporter 
shipment from the Windsor Site, a heavy-lift transporter stop time of 24 hours was used . For heavy-
lift transporter shipments from the Kenneth A. Kesselring Site, a stop time of 10 hours was used . 
The heavy-lift transporter shipments from the prototypes to the rail sidings occur through suburban 
populations only. These heavy-lift transporter stop times were used to evaluate all five alternatives. 
A . 7.1.1. 1S Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The following 
standard RADTRAN 4 computer code value was reviewed and determined to reflect the best estimate 
of current railroad industry practice: 
• Number of Inspections of the Shipping Container and Railcar. 
The following standard RADTRAN 4 computer code estimates of the populations that could 
be affected by the shipment of spent nuclear fuel were also used for the five alternatives : 
• Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transport Route (On Link) 
• Traffic Count Passing a Specific Poi nt - Rural , Suburban, and Urban Zones 
• Average Exposure Distance When Stopped 
• Persons Exposed While Stopped 
• Fraction of Travel During Rush Hour, on City Streets, and on Freeways. 
A. 7. 1. 1. 16 Number of Ship Inspections. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel from Pearl 
Harbor Naval Shipyard must first be transported by sh ip to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Using 
the standard values in the RADTRA N 4 computer code, the radiological exposures to the crew and 
government escorts are negligible since the distances fro m these individuals to the shipping containers 
are large. As a result , the rad iological exposure estimates are only expected to occur during 
inspections. Based on radiation monitoring results fo r past naval spent nuclear fuel shipments, this is 
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not real istic for naval spent nuclear fuel, and a separate calculational model was developed to account 
for this potential radiation exposure . The model uses the standard point source formula (see Section 
A.5. 1) to calculate the crew and government escort exposures during transport by ship . The model 
took into account the ship used, transport index, transport time, distance between shipping containers , 
distance from the shipping containers and living quarters, distance from the shipping containers and 
the engine room, the number of crew members and government escorts, and the time required fo r 
inspections based on records from historical shipments of spent nuclear fuel. After reviewing 
historical shipment records, it was determined that three different sized ships have recently been used. 
The smallest one, Ship I , was used once and is not expected to be used in the future. Only the other 
two, Ships 2 and 3, would be used in the future , in equal proportion . Table A-II below provides the 
information used to calculate the radiological exposures resulting from transporting naval spent 
nuclear fuel by ship . This model was used to evaluate all fi ve alternatives. 
Table A-II. Parameters used to calculate crew and escort exposure during ocean travel from 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. 
Parameter 
Transport Time, T , in days 
Separation Between M-130s, XI' in feet 
Nearest Distance to Living Quarters, X" in feet 
Nearest Distance to Engine Room, X" in feet 
Number of Crew Members, N, 
Number of Government Escorts (not part of crew 
size), N, 
Escort Inspect ion Time (per Escort), in hr/day 
Shielding Factor 
Ship I 
II 
92 
40 
20 
II 
2 
Ship 2 
8 
43 
80 
80 
22 
2 
0 .50 for historic 
0 .25 fo r future 
Ship 3 
9 
20 
300 
300 
26 
2 
( 1/3) for gamma, (2 /3) for neutron, for 
every 4O-foot increment from the 
container centerline 
A.7. 1.2 Accident During Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel. This section provides the 
input parameters used to calculate the radiological impacts for accidents during transportation of spent 
nuclear fuel for evaluation of the five alternatives. The planned shipments, transportation distances, 
population densities, and the percentages of travel in each population density described in Section 
A.7 .1.1 were also used for the accident analyses . Unless otherwise described in this section, the 
standard values provided by the RADTRAN 4 and RISKIND computer codes were used. 
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A. 7. 1. 2. 1 Accident Probability. The probability of a rail accident used for evaluation of 
all alternatives was obtained from "Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers 
of Interstate Freight" (Saricks and Kvitek 1994). The probabilities are provided both by state and a 
national average. The state dependent probabilities were used for the accident risk assessment. Past 
naval spent nuclear fuel shipments have traveled approximately 2 million kilometers (1.24 million 
miles) by rail without an accident, which is consistent with the national average of 5.57 x 10- ' 
accident per kilometer. 
A.7.1.2.2 Accident Severity Categories and Probabilities. In the "Shipping Container 
Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident Conditions" (NUREG 1987), referred to as the 
"Modal Study," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory categorized the potential damage to 
shipping containers according to the magnitude of the thermal and mechanical forces that could result 
from an accident. The structural and thermal forces were categorized into 20 regions. Given that an 
accident occurs, the probability that the accident would be in each region was calculated for both rail 
and truck shipments . Table A-12 provides the probabilit ies for rail accidents by region. 
Table A-12. Accident severity probabilities for rail shipments. 
~ 
R(4,1) 
1.786 x 10-' 
" 
S, 
"ii (30) ~ ~ 
&.§ 
~ .-
S, '" c 0 
R(3 , 1) 
5 .545 x 10-' 
"2 .5 (2) e; 2 ~ 
- S SI 
til " 
R(2,1) 
2.7204 x 10-' 
S (0. 2) 
.~ 
g 
R(I,I) 
0.993962 
R(4,2) 
3 .290 X 10-" 
R(3 ,2) 
1.0217 X 10- 1 
R(7. ,2) 
5 .0 11 X 10-1 
R( I,2) 
1.2275 x 10-' 
TI 
(500) 
R(4,3) 
2.137 X 10-" 
R(3.3) 
0.634 x 10-' 
R(2,3) 
3.255 X 10- 1 
R( I,3) 
7.95 11 x 10-' 
T, 
(600) 
R(4,4) 
1.644 X 10- " 
R(3,4) 
5 . 162 x 10- ' 
R(2,4) 
2.53 1 X 10-1 
R(I,4) 
6 . 140 x 10-' 
T, 
(650) 
R(4,5) 
3.459 x 10- " 
R(3,5) 
5 .296 x 10-' 
R(2 .5) 
1.075 x 10-' 
R(I.5) 
1.249 x 10-' 
T. 
(1050) 
Thermal Response (lead mid·thickness temperature, OF) 
A.7. 1.2.3 Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Integrity Following an Accident. Detailed 
structural and thermal analyses were performed for the shipping containers used for naval spent 
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nuclear fuel shipmenlS up to an equivalent strain of 30% and mid-wall temperature of 1050 ' F. For 
these cases, the naval spent nuclear fu el was not damaged . For the thermal and structural regions 
above 1050'F and 30% strain, the modal study defines the upper limits as unbounded . The naval 
spent nuclear fuel was postulated to be damaged and the fission products and corrosion products 
would be released in the quantities described in Table A-13 for the risk analyses. 
A. 7. 1.2.4 Release Fractions. The release fractions were derived based on the results 
presented in the NRC modal study (NUREG 1987) and the results of the structural and thermal 
analyses described above. Although the naval spent nuclear fuel is stronger, the release fractions for 
the boiling water reactor (BWR), pressurized water reactor (PWR), and aluminum-clad fuel from the 
modal study were used . From the modal study, the release fraction in lower left region R(I , I) is 
zero for the risk evaluation . For the maximum consequence evaluation, I % of the corrosion products 
might be released for the lower left reg ion, R(I , I). Based on the results of the structural and thermal 
analyses up to 30% strain and 1050'F mid-wall temperature, the naval spent nuclear fuel is not 
damaged ; therefore, regions R(I ,2), R( I,3), R(2, 1), R(2 ,2), R(2 ,3), R( I ,4), R(2 ,4), R(3,4), R(3,1) , 
R(3,2) and R(3,3) do not release fi ssion products. Ten percent of the corrosion products might be 
released . In the remaining regions, 10% of the fission products might be available fur release and 
released at the fractions specified below, also using a release of 10% of the corrosion products . 
Table A-13 provides the release fractions used. 
Table A-\3. Cask re lease fractions used fo r the RADTRAN 4 risk analyses. 
Release Fraction' 
Corrosion 
Cask Response Region Inert Gas Iodine Cesium Ruthenium Particulates Products 
R( I,I ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
R( I.2), R(I,3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
R(2, 1). R(2,2). R(2 ,3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
R(I ,4), R(2.4) , R(3,4) 0 .0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
R(3. 1). R(3,2), R(3.3) 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
R( I.5), R(2 ,5), R(3.5) 6.3 x 10- ' 4.3 x 10-: 2.0 x 10-> 4 .8 x 10-· 2.0 x 10" 1.0 
R(4,5), R(4.1 ), R(4.2) 
R(4,3). R(4.4) 
. The release fracti on represents the frac tion of the fuel inventory available for release in the shipping container 
that would be released into the atmosphere following an accident of the given severity. 
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A. 7. 1.2.5 Plume Release Height. For the accident risk assessment. a ground level 
release was used. For the maximum consequence assessment, a plume release height of 10 meters 
(32. 8 feet) was used . 
A. 7. 1.2.6 Direct Exposure from a Damaged Shipping Container. A radiation level 
following the accident at the IOCFR71 regulatory limit of I rem at I meter (3 .3 feet) from the 
container surface was used . 
A. 7. 1.2.7 Food Transfer Factors. Food transfer factors were derived for the isotopes 
related to naval spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the methods described in Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Guide 1.109 (NUREG 1977). 
A. 7.1.2.8 Distance from the Accident Scene to the Maximum Exposed Individual. 
No shielding was accounted for as the plume passes for the calculation of the exposure to the 
maximum individual. This location was determined using R1SKIND based on the atmospheric 
stability and plume release height used . The maximum exposed individual could be a member of the 
rail crew or the general population. 
A.7. 1.2.9 RISKIND Population Density. The standard national average for each 
population density from the RADTRAN 4 computer code was used for the RISKIND maximum 
consequences assessment (6 people per square kilometer for rural, 719 for suburban, . od 3861 for 
urban) . 
A.7. 1.2. 10 Radionuclide Inventory. The amount of radionuclides which would be 
rel eased from an average shipment are provided in Table A-14 . The values factor in the damage 
fraction described in Section A. 7 . 1.2.3 and release fractions descrihed in Section A.7. 1.2.4. The 
radionuclides listed result in 99 percent of the exposure in all pathways. 
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Table A-14. Radionuclides which would be released from an average shipment of naval spent 
nuclear fuel from a shipyard or prototype. 
For Accidents which Release Both 
Fission and Corrosion Products 
Nuclide Activity (Ci) 
Kr-85 9.85 x 10' 
Cs-134 3.72 x 10' 
Cs-137 3.44 x 10' 
H-3 1.39 x 10' 
Ru-l06 9.02 x 10- ' 
Ce- l44 4.89 x 10- ' 
Co.{j() 3.63 X 10-' 
Sr-90 3.41 x 10- ' 
Pu-238 1.02 x 10-2 
Pu-24 I 3.43 x 10-' 
Cm-244 1.36 x 10-' 
For Accidents which Release Only 
Corrosion Products 
Nucl ide Activity (Ci) 
Co-58 1.61 x 10- ' 
Mn-54 2.22 x 10-2 
Fe-55 6.62 x 10- ' 
Co.{j() 3.63 X 10- ' 
Sr-90 3.14 x 10-' 
Ni-63 1.19 x 10- ' 
A.7.2 Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage Following 
Examination 
A. 7.2 . 1 Incident-free Transportation of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage. This section 
provides the input parameters used to determine the radiological impacts associated with the routine, 
incident-free (i.e. , no aocident) transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage for each of the 
five alternatives. 
A. 7.2 .1. 1 Planned Shipments. Table A-15 prov ides the number of planned transfers in 
each cask. 
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Table A-IS. Planned transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage. 
NFS-IOO Peach Bottom Large Cell 
No Action, 0 0 15 
Decentralization - No Exam, 
Decentralization - Limited Exam 
Decentralization - Full Exam 0 0 14 
199211993 Planning Basis, 196 64 468 
All Regionalization Alternatives, 
All Centralization Alternatives 
A. 7.2. 1.2 Transport Index IT/). A TI of 0.3 was used for all NFS-IOO cask transfers. 
This value was determined from recorded measurements over the last 3 years for the same fuel types 
planned to be transferred in the future. The Peach Bottom and Large Cell casks have not previously 
been used for the planned transfers and therefore historic data were not available. Based on a 
comparison of predicted TI values from conservative safety analyses to the actual measured Tl's for 
similar casks and fuel types, a TI of 1.0 was calculated for both the Peach Bottom and Large Cell 
casks. 
A. 7.2.1.3 Transportation Distances and Population Densities. Section A.6 provided a 
description of the general methodology used for determining transponation distances and the 
population densities along the transponation routes. The distance between ECF and ICPP is 9.7 
kilometers (6 miles). From the HIGHWAY computer code, the transfer of naval spent nuclear fuel to 
storage occurs in a rural area. As stated in Section A.3.5 , the storage facility at the alternative sites 
was identical to ICPP. Therefore, for the evaluation of the alternatives , the distance traveled and 
population dens ity of the ECF to ICPP transfer were also used for the evaluation of the other 
alternativ 
A. 7.2. 1.4 Truck Speed. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code speed for truck 
shipments in a n.r?J population is 88.5 kilometers per hour (55 miles per hour). One of the reasons 
an on-site worst credible accident is less severe than the IOCFR71 hypothetical accident is that the 
speed is severely limi,ed by the on-s ite transportation procedures. An average speed of 24 .1 
kilometers per hour (15 Jr.iles per hour) was used . 
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A. 7.2. 1.5 Truck Stop Time. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code provides values 
for truck stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . The logs for 
historical transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to SlOrage were reviewed , and it was determined that 
the actual stop times (10 minutes) were much shorter than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code 
values. A stop time of 10 minutes was used to evaluate all five alternatives . 
A. 7.2 . 1.6 Rediation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The radiation exposure 
decrease due to distance described in Section A. 7 .1.1 .9 was also applied to the truck transfers of 
naval spent nuclear fuel to storage. 
A . 7.2. 1.7 Distance from Source to Crew. A dista" ce of 6 . I meters (20 feet) was 
measured between the shipping cask and the driver for the exclusive·use truck transfers of naval spent 
nuclear fuel shipments to storage. Two escorts, one located approximately 46 meters (150 feet) in 
front and one the same distance behind the transport vehicle, are also present. These data were used 
in the RADTRAN analyses for all alternatives . 
A. 7.2.1.8 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Transport index to 
exposu re rate conversion factors for the casks used for transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage 
were calculated using the standard equation in RADTRAN 4 . The results were compared to detailed 
computer analyses performed using SPAN4. and RADTRAN 4 results were found to overestimate the 
exposure. Using the SPAN4 computer code results, the effective package dimensions of the casks 
used in the RADTRAN 4 calculations were adjusted to provide a conservative yet more realistic value 
of the transport index to exposure rate conversion factor . The values used are provided in Table 
A-16. 
Table A-16. Transport index to exposure rate conversion faclOrs for the NFS-IOO, Peach Bonom, 
and Large Cell casks. 
Cask 
NFS· IOO 
Peach Bonom 
Large Cell 
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Effective Package Dimension 
(meters) 
3.8 (12 .5 feet) 
2.8 (9.2 feet) 
3.2 (10.5 feet) 
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Transport Index to Exposure 
Rate Conversion Factor 
8.41 
5.76 
6 .76 
A. 7.2.1.9 Storage. There is no intermediate storage time during transfers of naval spent 
nuclear fuel to its destinat ion. 
A . 7.2.1. 10 Persons Exposed While Stopped. The only stop time for the transfer of 
naval spent nuclear fuel to storage occurs during routine surveys at the destination entrance. This 
area is well removed from highway and general population and therefore no people were considered 
to be exposed during the short 10·minute stop. The escorts are not present during the surveys and the 
driver remains in the cab of the truck, 6.1 meters (20 feet) from the cask during the surveys. The 
people performing the surveys are badged and all exposure received during the surveys is included in 
the normal occupational exposure which is regularly monitored. 
A. 7.2.1.11 Traffic Count Passing a Specific Point. The RADTRAN 4 computer code 
uses 470 vehicles per hour passing the transport vehicle. Travel on the transport path is restricted to 
INEL employees by a security checkpoint, the majority of INEL employees ride the INEL site buses 
to work, and the transfers are not made during high traffic times (i .e., shift changes when buses are 
in service); therefore, using the standard 470 vehicles per hour value would be extremely 
conservative. A more realistic estimate of 25 vehicles per hour was used . 
A . 7.2. 1. 12 Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The following 
standard RADTRAN 4 computer code value was reviewed and determined to refl ect the best estimate 
of current industry practice and was consistent with historical data from transfers of naval spent 
nuclear fuel to storage: 
• Minimum Number of Inspections . 
The following standard RADTRAN 4 estimate of the population that could be affected by the transfer 
of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage was used to evaluate the five alternatives: 
• Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transport Route (On Link) . 
A. 7.2.2 Accident During Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage. This section 
provides the input parameters used to calculate the rad iological impacts for accidents during 
transportation of spent nuclear fuel to storage for evaluation of the five alternatives. The planned 
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transfers, transportation distances, population densities, and the percentages of travel in each 
population density described in Section A.7.2.1 were also used for the accident analyses . Unless 
otherwise described in this section, the standard values provided by the RADTRAN 4 and R1SKlND 
computer codes were used. 
A. 7.2.2.1 Accident Probllbility. The probability of a truck accident used for evaluation of 
all alternatives was obtained from "Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers 
uf Interstate Freight" (Saricks and Kvitek 1994). The truck accident rates are state dependent. The 
states in which naval spent nuclear fuel would be transferred to storage for the alternatives described 
in Section A.3 are Idaho, Washington, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Nevada. The corresponding 
accident rates for travel on rural interstates in accidents per kilometer are 2.30 x 10-7 for Idaho, 
2.50 x 10- 7 for Washington, 1.83 x 10-7 for South Carol ina, 1.48 x 10-7 for Tennessee, and 1.57 x 
10- 7 for Nevada. The values correspond to 3.70 x 10- 7 (Idaho), 4.02 x 10-7 (Wash ington), 
2.94 x 10-7 (South Carolina), 2 .38 x 10- 7 (fennessee), and 2.53 x 10- 7 (Nevada) accidents per mile. 
A. 7.2.2.2 Accident Severity Categories and Probabilities. In the modal study, 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory categorized the potential damage to shipping containers 
according to the magnitude of the thermal and mechanical forces that could result from an accident. 
The structural and thermal forces were categorized into 20 regions. Given that an accident occurs, 
the probability that the accident would be in each region was calculated for both rail and truck 
Shipments . Table A-17 provides the probabilities for truck accidents by region. 
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Table A- I7. Accident severity probabilities for truck shipments. 
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A.7.2 .2.3 Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Integrity Following an Accident. Detailed 
structural and thermal analyses have been performed for the casks used for Shipments of naval spent 
nuclear fuel to storage. As described in Section A.4.5, these analyses are performed using a worst 
credible accident which is defined based on the site specific terrain and administrative controls duri 
the short on-site shipment. The probability of the wolst credible accident is equal to that listed in 
region R(I,I) . For accident conditions in excess of the worst credible accident , the fission product 
and corrosion product release fractions described in the next section were used. 
A.7.2.2 .4 Cask Release Fractions. The cask release fractions were derived based on the 
results presented in the NRC modal study (NUREG 1987). Although the naval spent nuclear fuel is 
stronger, the rel ease fractions for the BWR, PWR, and aluminum-clad fuel from the modal study 
were used. From the modal study, the release fraction for lower left region R( I , I) is zero for the 
risk evaluation. For the max imum consequence evaluation, 1 % of the corrosion products were 
released for the lower left reg ion, R(I . I) . The remaining regions used 10% of the fi ssion products 
available for release, released at the fractions specified below, and release of 10% of the corrosion 
products . Table A-18 provides the release fractions used . The release fractions in Table A-18 for the 
less severe conditions differ fro m those in Table A- 13 because supplementary structural and thermal 
analyses have not been performed for the casks discussed in this section. 
A-61 Volume I. Appendix D 
Table A-IS. Cask release fractions used for the RADTRAN 4 risk analyses. 
Release F r...ction-
Corrosion 
Cask Response Region [oert Gas Iodine Cesium Ruthenium Particulates Products 
R(I,I ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
R(t,2), R(I ,3) 9.9 x 10-) 7.S x tOo, 6.0 x 10-' 8. t x 10- ' 6.0 x 10-' 1.0 
R(2,1), R(2,2), R(2,3) 3.3 x 10-' 2.S x 10-' 2.0 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 2.0 x 10- ' 1.0 
R(I ,4), R(2,4), R(3 ,4) 3.9 x 10- ' 4.3 X 10-) 2.0 x 10-' 4.8 x 10- ' 2.0 x 10- ' 1.0 
R(3,\), R(3,2), R(3,3) 3.3 x 10-' 2.S X 10-) 2.0 x 10- ' 2.7 x 10-' 2.0 x 10- ' 1.0 
R(I,S) , R(2,S) , R(3,S) 6.3 x 10- ' 4.3 x 10- ' 2.0 X 10-) 4.3 :l 10-" 2.0 x 10- ' 1.0 
R(4,S), R(4, I), R(4,2) 
R(4,3), R(4,4) 
• The release fraction represents the fraction of the fuel inventory available for release in the cask that would be 
released into the atmosphere following an accident of the given severi ty. 
A. 7.2.2.5 Plume Release Height. For the accident risk assessment, a ground level 
release was used . For the maximum consequence assessment, a plume release height of 10 meters 
(32.8 feet) was used. 
A.7.2.2 .6 Direct Exposure from a Damaged Shipping Container. A radiation level 
following the accident at the IOCFR71 regulatory limit of I rem at I meter (3.3 feet) from the cask 
surface was used . 
A. 7.2 .2. 7 Food Transfer Factors. Food transfer factors were derived for the isotopes 
related to naval spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the methods described in Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Guide 1.109 (NU REG 1977). 
A.7.2.2 .8 Distance from the Accident Scene to the Maximum Exposed Individual. 
No shielding was accounted for as the plume passes for the calculation of the exposure to the 
maximum individual. This location was delermined using RISKIND based on the selected 
atmospheric stability and plume release height. The maximum exposed individual could be a member 
of the track crew or the general population. 
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A. 7.2.2.9 RISKIND Population Density. From the HIGHWAY computer code, the 
population density for the on-site shipment was determined to be one person per square kilometer (2.6 
persons per square mile) in a rural area. For on-sile transportation at INEL, the population density in 
the most populated sector, from 1990 census data, is 55 people per square kilometer, with the 
majority of these people in the area 64.4 to 80 kilometers (40 to 50 miles) from the site. This 
population density is just into the lower region of the suburban density range of 53.7 to 1284.7 people 
per square kilometer (139 to 3326 people per square mile) used in HIGHWAY and INTERLINE. 
The standard value of 6 (rural) and 719 (suburban) people per square kilometer (15.5 and 1861 
people per square mile, respectively) was used for the evaluation of all alternatives . 
A.7.2.2. 10 Radionuclide Inventory. The transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage 
contain the same radionuclides as listed in Table A-14. On average, there is approximately 80 
percent of the activity of each radionuclide. 
A.7.3 Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between the 
Examination Facility and the Test Reactor Area 
A. 7.3.1 Incident-free Transportation of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies. This section 
provides the input parameters used to determine the radiological impacts associated with the routine, 
incident-free (Le., no accident) transportation of naval test specimen assemblies for each of the five 
alternatives. 
A. 7.3.1.1 Planned Shipments. Table A-19 provides the number of planned Iransfers in 
each cask. 
Table A-19. Planned transfers of naval test specimen assemblies. 
No Action, 
Decentralization - No Exam, 
Decentralizalion - Limited Exam 
Decentralization - Full Exam, 
199211993 Planning Basis. 
Regionalization at INEL, and 
Central izalion at INEL 
All other Regional ization and 
Centralization Alternatives 
NR/ATR 
o 
38 
o 
A-63 
Test Trai n 
o 
922 
960 
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A.7.3. 1.2 Transport Index. A TI of 130.0 was used for all NR and ATR cask transfers. 
This value was derived from historic measurements over the last several years. The new Test Train 
casles, which are currently being designed, would have a TI of 1.0. 
A. 7.3. 1.3 Transportation Distances end Population Densities. Section A.6 provided a 
description of the general methodology used for determining transportation distances and the 
population densities along the transportation routes . The distance between ECF and TRA is 8.0 
kilometers (5 miles). From the HIGHWAY computer code, this on-site transfer of naval test 
specimen assemblies occurs in a rural area. For shipments from TRA to the centralization sites, the 
HIGHWAY computer code was used to calculate the distance traveled, the population densities, aod 
the percent distance traveled in each population density. As described in Section A.7.4.1.3 , the 
HIGHWAY predicted distances for off-site shipments were increased by 3%. 
A.7.3. 1.4 Truck Speed. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code speed for truck 
shipments in a rural population is 88 .5 kilometers per hour (55 miles per hour). One of the reasons 
an on-site worst credible accident is less severe than the IOCFR71 hypothetical accident is that the 
speed is severely limited . An average speed of 16.1 kilometers per hour (1 0 miles per hour) was 
used for the on-site shipments . For off-site shipments to the centralization s ites , the standard 
RADTRAN 4 computer code values were used . 
A. 7.3. 1.5 Truck Stop Time. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code provides values 
for truck stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . The logs for 
historical on-s ite transfers of naval test specimen assemblies were reviewed , and it was determined 
that the actual stop t ime (one and one-half hours) was less than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer 
code values. For the alternat ive in which on-site transfers would continue, the one and one-half hour 
stop time was used . For the off-site shipments of test specimen assemblies to the centralization sites, 
a stop time of 0 .006 hour per kilometer (0.01 hour per mile) was used, consistent with the value used 
for other past truck shipments outside the boundaries of DOE facil ities (see Section A.7.4.1.4) . 
A.7.3. 1.6 Radiation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The radiation exposure 
decrease due to distance described in Section A. 7. 1. I. 9 was also applied to the truck transfers of test 
specimen assemblies . 
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A. 7.3. 1.7 Distance from Source to Crew. A distance of 3.6 meters (12 feet) was 
measured between the NRI A TR shipping cask and the driver for the exclusive-use truck transfers of 
test specimen assemblies on-site. Two escorts, one located approximately 46 meters (150 feet) in 
front and one the same distance behind the transport vehicle, are also present for on-site shipments. 
For off-site shipments to the centralization sites, the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code 
value for the number of crew members was used (2). The value used for the distance from the crew 
to the centerline of the cask for off-site shipments was 5.85 meters (20 feet), based on the conceptual 
design of the new Test Train cask. 
A. 7.3. 1.8 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Transport index to 
exposure rate conversion factors for the casks used for test specimen assembly transfers were 
calculated using the standard equation used by RADTRAN 4. The results were compared to detailed 
computer analyses performed using SPAN4, and RADTRAN 4 results were found to overestimate the 
exposure. Using the SPAN4 computer code results , the effective package dimensions of the casles 
used in the RADTRAN 4 calculat ions were adjusted to provide a conservative yet more real istic value 
of the transport index to exposure rate conversion factor. The values used are provided in Table 
A-20. 
Table A-20. Transport index to exposure rate conversion factors for the NRI A TR and Test Train 
casles. 
Cask 
NR/ATR 
Test Train 
Effective Package Dimension 
(meters) 
0.61 (2 feet) 
1.70 (5 .6 feet) 
Transport Index to Exposure 
Rate Conversion Factor 
1.70 
3.42 
A. 7.3.1.9 Storage. There is no intermediate storage time during transfers of naval test 
specimen assemblies . 
A. 7.3. 1. 10 Persons Exposed While Stopped. The only stop time for the transfer of 
naval test specimen assemblies on-site occurs during routine surveys at the aestination entrance. This 
area is well removed from highway and population and therefore no people were considered to be 
exposed during the one and one-half hour stop. The escorts are not present during the surveys and 
the driver is positioned approximately 46 meters (150 feet) from the source during the surveys. The 
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people performing the surveys are badged and all exposure received during the survey is included in 
the normal occupational exposure which is regularly monitored. For off·site shipments, the standard 
RADTRAN 4 computer code values were used . 
A. 7.3.1.11 Traffic Count Passing a Specific Point. The RADTRAN 4 computer code 
uses 470 vehicles per hour passing the transport vehicle. Travel on the on·site transport path is 
restricted to INEL employees, the majority of INEL employees ride the INEL site buses to work, and 
the transfers are not made during high traffic times (i .e. , shift changes): therefore, using the standard 
470 vehicles per hour value would excessively overestimate the number of persons involved . A more 
realistic estimate of 25 vehicles per hour was used for on·site shipments. For off·s ite shIpments, the 
standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values were used . 
A. 7.3.1. 12 Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The following 
standard RADTRAN 4 computer code value was reviewed and determined to reflect the best estimate 
of current industry practice and was consistent with recorded data from transfers of naval test 
specimen assemblies: 
• Minimum Number of Inspections . 
The followi ng standard RADTRAN 4 estimate of the population that could be affected by the 
transfer of test specimen assemblies was used for evaluation of the five alternatives : 
• Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transport Route (On Link). 
A . 7.3.2 Accident During Transportation of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies. This section 
provides the input parameters used to calcul ate the radiological impacts for accidents during 
transportation of naval test specimen assemblies for evaluation of the five alternatives. The planned 
transfers, transportation distances , population densities, and the percentages of travel in each 
population density described in Section A.7.3. 1 were also used for the accident analyses. Unless 
otherwise described in this section. the standard values prov ided by the RADTRAN 4 and RISKIND 
computer codes were used . All variables described in Section A.7.2.2 are applicable to these 
transfers with the exception of the RISKIND population density . 
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A.7.3.2.1 RISKIND Population Densities. For the Decentralization, 199211993 Planning 
Basis, Regionalization at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the test specimen assembly 
transfers would occur on the INEL site. For these transfers, the same conditions described in Section 
A.7.2.2.9 were used. For the other Regionalization and Centralization alternative risk assessments, 
the population densities from RADTRAN 4 were used. 
A.7.3.2.2 Release Fractions. For the Decentralization, 199211993 Planning Basis, and 
Regionalization at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the test specimen assembly transfers 
would occur on the INEL site. For these transfers , the same conditions described in Sections 
A.7.2.2.3 and A.7.2.2.4 were used. For the other Regionalization and Centralization alternatives, the 
conditions described in Sections A. 7 . 1.2.3 and A.7 .1.2.4 were used. 
A . 7.3.2.3 Radionuclide Inventory. The radionuclides which would be released from an 
average transfer are listed in Table A·21 , along with the activity. The values factor in the damage 
fractions and release fractions described in Section A.7.3.2.2 . The radionuclides listed result in 99 
percent of the exposure in each pathway. 
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Table A-21. Radionuclides which would be released from an average transfer of test specimen 
assemblies. 
For Accidents which Release Both For Accidents which Release Only 
Fission and Corrosion Products Corrosion Products 
Nuclide Activity (Ci) Nuclide Activity (Ci) 
1-131 1.30 x 10' Eu-156 3.75 x 10' 
H-3 3.51 x 10' Lu-l77 1.59 x 10' 
1-132 3.10 x 10' Eu-152 1.41 x 10' 
Eu-156 3.75 x 10' Zr-95 1.07 x 10' 
Eu-152 1.41 x 10' Zn-65 9.80 x 10" 
Zr-95 1.09 x 10' Co-60 7.68 x 10" 
Zn-65 9.80 x 10" Ce-141 6 .60 x 10" 
Co-60 7.68 x 10" Eu-154 6.15 x 10" 
Eu-154 6 .15 x 10" Cs-136 4 .69 x 10" 
Sc-46 3.25 x 10" Sc-46 3.25 x 10" 
Cs- 137 1.78 x 10" 1-131 2.37 x 10" 
Ru-l06 3.36 x 10- ' Hf-181 2.35 x 10" 
Nb-95 2.64 x 10- ' 
Pr-l44 2. 19 x 10- ' 
Ce-l44 2.19 x 10-' 
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A.7.4 Shipments of Naval Irradiated Test Specimens to Examination 
and Testing Facilities 
A. 7.4. 1 Incident-free Transportation of Test Specimens. This section provides the input 
parameters used to determine the radiological impacts associated with the routine, incident-free (i.e., 
no accident) transportation of test specimens for evaluation of the five alternatives . 
A. 7.4.1.1 Planned Shipments. Table A-22 provides the estimated number of shipments 
used in the analysis. 
Table A-22. Planned shipments of naval test specimens. 
NRBK-4IIWAPD-40 
Centralization 
Alternative ICPP PSNS Site BETIIS KAPL 
No Action 29 0 0 0 320 
Decentralization - No Exam 
Decentralization - Limited Exam 26 0 0 320 
Decentralization - Full Exam 0 0 0 0 320 
1992/1993 Planning Basis, 0 0 0 120 641 
Regionalization at INEL, and 
Centralization at INEL Alternatives 
All other Regionalization and 0 0 29 120 641 
Centralization Alternatives 
A. 7.4.1.2 Transport Index. A TI of 0. 1 was used for all NRBK-41 and WAPD-40 
shipping container shipments. These values were derived from recorded measurements over the last 
several years . 
A. 7.4. 1.3 Transportation Distances and Population Densities. Section A.6 prov ided a 
descr iption of the general methodology used for determining trans po nation distances and the 
population densities along the transponat ion routes . Historical data were obtained for shipments of 
test specimens . The distance traveled was averaged based on the point of origin and compared to the 
value calculated by HIGHWAY. The actual distance traveled was approximately 3% higher on the 
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average. In order to provide the best estimate exposure, which is based on the distance traveled , the 
HIGHWAY distances were increased by 3% for al l al ternatives . This technique al lowed for 
comparison of the alternatives on an equal basis. The percentages of distance traveled in each 
population density calculated by HIGHWAY applied to the distances which were increased by the 
3% . 
A. 7.4. 1.4 Truck Stop Time. The RADTRAN 4 computer code provides standard values 
for truck stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . The shipping 
logs for historical test specimen shipments were reviewed , and it was determined that the actual stop 
times were much shoner than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values. The recorded stop 
times were divided by the actual distance traveled from historical data over the last three years and an 
average of 0.006 hour per kilometer (0.01 hour per mile) was calculated . This value was used to 
evaluate all five alternatives. 
A. 7.4 . 1.5 Radiation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The radiation exposure 
decrease due to distance described in Section A. 7. 1. 1. 9 was also applied to the truck shipments of test 
specimens . 
A . 7.4. 1.6 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Container transpon 
index to exposure rate conversion factors for the casks used for test specimen shipments were 
calculated using the standard equation used by RADTRAN 4. The results were compared to detailed 
computer analyses performed using SPAN4, and RADTRAN 4 results were found to overestimate the 
exposure. Using the SPAN4 computer code results , the effective package dimensions of the 
containers used in the RADTRAN 4 calculations were adjusted to provide a conservative yet more 
realistic value of the transpon index to exposure rate conversion factor . The values used are provided 
in Table A-23 . 
Table A-23. Transpon index to exposure rate conversion factors for the NRBK-41 and W APD-40 
shipping containers. 
Container 
NRBK-41 
WAPD-40 
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Effective Package Dimension 
(meters) 
0.74 (2.4 feet) 
3.2 (10.5 feet) 
A-70 
Transpon Index to Exposure 
Rate Conversion Factor 
1.88 
6.76 
A . 7.4. 1. 7 Storage. The test specimen shipping containers are not stored during shipment. 
A . 7.4 . 1.8 Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The fo llowing 
standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values were reviewed and were determined to reflect the best 
est imate of current industry practice and were consistent with historical data from shipments of naval 
test specimens: 
• Truck Speed 
• Distance from Source to Crew 
• Number of Crewmen 
• Minimum Number of Inspect ions . 
The following standard RADTRAN 4 est imates of th. ,"opulations that could be affected by 
the shipment of test specimens were also used to evaluate the five al ternatives : 
• Persons Exposed While Stopped 
• Average Exposure Distance While Stopped 
• Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transpon Route (On Link) 
• Traffic Count Pass ing a Specific Point - Rural, Suburban , and Urban Zones 
• Fraction of Travel During Ru,h Hour, on City Streets, and on Freeways . 
A . 7.4.2 Accident During Transportation o( Test Specimens. This section provides the input 
parameters used to calculate the radiological impacts for accidents during transpon ation of test 
specimens to evaluate the five alternatives . The planned shipments, transpon ation distances. 
population densities, and the percentages of travel in each popul ation density described in Section 
A.7 .4. 1 were also used for the accident analyses. Unl ess otherwise described in this section. the 
standard values provided by the RADTRAN 4 and RISKIND computer codes were used . All the 
conditions and var iables described in Section A.7. 1.2 are applicable to th ese shipments with the 
exception of the Accident Probabil ity. 
A. 7.4 .2 . 1 Accident Probability. The probability of a truck acc ident used for evaluation of 
all alternatives was obtained from "Lo, gitud inal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers 
of Interstate Freight" (Saricks and Kvitek 1994). The truck accident rates are state dependent. The 
states in which naval spent nuclear fuel would be shipped to storage for the alternatives described in 
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Section A.3 were obtained from HIGHWAY. The accident rate values are consistent with past test 
specimen shipments which have traveled approximately 2.4 million kilometers (l.5 million miles) 
without an accident. 
A.7.4.2.2 Test Specimen Integrity Following an Accident. Detailed structural and 
thermal analyses were performed for the shipping containers used for naval test specimen shipments 
up to an equivalent strain of 30% and mid-wall temperature of 1050°F. For these cases, the sealed 
inner container was not damaged; therefore, only the activity on the outside of the inner container, 
which would be corrosion products, was released. For the thermal and structural regions above 
1050°F and 30% strain, the modal study defines the upper limits as unbounded. For these cases, the 
sealed inner container holding the test specimens was postulated to be damaged and the fission 
products and corrosion products would be released in the quantities described in Section A. 7 .1.2.4. 
A.7.4.2.3 Radionuclide Inventory. The test specimen shipments contain the same 
radionuclides as listed in Table A-21 . On average, there is approximately 1.5 percent of the activity 
of each nuclide. 
A.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
A.8.1 Historical - Incident Free 
This section summarizes the results of the calculations for the radiological and non-
radiological impacts of the incident-free transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens. 
Table A-24 shows the radiological impact on the general population, transportation workers 
(occupational), and the maximum exposed individual, and the non-radiological impact on all persons. 
The radiological impact on the general population for all historical shipments is 1.95 person-rem, 
wbich statistically corresponds to 0.00098 cancer fatalities in the entire population over the 40-year 
period considered . The radiological impact on transportation workers for all historical shipments is 
16.6 person-rem, which statistically corresponds to 0.0066 cancer fatalities. As can be seen from 
Table A-24, the radiological impact to the general population is greatest for the highway 
transportation of test specimens. Incident-free radiological impacts tend to be greater for highway 
transportation than for rail transportation since both the general population and transportation workers 
are closer to the shipping container in transit. In all cases, the maximum exposed individual is a 
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Table A-24. Incident-free results for historical Navy shipments. 
Naval Spent Nuclear 
Fuel to ECP2) 
Naval Spent Nuclear 
Fuel to ICPpI" 
Test Specimen 
Assemblies Between 
ECF and TRAIII 
Test Specimens(2) 
TOTALf3) 
,II On-site 
,2) Off-site 
General Population 
CoUective Estimated 
Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities 
0.70 3.5 It 10- 4 
0.10 5.0 It 10- ' 
0.22 1.1 It 10. 4 
0.93 4.7 It 10. 4 
1.95 9.8 It 10- 4 
Occupational 
CoUective Estimated 
Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities 
3.2 1.3 It 10- 3 
2 .8 l.l It 10- 3 
7.6 3.0 It 10- 3 
3.0 1.2 It 10. 3 
16.6 6.6 x 10-3 
,3, Muimum Exposed Individual exposures are not cumulative, they are the maximum value. 
~g 
MEl-General Population MEI.()ccupational 
Estimated 
Estimated Estimated Non-
Dose Cancer Dose Cancer Radiological 
(rem) Fatalities (rem) Fatalities Fatalities 
0.033 1.7 It 10- ' 0 .10 4.0 x 10- ' 1.6 X 10- 2 
2.1 It 10- ' l.l x 10-1 2.8 1.1 x 10. 3 0 
0.062 3.1 It 10- ' 7.5 3.0 x 10- 3 0 
0 .026 1.3 It 10- ' 1.5 6.0 It 10- 4 1.2 It 10- 2 
0.062 3.1 x 10·' 7.5 I 3.0 x 10- 3 2 .8 It 10- 2 
transportation worker, since the workers are closer to the shipment for a longer time than any 
member of the general population. The maximum exposed individual for all shipments is a driver for 
the trucks transferring test specimen assemblies between ECF and TRA. Under the limiting modeling 
approach that the same person drove every shipment for the entire period, this person received a total 
exposure of 7.5 rem over the approximate 4O-year period, or about 0.19 rem per year, which is 
within DOE limits for occupationally exposed individuals. By comparison, the maximum exposed 
individual for the general population received only 0.062 rem over the entire historical period, which 
is much less than the exposure to the maximum exposed individual transportation worker and 
corresponds to 0.0016 mrem exposure per year. It should be noted that the majority of the exposure 
to the transportation worker and maximum exposed worker is already accounted for since most 
transportation workers are badged and therefore this exposure is included with all other exposure they 
would receive on the job. The rail employees and off-site truck drivers are the only transportation 
workers who are not badged. Their exposure was calculated to be only approximately 30% of the 
total . 
The estimated non-radiological fatalities due to vehicle emissions is 0.028 for the entire 
4O-year period. 
A.8.2 Incident Free 
Table A-25 provides a summary of the annual exposures and risks from incident-free 
transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and hlst specimens for all alternatives. The values are 
calculated by dividing the values in Table A-26 by the 40 years evaluated to obtain the average annual 
values. 
The annual radiological impact on the general population ranges from 0.0085 to 0.30 person-
rem. The general population annual radiological risk ranges from 0.0000043 to 0.OC015 for cancer 
fatalities . 
The radiological impact on the transportation crew (occupational) ranges from 0.038 to 0.38 
person-rem. The transportation crew annual radiological risk ranges from 0.000015 to 0.00015 for 
cancer fatal ities. 
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Table A-2S. Summary of annual incident-free impacts during transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens. 
General Population Occupational MEl-General Population MEI-Occupational 
Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Cancer Cancer Cancer Cancer 
Collective Dose Fatalities Collective Dose Fatalities Dose Fatalities Dose Fatalities 
(person-rem/yr) (per year) (person-rem/yr) (per year) (rem/yr) (per year) (rem/yr) (per year) 
No Act ion 0.0085 4.3 x 10-6 0.038 1.5 x 10 -s 0.00098 4.9 x 10-7 0.0087 3.5 x 10-6 
Decentralization - 0.0085 4.3 x 10-6 0.038 1.5 x 10-s 0.00098 4.9 x 10 -7 0.0087 3.5 x 10-6 No Exam 
Decentralization - 0.021 1.1 x 10-s 0.068 2.7 x 10-s 0.0011 5.5 x 10-7 0.0087 3.5 x 10-6 Limited Exam 
Decentralization - 0.083 4 .2 x IO -s 0 .30 1.2 x 10-4 0.0043 2.2 x 10-6 0.032 1.3 x IO -s Full Exam 
1992-1993 Planning 0.053 2.7 x IO -s 0.18 7.2 x 10-s 0.0022 1.1 x 10-6 0.020 8.0 x 10-6 Basis 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 0 .053 2 .7 x 10-s 0.18 7.2 x 10-s 0.0022 1.1 x 10-6 0.020 8.0 x 10-6 
INEL 
Rcgionali7.ation or 
Centrali7.ation at 0.12 6 .0 x IO -s 0.25 1.0 x 10-4 0.0040 2.0 x 10-6 0 .027 1.1 x 10-s 
Hanford 
Regional ization or 
Centralization at 0.30 1.5 x 10-4 0.38 1.5 x 10-4 0.0040 2.0 x 10-6 0.12 4.8 x 10-s 
Savannah River 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 0.28 1.4 x 10-4 0.35 1.4 x 10-4 0.0040 2.0 x 10-6 0 .10 4.0 x 10-s 
Oak Ridge 
Region31ization or 
Centralization at 0. 15 7.5 x IO -s 0 .28 1.1 x 10-4 0.0040 2.0 x 10-6 0.042 1.7 x 10-s 
Nevada Test Site 
Estimated 
Non-
Radiological 
Fatalities 
(per year) 
1.5 X 10-4 
1.5 X 10-4 
2.2 X 10-4 
7.5 X 10- 4 
6.3 X 10-4 
6.3 X 10-4 
8.8 X 10-4 
8.3 X 10-4 
7.0 X 10-4 
9.3 X 10-4 
< Table A-26. Summary of 4O-year cumulative incident-free impacts during transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens. 
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No Action 
Decentralization -
No Exam 
Decentralizat ion -
Limited Exam 
Decentralization -
Full Exam 
1992-1993 Planning 
Basis 
Regionali7.ation or 
Centralization at INEL 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
Hanford 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
Savannah River 
Regionalization or 
Centralizat ion at 
Oak Ridge 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
Nevada Test Site 
General Population 
Collcctive Estimated 
Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalit ies 
0.34 1.7 x 10- ' 
0.34 1.7 x 10- ' 
0 .83 4.2 x 10- ' 
3 .3 
1. 7 x 10- ) 
2.1 
1.1 x IO - J 
2.1 
1.1 x IO- J 
2.4 x IO- J 
4.7 
6.0 x IO- J 
12 
5.5 x IO - J 
11 
3.0 x IO- J 
6.0 
Oecupational 
Collective Estimated 
Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities 
1.5 6.0 x 10- ' 
1.5 6 .0 x 10- ' 
2.7 l.l x 10- ) 
12 4.8 x IO- J 
7.3 2.9 x 10- ) 
7.3 2 .9 x IO - J 
9 .8 3.9 x IO - J 
15 6.0 x IO - J 
14 5.6 x IO - J 
11 4.4 x IO - J 
MEl-General Population MEI-Occupational 
Estimated 
Estimated Estimated Non-
Dose Cancer Dose Cancer Radiological 
(rem) Fatalities (rem) Fatalities Fatalities 
0 .039 2.0 x 10-J 0.35 1.4 x 10- ' 5.9 x 10-) 
0 .039 2.0 x 10- ' 0.35 1.4 x 10- ' 5.9 x 10-) 
0.045 2.3 x 10-' 0 .35 1.4 x 10- ' 8.9 x 10-) 
0.17 " .5 x 10- ' 0.43 1.7 x 10- ' 3.0 X 10-2 
0.086 4.3 x 10- ' 0.80 3.2 x 10-' 2.5 X 10-2 
0.086 4.3 x 10- ' 0 .80 3.2 x 10- ' 2.5 X 10-2 
0.16 8.0 x 10- ' 1.1 4.4 x 10- ' 3.5 X 10- 2 
0.16 8.0 x IO-J 4.7 1.9 x 10- ) 3.3 X 10- 1 
0.16 8.0 x IO -J 4.1 1.6 x 10- J 2.8 X 10-1 
0. 16 8.0 x 10- ' 1.7 6.8 x 10- ' 3.7 X 10-1 
For all alternatives, the maximum exposed individual is a transportation worker who drives 
the truck shipments. The annual radiological impact on the maximum exposed individual ranges from 
0.0087 to 0.12 rem. These values were calculated based on the modeling approach that for each of 
the categories of shipments described in Sections A.4.2 through A.4.4, the same person would drive 
all shipments. The maximum exposed individual annual radiological risk ranges from 0.0000035 to 
0.()()()()48 for cancer fatalities . The annual exposure to the maximum exposed individual of the 
general population ranges from 0.00098 to 0.0043 rem for the various alternatives. The estimated 
exposure and health effects to the maximum exposed individual for the general population correspond 
to approximately a factor of 10 less than those estimated for the transportation worker. 
The annual non-radiological risk ranges from 0.00015 to 0.00093 fatalities. 
The summary of exposures and risks from incident-free transportation of naval spent nuclear 
fuel and test specimens for all alternatives are included in Table A-26 for the 4O-year period. 
The radiological impact on the general population ranges from 0.34 to 12 person-rem. The 
general population radiological risk for the entire 40-year period ranges from 0.000 17 to 0.006 for 
cancer fatal ities. 
The radiological impact on the transportation crew (occupational) ranges from 1.5 to 15 
person-rem. The transportation crew radiological risk for the entire 40-year period ranges from 
0.0006 to 0.006 for cancer fatalities. 
For all alternatives, the maximum exposed individual is a transportation worker who drives 
the truck shipments. The radiological impact on the maximum exposed individual ranges from 0.35 
to 4.7 rem. These values were calculated based on using the same driver for all shipments for each 
of the categories of shipments described in Sections A.4.2 through A.4.4. The maximum exposed 
individual radiological risk for the entire 40-year period , 1995 through 2035, ranges from 0.00014 to 
0.0019 for cancer fatalities . The exposure to the maximum exposed individual of the general 
population ranges from 0.039 to 0.17 rem for the various alternative . The estimated exposure and 
health effects to the maximum exposed individual for the general population correspond to 
approximately a factor of 10 less than those estimated for the transportation worker. 
The non-radiological risk ranges from 0.0059 to 0.037 fatalities for the entire 40-year period. 
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There are appreciable differences in exposure to the general population, transportation crew, 
and the maximum exposed individual among the various alternatives . Part of these differences is due 
to the varying number of shipments. For example, for the Decentralization - Full Examination 
alternative, all shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel are shipped to the INEL and then returned to the 
shipyards and prototypes, thereby doubling the number of shipments. However, the single most 
important contributor to the differences among the alternatives is the shipment of test specimen 
assemblies. For the No Action, Decentralization - No Examination, and Decentralization - Limited 
Examination alternatives , there are no shipments; for the Decentralization - Full Examination, 
1992/1993 Planning Basis, Regionalization at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the 
exposure is minimal since the shipments remain on the INEL site. However, for the other 
Regionalization and Centralization alternatives, the test specimen assemblies would be shipped off-site 
between the INEL and the alternative sites. While the exposure rates on the casks are low, the 
number of shipments and the distances involved increase the radiological impact on the transportation 
crew and the general population. 
Tables A-27 and A-28 provide the 40-year cumulative incident-free results separately for 
on-site and off-site shipments. For all alternatives, the shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from 
shipyards and protO\YPes and shipments of naval irradiated test specimens are off-site. Likewise, the 
transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage following examination are on-site for all alternatives . 
The tr sfers of naval test specimen assemblies are off-site for the Regionalization and Centralization 
alternatives at Hanford , Savannah River, Oak Ridge, and the Nevada Test Site, otherwise they would 
be on-site. 
As described in Section 3.8 of the main body of this Appendix, all alternatives which do not 
make use of the existing Expended Core Facility at INEL would require a transition period while new 
facilities for examinati n and storage of naval spent nuclear fuel were developed. During the 
transition period, approximately 80 shipments from Navy sites to ECF would be needed . These 
shipments are not included explicitly in the detailed analyses; however, the appropriate number of 
shipments needed by each alternative during this period is explicitly included, so the range of 
environmental effects of these shipments is bounded . For example, the estimated fatalities for the No 
Action, Decentralization - No Examination, and Decentralization - Limited Examination alternatives 
would actually increase slightly if the transition shipments were included . The estimated fatalities for 
the alternatives in which the INEL continues to receive shipments would remain the same. For the 
Regionalization and Centralization alternatives at sites other than INEL, the estimated fatalities would 
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Table A-27. Summary of 4O-year cumulative incident-free impacts of on-site transportation. 
General Population Occupational MEl-General Population 
Collective Estimated Collective Estimated Estimated 
Dose Cancer Dose Cancer Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities (person-rem) Fatalities (rem) Fatalities 
No Action 0.00010 5.0 x 10-1 0.0018 7.2 x 10-1 0.000017 8.5 x 10-9 
Decentralization - No 0 .00010 5.0 x 10- ' 0.0018 7.2 x 10-1 0.000017 8.5 x 10-9 Exam 
Decentralization - 0.00010 5.0 x 10-1 0.0018 7.2 x 10-1 0.000017 8.5 x 10-9 Limited Exam 
Decentralization - 0 .013 6.5 x 10-6 0.44 1.8 x 10- ' 0.062 3.1 lI. 10- ' Full Exam 
1992-1993 Planning 0 .015 7.5 x 10-6 0.50 2.0 x 10-4 0.062 3.1 x 10 -' Basis 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 0 .015 7.5 x 10 -6 0 .50 2.0 x 10-4 0.062 3.1 x 10- ' 
INEL 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 0.0024 1.2 x 10-6 0.067 2.7 x 10- ' 0.000017 8.5 x 10-9 
Hanford 
Regionalizat ion or 
Centralization at 0 .0024 1.2xlO-6 0 .067 2.7 x 10- ' 0.000017 8.5 x 10-9 
Savannah River 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 0.0024 1.2 x 10-6 0.067 2.7 x 10-' 0.000017 8.5 x 10-9 
Oak Ridge 
RegionalizatiC'n or 
Centrali7.ation at 0.0024 1.2 x 10-6 0.067 2.7 x 10- ' 0.000017 8.5 x 10-9 
Nevada Test Site 
7q 
MEI-Occupational Estimated 
Estimated Non-
Dose Cancer Radiological 
(rem) Fatalities Fatalities 
0 .0017 6.8 x 10-- 0 
0.0017 6.8 x 10- ; 0 
0 .0017 6.8 lI. 10-1 0 
0.43 1.7 lI. 10-4 0 
0.43 1.7 x 10-4 0 
0.43 1.7 x 10-4 0 
0.065 2.6 x 10- ' 0 
0 .065 2.6 x 10- ' 0 
0 .065 2.6 x 10-' 0 
0.065 2.6 x 10- ' 0 
< Table A-28. Summary of 4O-year cumulative incident-free impacts of off-site transportation. 
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No Action 
Decentralizat ion - No 
Exam 
Decentralization -
Limited Exam 
Decentra lization -
Full Exam 
1992-1993 Planning 
Basis 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
INEL 
Regionalization o r 
Centralization at 
Hanford 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
Savannah River 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
Oak Ridge 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
Nevada Test Site 
General Population 
Collective Estimated 
Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities 
0.34 1.7 x 10-4 
0 .34 1.7 x 10- 4 
0 .83 4.2 x 10-4 
3.3 1.7 x 10- ' 
2. 1 1.1 x 10 - ' 
2. 1 \.1 x 10- ' 
4.7 2.4 x 10- ' 
12 6 .0 x 10- ' 
11 55 x 10- ' 
6.0 3.0 x 10- ' 
Occupational MEI·General Population 
Collective Estimated Estimated 
Dose Cancer Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities (rem) Fatalities 
I.S 6 .0 x 10 - 4 0.039 2.0 x 10-} 
1.5 6.0 x 10- 4 0.039 2.0 x 10-$ 
2.7 \.1 x 10-) 0 .045 2.3 x 10-$ 
II 4.4 x 10- ) 0.17 8.5 x 10-$ 
6.8 2.7 x 10- ' 0.086 4.3 x 10-$ 
6 .8 2.7 x 10- ' 0 .086 4.3 x 10-$ 
9 .7 3.9 x 10 - ' 0.16 8.0 x 10-$ 
15 6.0 x 10- ' 0 .16 8.0 x 10-$ 
14 5.6 x 10- ) 0.16 8.0 x 10-$ 
11 4.4 X 10- ' 0.16 8.0 x 10-$ 
MEI-Occupational 
Estimated 
Estimated Non-
Dose Cancer Radiological 
(rem) Fatalities Fatalities 
0.35 1.4 x 10- 4 5.9 x 10-' 
0 .35 1.4 x 10- 4 5.9 x 10-' 
0.35 1.4 x 10-4 8.9 x 10- ' 
0.35 1.4 x 10-4 3.0 X 10-1 
0 .80 3 .2 x 10-4 2.5 X 10- 1 
0 .80 3.2 x 10-4 2.S X 10-1 
\.1 4.4 X 10-4 3.5 X 10-1 
4.7 1.9 x 10- ' 3.3 X 10-1 
4.1 1.6 x 10- ' 2.8 X 10-1 
1.7 6.8 x 10-4 3.7 X 10-1 
also remain approximately the same since the number of shipments is approximately evenly 
distributed between the east and west coast origins and therefore the total distance traveled is the 
same. 
A.S.3 Accident Risk 
This section summarizes the re i1ts of the calculations for radiological and non-radiological 
risks from accidents which could oCCU! uring shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel and test 
specimens. Tables A-29 and A-30 pl ,' " de the results of the accident risk assessment for each 
alternative. The risks are provided for the general population in terms of exposure and estimated 
cancer fatalities. The risks are presented for 50% meteorological conditions, Pasquill Stability Class 
D. Table A-29 provides the risk; on an annual basis and Table A-30 provides the total risks over the 
entire 4O-year period. 
The annual radiological impact, from Table A-29, on the general population ranges from 
0 .00021 to 0 .021 person-rem. These exposures equate to 0 .00000011 to O.()()()()II estimated cancer 
fatalities . For non-radiological impacts, the estimated annual fatalities from traffic accidents range 
from 0 .0012 10 0 .022 . 
Th. cumulative radiological impact, from Tab'le A-30, on the general population ranges from 
0 .0082 to 0.84 person-rem. These exposures equate to 0 .000004 1 to 0.00042 estimated cancer 
fatalit ies . For non-radiological impacts, the estimated fatalities from traffic accidents range from 
0 .047 to 0 .84. 
There are appreciable differences in exposure to the general population, transponation crew, 
and the maximum exposed individual among the various alternatives. Pan of these differences is due 
to the varying number of shipments. For example, for the Decentralization - Full Examination 
alternative, all shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel are shipped to the INEL and then returned to the 
shipyards and prototypes, thereby doubling the number of shipments. As in the incident-free 
assessment , the shipment of test specimen assembl i is a large factor. For the No Action, 
Decentralization - No Examination, and Decentralization - Limited Examination alternatives, there are 
no shipments; for the Decentralization - Full Examination, 199211993 Planning Basis, Regionalization 
at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the exposure is minimal since the shipments remain 
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Table A-29. Summary of annual accident risk for transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel and 
test specimens. 
Estimated 
General Population Cancer Estimated 
Collective Dose Fatalities Traffic 
(person-rem/yr) (per year) Fatalities 
Class D Class D (per year) 
No Action 0.00021 1.1 x 10-7 1.2 x 10-' 
Decentralization - 0 .00021 1.1 x 10-7 1.2 x 10-' 
No Exam 
Decentralization - Limited 0 .00043 2.2 x 10-7 1.6 x 10-' 
Exam 
Decentralization - Full 0 .0028 1.4 x 10-' 2 .2 x 10-' 
Exam 
199211993 Planning Basis 0 .0020 1.0 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
Regionalization or 0 .0020 1.0 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
Centralization at INEL 
Regionalization or 0 .0033 1.7 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
Centralization at Hanford 
Regionalization or 0 .0210 1.1 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 
Central ization at 
Savannah River 
Regionalization or 0.015 7.5 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-' 
Centralization at Oak Ridge 
Regionalization or 0 .0070 3.5 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 
Centralization at 
Nevada Test Site 
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Table A-30. Summary of cumulative accident risk over the 4O-year period for transponation of naval 
spent nuclear ruel and test specimens. 
General Population Estimated 
Collective Dose Cancer Fatalities Estimated 
(person-rem) Traffic 
Class D Class D Fatalities 
No Action 0.0082 4.1 x 10-' 4.7 X 10- 2 
Decentral ization - 0.0082 4.1 x 10- ' 4.7 X 10- 2 
No Exam 
Decentralization - Limited 0.017 8.5 x 10-' 6.5 X 10- 2 
Exam 
Decentralization - Full 0. 11 5.5 x 10- ' 8.6 X 10- 1 
Exam 
199211993 Planning Basis 0.079 4.0 x 10- ' 5. 1 X 10- 1 
Regionalization or 0.079 4.0 x 10- ' 5. 1 X 10- 1 
Central ization at INEL 
Regionalization or 0. 13 6.5 x 10- ' 5.3 X 10- 1 
Centralization at Hanford 
Regionalization or 0.84 4.2 x 10-' 6.0 X 10- 1 
Centralization at 
Savannab River 
Regional ization or 0 .61 3.1 x 10-' 5.7 X 10- 1 
Centralization at Oak Ridge 
Regionalization or 0.28 1.4 x 10- ' 6. l x lO- 1 
Centralization at 
Nevada Test Site 
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on the INEL site. However, for the other Regionalization and Centralization alternatives, the test 
specimen assemblies would be shipped off-site between the INEL and the alternate sites. While the 
exposure rates on the containers are low, the number of shipments and the distances involved increase 
the radiological impact on the transponation crew and the general population . In addition, the routes 
themselves are an imponant factor. While differences in distance and population densities are 
imponant, the higher risk for the Regionalization at Savannab River and Centralization at Savannab 
River alternatives, in panicular, is due to the higher accident rates along the route taken and higher 
food transfer factors for shipments through farming states with rr.uch higher ingestion rates . 
Table A-31 provides the 4O-year cumulative risk, separated by on-site and off-site shipments. 
As described in Section 3.8 of the main body of this Appendix, a transition period could be 
necessary which would require approximately 80 shipments from Navy sites to ECF. These 
shipments are not included explicitly in the detailed analyses; however, the appropriate number of 
shipments engendered by each alternative during this period is explicitly included , so the range of 
environmental effects of these shipments is bounded . The addition of the transition shipments would 
increase the distance traveled for the No Action, Decentralization - No Examination, and 
Decentralization - Limited Examination alternatives . Since the accident risk is proponional to the 
distance traveled , the risk would increase slightly for these alternatives, which were the lowest of all 
alternatives. All other alternatives would remain the same. Therefore, incorporating the transition 
period would actually reduce the difference between alternat ives from the standpoint of transponation 
effects. 
A.S.4 Accident Maximum Consequences 
This section summarizes the results of the calculations of maximum consequences of accidents 
which could occur during shipments of naval spent nuclear ruel and test specimens. Tables A-32 and 
A-33 provide the results of the maximum consequence assessment for each alternative. The 
maximum consequences are provided for the general population by population area (rural, suburban, 
and urban) and the maximum exposed individual in terms of exposure. The members of the 
transpon ation crew may be the maximum exposed individual. 
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Table A-31. Summary of cumulative risk over the 4O-year period for transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens 
(on-site/off-site). 
ON-SITE OFF-SITE 
General Population General Population 
CoUective Estimated Estimated CoUective Estimated Estimated 
Dose Cancer Traffic Dose Cancer Traffic 
(person-rem) Fatalities Fatalities (person-rem) Fatalities Fatalities 
No Action 1.3 x 10-6 6.5 X 10- 10 6.8 X 10-6 0.0082 4.1 x 10-6 4.7 X 10- 1 
Decentralization - 1.3 x 10-6 6 .S X 10- 10 6.8 X 10-6 0.0082 4.1 x 10- 6 4.7 X 10-1 
No Exam 
Decentralization - 1.3 x 10-6 6.S X 10- 10 6.8 X 10-6 0.017 8 .S x 10-6 6.3 X 10-1 
Limited Exam 
Decentralization - 4.1 x 10- 5 2. 1 x 10- 1 3.2 X 10-4 0.11 S.5 x 10-5 8.4 X 10- 1 
FuU Exam 
1992-1993 Planning Basis 1.3 x 10- 4 6.5 x 10- 1 6 .1 X 10-4 0.079 4.0 x 10- 5 S.O X 10- 1 
Regionalization or 1.3 x 10- 4 6 .S x 1.0 -1 6.1 X 10- 4 0.079 4.0 x 10- 5 S.O X 10- 1 Centralization at INEL 
Regionalization or 8.7 x 10- 5 4.4 x 10-1 2.1 X 10- 4 0.13 6.5 x 10- 5 S .3 X 10- 1 Centralization at Hanford 
r-
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 8.7 x 10- 5 4.4 x 10-1 3.6 X 10-4 0.84 4.2 x 10- 4 S .9 X 10- 1 
Savannah River 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 8.7 x 10- 5 4.4 x 10-1 2.3 X 10-4 0.61 3.1 x 10-4 S.7 X 10- 1 
Oak Ridge 
Regionalization or 
Centralizat ion at 8.7 x 10- 5 4.4 x 10-1 1.6 X 10-4 0.28 1.4 x 10-4 6.0 X 10- 1 
Nevada Test Site 
Table A-32. Summary of maximum consequences (person-rem) of an accident (D"" ign "«is) . Table A-33 . Summary of maximum consequences (person-rem) of an accident 
(Beyond Design Basis). 
MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES 
MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES 
DESIGN BASIS 
(accident probability between I and I x 10- ') BEYOND DESIGN BASIS (acc ident probability between I x 10' · and I K 10-,) 
Maximum 
Exposed 
Individual Rural Suburban Urban 
(rem) (person-rem) (person-rem) (person-rem) 
M ... imum ExpoKd Run.1 Suburban Urban 
lndividll.ll 
Eltimaled Eatimatcd EatimalCd EIIimatcd Utimaud Ucimatcd 
Eatimal.ed Cancer Collective Cancer Collective Fatal Collective Cancer 
Do .. Fata!itiu Do .. FlulitiCi Dooe C. ncets Do .. Fatalitiu 
No Action 0.0034 0 .51 4.3 13 
(rem) (pcno .. (pc ..... (pcno .. 
ftm) ftm) ftm) 
Decentralization - No Exam 0.0034 0.51 4.3 13 No Action 0 .014 1.0 x 10-' ' .0 2.0 Jl 10- ' lS 1.3 X 10.
1 23 1.2 X 10- 1 
Decentralization - Limited Exam 0.014 4.0 4.3 13 
Deu~nl f1Iliz.l ion - 0 .014 1.0 x 10-' ' .0 2.0 X 10. ' lS 1,3 X 10- 1 23 1.2 II: 10- 1 
NoEum 
Decentralization - Full Exam 0.045 7.4 25 13 Dccenlralization - 0 .045 (jmitcd E1Im 
2.3 x 10- 1 1.' 3.7 x 10- ' lS 1.3 X 10-2 130 6.5 II: 10' 2 
1992/1993 Planning Basis 0.045 7.4 25 13 Decentn.lization - 1.8 9.0 x 10" 2100 I.' JJOO 1.1 130 6.5 x 10-1 
Regionalization or 0.045 7.4 25 13 
Centralization at INEL 
Full Exam 
199211993 PI_Min, 2.2 1.1 x 10- 1 JJOO 1.7 .,00 2.1 IJO 6.5 x 10" 
Ba.i. 
Regionalization or 0.25 38 100 56 
Centralization at Hanford 
Re,lonalwtion or 2.2 LI x 10- ' JJOO 1.7 4100 2.1 IJO 6 .5 x 10-1 
Cenlnlizationat 
INEL 
Regionalization or 0.25 38 320 560 
Centralization at Savannah River 
Rc,io.lIIliulion or 2.2 1.1 x 10- ' JJOO 1.1 4100 2.1 560 2.8 x 10-1 
Cenltaliulion .1 
H.nrord 
Regionalization or 0.25 38 320 560 Re,iolUlliulion or 2.2 1.1 x 10- ' JJOO 1.7 4100 2.1 1700 8.S x 10- ' 
Centralization at Oak Ridge Cenlnliulion .1 
Sav.nnah River 
Regionalization or 0.25 38 320 560 Re,ionaliulion or 2.2 1.1 x 10- ' JJOO 1.1 "00 2. 1 1700 8.S x 10- ' 
Centralization at Nevada Test Site Cenlnliulion .t 
O.k Rid,c 
Re,ionalizalion or 2.2 1.1 x 10-' JJOO 1.1 " 00 2. 1 1100 lUx 10- ' 
Centnliulion .t 
Nev.d. Tell Site 
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For design basis accidents, the calcul ated exposure to the general population ranges from 0.5\ 
person-rem in a rural area to 560 person-rem in an urban area . The risk associated with these 
exposures ranges from 0.00026 to 0.28 cancer fatalities . The exposure to the maximum exposed 
individual ranges from 0.0034 rem to 0.25 rem. The risk to the maximum individual ranges from 
0.0000017 to 0.00013 cancer fatalities. 
For beyond design basis accidents, the exposure to the general population ranges from 4.0 
person-rem in a rural area to 4100 person-rem in a suburban area (in this case. the probability of the 
accident of the same consequence in the urban area was less than \ x 1O - ~. The risk associated with 
these exposures ranges from 0.002 to 2.1 cancer fatalities . The exposure to the maximum exposed 
individual ranges from 0.014 rem to 2.2 rem. The risk to the maximum individual ranges from 
0.000007 to 0.001 I cancer fatalities . 
The shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from shipyards and prototypes , transfers of naval 
spent nuclear fuel to storage, transfers of test specimen assemblies to the examinatinn facility , and 
shipments of test specimens to test facilities were evalu ted for the maximum consequences of an 
accident . Although the naval spent nuclear fuel shipments contain a higher amount of activity per 
shipment, there are cases where the test specimen shipment consequences are larger. The 
consequences are larger primarily due to the higher number of shipments which increases the 
probabilities such that a more severe consequence is evaluated . 
Tables A-34 and A-35 provide the maximum consequences, separated by on-site and off-site 
shipments , respectively. 
As described in Section 3.8 of the main body of th is Appendix , a transi tion period could be 
necessary which would require approximately 80 shipments from Navy siteS to ECF. These 
shipments are not included explicitly in the detailed analyses: however, the appropriate number of 
shipments engendered by each alternative during this period is explicitly included, so the range of 
environmental effects of these sh ipments is bounded . Since all alternatives ship the same basic fuel 
types, the maximum consequences are determined by the probability of the accident which is a 
function of the distance traveled. As described in Section A.8.3. only the No Action. 
Decentralization - No Examination , and Decentralization - Limited Examination alternatives. which 
have the lowest estimated maximum consequences. would increase the distance traveled if the 
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Table A-34. Summary of maximum consequences of an on-site accident (Beyond Design Basis). 
MEl Rural Suburban 
Estimated Estimated CoUect:"e Estimated 
Collective Dose Cancer Collective Dose . Cancer Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities (person-rem) Fatalities (person-rem) Fatalities 
No Action 0.0013 6.5 x 10-7 0.37 1.9 x 10- 4 2 .4 1.2 x 10-) 
Decentralization - 0.0013 6.5 x 10- 7 0.37 1.9 x 10- 4 2.4 1.2 x 10- ) No Exam 
Decentrali7.ation - 0.0013 6.5 x 10-7 0.37 1.9 x 10- 4 2.4 1.2 x 10- ) Limited Exam 
Decentralization - 0.51 2.6 x 10- 4 200 1.0 X 10- 1 100 5.0 X 10-1 Full Exam 
1992-1993 Planning 2.2 1.1 x 10- 1 3300 1.7 4100 2.1 Basis 
Regionali7.ation or 
Centrali7.ation at 2.2 1.1 x 10- 1 3300 1.7 4100 2.1 
INEL 
Regionalizat ion or 
Centralization at 2.2 1.1 x 10 -1 3300 1.7 4100 2.1 
Hanford 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 2.2 1.1 x 10 -) 3300 1.7 4100 2.1 
Savannah River 
Regionalizat ion o r 
Centralization at 2.2 1.1 x 10- ) 3300 1.7 4100 2.1 
Oak Ridge 
Regionalizat ion or 
Centralization at 2.2 1.1 x 10- ) 3300 1.7 4100 2.1 
Nevada Test Site 
Urban 
Collective Estimated 
Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
< Table A-3S. Summary of maximum consequences of an off-site accident (Beyond Design Basis). 
2-
c 
3 
(l> MEl Rural Suburban 
>-, 
\Q 
o 
No Action 
Decentralization -
No Exam 
DecentralizatiOl: -
Limited Exam 
Decentralization -
Full Exam 
1 9~ 2- 1993 Planning 
Basis 
Regionalization or 
Centrali7.ation at 
INEL 
Regionalization or 
Centralization at 
Hanford 
Regionalization or 
Centralizat ion at 
Savannah River 
Regiona\izat ion or 
Centralizat ion at 
Oak Ridge 
Regionalizat ion or 
Centra lization at 
Nevada Test Site 
Estimated 
Collective Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities 
0 .014 7.0 x 10 -6 
0 .014 
7.0 x 10- 6 
0 .045 2.3 x 10 - 5 
\.8 9 .0 x 10 - 0 
\.8 9 .0 x 10 - 0 
\.8 9 .0 x 10 - 0 
\.8 9 .0 x 10- 0 
\.8 9 .0 x 10- 4 
\.8 9 .0 x 10- 4 
1.8 9 .0 x 10 - 4 
Collective Estimated Collective Estimated 
Dose Cancer Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities (person-rem) Fatalities 
4 .0 2 .0 X IO - } 2S 1.3 X 10-1 
4.0 2 .0 X 10- } 25 \.3 x 10-1 
7.4 3 .7 x IO -} 25 \.3 x 10- 1 
2700 \,4 3300 1.7 
2700 \,4 79 4 .1) x 10-1 
2700 \,4 79 4.0 x 10 -1 
2700 1.4 320 1.6 x 10- 1 
2700 \,4 320 1.6 x 10- 1 
2700 1.4 320 1.6 x 10- 1 
2700 1.4 320 1.6 x 10 - 1 
Urban 
Collective Estimated 
Dose Cancer 
(person-rem) Fatalities 
23 1.2 X 10-1 
23 1.2 X 10-1 
130 6.5 x 10-1 
130 6.5 x 10-1 
130 6 .5 x 10-1 
130 6 .5 x 10-1 
560 2 .8 x 10- 1 
1700 8 .5 x 10- 1 
1700 8.5 x 10- 1 
1700 8 .5 x 10- 1 
transition shipments were included. Therefore, incorporating the transition period would actually 
r"""Jce the differe nce between alternatives from the standpoint of transportation effects. 
A,9 EFFECT ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
The only method used to ship naval spent nuclear fuel to INEL in the past and the only 
method proposed for future shipments is by rail. The only exceptions to this are that naval spent 
nuclear fuel from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is transported by ship from Hawaii to Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard where the shipping containers are transferred to railcars for the journey to INEL, and 
a heavy-lift transporter is used to move the shipping containers from the Kesselring Site a few miles 
to the nearest railhead . The mode of shipment used fo r naval spent nuclear fuel tends to limit the 
exposure to members of the general public during transponation. The shipments pass through urban, 
suburban, and rural areas, using routes selected by the railroads in accordance with applicable 
regulations and the requirements of the load. The fractions of the distance traveled in urban, 
suburban, and rural areas range from about 2.5% urban, 12.5 % suburban, and 85% rural to 
approx imately 4% urban, 35% suburban , and 61 % rural, depending on the alternative considered. 
As shown in the analyses in this Attachment, the impacts on human health or the environment 
result ing from routine transport of naval spent nuclear fuel and hypothetical transportation accidents 
would be small for all of the alternatives considered. For example, it is unlikely that a single 
additional cancer would occur as a result of the transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel under any 
alternative. Shipping accidents could occur at any location along the routes used , so it is not possible 
to identify the minority or low-income composition of the populations along the routes . However, the 
fact that the potential impacts due to an accident for any of the alternatives considered would present 
no significant risk and do not constitute a credible adverse impact on the population along the 
shipping routes makes it possible to state that no adverse effects from accidents associated with the 
management of naval spent nuclear fuel wou ld be expected for any specific segment of the popUlation, 
minorities and low-income groups included . 
To place the impacts on environmental justice in perspective, the risk from routine shipping 
activities or hypothetical accidents associated with transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel under .ny 
of the alternatives considered would amount to less than one additional fatality per year in the entire 
populat ion. For comparison, in 1990 there were approximately 40,000 traffic fatali ties in the Vnited 
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States population and there were about 7,400 deaths caused by traffic accidents among people of color 
in the V . S. Even if all of the additional cancer deaths associated with an accident for any of the 
alternatives considered for naval spent nuclear fuel management were assumed to occur only amona 
people of color, that group would experience far less than one additional fatality per year. The same 
conclusion can be drawn for low-income groups. 
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ATTACHMENT B 
DESCRIPTION OF NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
RECEIPT AND HANDLING AT THE EXPENDED CORE 
FACILITY AT THE 
IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING LABORATORY 
B.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION OF FACILITIES 
The Expended Core Facility (ECF) is located within the confines of the Naval Reactors 
Facility (NRF) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) . It is a large laboratory fac il ity 
used to receive, examine, prepare for storage, and sh ip naval spent nuclear fuel and irradiated test 
specimen assemblies. The information derived from the examinations performed at ECF provides 
engineering data on nuclear reactor environments, material behavior, and design performance. These 
data are used to develop new technology and to improve the cost-effectiveness of existing designs. 
Naval spent nuclear fuel is prepared at ECF for storage and shipment to the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant (ICPP). Some naval equipment contaminated by radioactive material during use in 
the fleet is refurbished for reuse. 
The building which houses ECF is a concrete block structure approximately 1000 feet by 194 
feet. This space provides offices and enclosed work areas, including an array of interconnected 
reinforced concrete water pools which permit visual observation of naval spent nuclear fuel during 
handling and inspection while shielding workers from rad iation . Adjacent to the water pools are 
shielded cells used for operations which must be performed dry . Access to ECF for receipt and 
shipping of large containers is provided by large ro ll -up doors that allow rai lcar and truck entry. A 
schematic view of ECF is shown in Figure B-1 and a photograph of the water pool area is provided in 
Figure B-2 . 
ECF has been specifically designed to prov ide the unique physical and administrative controls 
required by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to ensure safe handling of irradiated and 
contaminated nuclear fuels and components with a high degree of worker safety and protection for the 
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environment. The original ECF building was constructed in 1957, and consisted of a water pool and 
a shielded cell with a connecting transfer canal . The facility has been modified as necessary to 
accomplish the expanding mission of the facility since then, including the addi tion of three more 
water pools, several shielded cells. and other capabil it ies dictated by the nature of the work required . 
B.1.1 Water Pools 
The purpose of the four interconnected water pools is to permit viewing and examination of 
radioactive reactor components and specimens while providing radiation shielding for workers. 
Walls and stainless steel gates dixide the water pools onto smaller work areas called zones . 
This panitioning makes it possible to drain a small ponion of the total water pool volume when 
facility equipment maintenance or repair is required . It also would permit isolation of an individual 
zone if a leak were to develop which, combined with transfer of the water from that pool to holding 
faci lities. would minimize the loss of water. 
B. 1. 1. 1 Water Pit No.1. This pool is used for the removal of spent fuel from shipping contain-
ers, and for preparation of fuel and low-level waste for shipment to ICPP. It also contains fuel and 
non-fuel storage areas. 
B. 1. 1.2 Water Pit No. 2. This water pool is used for handling irradiation test assemblies. 
Various components are tested for their reaction to radiation. Test assemblies returned from the 
Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at INEL are unloaded from the shipping cask and disassembled. 
Verification of test integrity and connection of electrical and mechanical monitoring devices are 
performed . 
B. 1. 1. 3 Water Pit No. 3. Radioactive components are separated by milling m~chines into smaller 
units for examination in this water pool. Dimensional measuring equipment is used to examine 
selected components . Fuel storage racks are also located in Water Pit No. 3. 
Observation rooms are located along the nonhern wall of this water pool. These rooms are 
below the level of the water surface and have viewing windows into the water pool. Components 
may he visually exami ned and remotely handled underwater for shielding purposes from these rooms. 
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B. 1. 1.4 Water Pit No. 4. Operations performed in this water pool include spent fuel removal 
from transfer containers, temporary fuel storage in racks, fuel examination, and preparations for spent 
fuel shipments. Observation rooms are located along the nonhern wall of the water pool. This water 
pool also contains the transfer canals that would link the water pools with the proposed Dry Cell 
Project, which would prepare spent fuel for shipment in a dry, enclosed environment. 
B. 1. 1.5 Construction. All of the water pools are constructed of reinforced concrete in such a 
manner that they are watenight. The water pool floors are des igned to suppon installed equipment 
and shielded Shipping containers weighing up to 100 tons with a minimum base area of 8 square feet. 
Water pool zone depths range from 20 feet to 45 feet. Water pool walls and floors are coated with a 
thermo-setting plastic coating which is highly resistant to radiation damage, is easy to decontaminate, 
and serves as an extra barrier to water leakage. 
B. 1. 1.6 Water Treatment and Minimizing Radioactive Contamination. Radioactive contami-
nants which have accumulated in the ECF water pools through the introduction of corrosion products 
from irradiation test assemblies and the unloading of spent fuel are removed by various filtration 
techniques. The design basis for the ECF water treatment system is to allow no discharge of 
radioactive material to the environment, maintain water clarity, and minimize the amount of 
radioactive contaminants in the water. 
The design goals are accomplished through the use of water purification modules, water pool 
surface skimming to remove film and fl oating material , and water recycling systems. The water 
purification modules prefilter the water to remove panicles larger than 60 microns in diameter, 
remove any dissolved solids in ion-exchan~e resin beds, and remove any organic or suspended 
material by absorpt ion in an activated carbon bed . Spent resin, carbon, and filter elements are 
disposed of as solid radioactive waste. 
B. 1. 1. 7 Water Management. The total volume of the ECF water pools (excluding the two new 
transfer canals that are empty) is 3.000.000 gallons. A I-inch difference in the water pool level is 
equivalent to approximately 9 ,300 gallons . 
The water pools are maintained at a nearly constant level. Alarms are installed to indicate 
both high and low level conditions. The total water volume is accounted for monthly. Any addition 
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of water to the system is reponed to a separate NRF site organization for an independent verification 
of water volume. 
Water leaves the water pools via evaporation, temporary filling of sh ipping containers, 
decontamination of equipment. and transfers to retention basins. Th~ water pool evaporation rate has 
been calculated theoretically and confirmed by experiment. Water returns to the water pools by 
transfers from the retention basins and by draining shipping containers. Water removed from the 
system due to evaporation and equipment decontamination is replaced by adding demineralized water. 
ECF has the capability of storing 235 ,000 gallons of water pool water in three underground, 
steel-reinforced, concrete storage basins . Two of the vaults each have a 4O,000-gallon capacity, and 
the third has a 155,000-gallon capacity. These basins provide the capability to replenish the water 
pools and receive water pool water if draining a water pool zone is necessary. 
B.1.2 Shielded Cells 
There are 14 concrete shielded cells in the facility . These shielded cells are used for 
examination of smaller components. such as specimens which have been removed from irradiation 
tests that have been exposed to a neutron flux in the ATR. and fuel and non-fuel components from the 
water pools . 
The shielded cells are constructed of concrete. with walls 3 feet thick to provide shielding 
from radiation. Ventilation in the cell bank maintains negative pressure inside the cells in relation to 
the rest of the facility . This ensures that radiological contamination is contained within the cells. 
All work in the shielded cells is performed remotely by equipment controlled from the cell 
gallery, and is viewed through shielded lead glass windows. The windows are 3 feet thick , and 
provide the same shielding value as the concrete walls. The interior of the cells can also be viewed 
through wall periscopes that permit undistorted viewing of equipment and components. 
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B.2 RECEIPT AND HANDLING OF NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
B.2.1 Receipt of Spent Fuel 
Nuclear-powered ship assignments for refueling, defueling, and overhaul are currently 
performed by the six nuclear-capable public shipyards (Mare Island, Puget Sound, Pearl Harbor, 
Portsmouth, Norfolk, and Charleston) and one nuclear-capable private shipyard (Newport News). In 
1993, the federal base closing commission included Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards 
among the bases to be closed in the near future. The spent fuel is removed from nuclear-powered 
ships and loaded into shipping containers designed specifically for naval spent nuclear fuel. The spent 
fuel containers are loaded and sealed at the shipyard and shipped to ECF via railcars, as described in 
Attachment A. A maximum of 48 containers can be staged on the rail siding at NRF outside ECF 
while awaiting transfer of the spent fuel to the water pools. ECF also receives spent fuel from naval 
prototype plants in a similar manner. 
B.2.2 Handling of Spent Fuel 
The shipping containers are brought into the ECF building at one of the two defueling stations 
and are prepared for defueling by removing the dust cover, leveling, and filling with water. 
Appropriate containments to prevent release of radioactive material are installed and the container 
access plug is removed to allow access to the fuel modules. 
The containers are unloaded at either the west end defueling station or the east end defueling 
station . Regardless of the defueling station used, the fuel modules are removed from their shipping 
container one at a time using a fuel handling machine which draws the module out of the container 
into a shielded volume, and the entire machine is transferred to the water pools. The fuel module is 
then discharged into a receiving receptacle in the water pools. Photographs of the two fuel handling 
machines used are provided in Figures B-3 and B-4. 
Every item containing nucl ear fuel received at ECF has a unique serial number. When the 
fuel is removed from its shipping container, two ECF fuel handlers independently read the serial 
number and compare it to the shipping paperwork. After the serial number is confirmed , the fuel is 
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Figure B-3. M· I40 container fuel handli ng machine. Figure 8-4. M· 130 contai ner fu el handl ing machine. 
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moved to a uniquely numbered storage port location . Two fuel handlers then independently verify 
that the fuel is stored in the correct storage location. ECF has a computer-based fuel accountability 
system which maintains a record of the location and type of every piece of nuclear fuel and how 
many grams of uranium are contained within the fuel. This system tracks every fuel movement 
during the time that the fuel is at ECF . 
All naval fuel modules have metal structures which contain no fuel above and below the fuel 
region to facilitate coolant flow and maintain proper support and spacing within the reactor . These 
upper and lower non-fuel bearing structures must be removed to provide access to the fuel-bearing 
sections to permit inspection of the module. Removal also reduces the storage space ultimately 
required for the fuel by approximatel y 50 percent. The upper and lower non-fuel bearing structures 
removed during the preparation of fuel modules are evaluated using the waste classification criteria 
established by federal regulat ions in IOCFR61 and DOE Order 5820.2. These non-fuel bearing 
structures do not contain any fuel. or fission products from fuel , and therefore cannot be considered 
·spent nuclear fuel. · They also do not contain transuranic elements or fission products and thus 
cannot be considered high-level waste or transuranic waste. Therefore, the amounts of radioactivity 
in the end boxes cause them to be classified as low-level waste. As indicated in Section 5 .2. 15 , the 
amount of low-level waste generated each year at the Expended Core Facil ity is 425 cubic meters . 
The radioactive isotopes which represent 99 percent of the act ivity in this material are identified as 
follows: 
ISOTOPE 
Fe-55 
Co-{;() 
Ni-59 
Ni'{;3 
HALF-LIFE 
(Years) 
2.73 
5 .271 
76,000 
100 
PRIMARY MODE 
OF DECAY 
Electron Capture (x-ray) 
Beta and Gamma 
Electron Capture 
Beta 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission IOCFR61 identifies three classes of low-level wastes 
which are generally suitable for near-surface disposal. namely, Classes A. B, and C . Those meeting 
the requirements for near-surface disposal are shipped to the INEL Radioactive Waste Managem. nt 
Complex using a shielded cask. Wastes with concentrat ions greater than those spec ified for Class C 
for certain short- and long-lived isotopes were found to be not generally suitable for near-surface 
disposal . These wastes are class ified as Greater Than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Waste. 
May 1989. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission promulgated a rule that requ ires disposal of 
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commercially generated low-level waste with concentrations of radioactivity greater than Class C in a 
deep geologic repository, unless disposal elsewhere is approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion. 
Currently, a small amount (about 25 cubic meters) of greater than Class C low-level waste in 
material removed from the ends of naval spent nuclear fuel modules over the years is being stored at 
the Naval Reactors Facility pending availability of a disposal facili ty licensed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. This material has been collected and held at the Expended Core Facility for 
many years. This practice is expected to continue over the period of time covered by this Environ-
mental Impact Statement. 
After these upper and lower metal structures have been removed from a fuel module, a lifting 
fixture is installed to facilitate handling . Prepared fuel may then be inspected immediately or it may 
be held for a time prior to inspection in storage racks in the water pool. In the event that the fuel is 
temporarily stored while await ing inspection, spacers are placed at the bottom of the selected port in 
the storage rack to maintain the position of the fuel module close to the top of the rack to make 
movement of the module easier. 
Visual examinations of all modules are performed to verify that the fuel has performed as 
expected . As discussed in Section 2 .4.1 , about 10 to 20 percent of the spent reactor cores are 
selected for more detailed examination or destructive analysis in accordance with the needs of the 
Naval Reactors fuel development program. The more extensive examinations performed in the water 
pools include measurements of key dimensions of the modules and collection of specimens to be 
examined in the shielded cells . The specialized equipment used to perform examinations of naval 
spent nuclear fuel are described in more detail in the section of this attachment devoted to equipment. 
Destructive analyses are performed at the Expended Core Facility or at other laboratories, but all 
material subjected to such analysis must be removed from the spent fuel modules at the Expended 
Core Facility. 
The last steps of spent fu el handling performed at ECF are staging the module for shipment 
and loading the module into the shipping cask used to transport spent fuel fro m ECF to ICPP. The 
spent fuel may be temporarily stored in the racks in tho ECF water pools until a cask becomes 
available to transfer the material to ICPP. 
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B.2.3 Shipment of Fuel to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 
A lead·filled . slainless sleel shipping cask is used 10 transport naval and prolOlype spem fuel 
modules from ECF 10 ICPP. The cask is removed from ilS Iransport lruck and lowered imo the ECF 
waler pool unlil il reslS on the noor of the pool. The closure head is removed . and insertS are placed 
in the cask 10 provide proper spacing of fuel and 10 mainlain proper posilioning during Iransport of 
the modules. The modules are inserted into the cask. the closure head is reinslalled. and the cask is 
lifted from the waler. The cask is drained. the eXlerior is deconlaminaled . and the cask is loaded 
onlO the lruck for shipment. The Iransport of the cask 10 ICPP is described in Anachmenl A. 
B.2.4 Library of Naval Reactor Components 
As the firSI modules of a given fuel design are received al the Expended Core FacililY for 
examinalion. selecled key operaling componenls are relained in "library" Slorage in the waler pools 10 
provide a source of reference. These older componenls are kepI 10 ensure thaI there will be a 
representalive ilem available 10 assisl in diagnosis of problems which may occur in any operaling 
power planl in the neet. The ilems chosen for this library are usually those thaI have been in service 
the longesl so thaI they display the mosl pronounced effecls of use . As the various fuel design Iypes 
are replaced in neel service by newer designs. fuel componenls relaled 10 the fuel design being relired 
are removed from library slorage and shipped !O ICPP . 
B.3 HANDLING OF IRRADIATED TEST SPECIMENS 
The irradialed malerials program evaluales small specimens of malerials for use in naval 
reaClor syslems. The specimens are loaded in sample holders. and the holders are placed in lesl 
assemblies al ECF . The assemblies are irradialed al ATR . and relurned 10 ECF for disassembly. 
The specimens are cleaned. examined. reloaded in a lesl assemhly. and relurned !O the ATR for 
cominued irradialion. A Iypical specimen und ergoes several cycles of irradialion and examinalion 
over several months or years . Examinations include nondestructive and destructive tests . Destructive 
leslS have hislorically included seclioning of speci mens for mechanical lesling and melallography. 
Metallographic work was performed in Ihe ECF ha l cells in Ihe pasl and is planned to be performed 
on specimens in the future. 
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After complelion of the final examinalion. specimens are shipped !O ICPP for slorage or 10 
the INEL Radioaclive Wasle Managemenl Complex for disposal. Other specimens are shipped 10 
either the Benis Alomic Power Laboralory near Pinsburgh. Pennsylvania. or the Knolls Alomic 
Power Laboralory near Scheneclady. New York for more delailed examinalions. 
B.4 DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT 
The normal method for moving the fuel in the waler pools 10 designaled examinalion 
equipmenl areas is by use of one of five bridge cranes which move on rails localed on the lOPS of the 
walls of the waler pools . The fuel is handled remolely. All fuel movemenlS are conlrolled by Irained 
personnel . and accounlabilily is mainlained both by compuler and by personnel using fuel Iransfer 
forms. 
B.4.1 Water Pool Equipment 
ECF has unique equipmenl in the waler pools thaI has been designed for remOle operalion 
underwaler 10 perform specific examinalions on naval spenl nuclear fuel and irradialed lesl specimens. 
Special consideralion was given during equipmenl design 10 provide for remote repair and replace-
ment of componenlS. A descriplion of the water pool spenl nuclear fuel and irradiation test examina-
tion equipment is presented below. 
B.4 . 1. 1 Water Pool Band Saws. There are IwO underwaler band saws in the ECF waler pools. 
These band saws are used to remove the non-fuel bearing slruclural malerial from the top and bonom 
of fuel cells in preparation for inspeclion. The fuel region of the fuel cell remains intact during the 
cuning procedure. 
B.4 .1.2 Water Pool Milling Machines. Three milling machines in the waler pools are used 10 
separale spent nuclear fuel componenls inlo smaller seclions for examination in the shielded cells. 
The fuel region of the fuel cell remains inlacl during the machining. The mills are used to section 
spent fuel inlo pieces which can be handled in the shielded cells for examinalions. such as gamma 
radialion measurement. or for obtaining smaller specimens for melallurgical analysis or fuel depletion 
measurement. The mill head of the largesl milling machine can be remotely inlerchanged with a band 
saw anachmenl 10 convert the machine inlo a cUloff saw. 
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8 .4 . 1. 3 Universal Inspection Station. This equipment is used to obtain dimensional measure· 
ments using specially designed probes that are inserted in the fuel module. This equipment can 
position and rotate the probe in any orientation by a dedicated computer. This information is used to 
assess dimensional changes in the fuel module. 
8 .4 . 1.4 Vertical Inspection Gage. The venical inspection gage is used for obtaining dimensional 
measurements or to trace the contour of the external surfaces of fuel cell assemblies or control rods. 
This information can be used to provide a three-<limensional image of the fuel cell or control rod at 
the end of fuel life to determine the effects of fuel element changes on the overall fuel cell assembly 
dimensions over fuel life and the effects of radiation on control rod dimensions over fuel life. 
8.4.1.5 Video Visual Equipment. Underwater television cameras and lighting can be set up in 
any zone in the water pools to obtain images of the external surfaces of the fuel cell assembl ies and 
control rods . These visual inspections are used to search for anomalies such as excessive corrosion or 
wear on external surfaces. The bonom end of the fuel cell assemblies can also be inspected for fl ow 
blockage, corrosion, and wear. 
8.4. 1. 6 Assembly and Disassembly Tables. These tables are used to assemble and disassemble 
irradiated test assemblies that are inserted in the ATR. There are two identical assembly and 
disassembly tables installed side by side in the water pools. Each is mounted on a tilt platform that is 
used to rotate the table from a horizontal posit ion for test assembly and disassembly to a vertical 
position for loading and unloading the test assembly . 
8.4. 1.7 Headwork Station. The Headwork Station provides containment and shielding for the 
."echanical connection and disconnection of components to and from the unirradiated portion of the 
assembly and disassembly of irradiations tests for the ATR. There are two independent work 
stations; each consists of an elevator platform which raises the top unirradiated portion of the test 
above the water surface. A containment is pos it ioned above the water surface to prevent the spread 
of contamination while the examination is performed above the water. 
8.4. 1.8 Fuel Storage Racks. Storage racks are required at ECF since. at times . fuel is received 
into the facility faster than fuel can be prepared and shipped out of the facility . Racks are also used 
to store the small amount of naval spent nuclear fu el selected fo r retention as library specimens for 
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future reference and study. Ensuring that the racks are conservatively designed to withstand any 
credible accident and continue to provide adequate nuclear separation are the major criteria for 
storage racks . 
The basic configuration of a fuel storage rack is a rectangular structural array of storage 
ports. Each port has a square opening, but depth is variable. All storage ports in use at ECF are 
stainless steel. Stainless steel is used exclusively to resist corrosion during the life of the storage 
racks. The storage ports are designed to withstand the weight of the heaviest fuel module which can 
be placed in the port, and the frame assembly is designed to support the entire weight of all the fuel 
ports fully loaded with the heaviest fuel type. 
All the fuel racks are designed to maintain their structural integrity during a design basis 
earthquake and to withstand the impact of a fuel module dropped onto the fuel racks . Analyses of all 
fuel racks in the event of seismic activity has demonstrated that they will not collapse during the 
postulated earthquake. ECF also performed a full analysis of the strength of the ports if a fuel 
module were dropped over the fuel racks, including the kinetic energy which the dropping fuel 
module would impart to the rack. It was determined that all fuel racks at ECF were adequately 
designed to withstand the energy of dropped fuel. The analysis also identified that some equipment 
handled at ECF was heavy enough that the racks might be deformed if the equipment were dropped. 
Thus, operating rules and procedures prohibit the movement of large loads over the fuel racks to 
ensure that no accidental damage to the racks can occur. 
Fuel storage racks were also designed to prevent arrangement of the modules into a potential-
ly critical configuration. The fu el racks are designed so that each port separates the module it 
contains from every other module by a distance great enough to prevent criticality under the most 
limiting conditions possible. To assure that only one piece of fuel is placed in a port , all fuel storage 
ports are equipped with lids which can be locked and sealed . Finally, the frame assemblies of all fuel 
storage racks are covered with stainless steel sheeting to prevent fu el from inadvertently being placed 
between fu el storage ports. 
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8.4.2 Water Pool to Shielded Cell Transfer Systems 
Components that have been removed from spent nuclear fuel cells or test assemblies can be 
transferred into the shielded cells using one of the three available water pool to shielded cell transfer 
systems. The transfer systems use carts that are driven through underwater tunnels. 
8.4.3 Shielded Cell Examination Equipment 
ECF has specialized equipment installed in the shielded cells which is designed to perform 
examinations on fuel elements and components removed from spent fuel cell assemblies and test 
specimens that have been irradiated in the ATR. A description of the major shielded cell equipment 
follows. 
B.4.3. 7 Electronic Balances. These are commercially available electronic balances that have been 
modified to operate remotely in the shielded cells. Components on these balances that are known to 
deteriorate from exposure to radiation have been replaced using materials that are less susceptible 10 
radiation damage. The equipment is interfaced with computer data acquisition systems to aid the 
operators in tracking and reducing the data. These balances are used primarily to assess weight 
changes that result from corrosion testing of materials in the ATR . 
B.4.3.2 Descale Tanks. Corrosion removal is performed for test specimens that have been 
irradiated in the A TR and structural components and fu el elements removed from spent nuclear fuel 
modules. These tanks use heat , chemicals , and ultrasound 10 dislodge corrosion that has accumulated 
on the specimens or components. The corrosion removal aids in visual examination of these 
specimens . 
B.4 .3.3 Bridgeport Milling Machine. This is a high-precision milling machine that has been 
modified for remote operation in the ECF shielded cells. The mill is controlled by a programmable 
controller located in the shielded cell gallery. The Briogeport mill is used for precise machining of 
non-fuel components removed from spent nuclear fuel cell assemblies. 
B.4.3.4 Specimen Coordinate Automated Measuring Machine. The specimen coordinate 
automated measuring machine is a fully au tomated unit specifically designed 10 perform three-
Volume I, Appendix D B-16 
dimensional measurements on irradiated test specimens and st ructural components removed from spent 
nuclear fuel cells. The equipment is completely computer controlled and has an accuracy of 0 .00005 
inch (50 microinches). The information obtained from this equipment is used to assess the effect of 
radiation on material growth and fuel burnup on swelling of specimens. 
B.4.3.5 Fiducial Automated Measuring Machine. This machine is used to measure the distance 
between scribe marks that are put on some types of specimens during fabrication. The machine accu-
rately measures the position of the scribe marks in relation to other fiducial marks on the specimen. 
These data are used to assess the effects of radiation on specimen growth and distortion. as well as 
the effect of fuel depletion on fuel ele!!lent swelling. 
B.4_3.6 Gamma Scan System. This system measures gamma radiation emitted by fission 
products to identify isotopes present in the fuel as a result of fuel depletion. The system is controlled 
by a dedicated computer which positions the specimen, provides for data acquis ition and evaluation. 
and provides an output of the isotppes detected by the system at each location along the axes of the 
specimen . 
B.4.3. 7 Alpha Box. The Alpha Box is a carbon steel containment inside the shielded cells . It 
provides isolation within the shielded cells for fuel cutting to prevent the spread of fission products. 
This is the only location in the facility where cutting through the fuel region of spent nuclear fuel is 
allowed . 
8.5 FACILITY DESIGN AND INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS 
8.5_1 Flood 
A flood at ECF due to overflow of any source of surface water within the INEL boundaries is 
a low probability event . With the construction of the INEL fl ood control diversion system in 1958. 
the threat of a flood from overflowing of the Big Lost River_ the primary source of surfac~ water at 
the INEL. has become very small. 
The maximum water elevation postul ated at ECF would be caused by a hypothetical Prohable 
M .. imum Flood resulting from failure of the Mackay Dam. located approxi mately 35 milc~ northwest 
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of the INEL. The hypothetical flood could result in a maximum water level approximately 3 feet 
above the floor elevation of the ECF building. This flood is postulated to result from water flowing 
over the top of the Mackay Dam and causing it to fail due to high water levels. This flood is highly 
unlikely. (Koslow and Van Haaften 1986) 
Dam failure due to other causes, such as seismic activity, is more likely . Although the 
Mackay Dam survived the 1983 Borah Peak eanhquake without damage, it was built without seismic 
design criteria. Additionally, it is not clear how resistant the dam structure is to seismic events . A 
fault segment runs within 6 kilometers of the Mackay Dam. 
Flooding of the ECF building is possible should the Mackay Dam fail. Flooding of the ECF 
building would not create a nuclear criticality hazard . Flooding of the building could result in the 
release of water containing low levels of radioactive contamination to the environment and damage to 
equipment in flooded areas. Following the dam break, it would take over 16 hours for the flood 
water to reach NRF. This is adequate time to complete emergency procedure preparations, such as 
filling and placing sandbags, for the expected flood conditions. 
B.5.2 Earthquake 
The ECF building structure was built in accordance with the Un iform Building Code for each 
panicular phase of construction. Water Pit No. I , Water Pit No. 2, and Water Pit No. 3 were built 
to "Zone 2" earthquake requirements wh ich were judged to be appropriate under the U.S. Geologic 
Survey classification of the area at the ti me of their construction. Water Pit No. 4 and its two 
transfer canals were built to the more restrictive "Zone 3" earthquake requirements in effect at the 
time they were built. 
A seismic assessment has been performed for the ECF using the actual characteristics of the 
ex isting faci lity. Based on th is assessment , a des ign bas is seismic event at ECF could have a peak 
ground acceleration of 0.24 g (Rizzo 1994) . Th is peak ground acceleration is derived on the basis 
that a moment magni tude 6.9 seismic event centered near Howe on the Lemhi fault would cause a 
rupture of approximately 34 ki lometers along the Lemhi fault . The Howe epicenter is the epicenter 
located closest to ECF, and 6.9 was the moment magnitude of the Borah Pea:. earthquake in 1983. 
This approach for postu lating the location of the seismic event is consistent with the Nuclear 
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Regulatory Commission methodology used for commercial power plants. The beyond design basis 
seismic event was based on a scenario resulting in a peak ground acceleration of 0.4 g at ECF. 
B.5.3 Tornado 
A tornado at ECF is a low probability event. The document "Technical Basis for Interim 
Regional Tornado Criter ia," WASH-l3oo, provides the technical basis for Nuclear ReaclOr Commis-
sion Regulatory Guide 1.76, "Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants." The WASH- l3oo 
document identifies the probability of occurrence of a tornado at ECF to be 7.8 x 10" per year based 
on historical records. Regulatory Guide 1.76 identifies the maximum wind speed appropriate to ECF 
to be 240 mph. Data collected by Dr. T . Fugita of the University of Chicago performed at the 
request of the DOE for the period between 1950 and 1976 indicate the probability of a tornado with 
winds of that speed occurring at the INEL is about 1.3 x 10"' per year. Based on a threshold wind 
speed for tornado damage of 75 mph (refer to P. L. Doan, "Tornado Considerations for Nuclear 
Power Plant Structures, " Nuclear Safety, Volume II, No. 4) and a probability of 0.80 for the 
occurrence of tornado-induced wind speeds greater than or equal to 75 mph (WASH-13oo, Table 3), 
the probability of a damaging tornado occurring at ECF is 7.8 x 10"' per year x 0.80 = 6 .2 x 10"' per 
year. 
A tornado could not affect the fuel storage area in ECF in such a way that the fuel would be 
rearranged into a critical configuration. The anicle by Doan cited above analyzes the effects of 
tornados for the general case of spent fuel in water pools and concludes " . .. massive loss of water due 
to either tornado-induced wind forces or tornado-generated miss iles cannot happen. It is credible, 
however, that a couple of feet of water could be lost owing to the combination of water splashing, 
water entrainment, and pressure differentials. The spent fuel at the bottom of the water pools would , 
however, remain completely covered .... By the same token, the radiation dose level above the water 
surface would not increase by any meaningful amount ." 
B.5.4 Fires 
The entire ECF faci lity is protected against fires by one of several types of sprinkler systems. 
A large, intense fire in fu el handling areas is a low probability event because of the nature of the 
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materials of construction in these areas. the amounts and kinds of material present. and the fire 
protection system. Most of the spent fuel is under many feet of water. providing additional protection 
against a fire which might involve fuel. Fires at other locations in the facility would be extinguished 
by the sprinkler system and by manual fire protection equipment (e.g .• fire extinguishers or fire 
hoses). An extensive fire involving the ECF building structure is highly unlikely because it has been 
constructed of non-combustible or fire-resistive material to the greatest extent possible, in accordance 
with applicable Atomic Energy Commission, Energy Resource and Development Administration, and 
DOE design criteria. 
B.S.S Loss of Water Pool Water 
Loss of all water in a section of the water pool is extremely unlikely. However, should a 
heavy object be dropped onto a water pool floor , a crack could develop . If this were to occur, the 
cracked water pool area would be isolated and drained in a controlled manner to one of the retention 
basins before a substantial loss of water to the en"ironment would occur. Even in the event that 
severe damage to a water pool floor were to result in the loss of substantial amounts of water pool 
water, no nuclear criticality hazard would result and no melting of fu el would occur. 
B.6 CRITICALITY CONTROL 
There has never been an inadvertent criticality at the Expended Core Facility. This is the 
result of strict application of the following principl es . 
A fundamental principle of nuclear safety is Criticality Control. When a mass of nuclear fuel 
reaches a cond ition at which its atoms are capable of undergoing a self-sustaining chain reaction, or 
splitting (fiss ioning) into new elements. the result is called a criticality . Nuclear fission releases 
energy in the form of radiation and heat. Controlled criticality within a shielded reactor vessel 
produces energy within a confined space without harm to personnel or the environment. Although the 
water pools , the shielded cells . and the ECF building are des igned to shield and contain radiation and 
radioactive contami nat ion, an uncontrolled criticality (or nuclear excursion) within ECF is unaccept-
able, and comprehensive measures are taken to prevent such an occurrence. Criticality control at 
ECF could be described more accurately as "absolute criticality prevention ." Condit ions are 
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identified , equipment or processes are designed, rules and procedures are formulated, and personnel 
are trained to prevent occurrence of an accidental criticality. 
Safety analyses are performed on all fuel types and system designs where all single plausible 
and unlikely accidents are considered. Conservatism is employed in establishing limits and controls, 
and spent fuel is handled to the more restrictive as-built values. Then a "double accident criterion" is 
applied to all fuel handling equipment and procedures . The double accident criterion states "Fuel 
must be handled and equipment designed so that acceptable margins to criticality exist after two most 
limiting, unlikely, independent, and concurrent accidents. In this context, two errors in a routine 
administrative procedure are considered to be a single accident, not two. ' As a result of application 
of this criterion to equipment and procedures at ECF, the amount of fuel which may be handled in 
any operation is typically restricted to one quarter of the minimum amount which could achieve 
criticality minus a safe margin to criticality. 
All nuclear fuel operations must be performed in accordance with approved criticality control 
procedures. Nuclear safety analyses are carefully reviewed by the responsible management and two 
independent nuclear safety committees. Naval Reactors must approve each analysis before it is used. 
Strict reviews and approvals are also applied to implementation of safety analyses in fuel handling 
procedures. 
The successful criticality control program at ECF is also due to thorough training and supervi-
sion of fuel handling personnel. Employees are educated concerning the principles of criticality, 
associated hazards, and prevention . A system of checks to ensure that the rules and limits are strictly 
observed is employed . It includes detailed training documentation, qualification and testing standards, 
a self-assessment (audit) program, and an array of accountability and nucl ear safety drills . 
B . .1 PROPOSED DRY CELL FACILITY 
The Dry Cell Facility cons ists of a shielded, radiologicall y controlled area with remotely 
operated equipment. The faci lity is designed for a 40-year life. built of structural steel and concrete, 
and would be integral with the ex isting ECF bu ilding . 
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The major element of the Dry Cell Facility is a large reinforced concrete shielded cell with 
interior dimensions of 22 feet wide by 84 feet long by 21 feet high. containing all the equipment 
necessary to inspe<:t and disassemble fuel modules . The facility will have the capability to prepare 
and load one fuel module per shift in a shipping cask . Based on a two shift per day operation (500 
shifts per year), and a 25-percent maintenance downtime. the Dry Cell Facility yearly capacity is 
expe<:ted to be 375 modules. Shielded decontamination and repair cells will be attached to the main 
shielded cell to allow remote decontamination and repair of equipment used throughout ECF. Artist's 
views of the Dry Cell Facility and the associated Cask Loading System are shown in Figures B-5 and 
B-6. 
The dry cell design incorporates 4-foot thick, radiation shielding walls constructed of high-
density and normal-density concrete. The shielding is designed to limit radiation levels in normally 
occupied areas around the cell to 0.1 millirem per hour or less . At the INEL Site boundary, there 
would be no measurable elevation ahove the naturally occurring background radiation levels . The dry 
cell design meets the latest seismic requirements and includes negative pressure air ventilation for 
radiological contamination control. Shielded lead glass windows and viewing aids are provided as 
required at the workstations . Power, lighting, and a fire suppression system are also provided. 
The Dry Cell Facility is also designed to facilitate decontamination and decommissioning of 
the facility at some future date. This is achieved by including cell liner contamination barriers. no 
fixed embedded piping, a minimum of cracks and crevices, smooth surfaces , and wall penetrations 
large enough to be radiologically surveyed to verify decontamination effectiveness. 
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ATTACHMENT C 
COMPARISON OF STORAGE IN 
NEW WATER POOLS VERSUS 
DRY CONTAINER STORAGE 
C.1 INTRODUCTION 
This attachment discusses the advantages and disadvantages of water pools versus dry 
container storage should construction of additional interim storage be required . The discussion 
considers the generic safety aspects of water pools and dry container storage based on evaluations 
performed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) as 
well as experience with naval spent nuclear fuel. 
C.2 WATER POOLS 
During the last four decades, the Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the .daho National 
Engineering Laboratory (INEL) has demonstrated the 'safety and reliability of water pools under the 
cont rol of the Naval Reactors Program. Water pools have historically been the method of choice for 
interim storage and fuel handling because: (I ) water has a high thermal capaci ty for the removal of 
heat from the fu el, (2) the transparency of water fac ilitates the inspection and movement of the fuel. 
(3) water is an excellent gamma and neutron shield . (4) water is easy to purify and recycle, and (5) 
water provides a means to prevent release of radioactive material into the air. 
The safety of spent fuel storage in a water pool can be considered in terms of three generic 
criteria. They are: ( I) the integr ity of spent fuel under water pool storage cond itions. (2) the 
structure and component safety of the fac ility. and (3) the potent ial risks of accidents and acts of 
sabotage at the spent fuel facili ty. 
The NRC conducted an extensive investigation into the storage of spent fuel and documented 
the find ings in the Waste Confidence Decision (NU REG 1984). Based on the technical evaluations 
cited in that document. the NRC found that the Zircaloy cladding which encases spent fuel is highl y 
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resistant to failure under pool storage conditions and concluded that Zircaloy-clad commercial fuel 
satisfied the first generic criterion. This conclusion is consistent with the extensive experience with 
naval spent nuclear fuel. Naval fuel is Zircaloy clad and thus is highly resistant to corrosion in 
water. In addition, a Navy fuel assembly has much higher mechanical integrity than commercial fuel 
since it is designed for military application and is capable of withstanding shock loadings which may 
be encountered in banle conditions. 
The NRC also conducted an extensive evaluation of the structural and component safety of 
water pools. The NRC found no reason why spent fuel storage pools would not be capable of 
performing their cooling and storage functions for a number of years past the design life of 40 years 
if the water pools are properly maintained; therefore, the second generic criterion would be satisfied. 
This conclusion is consistent with the naval fuel experience of over 35 years of operatio~ of the ECF. 
The risk of major accidents at spent fuel storage pools resulting in off-site consequences is 
remote because of the secure and stable character of the spent fuel in the storage pool environment, 
and the absence of driving forces (i.e., high pressure or temperature) which might result in dispersal 
of radioactive material (NUREG 1984). The consequences of terrorist attacks on a spent fuel storage 
pool would be limited by the realities that the radioactive content of spent fuel is in the form of 
material encapsulated in high-integrity metal cladding and stored underwater in a reinforced concrete 
structure. Under these conditions, the radioactive content of spent fuel is relatively invulnerable to 
dispersal to the envi ronment (NUREG 1984). 
These cons iderations led the NRC to conclude that storage pools can be designed to safely 
wi thstand accidents caused either by natural or man-made phenomena such that there would be no 
impact to the environment. Therefore. the third generic criterion would be satisfied . 
The NRC concluded that all areas of safety and environmental concern (e.g., maintenance of 
systems and components, prevention of material degradation. protection against accidents and 
sabotage) have been addressed for water pools. and that spent fu el can be stored with no environmen-
tal impact. This conclusion is supponed by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA 1993). 
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C.3 DRY CONTAINER STORAGE 
Dry container storage technologies have been in use in the United Kingdom since 1972 
(MOCSG 1993). In the United States, demonstration projects have been underway since 1982. In 
dry container storage, multiple barriers prevent gaseous as well as paniculate fission product releases. 
Two separate barriers must fail before fission products can be released : (I) the fuel cladding, and 
(2) the outer secondary seal . In addition, dry storage systems provide metal or concrete shielding to 
reduce the external radiation to acceptable limits. 
The NRC concluded that dry container storage involves a simpler technology than that 
represented by water storage systems. Water storage relies to a cenain extent upon active systems 
such as pumps, renewable filters , and cooling systems to maintain safe storage. Favorable water 
chemistry must also be maintained to retard corrosion. Dry container storage uses convective 
circulation of an inen atmosphere in a sealed dry system so there is little opponunity for corrosion 
(NUREG 1984). 
The NRC also found that dry container storage of spent fuel in dry wells, vaults , silos, and 
metal casks is relatively invulnerable to sabotage and the forces of nature, because of the weight and 
size of the sealed, protective enclosures. which may include IOO-ton steel casks, large concrete-lined 
casks, and surface concrete silos (NUREG 1980). 
The NRC concluded that for dry interim storage, all areas of safety and environmental 
concern (e.g., maintenance of systems and components, prevention of material degradation. protection 
against accidents and sabotage) have been addressed and shown to present no more potential for 
adverse impact on the environment and the public health and safety than storage of spent fu el in water 
pools. This conclusion is suppon ed by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA 1993). 
As stated ear lier. naval fue l uses Zir<aloy cladding and has a much higher mechanical 
integrity than commercial fuel since naval fue l is designed for military application. Therefore. the 
generic concl usions reached for commercial spent fuel are directly applicable to naval spent fu el. 
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C.4 NON-RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SPENT FUEL 
STORAGE 
The NRC concluded (NUREG 1984) that "there are no significant non-radiological conse-
quences due to the extended storage of spent fuel which could adversely affect the environment." The 
construction of an interim spent fuel storage facility (i .e., the construction of a water pool, a concrete 
pad, a building, rail spur, etc .) would have little impact on the environment. The amount of heat 
given off by spent fuel decreases with time as the fuel ages and decays radioactively, and the amount 
of additional energy and water needed to maintain spent fuel storage is also small. 
C.s LAND UTILIZATION 
With the use of water pool storage or dry c ntainer storage at an existing shipyard, land 
already devoted to industrial use is planned to be used for the spent fuel storage facil ity. The amount 
of land required for storage at specific shipyards is addressed in Attachment D. 
C.s COST 
The use of alternate sites other than INEL would involve the construction of additional storage 
facilities. Both water pools and dry container storage could be used , with little environmental impact; 
therefore, the relative cost between these two options could be relevant. Conceptual cost estimates 
have been prepared for each storage option at each location that is being evaluated . These cost 
comparisons are found in Attachments D and E. 
C.7 SUMMARY 
Based on the above discussion , both a new water pool and dry container storage would be 
suitable for the interim storage of spent naval fuel with no important radiological or non-radiological 
environmental impact. If a facility would be required to be used for the inspection of spent fuel, as 
well as storage, then a water pool offers an advantage since water is an inexpensive and convenient 
form of transparent shielding . If it were not necessary for a new facility to be used to inspect spent 
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fuel, then the cost of the facility and the amount of land required could be factors in selecting an 
option. 
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ATTACHMENT D 
DESCRIPTION OF STORAGE OF 
NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AT SERVICING 
LOCATIONS 
(SHIPYARDS AND PROTOTYPES) 
0.1 STORAGE OF NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN CONTAINERS 
AT SHIPYARDS AND PROTOTYPES 
0.1.1 Introduction 
This attachment examines the alternative of storing naval spent nuclear fuel at shipyard and 
prototype sites where the fuel is removed from the reactor plant. Water pool storage, immobile dry 
storage containers, and dry storage in shipping containers are evaluated for each shipyard and 
prototype location. Under the No Action alternative, naval spent nuclear fuel would be stored in 
shipping containers. For the other alternatives where naval spent nuclear fuel would be stored at 
shipyard and prototype sites, the storage mode would be selected by the Record of Decision. 
Attachment C has addressed the generic safety of water pool and dry storage and concluded that both 
methods would be suitable for the interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel with very little 
environmental impact. This attachment addresses the design requirements, operational considerations, 
costs, and land requirements for the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard , 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard , Portsmouth Naval Shipyard , and the Kesselring Site. 
The interim storage facilities for naval spent nuclear fuel at shipyards and prototype locations 
would be designed to comply with applicable requirements . The storage facilities would be monitored 
and maintained in compliance with Naval Reactors Program requirements for radiation protection of 
workers and the public and the environment. Specifically, exposure to workers at the storage site 
would be maintained as low as reasonably achievable and would be controlled to Naval Reactors 
Program radiation exposure standards . As with current naval practices, no measurable increase in 
radiation levels at the s ite boundary would result from the storage of naval spent nuclear fuel at any 
alternate site. 
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0.1.2 Shipping Containers 
D. 1.2. 1 Container Design Features. Shipping containers and immobile dry storag~ containers 
position the spent naval fuel modules within sealed structures designed to physicaliy constrain, 
suppon, and remove residual heat from the fuel in an environment that prevents corrosion of the fuel. 
The massive size of the containers provides not only strength, but also shielding against exposure to 
radiation from the spent fuel within. 
The shipping containers might be M-14O sh ipping containers with long-lived seals suitable for 
storage of spent nuclear fuel for the duration of the period covered by this Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) . A description of the M-140 shipping container is provided in Attachment A. This 
container is already cenified to meet the requirements of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
contained in IOCFR71, for the transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel. With install ation of a long-
lived seal, the M-14O container could be qualified for storage for 40 years . The shipping containers 
could either be positioned on railcars at the storage site or on concrete pads. The process of 
designing the shipping container long-lived seal would commence with the Record of Decision if th is 
option were selected . The cost associated with the design and recenification of the shipping container 
would range from approximately $1 million to $5 million. The cost to manufacture each shipping 
container would be about $5 million . Some uncenain.ties in estimated co!:s exist due to the fact that a 
detailed design for the shipping container long-lived seal is not yet available. 
If the Record of Decis ion were to choose shipping containers, a more detailed eval uation 
would need to be performed to determine whether it is more appropriate to modify the M-14O 
shipping container design or whether a new container design should be used . Since the M-14O was 
designed as a shipping container, the modifications that would need to be made to conven an M-14O 
to accommodate interim storage might involve substantial new design work and recenification for 
shipping. 
About 500 additional containers with he lding capacity equivalent to the M-140 container 
would need to be fabricated to cover the projected reactor servicing from 1995 through 2035 . If an 
alternative using the shipping containers were to be chosen, an expanded manufacturi ng vendor base 
would need to be developed to meet the projected container requirements. With the current 
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manufacturing capabilities, 3 years are required to build an M-14O container and the output capacity 
is about 6 containers per year . 
The shipping containers loaded during the period preceding the Record of Decision would 
also need to be modified to meet the storage container design criteria. An evaluation would be 
performed to determine whether these modifications could be safely made with spent nuclear fuel 
present in the containers. In the event that the spent nuclear fuel must be removed from the shipping 
containers, the containers would be unloaded and the spent nuclear fuel would be transferred into 
modified shipping containers at a suitable facility under controls which would protect workers, the 
public, and the environment. The unloading of spent nuclear fuel from the original shipping 
containers and reloading into modified shipping containers would introduce additional spent nuclear 
fuel handling, transponation, and risks . 
D.1.2.2 Operations. The process of load ing spent nuclear fuel into shipping containers for storage 
would be similar to that used for loading M-140 shipping containers. During reactor refueling 
operations, spent nuclear fuel is normally loaded into M-14O shipping containers that are filled with 
water. The spent nuclear fuel is staged in this configuration for sufficient time to ensure that heat 
produced by radioactive decay of fission products is adequately dissipated . When the water is 
removed from the M- 14O container, the loaded M-140 can be shipped . After water is drained from 
the shipping container, it would be transponed to the storage site. The water is processed for reuse. 
The transponation procedures would be essentially unchanged from current procedures except that 
containers would be moved to the interim storage site instead of being shipped to the Expended Core 
Facility (ECF) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory ((NEL) fo r inspection. For railcar 
storage, the railcar would be positioned in the storage area. For cases where the shipping container is 
stored on a concrete pad , the container would be off-loaded from the railcar or truck, positioned, and 
then secured to the pad (if securing would be required). In order to accomplish this transfer, a large 
capacity crane would be needed at each site, and the site would need to be prepared as necessary to 
accommodate the mode of storage. 
0.1,3 Immobile Dry Storage Containers 
D. 1.3. 1 Container Design Features. There are currently no immobile dry storage containers 
designed for interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel. The container design would be similar to 
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that of containers which are presently certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for storage of 
spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors. The design, approval , and construction of an immobile 
dry storage container would commence with the Record of Decision if this option were selected . This 
effort could require up to 5 years to complete. The cost associated with the design and approval of 
the immobile storage container would be about $2 million. The cost to construct each immobile dry 
storage container would be about $2 million. These estimates are based on costs of commercially 
available containers with contingencies added to account for additional design features that may be 
required. 
Two concepts for storing naval spent nuclear fuel in immobile dry storage containers have 
been developed in order to provide a baseline fo r assessing the impacts. Other dry storage 
approaches (such as dry storage vaults) exist and would be considered in more detail if the Record of 
Decision were to choose the immobile dry container storage alternative. The first approach (referred 
to as the minimum fuel loading concept) is based on the number of spent fuel assemblies stored in the 
immobile dry storage container being about the same as that which is loaded into M-I40 shipping 
containers. This approach results in the need for about 500 immobile dry storage containers. The 
second approach (referred to as the maximum fuel loading concept) maximizes the number of fuel 
assemblies that would be stored in the immobile dry storage containers. The number of containers 
required for the second approach is about 300. 
The minimum fuel loading concept results in a container with a comparatively Simpler design, 
less maintenance, and lower unit costs (- $1.9 million/container). Under the maximum fuel loading 
concept, the container would need to be equipped with additional active cooling features such as water 
circulation to ensure that the heat produced by radioactive decay of fission products is adequately 
removed. These additional cooling features would be needed for a period of several years after the 
spent nuclear fuel is removed from the reactor vessel. For the minimum fuel loading concept, 
additional active cooling featu res such as recirculating water would not be required to remove heat. 
As with the shipping containers, an expanded vend r base would be necessary in order to construct 
the immobile dry storage conlainers at the rate they would be needed . 
Figures 0- 1 and D-2 provide conceplual layouts of candidale immobile dry storage containers 
for naval spenl nuclear fuel. 
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Figure D-1. Conceptual concrete immobil lry storage contai ner for naval spent nuclear fuel. 
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Figure I}-Z. Conceptual vertical metal immobile dry storage container for naval spent nuclear fuel. 
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The dimensions of the immobile dry storage container that would be used for naval spent 
nuclear fuel would be approximately the same as the M-I40 shipping container (i.e. , approximately 
10 to 16 feet high and 8 to 10 feet wide) . The fuel spacing within the container and the container 
itself would be designed to prevent any nuclear chain reaction, to ensure that decay heat is adequately 
dissipated, and to ensure that the spent fuel would be protected from hazards associated with natural 
phenomena or human activities for each storage site. 
0 . 1.3.2 Operations. Operations commence following the defueling of the reactor, after fuel 
modules are in a suitable holding container such as an M· 130 or M-I40 shipping container. The 
immobile dry storage container would be positioned at the storage location. Transfer of a spent fuel 
module from the holding container to the dry storage container would be accomplished one fuel 
module at a time using a shielded transfer container. All fuel transfers would be conducted in strict 
accordance with procedures which would have been written, reviewed, and approved by personnel 
trained, qualified, and specifically authorized to perform such work. The transfer container would be 
landed on the holding container, and a module would be withdrawn from the holding container. The 
module would be secured and the loaded transfer container closed, moved into position over the dry 
storage container, and landed. The transfer container would be reopened and the module lowered and 
seated in the immobile storage container. The transfer container would then be removed. This 
process would be repeated until the container is filled with spent fuel modules. The container would 
then be sealed. 
Transfers of spent nuclear fuel to the immobile dry storage container would be conducted in 
accordance with Naval Reactors Program requirements for radiation protection. Radiological 
containment devices would be used where necessary to prevent radioactivi ty from spreading to the 
workplace and from becoming airborne. The transfer and storage containers would contain radiation 
shielding that minimizes radiation exposure to the workers during transfer and storage operations and 
ensures that radiation levels at the site perimeter are indistinguishable from natural background . 
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0.1.4 Water Pool Storage 
D. 1.4 . 1 Water Pool Design Features. If the Record of Decision were to choose the al ternative of 
storing naval spent nuclear fuel in water pools, five water pools could be constructed , one at each 
designated storage site. Each water pool facility would be designed, built, and operated in accordance 
with DOE Order 6430. 1 A and consistent with the intent of Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
requirements in IOCFR72 and associated Regulatory Guides . The siting, design, construction, and 
approval of a water pool storage facil ity would commence with the Record of Decis ion and could take 
6 to 9 years to complete. The design and construction of each water pool facility would also conform 
with local construction standards for each site. 
Water pools operate by holding spent fuel modules in a deep pool of water. The water 
provides cooling for the spent fuel , a transparent medium for work activities, and protection from 
radiation (see Anachment C). The structural materials of the fuel modules and naval fuel cladding, as 
well as temperature and chemistry control of the water, would result in the spent fuel being highly 
resistant to corrosion. Corrosion-resistant racks below the water surface would be used to support 
and position the fuel modules in place for handling and to prevent a critical mass being formed. The 
water depth would be sufficient to provide shielding to protect workers and the environment during 
module movement and storage. 
D. 1.4 .2 Operations. The naval spent nuclear fuel would be transferred to the water pool in a 
suitable container, such as an M-130 or M- I40 shipping container. The fuel modules would then be 
transferred into the water pool using equipment and procedures that are similar to well-proven 
procedures used at ECF for unloading spent nuclear fuel from shipping containers. The spent nuclear 
fuel modules would be individually lowered and secured in the storage racks located on the water 
pool floor . The use of a water pool for storage of naval spent nuclear fuel would provide an 
opportunity for limited visual inspection of the exterior of the fuel modules after removing them from 
the naval vessels. Th is opportunity would not exist to the same extent for the dry storage container 
alternatives. 
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0 .1.5 DeSign Basis Considerations for Storage Containers and Water 
Pools 
The de:;ign of both the shipping and immobile dry storage containers would be in accordance 
with DOE Order 6430. IA and consistent with the intent of Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations found in IOCFR72 and associated 
Regulatory Guides. Anachment F describes the exposures which would be expected during normal 
operational exposures and the exposures calculated for hypothetical accidents that might occur during 
interim storage of spent fuel at each shipyard and prototype location. The accidents that would be 
used to establish the requirements for the design of the interim storage facilities are discussed below. 
D.1.S.1 Design Basis Considerations for Storage Containers. 
(I) Natural Phenomena. The fuel spacing within the container and the container itself 
would be designed to prevent a nuclear criticality, to ensure that heat produced by 
radioactive decay of fission products is adequately dissipated, and to ensure that the 
container would safely survive hazards associated with natural phenomena such as storms 
or flooding for each storage site . The shipping containers and the immobile d.y storage 
containers would be designed to withstand the most severe design basis seismic event 
expected for the storage sites . The seismic analysis would evaluate the internal and 
external structures of the containers and the components associated with stability of the 
containers . The containers and associated components would be designed to protect the 
environment during other natural phenomena such as tornado winds. tornado missiles, 
hurricanes, volcanic ac tivity, des ign basis fl oods, and very largo waves . If the Record 
of Decision involves the need for new faci lities for the interim storage of naval spent 
nuclear fuel . detailed s ite-spocific seismic evaluations would be conducted for those sites, 
and the results would be incorporated into the design of new facilities. The construction 
of any new facilities for naval spent nuclear fuel management would meet strict seismic 
standards for the interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel. The design and 
construction of these facilities to seismic standards which take into consideration the 
seismic character of the area would ensure that structures could withstand a major 
seismic evenl. The adequacy of the storage facility would be documented in a safety 
assessment report for each location. 
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(2) Man-made Hazards. The containers would be arranged to allow access for routine 
inspections. maintenance. and emergencies. This includes sufficient accessibility for 
pressure, temperature, and radiological monitoring as well as for fire fighting equipment 
and ambulances. 
The containers would be designed to withstand a fire without losing fission product 
containment . Flammable liquids and gases as well as explosive materials would be 
prohibited in the storage area with the exception of fuel in motor vehicles needed to 
suppon operations. Combustible materials su,h as wood, paper, and plastic would be 
kept to a minimum in the spent nuclear fuel storage areas. 
The fuel spacing within the container and the container itself would be designed to 
prevent nuclear criticality, to ensure that the heat produced by radioactive decay is 
adequately dissipated , and to ensure that it would safely survive credible man-made 
accidents for each storage site. Other man-made hazards such as truck accidents, 
airplane crashes, and objects dropped by cranes would also be addressed in the safety 
assessment repon. 
0 . 1.5.2 Design Basis Conside,ations for Wate, Pools. 
( I) Natural Phenomena. The spent nuclear fuel spacing within the water pool and the 
water pool itself and the building support structures would be designed to prevent 
criticality, to ensure that heat produced by radioactive decay is adequately dissipated, and 
to ensure that it would protect the fuel from the hazards associated with the design basis 
natural phenomena for each storage site (i.e .. seismic. tornados, missiles generated by a 
tornado. hurr icanes. volcanic activity, maximum expected fl oods, and very large waves). 
The water pools would be equipped with spent fuel storage racks for restraining the 
modules. The racks would be designed to safely survive the above hazards. If the 
Record of Decision involves the need for new facilities for the interim storage of naval 
spent nuclear fuel. detai led site-speci fi c seismi 11u' ions would be conducted for those 
sites, and the results would be incorporated 11110 the design of new facilities . The 
construction of any new facilities for naval spent nuclear fuel management would meet 
suitt seismic standards for the interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel. The design 
and construction of these faci lities to seismic standards which take into consideration the 
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seismic character of the area would ensure that structures could withstand a major 
seismic event. The adequacy of the water pool facility would be documented in a safety 
assessment repon for each location. 
(2) Man-made Hazards. The water pool facility would be designed to withstand fire 
without damage to the spent fuel within the water. Flammable liquids and gases as well 
as explosive materials would be prohibited in the vicinity of the storage area with the 
exception of incidental quantities of flammable solvents necessary to suppon operations. 
Combustible materials such as wood, paper, and plastic would be kept to a minimum in 
the water pool facility. 
The fuel spacing within the water pool would be designed to prevent criticality, and to 
ensure that it would safely survive credible man-made accidents for each storage site. 
Other man-made hazards such as truck accidents, airplane crashes, and crane drop 
accidents would also be addressed in the safety assessment repon. 
0.1.6 Shipyard and Prototype Locations 
This section describes conceptual locations at the shipyard and prototype sites where storage 
faci lities could be located to service refuelings and defuelings of naval ships. This section also lists 
land requirements for each storage method at each location, the construction cost for each method. 
and the associated operating cost. 
0.1.6.1 Land Requifements. This section provides a summary of the land required for each of 
the storage methods at each of the locations where refueling and defuel ing are planned from 1995 
through 2035 . 
These locations are the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. the 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard , the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. and the Kesselring Site. A map of each 
of these sites is provided in Figures 0 -3 through 0 -7, indicati ng a possible storage location at each of 
these facilities . 
0 - 11 Volume I. Appendix 0 
jg-
< 2. 
c: 
3 
CD 
o 
. 
-N 
figure 0-3. Conceptual location of the interim storage site at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard . 
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Figure 0-4. Conceprual locat ion of the inter im storage site at Norfolk Naval Shipyard . 
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Figure D-S . Conceptual locat ion 0f the interim storage site at Kesselring Prototype Site . 
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Figure 0-7. Conceptual location of the interim storage site at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. 
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Table D-I provides a summary of the amount of land needed for each of the storage methods 
at each of the locations where storage of naval spent nuclear fuel could be located. It should be noted 
that the number of containers and land required could be slightly less than identified in Table D- I as a 
result of actions talcen during the transition period. As shown in Table D-I , storage utilizing shipping 
containers on railcars would typically require dedication of the most land . 
Table D-I- Square feet of land required for storage facility . 
Shipping 
Number of Immobile: Containers Shipping 
Immobile Number of Dry Stonge on Concrc:tc Containers Water Pool 
Dry Storage Shipping Containen{l) Pad{» on Railcars Facilitt4) 
Location Containers(!) Containers W) ( ~~ (~'> (~'> 
Porumouth 27-51 61 10.000-19.000 18 .000 72.000 20.000 
Puget Sound 153-206 2 19 57.000-n .ooo 64.000 260.000 33 .000 
Purl H.rbor 21-30 42 8.000-11.000 12.000 50.000 20.000 
Norfolk 132-219 247 49.000-82.000 72.000 293.000 31 .000 
Kesselring 5-6 1.900-2 .000 1.700 7.100 17.000 
'" 
Range in required Dumber of containers is due to options in conceptual design (see Section 0.1.3 . 1). 
The immobile dry storage arrangement uses the containers stored on a concrete pad in double rows with 
one container diameter separation between adjacent containers. Each row is separated by a IS· foot wide 
acc:essway. Range in required land area is due to options in conceptual design. 
01 
"1 
The shipping container arrangement uses the containers stored on a concrete pad in double rows with 4 feet 
between adjacent containers. Each row is separated by a IS-foot wide accessway. 
Tbe water pool facility consists of a building that contains adequate space to house supporting equipment 
and facilities (approximately 17,000 ft~ and a water pool with adjacent work areas of sufficient size to 
accommodate the amount of spent nuclear fuel expected to be stored in the facility until 2035. 
0 . 1.6.2 Site Construction. Container. and Operating Costs. This section provides estimated 
costs associated with each allemalive for sloring spenl nuclear fuel at the shipyard and prototype sites. 
The major cost factors include facil ily conslruclion or site preparalion COSIS, container costs, and 
operating costs over the lifet ime of the faci lity . Cost estimates are based on 1995 dollars . 
Table D-2 provides a summary of the eSlimaled construclion costs for each storage option at 
each shipyard and prototype localion. The construclion costs for immobile and shipping COnlainers on 
concrete pads and shipping conlainers on railcars include estimated costs for concrele (labor and 
malerials), rails (for railcars), or cranes for lifting and handling COnlainers or fuellransfer containers 
(for concrete pad sto rage). The majority of the construction costs for concrete pad storage options 
D-17 Volume I, Appendix D 
)4-4-
Table D-2. Estimated site construclion costs (millions of dollars) . 
Immobile 
Dry Storage Shipping Shipping Construction and 
Containers on Containers on Containers Installation of 
Localion Concrete Pad Concrete Pad on Railcars Water Pools 
Portsmouth 11- 12 10 2 96 
Puget Sound 15-16 13 5 141 
Pearl Harbor 10-11 9 95 
Norfolk 14-17 14 6 135 
Kesselring 10 1 ( 1) 89 
Total ~ 54 15 556 
UlEstimate does Dot include costs associated with establishing railroad extension from the access railroad to 
the storage site. 
are associated with the need for a high-capacity crane. Waler pool conslruction costs include 
estimates of costs for construction of the water pool , building structure, and associated support 
equipment. The table shows that construction costs for a water pool facility exceed those of other 
alternatives, and that shipping conlainers on railcars involves the lowest construction costs. However, 
the water pool facil ity construction COSIS represent a complele facility ready to hold spent nuclear fuel 
for interim storage. The construction costs in Table D-2 for the other slorage modes represent 
completed site construction without the cost of the containers (see Table D-3) to hold the spent 
nuclear fuel. 
Table D-3 provides a summary of the estimaled costs to build shipping containers and 
immobile dry storage conlainers through 2035. The table shows thaI the immobile dry storage 
containers are the least expensive conlainers , and that the cost to build shipping containers to rest on 
concrete pads is slightly lower than 10 rest on railcars . The difference in cost between the iwo 
shipping conlainer options is due 10 the cost of a dedicaled railcar during storage . The shipping 
conlainer costs in Table D-3 would be reduced by about 13 percent due 10 actions taken during the 
trans ilion period (these actions are descrihed in Section 3.8) to ship conlainers from the shipyards to 
ECF. Consequently , the tOlal costs for shipping containers on concrete pads and shipping containers 
on railcars considering the Iransit ion period would be about 26 15 and 2760 million doll ars . 
respectively . 
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Table 0-3. Estimated container cost (millions of dollars). 
Immobile 
Dry Storage Shipping Shipping 
Containers on Containers on Containers on 
Location Concrete Padlll Concrete Pad Railcars'" 
Portsmouth 55-100 319 337 
Puget Sound 314406 1145 1209 
Pearl Harbor 43-59 220 232 
Norfolk 271-431 1292 1363 
Kesselring 10-12 31 33 
Total 693-1008 3007 3174 
fllRange in container costs due to options in conceptual designs (see Sections 0 . 1.2.1 and 0.1.3 ,-1). The lower 
end of the range represents container costs for the rn.u:imum fuel loading option (which requires fewer 
containers). 
Cllncludes the cost of an equal number of railcars and containers required for this option. 
Table D-4 provides the estimated costs to operate a naval spent nuclear fuel storage area. The 
operating costs include estimates of cost for personnel to monitor the facility, handle the spent nuclear 
fuel when it arrives at the facility, and maintain the facility . These estimates do not include the costs 
associated with eventual preparation of spent fuel for shipment to a site for disposition . Disposition 
preparation costs cannot be estimated at this time because the method for preparing the spent fuel has 
not been defined . Table D-4 shows that the lowest operating costs are associated with shipping 
containers on concrete pads and that water pool storage requires the highest operating costs. 
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Table 1>-4. Estimated operating costs through the year 2035 (millions of dollars). 
Immobile 
Dry Storage Shipping Shipping 
Containers on Containers on Containers 
Location Concrete Pad Concrete Pad on Railcars'" 
Water Pool 
Portsmouth II 8 
180 
Puget Sound 23 4 24 
206 
Pearl Harbor II 3 6 
180 
Norfolk 21 4 27 
206 
Kesselring 9 2 3 
124 
Total 75 16 68 
896'" 
(IlFor comparison. the estimated operating cost (personnel to monitor and handle fuel and maintain the facility) 
for the ICPP Building 666 for the same period is 232 million dollars. 
allncludes cost to replace or refurbish railcar after prolonged storage. 
0 . 7.6.3 Total Construction and Operating Costs. Table D-5 is a compilation of the data 
contained in Tables D-I through D-4, and calculated based on the entire 4O-year period from the 
Record of Decision (1995 through 2035). This table shows that the total costs associated with the use 
of immobile dry storage containers are the lowest of all the storage options considered except for 
storage at Puget Sound and Norfolk where the largest amounts of spent fuel would be stored. In 
these cases, the total costs for using water pool storage are within the same range of approximation as 
immobile dry container storage. 
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Table D-S. Total costs through the year 2035 (millions of dollars) . 
Immobile 
Dry Storage Shipping Shipping 
Containers on Containers on Containers 
Location Concrete Pad'" Concrete Pad on Railcars Water Pool 
Portsmouth 77· 123 332 347 276 
Puge! Sound 352-445 1162 1238 347 
Pearl Harbor 64-81 232 239 275 
Norfolk 306-469 1310 1396 341 
Kesselring 29·31 41 37 213 
Total Cost 828·1149 3077 3257 1452 
U1Range in total costs due to options in conceptual design (see Section 0.1.3. 1). The lower cost is associated 
with the maximum loading concept. 
0.1.7 Time Required to Implement Each Storage Method 
If the Record of Decision were to choose one of the alternatives involving storage of naval 
spent nuclear fuel at shipyards and prototype sites, some period of time would be required after the 
decision to fully implement the selected storage alternative. This section examines the time required 
to implement each storage method . 
0 . 1.7. 1 Container Storage. Implementation of the alternatives involving use of immobile dry 
storage containers and shipping containers could be viewed as a three·phase process. The first phase 
would cover the time required to design the container or container modification, to review and accept 
the design. to approve the container. to establish contracts for container fabrication . and fabricate the 
first container. During this phase. the shipyards and prototype sites where the containers would be 
stored would also construct. or modify the container storage location as appropriate for the alternative 
chosen. For immobile dry storage containers. this phase would take about 5 years. if 2 years are 
required to design and accept the container design. I year is needed for approval of the container, and 
2 years are required to build the container. For containers designed for both storage and shipping. 
this process would take about 5 years. based on I year to design the modifications. 1 year to approve 
the container . and 3 years to build the container. 
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The second phase would involve establishing funding. This will take approximately 3 years 
to complete. The third phase of the implementation period would involve fabrication of the remaining 
required containers. The estimate of the number of containers is based on the projected schedule for 
naval vessel refuelings and current estimates of the amount of spent nuclear fuel that would be placed 
into the containers. Although production rates for immobile dry storage containers and shipping 
containers are unknown, they can be approximated from existing production rates for M· I40 shipping 
containers. With current manufacturing capabilities, 3 years are required to build an M· I40 
container, and the manufacturing capacity is about six containers per year. This production rate 
would need to be accelerated to 18 to 24 containers per year by increasing the number of 
manufacturers and by making fabrication process improvements . If the production rate of immobile 
dry storage containers and shipping containers is the same as that of M·I40 containers and production 
rates can be increased as noted above, the supply of immobile dry storage or shipping containers 
would meet the demand for these containers at some point after the first several years . During the 
transition period, when an insufficient number of containers would be available to store all the spent 
fuel planned to be removed from U.S. Navy nuclear·powered vessels, some other means of storing 
naval spent nuclear fuol would be needed. As described in Section 3.8 of this EIS, it is expected that 
a transition period of 3 years of shipping followed by 3 years of allowing naval spent nuclear fuel to 
be stored in shipping containers at shipyards would provide the necessary storage space. 
D. , . 7.2 Water Pool Storage. If 6 to 9 years would be required to design, approve, and construct 
a water pool facility and this process would be initiated for each location within a year after the 
Record of Decision, water pools would be available for storage of naval spent nuclear fu el about 7 to 
10 years following the Record of Decision. During the trans ition period , when water pools would be 
under construction at selected locat ions. some other means of spent nuclear fuel storage would be 
needed. such as the method described in Section 3.8. 
0 .1.8 Summary 
Table D-6 summarizes the major advantages and disadvantages of the spent nuclear fu el 
storage alternatives previously d iscussed in this attachment. 
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Table 0-6. Comparison of naval spent nuclear fuel storage alternatives. 
Table 0-6 (Cont). 
Storage Mode Advantages Disadvantages 
I. Shipping Container 
Storage Mode Advantages Disadvantages 
2. Immobile Dry Storage I. Lowest total costs of all the I. The maximum fuel loading 
A. Storage on Railc,", s I. Least amount of container I. Railcars must be Containers storage options . concept requires that the 
handling after arrival at refurbished or replaced containers be fi lled with 
storage location. after prolonged storage. water for cooling purposes 
for several years after 
2. Eliminates the need to 2. Requires the largest land removal from the reactor. 
remove spent fuel modules area of the storage options, This requi res additional 
from the transfer container except for Kesselring. maintenance and slightly 
upon arrival at the storage increases risk of low-level 
site. 3. Shipping containers are contamination spillage 
more expensive than dur ing accidents . 
immobile dry storage 
containers and water pools 2. Must remove spent fuel (water pools cost more from transfer container and 
when small fuel quantities load it into immobile 
are stored such as at container. 
Kesselring). 
3. Water Pool Storage I. Has a lower total cost than I. Has the highest operating 
B. Storage on Concrete I. Eliminates the need to I. More container handling shipping containers, except costs of all the storage 
Pads remove spent fuel modules required compared to for Pearl Harbor and options. 
from the transfer container railcar storage option (if Kesselring which have less 
upon arrival at the storage containers will not need to containers. 2. Must remove spent fuel 
site. be removed from railcar) . from transfer container and 
2. Provides opportunity for load into water pool. 
2. Concrete pads are less 2. Higher total cost than conducting visual 
expensive than railcar immobile dry storage examinations . 
storage if rai lcars must be containers and water pools· 
replaced or refurbished . ("when large quantit ies of 
fuel are stored). 
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0.2 INSPECT HIGH PRIORITY FUEL AT PUGET SOUND NAVAL 
SHIPYARD 
0.2.1 Introduction 
This section of the attachment discusses the alternative of inspecting a limitecf amount of naval 
spent nuclear fuel at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (hereafter referred to as Puget Sound) to provide 
information on nuclear fuel performance for use in the development of advanced nuclear reactors. 
The inspections would be performed at the shipyard's existing Water Pit Facility. The limited amount 
of fuel inspected would be stored at Puget Sound following inspection, and all other spent fuel would 
be stored in a facility at or near the refueling or defueling sites until the time that permanent geologic 
storage becomes available. 
0.2.2 Water Pit Facility Description 
The Water Pit Facility is located at the west side of Dry Dock 5, within the industrial zone of 
Puget Sound. This zone consists of facilities involved in ship construction and repair, dry r!llcking, 
and conversions. The area is bounded by Decatur Avenue on the north, the waterfront on the south, 
the Naval Supply Center on the west, and the main gate on the east. The Water Pit Facility is located 
approximately 411 meters (1350 feet) from the nearest shipyard public property boundary. Figure 
0-8 illustrates the layout of the Water Pit Facility. 
The Water Pit Facility was originally constructed to provide the shipyard with the capability 
to refuel nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, with the work for the first such refueling at Puget Sound 
expected to commence in approximately 2006. To date, the facility water pool has been used for 
refueling equipment demonstrations and test ing. 
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Figure 0-8. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Water Pit Facility. 
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The following key features of the Water Pit Facility are presented in terms of the fac il ity's 
originaJ aircraft-carrier refueling mission. Because of these design features . the facility is also 
considered suitable for limited naval spent fuel inspection operations. 
I. A water pool for disassembly, assembly, and holding of fuel cells. The layout of the 
water pool is described below. 
2. A work area for unpackaging, inspection, and preparation of new fuel clusters and 
associated equipment 
3. An area for loading of shipping containers 
4 . A general use work area to suppon miscellaneous refueling suppon operations . 
The Water Pit Facility is divided into two distinctive structures. The high bay structure is a 
radiologically controlled area containing the water pool and general work areas discussed above. This 
Structure is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena and of postulated 
failures of adjoining or adjacent structu res without damage to the water pool or compon.nts in the 
water pool. The high bay walls are constructed of concrete to a height of 3.7 meters (12 feet) above 
ground level. The second structure is the Personnel Suppon Building which houses offices and other 
suppon areas. This structure is designed to meet the requirements of established naval facilities 
standard ized criteria for structural design. 
The water pool measures 7 .3 meters (24 feet) wide x 20.4 meters (67 feet) long x 11.1 meters 
(36.5 feet) deep wi th . water depth of 10.5 meters (34.5 feet). It includes four work areas on each 
side of the pool at the eas t end to suppon refueling operations and a fuel hold ing area at the west end 
of the pool. Tolfee of the four work areas are a nominal 2. 1 meters (7 feet) x 2 .1 meters (7 feet) and 
the founh area is a nominal 2.6 meters (8.5 feet) x 2. 1 meters (7 feet). The transfer aisle down the 
center of the pool is provided for all fu el and non-fuel movements . The water pool design includes 
provisions for isolat ion gates for each work area, for the fu el holding area, and for the dry pit . This 
isolation gate arrangement prov ides the capability to separate the various areas of the water pool if 
required . The dry pi t, measur ing 7.3 meters (24 feet) wide x 4.9 meters (16 feet) long x 11.1 meters 
(36.5 feet) deep, permits expansion of the water pool as needed . 
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0,2_3 Limited Inspection Operations 
If future naval spent fuel examinations could not be accomplished at current capacity, the 
capacity which was available would be used to best advantage. Only naval spent nuclear fuel 
ident ified as having the greatest scientific value would be selected for detailed examination. 
Generally, this is spent nuclear fuel which is the first of a kind design or which has a characteristic of 
special interest. 
Naval nuclear-powered ships would continue to be refueled and defueled at various shipyards 
across the country. Most of the spent fuel would be stored in a facility at or near the refueling and 
defueling sites until the time that permanent geologic storage becomes available. Those few fuel cells 
identified as high priority would be transponed by railcar to Puget Sound in standard shielded 
shipping containers. Following its receipt in the Water Pit Facility's rai lcar work area, a shipping 
container would be prepared for fuel cell removal (dust cover removed , leveled , filled with water, 
containment installed, access plug removed). The fuel cells would be removed from the shipping 
container, one at a time, and transferred to the water pool in a shielded transfer container. The cells 
would be discharged into the pool and placed in the holding racks to await examination work. Upon 
completion of examination work, the spent fuel would be stored at Puget Sound as described in 
Section 0 .1. Storage facilities would have to be designed and cenified to accommodate module 
sect ions resulting from spent fuel examinations as well as intact modules. 
The following major items of water pool equipment (or equivalent) are considered necessary 
to support a high-priority naval spent nuclear fu el examination program . Also necessary are the 
relatively small and ponable cameras and light sources for visual inspections. This equipment would 
suppon those spent fu el examinations currently performed in the ECF water pools at INEL as 
described in Section B.4.1 of Attachment B and summarized below. 
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EQUIPMENT 
ITEM PURPOSE 
Bandsawl Remove non-fuel structurals above & below fuel region 
Upender to provide access for inspection and to rotate cells 
between vertical and horizontal orientations 
Universal Measure fuel cell dimensions 
Inspection 
Station 
Vertical Trace contour of surfaces of fuel cell assemblies and 
Inspection Gage control rods 
Milling Machine Section fuel cells into subassemblies, preassemblies, and 
elements for other examinations 
FLOOR SPACE 
REQUIRED 
46.4 m' (500 ft') 
8.2 m x 5.6 m 
(27 ft x 18.5 ft) 
7 .5 m' (81 ft,) 
2.7 m x 2.7 m 
(9 ft x 9 ft) 
16.7 m' (180 ft') 
3.0 m x 5.5 m 
(10 ft 7. 18 ft) 
11.1 m' (120 ft') 
3.7mx3.0m 
(12 ft x 10 ft) 
Based on floor space requirements, the Water Pit Facility water pool and dry pit could not 
accommodate spent nuclear fuel examinations without removal of work area partition walls and 
without removal of the aircraft carrier refueling equipment. As a result, Puget Sound would no 
longer have the capability to refuel nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Expansion of the Water Pit 
Facility to accommodate simultaneous refueling and examination operations is undesirable due to the 
proximity of other shipyard facilities . 
Puget Sound does not have a shielded cell examination capability. Two options were 
considered for implement ing such a capabil ity: 
I. Transfer fuel sections from Puget Sound to a shielded cell facility at another Naval 
Reactors site such as the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory near Schenectady, New York, 
or the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory near Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania. This would 
require addi tional shipments of spent fuel sections across the country . The spent fuel 
would be transported in shipping casks which would have to be certified for this 
purpose. 
2. Construct shielded cells at Puget Sound . These cells would necessarily be sited some 
distance from the Water Pit Facility since sufficient space is not available either within 
the faci lity or adjacent to it in the industr ial zone of the shipyard . In addition, a means 
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of transferring items for examination between the water pool and the shielded cells 
would have to be implemented . Shielded cask movements via truck and cart movements 
via underground tunnel are two possible means of transfer. This option is undesirable 
because it involves construction of a new facility but does not provide direct 
communication between the water pool and shielded cells. 
Based on the above discussion, the alternative of examining a limited amount of naval spent 
nuclear fuel would include a full range of water pool visual and dimensional inspections at the Puget 
Sound Water Pit Facility and a full range of shielded cell examinations at another Naval Reactors site. 
This alternative would therefore include all INEL-ECF capabilities as described in Sections B.4. 1 and 
B.4.3 of Attachment B. 
0_2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of this Alternative 
Advantages 
I. Portions of the naval spent nuclear fuel examination program could be moved from 
INEL-ECF without having to construct new facilities . A full range of water pool 
inspections could be accomplished at Puget Sound. A full range of shielded c ~lI 
examinations could be accomplished at another Naval Reactors site. 
Disadvantages 
I . The small size of the water pool complicates placement of inspection equipment. As a 
result , the equipment would be limited in nature and would require removal of water 
pool work area partition walls and removal of aircraft carrier refueling equipment. As a 
result , Puget Sound would no longer have the capability to refu el nucl ear-powered 
aircraft carriers. 
2. Transferring items for examination between the water pool and shielded cells would 
involve additional spent fue: shipments ac ross the country and would require design and 
certification of a container fo r this purpose. 
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0 .2.5 Facility Support Systems 
The systems which were intended to suppon the aircraft carrier refuelings will also suppon 
the limited naval spent fuel inspection effons. These include the water pool fluid systems, the heating 
and ventilation systems, and the normal and emergency electrical power systems . 
0.2.6 Radiation Sources 
The primary sources of radiation in the Water Pit Facility would be the spent fuel and the 
associated irradiated components which are handled during inspection operations . Radiation results 
from the fission products which reside in the fuel region of the depleted clusters and are contained by 
the fuel cladding. The cladding around the fuel region would not be penetrated by any fuel cell 
cuning or sectioning operation in the Water Pit Faci lity. Irradiated non-fuel components are also 
sources of radiation, as are corrosion products which reside on all external surfaces. Handling 
operations could cause some of the corrosion products to become detached from the surfaces. 
Therefore. in addition to direct radiation, contamination must be considered in the control of radiation 
sources. 
The water pool water is treated by the filtration and purification system to maintain the 
waterborne radioactivity as low as reasonably achievable, typically less than I x 10" microcurie 
Co-60/mI . This level of activity is below the concentration limit in IOCFR20, Attachment B, Table 2 
for liquid effluents released to the general environment. The vessels and piping in the filter system 
then become potential radiation sources. The water must be considered a source even though its 
radiation level will be very low . The waterborne radioactive material causes equ ipment in the pools 
to become radiat ion sources, the water pool floor to become contaminated. and a radioactive scum 
ring to form on the walls of the water pool at the water surface. Even considering all of th-se 
sources contributing to the ambient radiation level in the water pool area, the controls which are 
exercised will ensure that the overall source is minimal and the occupational exposure remains as low 
as reasonably achievable. 
There would normally be no ai rborne radioactivity generated by the handling of the cells in 
the water pool. However, very low levels of airborne activity (approximately I x 10"" microcurie 
Co-60/ml) have been detected near the surfaces of other water pools. This level of activity is below 
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the concentration limit in IOCFR20, Attachment B, Table 2 for airborne effluents released to the 
general environment . The presence of even low-level airborne contamination will eventually lead to 
the venti lation system ductwork and HEPA filters becoming sources of radiation. This would occur 
over a very long period of time and the radiation levels would be controlled to a very low level. As 
noted above, the controls which are exercised will ensure that the occupational exposure remains as 
low as reasonably achievable. 
0 .2.7 Radiological Protection Features 
The facility is designed to protect workers and the general public from radiological risk. 
Controls are such that workers receive much less than the allowable limits for radiation and 
radioactivity. The ventilation system is designed to mitigate the consequences of an accidental release 
of radionuclides within the Water Pit Facility building and to limit the atmospheric release at the 
stack . The double-walled (reinforced concrete, stainless steel liner) water pool is designed to prevent 
leakage under design eanhquake force loading conditions. The radioactive fluid systems will maintain 
zero liquid discharge to the environment during Water Pit Facility operations. 
0.2.8 Estimated On-Site Dose Assessment 
The occupational radiation exposure for workers performing limited spent fu el inspections in 
the Water Pit Facility is expected to be consistent with that of ECF workers performing similar 
operations at INEL. As discussed in Section 5.2.12 . 1. radiation exposures to ECF workers at INEL 
have averaged approximately 100 mrem per year. The person-rem per year for the Water Pit Facility 
will vary with the manning level which is dependent on the spent fuel inspection activity occurring in 
the facility. However. the maximum manning level is anticipated not to exceed 60 people. 
0 .2.9 Seismic Design 
Structural loadings due to seismic activity were determined as follows. Building floor 
response spectra for the horizontal and venical directions were obtained from a three-{(imensional 
damping mass spring model of the high bay which included soil-structure interaction. subjected to a 
0.35 g ground acceleration value resulting from the seismic design analysis . The high bay 
superstructure and substructure were analyzed usi ng the flonr response spectra in separate finite 
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element computer models. The superstructure model was subjected to structural loads which included 
a 113.5-metric ton (I 25-lOn) load lifted by the large overhead crane. The combined forces of these 
loads with the seismic loads were applied 10 the substructure model at the column base plate locations. 
The substructure model was subjected to the design earthquake response spectra. This method was 
repeated for other combinations of structural loads with wind or IOmado loads. Members were 
checked and designed for the maximum stress from any of the loading combinations . In add ition, the 
water pool is designed to contain the pool water under design earthquake force loading conditions. 
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ATTACHMENT E 
DESCRIPTION OF RECEIPT, 
HANDLING, AND EXAMINATION OF NAVAL SPENT 
NUCLEAR FUEL AT ALTERNATE DOE FACILITIES 
E.1 DISCUSSION 
This anachment describes the options for establishing new or modified facilities that 
essentially duplicate the capab ilities of the existing Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). Also discussed herein are the differences from' the existing 
facility . which is described in detail in Attachment B. 
The ca~abilities of the ECF at INEL include detailed examinations of spent nuclear fuel from 
naval reactors and test specimens from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the INEL Test Reactor 
Area . It would be possible to provide ECF capabilities at an alternate DOE facility (Savannah River 
Site. Hanford Site. Oak Ridge Reservation. or Nevada Test Site) by constructing an entirely new 
facility . At Savannah River or Hanford. ECF capabilities could also be provided by modifying an 
existing facility . The preferred locations for siting an ECF at Savannah River. Hanford , Oak Ridge, 
and the Nevada Test Site are described in Sections 4 .3. 1, 4 .4 . 1. 4.5 .1, and 4 .6.1 , respectively . The 
main advantage of new construction is that the facility can provide all capabilities currently available 
at the ECF at INEL without limitations . The new construction water pool and shielded cell complex 
would be constructed in such a IT.anner as to duplicate, as much as possible. the capabilities of the 
ECF at INEL. The existi ng ECF is highly capable. having been designed to accomplish the tasks 
required by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program . Key disadvantages of new construction, 
however. are high cost and the time nece5sary to initiate and complete construction. 
Modir :at ion of an existing facility at Savannah River or Hanford which has at least some of 
the features that are requ ired in a functional ECF would enable reductions in cost and ti'11e to achieve 
full capabili ty . depend ing on how many facility mod ifications are required . A disadvantage. however, 
i, that some of the methods currentl y in use at the ECF at INEL may also require modification to 
effectively and promptly utilize an existing facil ity. and such modifications may compromise the 
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capabilities of the examination facility. The existing facility that can be made a part of the Savannah 
River Site is the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (hereafter referred to as the Barnwell Plant) which is 
unused and available following acquisition from its present private corporate owners. The existing 
facility on the Hanford Site is the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF) which is unused 
and available immediately. Sections E.2 and E.3 describe the modifications to existing facilities or to 
current processes that would be needed to provide the complete range of ECF capabilities at the 
Barnwell Plant and the FMEF. Section E.4 provides a discussion of how naval spent fuel and test 
specimen examination work would proceed through the interim period as this work is being 
transferred from the ECF at INEL to the ECF location at the alternate DOE facility . 
Receipt and handling of naval spent fuel at the new ECF location at the alternate DOE facility 
would be similar to receipt and handling of spent fuel at the ECF at INEL as described in Section B.2 
of Attachment B. Following all examinations at the new ECF. most of the spent fuel would be 
loaded in the water pool into shipping casks for transport to the long-term fuel storage location at the 
same DOE facility. The spent fuel would remain at this location until the time that ultimate 
disposition is possible. 
The new ECF would also cuplicate the capabilities of the ECF at INEL with respect to the 
assembly , disassembly, and examination of ATR irradiation test specimens. 
E.2 USE OF THE BARNWELL PLANT AT SAVANNAH RIVER 
FOR ECF WORK 
The Barnwell Plant is not owned by DOE but could be acquired and incorporated into the 
Savannah River Site property. It has a water pool compl ex with about 433 square meters (4660 
square feet) of surface area (see Figure E-I) that can be utilized with minor modifications to perform 
unloading of n .. al fuel transport casks in a manner virtually identical to that employed at the ECF at 
INEL. An overhead crane running the length of the water poo! would have to be added . However, 
providing naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimen examination capab ilities comparabl e to the ECF 
at INEL would entail an expansion of the Barnwell Plan t water pool to at least two times its present 
size. The design of the Barnwell Plant facility provides for such an expansion in an easterly direction 
while the exist ing water pool remains fun ctional in a reduced capacity mode. 
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It is envisioned that the full ECF shielded cell capabilities could be provided at the Barnwell 
Plant using a combination of the three remote maintenance cells and the eight sample and analytical 
cells. Material would be transferred from the water pool to the remote maintenance cells via a 
conveyor. The crane equipment maintenance gallery and the upper level of the remote process cell 
are connected by a shielded door; these cells are connected to the remote maintenance and scrap cell 
below by hatches (see Figure E-2). Additional work stations (viewing window and manipulator pons) 
would have to be added to service these cells . The remote maintenance cells are connected to the 
sample and analytical cells above via a waste chute which would have to be upgraded to improve 
transfer capability between these cell areas . Methods would have to be developed for material 
movement from one shielded cell elevation to another. The combined length of the ECF shielded 
cells atlNEL is less than 57 .9 meters (190 feet). The combined length of the Barnwell Plant remote 
maintenance cells and sample and analytical cells is greater than 67 . 1 meters (220 feet), so that 
sufficient cell work space shou'ld be available. There are also five contact maintenance cells 
available, although at present they have no workstations and are not connected to each other, to any 
other cell area, or to the water pool. An alternative to the Barnwell Plant water pool expansion 
would be to use the contact maintenance cells for some of the operations presently performed in the 
ECF water pool at INEL. Varying amounts of existing equipment and piping in the Barnwell Plant 
shielded cells would have to be removed and disposed . 
Once modified , the Barnwell Plant would provide the full range of water pool and shielded 
cell examination capabilities . However, the arrangement of the cells in the fuel handling area could 
make material movement within the faci lity more difficult th an material movement at the ECF at 
INEL. As a result, throughput in the Barnwell Plant could be adversely affected . 
E.3 USE OF THE FUELS AND MATERIALS EXAMINATION FACILITY 
AT HANFORD FOR ECF WORK 
The FMEF on the DOE Hanfo rd Site in Washington currentl y has a large shie lded cell 
complex that is suitable for ECF-type shielded cell operations with several modifi cations. Those 
mod ifications primarily entail the logistics associated with install ing the equipment in the cells and 
transporting items for examination to and from this equipment. 
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At present, there is no water pOQI at FMEF. One means of providing this portion of ECF 
capabilities would be to establish a dry cell facility . The FMEF main process cell , decontamination 
cell, and upper process cell were evaluated for such a facility (see Figure E-3). Conceptually, 
material would be transferred from shielded casks in the shipping and receiving crane bay into the 
decontamination cell via a ceiling port. At present, there are only small penetrations between the 
decontamination cell and main process cell; this would have to be upgraded to facilitate material 
transfer. The combined surface area of the three cells is about 706 square meters (7600 square feet), 
compared to at least 866 square meters (9320 square feet) for the conceptual expanded Barnwell Plant 
water pool discussed previously. This suggests that the full ECF water pool capabilities could not be 
provided in the dry cell facility. In addition, one or more of the process cells is intended for 
inci~sion in the shielded cell complex (see next paragraph). Removal of decay heat from spent fuel 
and irradiation test specimens in temporary dry storage would have to be evaluated. It is concluded 
that duplication of ECF spent fuel and test specimen examination capabilities at FMEF would require 
construction of a new water pool at least two times the present size of thl! Barnwell Plant water pool. 
The location of the pool and the means for transferring items between the pool and the shielded cell 
complex would have to be evaluated. 
It is envisioned that the full ECF shielded cell capabilities could be provided at FMEF using a 
combination of the main process cell and the 14 process support cells. The main process cell is 
connected to the process support cells below by hatches (see Figure E-3). There appear to be 
sufficient workstations (viewing window and manipulator ports) servicing all cells . Methods would 
have to be developed for material movement from one shielded cell elevation to the other. The 
combined length of the FMEF main process cell and process support cells is greater than 76.2 meters 
(250 feet), so that sufficient cell work space should be available. The decontamination cell and upper 
process cell would be available in support of shielded cell operations. The FMEF shielded cells are 
essentially empty. 
Once modified, the FMEF would provide the full range of water pool and shielded cell 
examination capabilities. However, the arrangement of the cells in the fuel handling area and the 
separation of the water pool and shielded cells would make material movement within the facility 
more difficult than material movement at the ECF at INEL. As a result, throughput in the FMEF 
could be adversely affected. 
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BEST COpy AVAILABLE 
E.4 INTERIM OPERATIONAL PERIOD 
A transitional period will exist between the date that the Record of Decision is issued and the 
date that the alternative selected can be fully implemented (unless the selected alternat ive maintains 
ECF operations at INEL). This transition period would be approximately 6 years . If it is desired 
that all ECF work be completely transferred to an alternate DOE facility, then actions would have to 
be taken to minimize the disruption in examination capability for naval spent nuclear fuel and ATR 
test specimens. This section discusses how this will be accomplished if the alternate DOE facility 
option is selected in the Record of Decision. 
The Barnwell Plant would have to be acquired by the DOE from its present private corporate 
owners. It is estimated that less than $SOO million in acquisition, modificat ion. and construction costs 
would complete the Barnwell Plant for ECF usage. 
The FMEF at Hanford is already owned by the DOE but it appears to requ ire a greater 
amount of design effon to be a full y functional ECF since a large water pool would need to be 
constructed and tied in to the shielded cell complex in order to initiate fuel receipt. It is estimated 
that less than $SOO million in mod ification and construction costs would complete the FMEF for ECF 
usage. 
During the transitional period between the Record of Decision and full implementation of the 
selected alternative, shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel to the ECF at INEL would cont inue, 
pending construction of storage and examination facilit ies at the new si te. All naval spent nuclear fuel 
would then be transferred to the new site. 
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ATTACHMENT F 
ANALYSIS OF NORMAL OPERATIONS 
AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 
Th is attachment presents estimated environmental consequences, event probabilities. and risk 
(a product of probability and consequence) for both normal operations and postul ated accident 
scenarios related to the storage and examination of naval spent nuclear fuel. Normal operations and 
accidents are evaluated to estimate the potential for releases of both radioactive material and tox ic 
chemicals. The results of these analyses are presented in terms of the health effects to facility 
workers and the public predicted due to the release of "dioactive materials and toxic chemicals into 
the environment. Effects on environmentaJ factors are also presented , based on the amount of land 
which could be impacted due to postulated accidents . 
Analys is results are presented for several different Department of Energy (DOE) and naval 
shipyard locations which are being considered as alternative sites for future naval spent nucl ear fue l 
storage alld examination. The DOE facilities evaluated include the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory (lN EL). Savannah River Site. Hanford Site, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge Reservation 
(hereafter referred to as Oak Ridge). and Kenneth A. Kessel ring Site. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard , 
Pearl Harbor Naval Sh ipyard. Norfolk Naval Shipyard . and Portsmouth Naval Sh ipyard have also 
been eval uated fo r naval spent nuclear fuel operations. 
SUMMARY 
Analyses of normal operations and des ign bas is and beyond design basis hypothetical accidents 
were performed to estimate the potent ial consequences due to release of radioactive materials and 
toxic chemicals . The analysis results for radiological operations have been summarized by the 
locations and alrernatives being considered in the Environmental Impact Statement. 
Historical Acci dents 
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has an outstanding nuclear safety record. In over 
4500 reactor-years of operation and more than 300 refuelings and defueli ngs of Naval reactors. there 
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has OeV!;!T heen a nuclear reactor a~ddl!nt . critkality acddl!nt . transponation a~ddent. or any release 
of radioactivity having a significant efft!~ t on the environment. 
Summary or Na.al Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Allernati ... 
Alternative 
No Action 
Decentralization 
No Examination 
Decentral ization 
Limited Examination 
Decentral ization 
Full Exam inat ion 
Planning Basis 
Regionalization or 
Central ization 
Normal Operations 
Description of SNF Activity 
SNF retained at shipyards and Kesselring . Dry storage in con-
tainers only . 
SNF retained at shipyards and Kesselring. Either dry conlainers or 
water pool storage would be used . 
SNF retained at shipyards and Kesselring. Either dry containers or 
water pool storage would be used . Limited SNF sh ipments to 
Pugel Sound Naval Shipyard for examination. 
All SNF shipped to INEL-ECF fo r examination. All SNF returned 
to origin for storage in eithl!f dry comaint!fs or water pools. 
SNF would be received. examined. and stored at INEL as in past 
years. The proposed dry cell faci lilY would he compl eted at ECF. 
SNF would he received . examined. and stored at ei ther INEL. 
Hanford . Savannah River. Nevada Test Site. or Oak Ridge. 
Table F- I presents the eslimated numher of fatal cancers per year to the general JX'pul ation 
living with in a 50-mile radius of 1!3ch facil ity dut! to rad iolug h.:al rd l!ases from normal opt!ralions. 
The results in this table were calculated using Ihe methods described in Seclion F. I .3. The numher 
of fatal cancers is ver'i low at all locations and for all altt! rnati vt;!s . 
The ISC2 compuler code (EPA 1992h) was used 10 estimale the concentration of chem;';als 
released during normal operations. The results show that for INE L. Hanford . Savannah River. the 
Nevada Test Site. the Barnwell Pl ant. and Oak Ridge. no amhient ai r qualilY standards would he 
exceeded: therefore. no adverse effc!~ l s ar\! t!xP\!~too . Hc:aling hui lC:TS and t!mt!rgt! n~y dic:sd 
generators already exist at the Navy shipyard lo.:ations and thus sdt!~tio n uf thc:st! ait c:rnatl! l o~at in ns 
would not result in a measurable! in~rl!ast! in c:missions . 
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Hypothetical Accident Evaluations 
Several hypothetical accidents were analyzed at each facility for each of the alternatives . The 
results are summarized in Tables F-2 and F-3. TIl results in these tables were calculated using the 
methods described in Section F. I .3. Both fatal cancers from the maximum foreseeable accident at 
each location and the most severe risk from a facility accident at each location are presented. Risk is 
defined as the product of the consequences of an event multiplied by the probability of that event. 
The risks associated with the accidents analyzed have not been added together in order to avoid 
creating the impression that all risks have been calculated. The risks presented in this appendix cover 
the complete range of accidents which might make a detectable contribution to overall risk and 
additional analyses would not be expected to result in increases in calculated risk. The facility 
accident which results in the highest risk is a drained water pool at (NEL, Hanford , Puget Sound, 
Portsmouth, and Kesselring . For Savannah River, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk, the Nevada Test Site, and 
Oak Ridge, an airplane crash into a dry storage area or a dry cell facility results in the greatest risk. 
As was the case for the normal operations evaluation , the accident risk is very low at all locations and 
for all alternatives . 
Table F-4 presents a summary of the risk of fatal cancers by alternative for normal operations 
and most severe facility accident fo r each alternative. Consistent with the detailed tables , this 
summaiY table shows that all alternatives and all locations assoc iated with spent fuel examination have 
very low risk. 
Tables F-5 through F-8 present a summary by alternative of the impacts from all naval spent 
nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents which were analyzed. 
A shipping accident in Puget Sound, at a location in the shipp ing lane approximately 2 mil es 
from Seattle, was also anal yzed usi ng th v methods described in th is Attachment. Th is hypothetical 
accident results in a fire onboard the ship which involves spent nuclear fuel shipping conta iners. 
When compared to the fac ility accidents analyzed at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, this shipping 
accident has a sl ightl y lower risk of fatal cancers than the most severe facil ity accident at the 
shipyard. 
The EP( computer code (Homann 1988) was used to estimate the concentration of chemicals 
released in the event of two postulated accident condition . One postulated accident involved a 
chemical spill and fi re at ECF and the alternate DOE sites and the other postulated accident involved 
a diesel fuel fire at ECF, the al ternate DOE sites, and the shipyard locations . The chemical 
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Table F-l. Number of fatal cancers per year from normal operations (fatalities per year to general population located within 2: 50-mile radius of site) . 
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DRY STORAGE AT NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM SITES, WATER POOL STORAGE AT DOE SITES 
Planning Basis! 
DecentraliZAtion- RegionaliZAtionl RegionaliZAtionl 
No Action DecentraliZAtion- Puget Sound DecentraliZAtion- CentraliZAtion- CentraliZAtion-
No Examination Exam INEL Exam INEL Hanford 
INEL 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 8.50 x 10-1 8.50 x 10-1 0 .00 
Hanford 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 4.00 x 10~ 
Savannah River 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nevada Test Site 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Oak Ridge 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 
Pugct Sound 1 . 20xI0~ 1.20 x 1 0~ 6 .62 x 10-5 •• 1.20 x 10~ 0.00 0 .00 
Pearl Harbor 9 .30 x 10-9 9.30 X 10- 9 9.30 x 10- 9 9 .30 x 10-9 0.00 0.00 
Portsmouth 2.30 x 10-1 2.30 x 10-1 2.30 x 10-1 2.30 X 10-1 0.00 0.00 
Norfolk 2.10 x 10-5 2.10 x 10-5 2. IOx 10-5 2.10 x 10-5 0.00 0.00 
Kess.:Jring 4. 10 x 10-12 4.10 x 10-12 4.10 x 10-12 4.10 x 10- ,2 0.00 0 .00 
Total 2.24 x 10-5 2.24 x 10-5 8.74 x 10-5 2.33 x 10-5 8.50 x 10-1 4.00 x 10~ 
WATER POOL STORAGE AT ALL SITES* 
INEL 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.50 X 10-1 
Hanford 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Savannah River 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nevada Test Site 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 
Oak Ridge 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Pugct Sound 1.20 x 10-6 6.50 x 10-5 6 .50 x 10-5 6.50 x 10-5 
Pearl Hamor 9.30 x 10-9 7.00 x 10-5 7.00 x 10-5 7.00 x 10-5 
Portsmouth 2.30 x 10-1 2.30 x 10-5 2.30 x 10-5 2.30 x 10-5 
Norfolk l . IO x 10-5 1.40 x 10~ 1.40 x 10~ 1.40 x 10~ 
Kesselring 4.10 x 10- '2 4.10 x 10-5 4.10 x 10-5 4.10 x 10-5 
TOOl I 2.24 x 10-5 3.39 x 10~ 3.39 x 10~ 3.40 x 10~ 
. Under No Action alternative, dry storage at Naval Nuclear PropulSion Program sites 
··Includes dry 8toroge and waler pool examination under this alternative 
8.50 x 10-1 0.00 
0.00 4.00 x 10~ 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
8.50 x 10-1 4.00 x 10~ 
RegionaliZAtionl RegionaliZAtionl RegionaliZAtionl 
CentraliZAtion- CentniliZAtion- Cenlr1lliZAtion-
Savannah River Nenda Teat Sile Oak Ridge 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0 .00 
1.80 x 10-5 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 9.00 x 10~ 0.00 
0 .00 0 .00 5.00 X 10-5 
0.00 0.00 0 .00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.80 x 10-5 9.00 x 10-1 5.00 x 10-5 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 .00 0 .00 0.00 
1.80 x 10-5 0 .00 0.00 
0.00 9 .00 x 10~ 0 .00 
0.00 0 .00 5.0 x 10-5 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0 .00 0.00 
1.80 x 10-5 9.00 x 10~ 5.00 x 10-5 
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Table F-2. Number of fatal cancers from a maximum foreseeable accident (fatalities per accident over a 50-year period to general 
population within a 50-mile radius of site) . 
DRY STORAGE AT NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM SITES, WATER POOL STORAGE AT DOE SITES 
Planning Basisl 
Decentralizalion- Regionalizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl 
No Action Decentralizalion- Pugel Sound Decentralization- Centrali7Alion- Centralization- Centralization · Centralization- Centralization-
No Examination Exam INEL Exam INEL Hanford Savannah River Nevada Tell Site Oak Ridge 
INEL 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.70 X 10-2 1.70 X 10-2 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Hanford 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 4.70 X 10-2 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Savannah River 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 4.80 0.00 0.00 
Nevada Test Site 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 1.80 X 10-1 0.00 
Oak Ridge 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.40 
Pugel Sound 1.7 x 10-2 1.7 X 10- 2 5. 1 X 10-1 .. 1.7 X 10-2 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pearl Harbor 2.60 x 101 2.60 X 101 2.60 X 101 2.60 X 101 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
Pons mouth 9 .00 9.00 9.00 9 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 O .~ 0 .00 
Norfolk 1.6 X 101 1.6 X 101 1.6 ~ 101 1.6 X 101 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
Kesselring 7.50 7.50 7.50 7 .50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
Max 2.60 x 101 2.60 X 101 2.60 X 101 2.60 X 10\ 1.70 X 10-2 4.70 X 10-2 4.80 1.80 x 10-\ 8.40 
-
WATER POOL STORAGE AT ALL SITES* 
INEL 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70 X 10-2 1.70 X 10-2 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 
Hanford 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.70 X 10-2 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Savannah River 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 4.80 0 .00 0 .00 
Nevada Test Sile 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 1.80 X 10-\ 0 .00 
Oak Ridge 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 8.40 
Pugel Sound 1.7 x 10-2 5.1 X 10-1 5.1 X 10-1 5.1 X 10-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Pearl Harbor 2.60 X 10\ 1.10 1.10 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Ponsmouth 9.00 3.40 x 10-1 3.40 X 10-\ 3.40 X 10-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
Norfolk 1.6 x 101 6 .0 X 10-1 6 .0 X 10-1 6.0 X 10-1 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
Kesselring 7.50 2.50 x 10-1 2.50 X 10-1 2.50 X 10-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 
Max 2 .60 x 10\ 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.70 x 10-2 4.70 X 10-2 4.80 1.80 x 10-1 8.40 
· Under No Achon altemahve . dry slorage .t Nav.1 Nuclear uls10n Program slles Prop 
··lncludes dry storage and water pool examination under this alternative /~ 
Table F-3. Most severe risk from a facility accident (probability of fatalities per year per accident to general population within a 
~ 50-mile radius of site). 
i: 
3 
(1) 
DRY STORAGE AT NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM SITES, WATER POOL STORAGE AT DOE SITES 
Planning Basis! 
Decentralization- Regional ization Regionalization/ RegioMlization/ RegioMlization/ RegioMlization/ 
No Action Decentralization- Puget Sound Decentralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization-
No Examination Exam INEL Exam INEL Hanford Savannah River NeYidi Teat Site OIk Ridge 
INEL 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 1.70 x 10-7 1.70 x 10-7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hanford 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.70 x 10-7 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Savannah River 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 9.(0 x 10~ 0.00 0.00 
Nevada Test Site 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 7.20 x 10 .... 0.00 
Oak Ridge 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.40 x 10~ 
Puget Sound 1.7 x 10-7 1.7xlO-7 5.10 x 10~" 1.7 x 10-7 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 
Pearl Harbor 2.60 x 10~ 2.60 X 104 2.60 X 104 2.60 x 10~ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Portsmouth 9.00 x 10-7 9.00 x 10-7 9.00 x 10-7 9.00 x 10-7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Norfolk 1.6 x IO-~ 1.6 x IO-~ 1.6 x IO-~ 1.6 x IO-~ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 
Kessdring 7.50 x 10-7 7.50 x 10-7 7.50 x 10-7 7.50 x 10-7 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 2.60 x IO~ 2.60 x IO~ 2.60 X 104 2.60 X 104 1. 70 X 10-7 4.70 x 10-7 9.60 x 10~ 7.2 x 10 .... 8.40 x 10~ 
WATER POOL STORAGE AT ALL SITES* 
INEL 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70 X 10-7 1.70 x 10-7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hanford 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.70 X 10-7 0.00 0 .00 0.00 
Savannah River 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.60 x 10~ 0.00 0.00 
Nevada Tes! Site 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 7.20 x 10-8 0.00 
Oak Ridge 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.40 x 10~ 
Puget Suund 1.7 x 10-7 5.1 x 10~ 5.1 x 10~ 5.1 x 10~ 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
Pearl Harbor 2.60 x 10~ 1.10 x IO-~ 1.10 x 10-~ 1.10 x IO-~ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Portsmouth 9.00 x 10-7 3 .40 x 10~ 3.40 x 10~ 3.40 x 10~ 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Norfolk 1.6 x 10-~ 6.0 x 10~ 6.0 x 10~ 6.0 x 10~ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 
Kesselring 7.50 X 10-7 2.50 x IO~ 2.50 x 10~ 2.50 x 10~ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 2.60 x 10~ \.10 x IO-~ \.10 x IO-~ \.10 x IO-~ 1.70 x 10-7 4.70 x 10-7 9.60 x 10~ 7.20 x 10 .... 8.40 x 10~ 
· Under No ActIon alternative, dry Itorage at Naval Nuclear PropulSIon Pro8ram IItel I ··Include. d Ilora e and water I examiMtion under thil alternative ry ql g po<> 
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Table F-4. Risk of fatal cancers by alternative (probability of fatalities per year per accident to general population within a 
50-mile radius of site). 
Planning Basis! 
Decentralization- Regionalization Regionalizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl 
Decentralization- Puget Sound Decentralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization-
No Action No Examination Exam INEL Exam INEL Hanford Savannah River Nevada Test Site Oak Ridge 
Normal 
Operations Risk 
Dry Storage At 
2.24 x IO-~ Navy Sites, 2 .24 x IO-~ 8.74 x 10-' 2.33 x 10-' 8.50 X 10-7 4.00 x 10~ 1.80 x IO-~ 9.00 x 10~ 5.00 x 10-' 
Water Pool 
Storage At DOE 
Sites 
Normal 
Operations Risk 
Watu Pool 2.24 x 10-' 3 .39 X 10-4 3.39 X 10-4 3.40 X 10-4 8 .50 X 10-7 4.00 x 10~ 1.80 x IO-~ 9 .00 x IO~ 5.00 x 10-' 
Storage At All 
Sites 
Most Severe 
Ri sk From A 
Facility 
Accident Dry 
Storage At 2.60 x 10-4 2.60 X 10-4 2.60 X 10-4 2.60 X 10-4 1.70 x 10-7 4.70 x 10-7 9.60 x 10~ 7.20 x 10~ 11 .40 x 10~ 
Naval Nuclear (I) (I) (I) (I) (2) (2) (I) (I) (I) Propulsion 
Program Sites , 
Water Pool 
Storage At DOE 
Sites 
Most Severe 
Ri sk From A 
Facility 2.60 x 10-4 1.10 x IO-~ 1.10 x IO-~ 1.10 x IO-~ 1.70 X 10-7 4.70 X 10-7 9.60 x 10~ 7.2 x 10~ 11 .40 x IO~ 
Accident Water (I) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (1) (I) (I) 
Pool Storage At 
All Sites 
(I) Accident initiator - Airplane crash 
(2) Accident initiator - Drained ""ater pool 
Table F-S. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for the 
No Action alternative. 
Table F-6. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel faci lity radiological accidents for 
Decentralization alternatives. 
Consequences 
to Public 
Accident Probability (fatalities Risk to Public Dose to Worker Dose to MOl 
Description (per year) per accident) (fatalit ies) (rem) (rem) 
Consequences 
to Public 
Accident Probability (fatalities Risk to Public Dose to Worker Dose to MOl 
Description (per year) per accident) (fatalities) (rem) (rem) 
DRY STORAGE ACCIDENTS WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION 
ACCIDENTS 
Mechanical Damage 
Puget Sound 1.0 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 3.9 x 10-' 
"Information applicable only for full examinations at INEL. 
Pearl Harbor 1.0 x 10-' 3.0 x 10-' 3.0 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 2.1 x 10-' Drained Water Pool 
Norfolk 1.0 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 8.1 x 10-' 
Ponsmouth 1.0 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 4.2 x 10-' "INEL 1.0 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-' 2. 1 1.7 x 10-' 
Kesselring 1.0 x 10-' 7.4 x 10-' 7.4 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 8.1 x 10-' Puget Sound 1.0 x 10-' 5. 1 x 10-' 5. 1 x 10-" 2. 1 1.4 
Pearl Harbor 1.0 x 10-' 1.1 1.1 x 10-' 2. 1 7.9 x 10-' 
Airplane Crash Norfolk 1.0 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-<1 2.1 . 3.0 
Ponsmouth 1.0 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-<1 2.1 1.6 
Pearl Harbor 1.0 x 10-' 26 2.6 x 10-< 92 19 Kesselring 1.0 x 10-' 2.5 x 10-' 2.5 x 10-< 2.1 2.9 x 10-' 
Norfolk 1.0 x 10-" 16 1.6 x 10-' 92 72 
Ponsmouth 1.0 x 10-' 9.0 9.0 x 10-' 92 38 Accidental Criticality 
Kesselring 1.0 x 10-' 7.5 7.5 x 10-' 92 7.7 
"INEL 1.0 x 10-' 6.4 X 10-' 6.4 x 10-' 8.0 9.2 x 10-' 
Puget Sound 1.0 x 10-' 2.8 x 10-' 2.8 x 10-< 8.0 1.3 
Pearl Harbor 1.0 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-<1 8.0 6.7 X 10-' 
Norfolk 1.0 x 10-' 3.5 X 10-' 3.5 x 10-<1 8.0 2.7 
Ponsmouth 1.0 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-<1 8.0 1.4 
Kesselring 1.0 x 10-' 1.1 x 10-' 1.1 x 10-" 8.0 2.3 x 10-' 
Mechanical Damage 
"INEL 1.0 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-<1 5.3 X 10-11 5.2 x 10-< 2.6 x 10-< 
Puget Sound 1.0 x 10-' 7.2 x 10-' 7.2 X 10-'0 5.2 x 10-< 1.7 x 10-< 
Pearl Harbor 1.0 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 5.2 x 10-' 9.3 x 10-' 
Norfolk 1.0 x 10-' 8.0 x 10-' 8.0 X 10-'0 5.2 x 10-' 3.5 x 10-< 
Ponsmouth 1.0 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 5.6 X 10-'0 5.2 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-' 
Kesselring 1.0 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 6.0 X 10-'0 5.2 x 10-' 3.6 x 10-' 
Airplane Crash 
Pearl Harbor 2.0 x 10-' 4.6 x 10-' 9.2 X 10-' 1.6 X 10-' 2.8 x 10-' 
Norfolk 4.0 x 10-' 2.4 x 10-' 9.6 x 10-' 1.6 X 10-' 1.1 X 10-' 
Kesselring 2.0 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 3.6 x 10-' 1.6 X 10-' 1.1 x 10-' 
HEPA Filter Fire 
"INEL 5.0 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 2.4 X 10-' 2.5 x 10-' 
Puget Sound 5.0 x 10-' 6.4 x 10~ 3.2 X 10-' 2.4 x 10-' 1.6 x 10-' 
Pearl Harbor 5.0 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 2.4 x 10-' 8.7 x 10-' 
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Table F-6. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for 
Decentralization alternatives. (Cont) Table F-7. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for 
Consequences Planning Basis, Centralizatie>n at INEL, and Regionalization at INEL alternatives . 
to Public 
Accident Probability (fatalities Risk to Publ ic Dose to Worker Dose to MOl Consequences 
Description (per year) per accident) (fatalities) (rem) (rem) to Public Accident Probabil ity (fatalities Risk to Public Dose to Worker Dose to MOl 
Norfolk 5.0. 10-< 6.9. 10-< 3.5 • 10-' 2.4 • 10-' 
3.3 • 10-' Description (per year) per accident) (fatalities) (rem) (rem) 
WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION 
ACCIDENTS 
WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION 
ACCIDENTS 
'Information applicable only for full e.aminations at INEL 
Drained Water Pool 
Ponsmouth 5.0. 10-< 3.9. 10-< 2 .0 . 10-' 2.4 • 10-' 
1.7. 10-' 
Kesselring 5.0. 10-< 3.3 • 10-< 1.7.10-' 2.4. 10-' 
3.5 • 10-< INEL 1.0.10-' 1.7.10-' 1.7. 10-' 2.1 1.7.10-' 
Minor Water Pool Leak Accidental Criticality 
'INEL 1.0.10-1 I.3 • 10-' I.3 • 10-" N/A 
2.5 • 10-" INEL 1.0.10-' 6.4 • 10-' 6 .4. 10-' 8.0 9.2. 10-' 
Puget Sound 1.0.10-1 4 .2. 10-" 4.2. 10-
1
• N/A 3.2 • 10-1• 
Pearl Harbor 1.0.10-1 4.6. 10-1• 4.6. 10-" N/A 
1.3 • 10-1• Mechanical Damage 
Norfolk 1.0.10-1 1.8. 10-' 1.8 • 10-
1
• N/A 2.7. 10-1• 
Pons mouth 1.0 . 10-1 1.4. 10-" 1.4 • 10-
1
• N/A 1.3 • 10-1• INEL 1.0.10-' 5.3. 10" 5.3. 10-" 5.2. 10-' 2.6. 10"" 
Kessel ring 1.0.10-1 8.5 • 10-" 8.5 • 10-
1
• N/A 6.0 • 10-" 
HEPA Filter Fire 
DRY STORAGE ACC IDENTS INEL 5.0. 10-< 5.3 • 10-' 2.7. 10-' 2.4. 10-' 2.5 • 10-' 
Mechanical Damage Minor Water Pool Leak 
3.9 • 10-' 
Puget Sound 1.0.10-' 1.7. 10-' 1.7. 10-' 5.6. 10--' 
Pearl Harbor 1.0.10-' 3.0. 10-' 3.0. 10-' 5.6 . 10-' 
2.1 • 10-' INEL 1.0.10-1 1.3. 10-' 1.3 • 10-' N/A 2.5 • 10-" 
Norfolk 1.0 .10-' 1.8. 10-' 1.8. 10-' 5.6. 10-' 
8.1 • 10-' 
Ponsrnouth 1.0. 10-' 1.0.10-' 1.0.10-' 5.6. 10-' 
4.2. 10-' DRY STORAGE ACCIDENTS 
Kessel ring 1.0.10-' 7.4 . 10-' 7.4. 10-' 5.6. 10-' 8.1 • 10-' Mechanical Damage 
Airplane Crash INEL 1.0 . 10-' 4.9. 10-' 4.9 • 10-' 5.6. 10-' 4.6. 10-< 
Pearl Harbor 1.0.10-' 26 2.6. 10-< 92 
19 
Norfolk 1.0. 10"" 16 1.6. 10-' 92 
72 DRY CELL ACCIDENTS 
Ponsmouth 1.0.10-' 9.0 9.0. 10-' 92 38 
Kessel ring 1.0.10-' 7.5 7.5 • 10-' 92 
7 .7 Mechanical Damage 
DRY CELL ACCIDENTS INEL 1.0. 10-' 3.5 • 10-' 3.5 • 10-' 1.0.10-
1 2.2 • 10-< 
Mechanical Damage Loss of Shielding 
'INEL 1.0. 10-< 3.5 • 10-< 3.5 • 10-' 1.0. 10-
1 2.2 • 10-< INEL 1.0. 10-' 3.0. 10-" 3.0 • 10-" 7.2 • 10-' 9.3 • 10-" 
Loss of Shielding 
'INEL 1.0. 10-' 3.0. 10-" 3.0. 10-" 7.2. 10-' 
9.3 • 10-" 
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Table F-8. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for 
Regionalization or Centralization at other DOE sites alternatives . 
Information applicable only to DOE site selected for Regionalization or Centralization. 
Consequences 
to Public 
Accident Probability (fatal ities Risk to Public Dose to Worker Dose to MOl 
Description (per year) per accident) (fatalities) (rem) (rem) 
WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION 
ACCIDENTS 
Drained Water Pool 
Savannah River 1.0 x 10-5 1.1 X 10-1 1.1 x 1~ 2.1 1.6 x 10- 2 
Hanford 1.0 x 10-5 4.7 X 10-2 4.7 X 10-1 2.1 6.3 x 10-3 
Nevada Test Site 1.0 x 10-5 1.9 X 10-3 1.9 X 10-8 2 . 1 3.3 x 10-2 
Oak Ridge 1.0 x IO-~ 1.8 X 10-1 1.8 X 10..{) 2.1 5.2 
Accidental Criticality 
Savannah River 1.0 x 10-5 4.5 X 10-2 4.5 X 10-1 8.0 9 .4 X 10-3 
Hanford 1.0 x 10-5 1.6 X 10-2 1.6 X 10-1 8.0 2.8 X 10-) 
Nevada Test Site 1.0 x 10-5 7.0 x lQ-4 7.0 x 10-9 8.0 2.0 x 10-: 
Oak Ridge 1.0 x 10-' 8.8 X 10-2 8.8 X 10-1 8.0 4.7 
Mechanical Damage 
Savannah River 1.0 x 10-' 2.0 X 10-5 2.0 X 10-10 5 .2 X 10-4 2.2 X IO..{) 
Hanford 1.0 x 10-' 8.6 X IO..{) 8.6 X 10-11 5.2 x 10-* 9.8 X 10-1 
Nevada Test Site 1.0 x 10-' 5.6 X 10-1 5.6 X 10-12 5.2 x 1Q-4 4 .6x I~ 
Oak Ridge 1.0 x 10-5 3.4 x 10-' 3.4 X 10-10 5.2 x 10-* 5 .9 x IQ-4 
Airplane Crash 
Savannah River 2.0 x I~ 6. 1 X 10-3 1.2 X 10- 1 1.6 X 10-1 6.4 x 10-4 
Oak Ridge 1.0 x IO..{) 1.0 X 10-2 1.0 X 10-1 1.6 X 10-1 1.8 X 10-1 
Nevada Test Site 4 .0 x 10-1 1.7 X 10-4 6.8 X 10-11 1.6 X 10-1 1.3xlO-3 
HEPA Filter Fire 
Savannah River 5.0 x IQ-4 1.3 x 10-4 6 .5 x 10-1 2.4 X 10-) 2.1 x IO-~ 
Hanford 5.0 x IQ-4 5.3 x 10-' 2.7 X 10-8 2.4 X 10-3 7.0 X 10-6 
Nevada Test Site 5.0 x IQ-4 5 .7 x IO..{) 2 .9 X 10-9 2.4 X 10-) 4 .3 x 10-' 
Oak Ridge 5.0 x 10-4 2.2 X 10"" 1.1 X 10-1 2.4 X 10-3 5.7 X 10-3 
Minor Water Leak 
Savannah River 1.0 x 10-1 1.3 X 10-9 1.3 X 10-10 N/A 7.9 x 10-10 
Hanford 1.0 x 10-1 1.7 X 10- 10 1.7 X 10- 11 N/A 9.9 x 10-12 
Nevada Test Site 1.0 x 10-1 1.4 X 10-9 1.4 r. 10-10 N/A 2.5 x 10-9 
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Table F-8. Impacts ~rom naval spent nucl ear fuel facility radiological accidents for 
ReglonahzatlOn or Centralization at other DOE sites alternatives. (Cont) 
Information applicable only to DOE sites selected for Regionalization or Centralization . 
Accident 
Description 
Probability 
(per year) 
Consequences 
to Public 
(fatalities 
per accident) 
Risk to Public 
(fatalities) 
Oak Ridge 1.0 x /0- ' 3.9 x 10-" 3.9 X 10-'0 
DRY STORAGE ACCIDENTS 
Mechanical Damage 
Savannah River 
Hanford 
Nevada Test Site 
Oak Ridge 
Airplane Crash 
Savannah River 
Oak Ridge 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
3.0 X 10-' 
3.0 x /0-' 
DRY CELL ACCIDENTS 
Mechanical Damage 
Savannah River 
Hanford 
Nevada Test Site 
Oak Ridge 
Loss of Shielding 
Savannah River 
Hanford 
Nevada Test Site 
Oak Ridge 
Airplane Crash 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10'" 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
Savannah River 2 .0 x 10-' 
Oak Ridge 1.0 x 10'" 
Nevada Test Site 4.0 x /0-' 
3.0 x 10-' 3.0 x 10-' 
1.3 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
5.3 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-'0 
5 . I x /0-' 5. 1 x 10-' 
2 .8 8.4 x 10-' 
4.7 1.4 x 10'" 
1.4 x /0-' 1.4 X /0-' 
5.3 x 10'" 5 .3 x /0-' 
3.7 x /0-' 3.7x/O-· 
2.5 x 10-' 2 .5 x 10-' 
3.0 x 10-" 3.0 X /0-21 
4 .9 x /0-" 4.9 x /0-" 
3.7 x /0-" 3.7 x 10"" 
7.5 x 10'" 7.5 X /0-11 
4 .8 9.6 x 10-6 
8.4 8.4 x 10-6 
1.8 x /0- ' 7.2 x /0-' 
F-13 
Iq't 
Dose to Worker 
(rem) 
NIA 
5 .6 x 10-' 
5.6 x 10-' 
5 .6 x /0-' 
5.6 x 10-' 
92 
92 
1.0 X 10-' 
1.0 X 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
1.0 x 10-' 
7.2 x 10-' 
7 .2 x 10-' 
7.2 x 10-' 
7.2 x /0-' 
160 
160 
160 
Dose to MOl 
(rem) 
1.5 x 10-" 
4 .9 x 10-' 
1.7 x 10-' 
8.8 x 10-' 
1.4 x /0-' 
4.7 x 10-' 
120 
2.4 x 10'" 
7 . I x 10-' 
4 .0 x 10-' 
5 .8 x 10-' 
6 .7 x 10-" 
3.3 x 10-" 
6.3 x 10-" 
1.2 x 10-' 
8.2 x 10-' 
350 
1.6 
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concentrations were then compared against Emergency Release Planning Guide (ERPG) levels as a 
means of evaluating their effects. ERPG values are specific for each substance and provide an 
est imate of the airborne concentration thresholds above which one can reasonably observe adverse 
effects . Exposure to an ERPG-I level could result in a very mild effect whereas exposure to an 
ERPG-3 level could result in a life-threatening health effect. For the postulated accident involving a 
chemical spill and fi re. on-site personnel (worker) could be exposed to concentrations of hydrochloric 
acid. phosgene. sul furic acid . and sodium hydroxide above ERPG-3 levels which indicates a potential 
for long-term health effects . However. no member o~ the general public located off-site would be 
expected to be exposed to levels above ERPG-3 except lor Oak Ridge where sulfuric acid and sodium 
hydroxide concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 . For the postulated accident involving a diesel fuel 
fi re. on-site personnel could be exposed to concentrations of sul fu r dioxide and oxides of nitrogen 
above ERPG-3 levels. No member of the general public located off-site would be expected to be 
exposed to levels above ERPG-3 except for Oak Ridge where sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen 
concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 and one shipyard location (Norfolk) where nitric oxide 
concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 under severe meteorological conditions. However. for both 
postulated accidents. the accident analyses did not include evacuation of on-site or off-site personnel 
and it is expected that chemical exposures would be below ERPG-3 levels because actions such as 
evacuation would be used to reduce the effects on the public and workers . 
Fugitive Dust Analysis 
The FDM computer code was used to estimate the fugitive dust concentrations that could 
result from the construction of a water pool faci lity at the alternate locations. It was determined that 
the release of fugit ive dust would not result in any adverse effects for any of the alternate locations. 
Other Impacts 
The radiological impact of acc idents on the environs of a faci lity was determined by 
examining the area that could be contaminated following such an event. Calculations using average 
meteorological conditions were performed for each accident scenario. These calculat ions determined 
the extent of the contamination which causes on ly a small increase in background radiation from 
naturally occurring sources. For most facilities and most accidents. the contaminated area was 
confined to the boundaries of the site. For a few cases. the casualty scenarios did result in contami-
nated land outside the site boundaries; however. the total land contaminated for those scenarios (inside 
and outside the boundary) was no mor< than 207 acres. The impact o f this contamination would be 
temporary while the area was isolated and remediatiun efforts completed . 
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F.1 RADIOLOGICAL ISSUES FROM NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
INSPECTIONS AND STORAGE 
Naval spent nuclear fuel is currently examined and stored at the Naval Reactors Facility's 
Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the DOE Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) . The 
INEL-ECF is a large laboratory facility used to receive, examine, and ship naval spent nuclear fuel 
and irradiated test specimen assemblies. Enclosed work areas at INEL-ECF include an array of 
interconnected reinforced concrete water pools which permit visual observation of naval spent nuclear 
fuel during handling and inspection while shield ing workers from radiation . Adjacent to the water 
pools are shielded cells used for operations which must be performed dry . One of the water pools 
contains transfer canals that will link the water pools with a proposed Dry Cell Project. which would 
provide a location for preparation of spent fuel in a dry, enclosed environment. 
The proposed Dry Cell Facility will consist of a shielded, radiologically controlled area built 
of structural steel and concrete with remotely operated equipment necessary to examine fuel modules. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of the Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA) reported that extensive safety analysis has shown that pool storage of Zircaloy-
clad fuel is a very safe option which can last for decades (NEA 1993). The external hazards, such as 
earthquakes and aircraft crashes, are potential threats for L~ese facilities (loss of coolant) but 
appropriate siting, design. and additional shielding can cope with these hazards. Dry storage has not 
yet generally been carried out on a very large scale but it is anticipated that long-term storage in 
adequate canisters is a very safe pract ice even against earthquakes and aircraft crashes. 
Several technologies are bei ng used currently for the storage of spent fuel at reactor sites and 
at si tes away from reactors . Both wet (POOl) storage facilities and dry storage facilities (bui ld ings and 
containers) are used on a commercial scale. 
The safety of spent fuel storage has been extens ively evaluated . The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) reported in the "Waste Confidence Decision" of 1984 that there is reasonable 
assu rance that spent fu el can be stored safely and without s ignificant environmental impact in reactOf 
pools or in spent fuel storage installations (NUREG 1984). For both dry storage and wet storage, the 
NRC stated its belief that current storage technologies are capable o f provid ing safe storage for at 
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least 30 years beyond the active li feti me of the reactor facility . The NRC also concluded that the 
possibility of a major accident or sabotage at a spent fuel storage facility with radiological conse-
quences for the public is extremely remote. 
Considerable experience has been gained in the transport of spent fuel elements and in the 
consequent safety-related development of suitable transportation casks. This experience has made it 
possible to develop a concept for dry storage of spent fuel elements within transportation casks; dry 
storage containers generally have not been the transportation casks themselves. 
The concept of a cask which could be used for both transportation and storage has been 
licensed in the United States in the framework of a policy of dry storage in Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installations (CFR 1993). According to this policy, the reactor operators are entitled to store 
the spent fuel elements, which have cooled in a pool for at least one year after discharge from the 
reactor, in specially licensed containers under dry conditions for 20 years or more. A number of 
storage casks have received official approval for that purpose. 
F.1.1 Normal Operations 
Current practice for examination of naval spent nuclear fuel at ECF includes removal of upper 
and lower non-fuel bearing structures, visual examination. measurement of key dimensions. collection 
of specimens. and loading into a shipping cask . Temporary storage of spent fuel at INEL-ECF is 
required since fuel is , at times, received into the facility faster than it can be exami ned and shipped 
out of the facility. In addition, a small amount of spent fuel is selected for retention as library 
specimens for future reference and examination . Routine releases to the atmosphere were evaluated at 
all locations based on measured releases from INEL-ECF. Each location was evaluated using releases 
equivalent to those of INEL-ECF. Each location's specific population and meteorology were then 
used to produce estimated consequences . 
F. 1. 1. 1 Water Pool Storage. Wet storage is a highly developed technique and it is the standard 
method used worldwide for storage of spent fuel. While in wet storage pools. temperatures, 
pressures, and radiation fluxes are lower than in the reactor. so there is no intrinsic driving force for 
the sudden release of a major fraction of the radioactive materials contained in the stored spent fuel . 
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The Zircaloy cladding of naval spent nuclear fuel is an efficient barrier against fission product 
release during handling and storage of spent fuel. Given adequate control of water purity, Zircaloy 
resists corrosion in water during the long-term storage conditions of fuel assemblies. At the end of its 
service life, the fuel is covered with a tightly adhering oxide layer formed at high temperatures which 
is a major factor that inhibits further corrosion during storage. 
Direct exposure to radiation of persons working in storage facilities can occur during such 
activities as handling of fuel caslcs and fuel assemblies, handling of contaminated filters , and repair 
and maintenance work. Experience shows that, in common with other fuel cycle facilities, the risk of 
increased occupational exposure arises when any maintenance or unusual operations are carried out. 
Such increased exposures can, however, generally be minimized by good planning, adequate 
reduodancy of critical components, paying panicular attention to the design of those items that are 
liable to become contaminated from the point of view of repair and maintenance, and by the use of 
local shielding and equipment decontamination procedures. Systems and components that are 
imponant in this context include: 
• 
• 
• 
pool water cooling and makeup systems; 
filter equipment for purification of pool water; 
ventilation systems; 
• equipment for temperature, water level, and leakage measurement in the fuel pools; 
• 
• 
hoists and handling systems for fuel assembl ies; and 
equipment for handling and storage of other wastes. 
Shielding from radiat ion is normally assured by providing a minimum depth of water abnve 
the fuel elements in storage to reduce the exposure rates . Fuel transfer mechanisms have limit 
switches and mechanical stops to prevent the inadvenent raising of fuel to the water surface. A high-
integrity pool structure is needed in order to guarantee adequate containment of the pool water, but a 
limited loss of water resulting in a substantial reduction of the shielding layer is unlikely to involve 
high risks of exposu res to personnel above operational limits since adequate countermeasures can be 
taken in time. 
Storage of naval spent nuclear fuel in water pools is an alternative being evaluated at all DOE 
and Navy shipyard locations discussed above. Source terms for all locations were based on actual 
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releases reponed by INEL-ECF in the past. Exposures due to downwind dispersion, water release, 
and direct radiation were calculated . 
F. 7. 7.2 Dry Storage. Many thousands of spent fuel assemblies of different types have been stored 
for periods of time ranging from a couple of years to over 30 years in more than 20 different dry 
storage facilities . In general, the spent fuel behavior during storage has been excellent and no 
detrimental effects of dry storage on the integrity of the spent fuel have been detected (NEA 1993). 
The dry storage of spent fuel is being used to a limited extent in several countries. In the 
United States, fuel was stored in dry wells at the INEL. Dry wells were used for the storage of a 
small amount of fuel at the Nevada Test Site as pan of a large dry storage demonstration program. 
Storage staned at the Climax deep dry wells (600 meters below the surface in granite) in 1979. In 
1983, one fuel assembly underwent extensive non-<lestructive and destructive characterization. No 
problems requiring process changes were identified (NEA 1993). 
Designs of metal casks for use in spent fuel storage have been in existence since the late 
19705. The caslcs are generally equipped with a double-lid system to ensure safe containment of 
contents . These casks have been subjected to a variety of tests and demonstrations since the early 
1980s using both intact and consolidated fuel. 
The DOE sponsored the demonstration of the storage of fuel in metal casks at the Morris 
storage facility in 1984 and 1985. The DOE entered into a cooperative agreement with Virginia 
Power, a United States' utility, to demonstrate the use of three types of metal casks. The Virginia 
Power Surry Nuclear Power Station has been licensed by the NRC for storage of spent fuel in metal 
casks. 
Results of demonstration activities have shown the following (NEA 1993): 
• 
• 
radiation and thermal levels resulting from metal cask storage have been acceptable; 
no fuel failure has occurred during demonstration storage; 
• no secondary wastes have arisen from the storage operation. 
Storage of naval spent nuclear fuel in storage or shipping containers is an alternative being 
evaluated at all locations. Since no ai rborne releases are expected from routine dry storage activity, 
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only the biological effects of direct radiation exposure to the on-site personnel and the public were 
determined . 
F. 1. 1.3 Dry Cell Operations. The handling of naval spent nuclear fuel for research and develop-
ment purposes in dry cells like the proposed Dry Cell Project was evaluated at selected DOE 
locations . The health effects due to routine airborne releases and direct radiation exposure were 
estimated . 
F.1.2 Screening/Selection of Accidents for Detailed Examination 
Accidents were considered for inclusion in detailed analyses if they were expected to 
contribute substantially to risk (defined as the product of the probability of occurrence of the atcident 
times the consequence of the accident). Accidents were categorized into three types as either 
Abnormal Events, Design Basis Accidents , or Beyond Design Basis Accidents. These categories are 
characterized by their probability of occurrence as described funher in Section F.1.3. 7. Construction 
aod industrial accidents are included in these categories . 
In selecting accidents to include in deta iled analyses, several considerations were utilized . 
Initiating events were reviewed including natural phenomena (eanhquakes, volcanic activity, 
tornadoes, hurricanes and other natural events) and human initiated events (human error, equipment 
failures, fires, explosions, plane crashes , transportation accidents, and terrorism). Guiding principles 
were established. such as : the radioactive materials involved must be available in a dispersible form; 
there must be a mechanism available for release of such materials from the facility ; and , there must 
be a mechanism avai lable for off-s ite d ispersion of the released materials . The pathways whereby 
members of the publ ic can be affected fro m the nuclear aspects of spent fuel operations are direct 
exposure to radiation, inhalation of radioactive materials, or ingestion of radioactive materials . 
Recognizing these fund amental processes and pathways . accidents involving the following basic 
phenomena were identified: 
• 
• 
• 
loss of shieldi ng of radioactive materials . 
release of radioactive products to the environment due to overheating of fuel . 
release of rad ioactive products to the environment due to mechanical shock or damage 
or inadvertent breaching of fue l cladd ing or containment, 
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• 
• 
an unplanned criticality, 
transportation accidents . 
After the basic phenomena were identified , other references were consulted to ensure that all 
important accidents were considered. These included safety analysis reports, court decisions, other 
environmental impact statements, and summary documents such as the "Final Generic Environmental 
Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Power Reactor Fuel " 
(NUREG 1979a) and "The Safety of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" (NEA 1993). 
Examining the kinds of accidents which could result in release of radioactive material to the 
environment or an increase in radiation levels shows that they can only occur if an accident produces 
severe conditions. Some types of accidents , such as procedure violations, spills of small volumes of 
water containing radioactive particles, or most other types of common human error, may occur more 
frequently than the more severe accidents analyzed. However, they do not involve enough radioactive 
material or radiation to result in a significant release to the environment or a meaningful increase in 
radiation levels . Stated another way, the very low consequences associated with these events produce 
smaller risks than those for the accidents analyzed , even when combined with a higher probability of 
occurrence. Consequently, they have not been included in the results presented in this Environmental 
I mpact Statement. 
Acts of terrorism are expected to result in consequences which are bounded by the results of 
accidents which were evaluated. Naval spent nuclear fuel is not considered to be amactive to 
terrorists due to the bulk of the fuel and containers and due to the high radiation fields involved with 
unshielded spent nuclear fuel. However, terrorist attacks on naval spent nuclear fuel during shipment 
were evaluated . The massive structure of the shipping containers used for naval spent nuclear fuel 
makes them an unlikely target of a terrorist attack . No such attacks have occurred in the nearly 40 
years of rail shipments which have now travelled about 2 million kilometers . Thus. the probability of 
a terrorist attack on a shipment is judged to be no more than the probability of a rail accident which 
is listed in Section A.7. 1.2. 1 of Attachment A to Appendix D of this Environmental Impact State-
ment. The consequences of a terrorist attack are also judged to be no more severe than those listed 
for transportation accidents . Therefore. the same conclusions reached for transportation accidents 
apply to the risk to the extremely rugged shipping containers from terrorist attack during a shipment. 
In addition. during shipment . all naval spent nuclear fuel containers are accompanied by escorts who 
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remain in contact with headquarters . In the event of an emergency, state and federal resources would 
be quickly summoned to stabilize the situation. 
For an act of war, sabotage, or terrorist attack, it is likely the risk would be lower than 
calculated for the airplane crash because it should be less probable that a force would exist to disperse 
radioactive products into the atmosphere from a weapon as compared to the motive force of the fire 
assumed in the case of an airplane crash . For example, attacks on containers using anti-tank weapons 
would be less severe than the accidents analyzed because: (a) anti-tank weapons would cause a self-
sealing penetration in the metal of a container, unlike that which is assumed from the airplane crash 
(impact from a 50-inch diameter engine rotor); (b) there is no explosive material inside the container, 
so it will not "blow up" as a tank would if hit by such a weapon (in a tank attack, the tank shells 
inside the turret detonate); (c) there would be no fire to disperse the radioactivity that is re leased 
when the container is breached, unlike an aircraft crash where the jet fuel wilt burn creating such a 
fire. The rugged design of containers and the thick walls of water pools, combined with the shock-
absorbing nature of water with a free surface, reduce the effects of other types of explosive charges. 
It is not credible that a terrorist attack would result in a criticality or meltdown of spent nuclear fuel ; 
however, in Section F.I .4.2. 1.2, the consequences of a hypothetical criticality accident are presented. 
The risks associated with an accidental criticality are less than those associated with a drained water 
pool or an airplane crash into dry storage containers. 
The effect of a terrorist allack or an act of sabotage is expected to be conservatively bounded 
by the limiting accident discussed at each facility under each alternative . For example, the most 
limiting accident involving naval spent nuclear fuel is described in this allachment to be an airplane 
crash into a shipping container at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. This accident would lead to 26 
latent fatal cancers over the next 50 years in the population within 50 miles of the shipyard . Since 
the probability of the event is one chance in 100,000 per year. the risk would be 0 .00026 latent fatal 
cancer fatalities per year or . in other words . about one chance in 4,000 of a llngk latent fatal cancer 
fatality over a year. This ri sk is shared among the approximately 820,000 people residing within 50 
miles of the shipyard who would be expected to have over 2 ,000 cancer fatalities from all causes 
every year. For an act of war, sabotage. or terror ist auack, it is likely the risk would be lower than 
calculated because it should be less probable that a fo rce would exist to disperse radioactive products 
into the atmosphere from a weapon as compared to the motive force of the fire assumed in the case of 
an airplane crash . 
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Accidents initiated at nearby facilities, by other activities unrelated to spent nuclear fuel 
handling or storage. or during construction of an ECF or dry cell type of facility , would not produce 
effects more severe than the sequences of events described. This is because naval spent nuclear fuel 
undergoing examination or in storage under the conditions of the alternatives evaluated would not 
need special conditions or uninterrupted operator attention to prevent overheating, failure of 
containment, or loss of shielding. Therefore, evacuation in response to an accident at some other 
facility would not compromise safety. This inherent safety, combined with the distance between naval 
spent nuclear fuel facilities and any other activities which might suffer a catastrophic accident , means 
that the accidents analyzed in this document produce conditions at a naval spent nuclear fuel facility 
which would be more severe than those for any hypothetical synergistic combination of events 
resulting from accidents at other, unrelated facilities. Therefore, such analyses have not been 
included in this evaluation. 
The existence of common cause accidents at a facility has been considered. In general, only 
one spent nuclear fu el facility is located at a panicular Navy site. However, it is possible for natural 
phenomena, like an earthquake, to produce more than one accident at some sites causing a situation 
result ing in the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere or an increase in radiation levels 
due to loss of shielding. However. the probability of two or more accidents having maximum 
consequences occur concurrently is less than the probability of the individual events . For example, if 
an earthquake affected the Naval Reactors Facil ity at INEL, a crane might fail causing damage to 
stored spent fuel, the water pool might drain. and shielding for the Dry Cell might be damaged . The 
impacts for this could conservatively be estimated by summing the consequences. A combined total 
of 2.8 x 10" fatal cancers are estimated. Similarly, consequences from spent nuclear fuel facilities 
within a DOE site could be combined to conservatively estimate site wide impacts. But again, the 
probability of a common cause event resulting in this number of consequences is lower than the 
probability of the individual accidents because the severity of impact will vary between facilities due 
to separation distances. 
Several accident scenarios were developed for the handling and storage of naval spent nuclear 
fuel. All potential accidents were not evaluated. but cases which are considered to be more severe 
than all other reasonabl e acc idents were analyzed. Each of these accident scenarios was evaluated at 
several locations using identical sour~e terms. Like the evaluations for normal operations. popul ation 
and meteorology data specific to each site were used to esti mate site specific health effects. 
F. 1.2. 1 Water Pool Storage. Six hypothetical accident scenarios were evaluated for naval spent 
nuclear fu el stored in water pools . These hypothetical sequences of events include a drainage of the 
water pool caused by an earthquake. an accidental critical ity. mechanical damage due to operator 
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error or crane failure. an airplane crash into the water pool facility , a fire in a high efficiency 
paniculate air (HEPA) filter, and minor water pool leakage. Radiation exposure to on-site 
individuals, an individual at the site boundary, and the general population was estimated for airborne 
releases of radioactivity, water releases. and direct radiation exposure. 
F. 1.2.2 Dry Storage. Two hypothetical accident scenarios were evaluated for naval spent nuclear 
fuel stored in shipping containers . The first scenario postulates that a wind-driven missile crashes 
into storage casks, with mechanical damage causing a release of corrosion products into the environ-
ment. The second hypothetical scenario is based on an airplane crash into the dry storage area. Once 
again, radiation exposure to on-site individuals, an individual at the site boundary, and the general 
population was estimated for airborne releases, water releases, and direct radiation exposure. 
F.1.2.3 Dry Cell Operations. Three hypothetical accidents were evaluated for naval spent nuclear 
fuel handled in dry cells at several locations . These scenarios include cuning into the fuel region or 
mechanical damage during examination work, partial loss of concrete shielding due to an earthquake, 
and an airplane crash into the dry cell facility. Once again, radiation exposure to on-site individuals. 
an individual at the site boundary. and the general population was estimated for airborne releases, 
water releases, and direct radiation exposure. 
F. 1.2.4 Shipboard Fire Involving Shipping Containers. Attachment A describes the historical 
practice of shipping naval spent nuclear fu el from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to Puget Sound Naval 
Sh,pyard by ship where the containers are then transported to ECF by rail. Since 1962, there have 
been 17 shipments containing a total of 20 shipping containers. Even though there have not been any 
accidents involving these shipments. hypothetical accidents were evaluated near the Pearl Harbor and 
Pugot Sound shipyards. The scenario involves a collision of the spent nuclear fuel ship with another 
ship wh ich results in a fire . The radiation exposure to nearby individuals and the general population 
was estimated for airborne and water releases. 
F .1.3 Analysis Methods for Evaluation of Radiation Exposure 
F. 1.3. 1 General. An evaluation of normal operations and hypothetical accidents at the exist ing and 
proposed sites was performed to assess the possible radiation exposure to individuals due to the 
release of radioact ive materials. The analyses are based on the same operations carried out at the 
different potential locations and the same accidents at any of the s ites evaluated . With this approach. 
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it is possible to compare the incremental effect of the proposed alternative actions or the different 
impacts of the postulated accidents at the different sites. These locations include four naval shipyards 
(portsmouth , Norfolk, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor) , five Depanment of Energy facilities (INEL, 
Savannah River, Hanford, Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge), and the Kesselring Site. 
F. 1.3.2 Exposures to be Calculated. Radiation exposure to the following different individuals 
and the general population is calculated for normal operation of the spent fuel facility and for accident 
conditions: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Worker (Worker). An individual located 100 meters (330 feet) from the radioactive 
material release point. (The impact of accidents on close-in workers is not calculated 
numerically but is discussed qualitatively for each accident in Section F. 1.4.3 of this 
attachment.) 
Maximally exposed collocated worker (MCW). At DOE locations, a theoretical 
individual located at whichever is the greater of 0.4 mile from the facility area 
boundary or 75 % of the distance to the nearest independent facility area. The MCW 
is not evaluated if the site boundary is closer than the MCW location. Thus. at 
shipyard locations and the Kesselring Site. the MCW is not specifically evaluated. 
Maximally exposed off-s ite individual (MOl). A theoretical individual living at the 
DOE site or shipyard boundary receiving the maximum exposure. At the Savannah 
River Site, two separate MOl locations were evaluated depending upon whether the 
spent fuel facility is constructed on the Savannah River Site or is located at the 
existing Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (hereafter referred to as the Barnwell Plant) 
which is adjacent to the Savannah River Site . At Hanford. two separate MOl 
locations were also evaluated depending upon whether a new facility is constructed in 
the 200 Area or modifications are made to the Fuels and Materials Examination 
Facility (FMEF) which is located in the 400 Area. 
Nearest public access individual (N PA). At larger DOE sites . highways used by the 
public may cross the federal reservation which includes the fac ility where naval spent 
nuclear fu el operations could be conducted . Consequently. these analyses included 
evaluation of the exposure to a theoretical motorist who might be stranded on such a 
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• 
• 
highway at the time of an accident. Based on experience from emergency exercises, 
emergency response teams would be able to evacuate such an individuaJ within 2 
hours. so this was the exposure time used in the calculations. At naval shipyard 
locations. no public access highways exist, but military personnel. civilian employees, 
o r their family members, including some who reside on the base, may be located 
outside the controlled industrial area boundary but inside the confines of the military 
base. Such personnel might be at their homes, in buildings, or on the roadways of 
the base at the time of an accident or at any time throughout the year for the 
evaluation of normal operations . The base res idents are used as the NPA individuals 
at these shipyards for analyses of normal operations. In the event of a severe accident 
they would be evacuated within 2 hours under military control of the base, S0 th is 
time was used in accident calculations. No NPA value was calculated for the 
Kesselring Site and the Nevada Test Site because there are no public roads which 
cross these sites , there are no residents, and there are no other public accesses. 
Maximally exposed ind ividual at nearby communities is evaluated for accidents. 
General population within a 50-mile rad ius of the facility. 
Exposure is calculated to result from direct rad iation from the facility and exposure to 
radioactive contamination released to the air. Normal releases directly to the water pathway occur 
only at shipyards which are located directly on bodies of water. and contamination of the water at all 
sites results from fallout of airborne contamination . The releases to the air might result in exposure 
through several pathways described as follows : 
• ExternaJ direct exposure from immersion in the airborne radioactive materiaJ (air 
immersion) 
• External direct exposure from radioactive material deposited on the ground (ground 
surface) 
• Internal exposure from inhalation of radioactive aerosols and suspended panicles 
(inhalation) 
F-25 Volume I, Appendix D 
cSt/C 
• Internal exposure from ingestion of terrestrial food and animal products (ingestion) 
• Exposure from contaminated water (water release) . 
The radiation exposure is calculated by the computer programs discussed in Section F.I .3.6 in 
a manner recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection OCRP 1977; 
ICRP 1979). Weighting factors are used for various body organs to calculate a "commined effective 
dose equivalent" (CEDE) from radiation inside the body due to inhalation or ingestion. Commined 
dose equivalents (CDEs) are calculated for organs such as the lungs, stomach, small intesti ne, upper 
large intestine, lower large intestine, bone surface red bone marrow, testes, ovaries, muscle, thyroid. 
bladder, kidneys, liver etc. The CEDE value is the summation of the CDEs to the specific organ 
weighted by the relative risk to that organ compared to an equivalent whole-body exposure. 
The programs also calculate an effective dose equivalent (EDE) for the external exposure 
pathways (immersion in the radioactive material. exposure to ground contamination) and a 50-year 
CEDE for the internal exposure pathways . The sum of the EDE from external pathways and the 
CEDE internal pathways is called the "total effective dose equivalent" (TEDE) in this Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) and is also calculated by the programs. The TEDE reponed in the results 
section is the sum of the TEDE's from air, water, and direct radiation exposures. 
The exposure from ingestion of terrest rial food and animal products is calcul ated on a year ly 
basis. However, it is expected that continued consumption of contaminated food products by the 
public would be suspended after a Protective Action Guideline is reached. In 1991. the 
Env ironmental Protection Agency recommended protective action guidelines in the range of I to 5 
rem whole-body exposure. To ensure a consistent analysis bas is, no reduction of exposure due to a 
Protective Action Guideline was accounted for in the analysis. This would result in a conservative 
approach which may slightly overes timate health effects within an exposed popul ation. but allows for 
consistent comparisons between alternatives. 
Table F. 1.3.2-1 ident ifies selected nearby communities for each site for which hypothetical 
exposures for a max imall y exposed individual were calculated. In all cases. the MOl exposure was 
greater than maximum exposure at any nearby community. Calcul ations were performed for these 
localities to evaluate exposures fo r areas representat ive of the range of commun ities within 50 miles 
of the si tes analyzed. The selection of these communities was not intended to indicate that other 
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localities were not important. Other communities of interest in the vicinity of the sites in addition to 
those evaluated include a number of communities in Maine and New Hampshire near the Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard, including Portsmouth, Durham, Eliot, Greenland, Kittery, New Castle, North 
Hampton, Ogunquit, Rye, and South Berwick. 
Table F.1.3.2-1. Nearby communities for each site. 
INEL 
Savannah River 
Hanford 
Nevada Test Site 
Oak Ridge 
Puget Sound 
Pearl Harbor 
Norfolk 
Portsmouth 
Kesselring 
Howe, Atomic City , Arco, Blackfoot, Idaho Falls 
Snelling, Barnwell , Jackson. Aiken, Allendale, Augusta, Sylvania, Bamberg, 
Wrens 
Othello, Richland, Prosser, Pasco, Yakima, Umatilla 
Beatty, Pahrump, Las Vegas 
Oak Ridge, Harriman, Rockwood, Knoxville, Jefferson City 
Seattle, Tacoma, Olympia, Port Angeles 
Pearl City, Aiea, Pacific Palisades, Ewa Beach, Honolulu, Ewa, Wahiawa 
Newport News, Hampton, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, Williamsburg 
Dover, Exeter, Hampton Beach, Sanford, Nashua, Lowell, Concord, Portland, 
Boston 
Ballston Spa, Saratoga Springs, Amsterdam, Schenectady, Corinth 
Table F. I .3.2-2 presents an example of the detailed exposure calculation results which were 
performed. The table shows the possible exposure pathways and individuals analyzed. 
F.1.3.3 Evaluation of Health Effects. Health effects are calculated from the exposure results. 
The risk factors used for calculations of health effects are taken from Publication 60 of the Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection (lCRP 1991). Table F.1.3.3-1 lists the appropriate 
factors used in the analysis of both the normal operations and the hypothet.ical accident scenarios. 
Cancer fatalities were used to summarize and compare the results in this Environmental 
Impact Statement since this effect was viewed to be of the greatest interest to most people. As shown 
in Table F .1.3.3-1 , the number of total health effects (deaths, non-fatal cancers, genetic effects, and 
other impacts on human health) may be easily obtained by multiplying the latent cancer fatalities by 
the factor of 1.46. which is the ratio of 7.3/5.0. 
The numerical estimates of cancer deaths and other health detriments presented were obtained 
by the practice of linear extrapolation from the nominal risk estimate for lifetime total cancer 
mortality at 10 rad . Other methods of extrapolation to the low-dose region could yield higher or 
lower numerical estimates of cancer deaths . Studies of human popul ations exposed at low doses are 
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<: Table F.1.3.2-2. Summary of exposure cal culation results . 
£ 
c 
3 
nl 
> 
'0 
'0 
nl 
::s 
0. 
Location 
Worker 
MCW 
NPA 
MOl 
Inhalation 
CEDE 
(rem) 
5.4 x 10-1 
4.8 x 10"" 
1.4 x 10"" 
6.1 x 10"" 
Air Ground 
Immersion Surface 
EDE EDE 
(rem) (rem) 
6.5 X 10"" 7.9 X 10- 1 
8.6 X 10-
' 3.4 X 10"" 
3.2 X 10-
' 
5.2 x 10-5 
1.2 x 10~ 7.8 X 10"" 
Airborne 
lngestion Release Water Direct 
EDE EDE Rdease Radiation 
(rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 
N/A 1.3 N/A 8.8 x 10-5 
N/A 8.2 x 10"" 1.6 X 10-17 3.8 X 10-8 
N/A 1.9 x 10"" 1.6 X 10-17 3.4 X 10-9 
3.1 x 10-' 1. 7 x 10-) 3.0 x IO-s 9.6 X 10-9 
Exposure to Maximally Exposed Individual at Nearby Communities (rem) 
.." , 
IV 
00 
Arco 
(30600m) 
Howe 
(16100m) 
Idaho Falls 
(72400m) 
Blackfoot 
(68100m) 
Atomic City 
(24200m) 
Population of 
11 5690 
5.2 x 10-5 
9.8 x 10-5 
3. 1 x 10-6 
4.8 x 10-6 
2.9 x 10-5 
1.1 x 10-1 
1.3 X 10-' 6.4 x 10-5 3. 1 x 10-5 1.5 x 10-' 3.0 x 10-5 3.4 X 10-9 
1.8 X 10-
' 
1.2 x 10-4 5.6 x 10-5 2.7 X 10-4 3.0 x 10-5 3.4 X 10-9 
5.2 X 10-9 3.6 x 10~ 2.0 x IO~ 8.7 x 10~ 3.0 x 10-5 2.1 X 10-10 
3.3 X 10-9 5.2 x IO~ 3.4 x IO~ 1.3 x 10-5 3.0 x 10-5 2.1 X 10-10 
1.0 X 10-
' 
3.6 x 10-5 1.6 x 10-5 8. 1 x 10-5 3.0 x 10-5 3.4 X 10-9 
Exposure to Population within 50-mile Radius (person-rem) 
6.1 x 10-5 1.5 X 10- 1 4.5 X 10-2 3.0 X 10-1 3.8 5.3 x IO~ 
Likelihood 
Total • of Fatal 
EDE Cancer 
(rem) 
1.3 5.3 x 10-' 
8.2 x 10-' 4.1 x 10-7 
1.9 x 10-' 9.5 x 10-8 
1.7 X 10-3 8.6 X 10-7 
1. 8 x 10-' 8.8 x 10-8 
3.0 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-7 
3.9 x 100s 1.9 x 10--
4.3 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-8 
1.1 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-8 
Fatal 
Cancers 
4.1 2.1 x 10-) 
Table F.1.3.J-1. Risk estimators for health effects from ionizing radiation. 
Risk Factor (probability per rem)' 
General 
Effect Nuclide Worker Popul ation 
Fatal cancer (all organs) All 4.0 x 10~ 5.0 x 10~ 
Weighted non·fatal cancer" All 8.0 x 10" 1.0 x 10~ 
Weighted genetic effects" All 8.0 x 10" 1.3 x I~ 
Weighted total effects" All 5 .6 x 10~ 7.3 x 10" 
• For higb individual exposures ( ~20 rem), the above risk factors are multipl ied by a fac tor of two . 
General population exposures were not modified because the large drop in exposure with increasing 
distances results in average exposure rates well below 20 rem. 
In determining a means of assessing health effects from radiation exposure, the ICRP has developed a 
weighting method for non-fatal cancers and genetic effects to obtain a total weighted effec t. or "health 
detriment", 
inadequate to demonstrate the actual level of risk. There is scientific uncenainty about cancer risk in 
the low-<lose region below the range of epidemiologic observation, and the possibility of no risk 
cannot be excluded (CIRRPC 1992). In this appendix, the doses have been provided in all cases to 
al low independent evaluat ion using any relation between exposure and health effects. 
F. 1.3 .4 Population. Population distributions specific to each site were used for the evaluations . 
The population distributions were obtained from 1990 United States Census data. The population 
information was obtained in 16 compass directions and 5 equal radial distances from the likely 
location of a naval spent nuclear fu el site to a 50-mile total distance. 
F. 1.3 .5 Meteorology. For the navy shipyards, Savannah River. and Kesselring Sites. the 
meteoro logical data used in the analyses were obtained from the SCRAM bulletin board system. For 
the INEL. Hanford . Nevada Test Site. and Oak Ridge. site tower meteorological data were used . The 
SCRAM bulleti n board is operated by the Support Center for Regul atory Air Models with in the 
Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards . The SCRAM 
surface meteorological data fil es are comprised of data acquired from the National Climat ic Data 
Cente r. The SCRAM data for 4 or 5 years were used with programs from the bull etin board to 
develop meteorological data in the STability ARray (STAR) format wh ich is a joint frequency 
distr ibution of6 wind speed intervals. 16 wind di rections. and 6 stability categories. The STAR data 
were reformaned into the format required hy the GEN II program. described below, for evaluation of 
normal operations. 
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The STAR data were also used to calcul.te the 50% and 95 % meteorological conditions for 
the accident analyses . The 50% condition represellts the average meteorological condition. This 
condition is defined as that for which more severe conditions with respect to accident consequences 
occur less than 50% of the time. The 95% condit ion represents the meteorological conditions which 
could produce the highest calculated exposures. This is defined as that condition which is not 
exceeded more than 5% of the time or is the worst combination of weather stability class and wind 
speed . Each of these conditions is evaluated for 16 wind di rections . 
For each location, the nearest available SCRAM data was used to represent the conditions at 
the site being evaluated . Table F. 1.3.5-1 shows the pert inent data for the meteorological data 
application. 
Table F.l .3 .5-1. Meteorological data applicability. 
Site Data From Data Years 
Portsmouth Portland ME Airport 1985-1989 
Norfolk Norfolk VA Airport 1985-1989 
Puget Sound SEATAC Airport 1985-1989 
Pearl Harbor Honolulu Airport 1985-1989 
INEL NRF Tower 1987-1991 
Kesselring Albany NY Airport 1985-1989 
Savannah River Augusta GA Airport 1984-1987 
Hanford 200 Area Tower 1983-1990 
Nevada Test Site Desert Rock Tower 1990 
Oak Ridge Y-12 West Tower 1990 
F. 1.3 .6 Computer Programs. Five computer programs were used to evaluate the rad iation 
exposures to the specified individuals and general population. 
F. 1. 3 . 6 . 1 GENII. The code used for the environmental and transport and exposure 
assessment calculations for normal operations was GENII (Nap ier et al. 1988). This code was 
developed at Pacific Northwest Laboratory by Battelle Memorial Institute to incorporate the internal 
dosimetry models recommended by the International Commission on Rad iological Prote<tion in 
Publication 26 (ICRP 1977) and Publication 30 (ICRP 1979) into envi ronmental pathway analys is 
models in use at Pacifi c Northwest Laboratory. 
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Although GENII can be used to model both acute and chronic releases to the atmosphere, 
only the chronic option was used in the normal operations evaluation refl ecting long-term average 
exposure to the released radioactive contaminants. For the chronic evaluations, the code also uses 
meteorological conditions averaged over each sector to reflect exposure to long-term average 
concentrations. The ingestion calculation used the modeling approach that exposed individuals within 
50 miles of the site consumed 30% of milk products and 10% of all products grown locally where the 
people live. 
F. 7.3.6.2 RSAC·5. The computer code RSAC-5 was developed by Westinghouse Idaho 
Nuclear Co, Inc. , for the DOE-ID Operations Office and is in the public domain (Wenzel 1993). The 
code calculates the consequences of the release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. It allows the 
amount of each fission product nuclide from a nuclear event to be input individually or to be 
calculated internally by the code. RSAC-5 calculates potential radiation exposures to maximally 
exposed individuals or population groups via inhalation, ingestion, exposure to radionuclides 
deposited on the ground surface, immersion in airborne radioactive material , and radiation from a 
cloud of radioactive material . RSAC-5 meteorological capabilities include Gaussian plume dispersion 
fo r Pascal-Gifford conditions. RSAC-5 release scenario modeling allows reduction of nuclides by 
chemical group or element and calculates decay and buildup during transport through operations, 
faci lities, and the environment. It also models the effect of filters or other cleanup systems. 
Population exposures are the product of the calculated individual exposure and the number of people 
in the affected populat ion. 
F. 7.3.6.3 OR/GEN. ORIGEN (Croff 1980) is a computer code system for calculat ing the 
buildup and decay of radioactive materials (fi ssion products, act inides, and activation products). The 
code input was modeled to describe tt , naval nuclear fuel system and incorporates cross-section data 
that are distinct to naval fuels . 
F.7.3.6.4 SPAN. SPAN (Wall ace 1972) is the computer code which was used to calculate 
the direct radiation levels. Attenuation from ai r was included in the calcul ated radiation levels. To 
determine the unit person exposure per sector, SPAN was used to integrate the radiation level over 
the sector . The radiation levels calcul ated at various distances were used as the source to represent 
the proper distance falloff in the sector. and a total radiation level fo r each sector was calculated . 
This total integrated radiation level for each sector was then divided by the sector volume, resulting in 
an -average" radiation exposure for any point within the sector. 
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F.7.3.6.5 WATER RELEASE. WATER RELEASE is an unpublished computer code used 
to calculate exposures to humans arising from radionuclides which have been introduced into water in 
the vicinity of the proposed spent nuclear fuel storage and examination facilities. The following 
discussion provides a brief description of the key points associated with obtaining these estimates . All 
radionuclides which were considered to be introduced into the water at a site were postulated to be 
promptly distributed uniformly in the water in the immediate vicinity of the site during the time 
period in which the nuclides were introduced. There are two processes by which radionuclides might 
enter the water at each site: via liquid discharge or via airborne discharge. For liquid discharges, a 
fraction of the released radionuclides might enter the water accessed by humans each year by 
infiltrating the ground to the groundwater then traveling either to wells or surface water. For 
airborne discharges, some fraction of the released radionuclides might enter the water by deposition 
from the air. For both of these processes, the fraction of radionuclides that might enter the water 
used by humans has been postulated to enter the water immediately, except for NRF and the Nevada 
Test Site. For NRF and the Nevada Test Site, it has been postulated that 20 years pass before the 
nuclides might enter the water accessed by humans. This estimate is based upon the fact that water 
must percolate into the ground and reach groundwater resources. Further, contamination must travel 
with the water in the aquifer to a point where it can be used by humans, such as a well at Atomic 
City. An assessment of the infiltration rate of radionuclides beneath ICPP estimates that about 200 
years aro needed for them to pass into the aquifer (Smith 1994). Also , the water in the aquifer flows 
at a rate of 5 to 20 feet per day. Therefore, 20 years was used as the time for radionuclides to reach 
humans at INEL. Similarly, at the Nevada Test Site surface water is not present so water must reach 
aquifers which are more than 600 feet deep. Hence, 20 years was also used at this site. 
Once the radionuclides have been introduced into the water at a site, they were calculated to 
be transported to locations where they might affect man ei ther directly as via immersion (swimming) 
or indirectly as via ingestion of food. During this transport period , these radionuclides are subjected 
to various mechanisms which may reduce their concentration in the water such as radioactive decay, 
dilution in larger vo lumes of water, removal by sedimentation, etc. The pathways cons idered in this 
analysis by which radionuclides in the water at a site might reach man are immersion, exposure to 
surface deposits, boating and equipment exposure, and consumption of drinking water, fish, 
crustacea, molluscs, game animals, vegetables and fru its, root crops, milk and eggs, and domesticated 
animals. During the period when the rad ionuclides have left the water environment and are being 
transported through the pathways to man, they may be subjected to both concentration and removal 
mechanisms which wi ll further mod ify their effect upon man. These mechanisms include 
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concentration in the surface deposit, animal . and crop pathways; decay during periods between 
harvesting a crop and its ingestion by man ; and removal of activity due to harvesting, handling , and 
cleaning of a foodstuff. 
For each of the sites at which storage or examination of spent nuclear fuel is being 
considered, estimates were made for the exposures which the total population affected by releases 
from the site may receive and for the exposures which a maximally exposed individual may receive 
from these same releases . The exposures to the population affected at a given site were obtained by 
calculating the exposures received by an average individual in the vicinity of that s ite and mUltiplying 
that exposure by the number of people that are affected. The exposure to a maximally exposed 
individual used the maximum exposures and consumption rates which any individual at that site may 
experience regardless of the probabilities associated with just one individual actually following all the 
maximum pathways. The specific pathways which are applicable at a given site are dependent upon 
the site, since the exposure of an average or a maximum individual to each of the pathways is 
different for each of the sites . For example, exposures associated with the drinking water pathway 
are not considered for the shipyard si tes since all radionuclides basically end up in salt water prior to 
their becoming available to man at these sites. On the other hand , the radionuclides introduced at the 
DOE and prototype sites can enter the drinking water pathway after a delay period. An initial delay 
occurs while the radionuclides seep through the ground soil before entering the aquifer. The delay 
continues while the radionuclides travel through the drinking water pathway and ultimately yield 
exposures to man. The total exposure to the population or to a maximally exposed individual at a 
given site is the resultant sum of the exposure commitments from the individual pathways applicable 
at that site. 
F. 1.3. 7 Categorization of Accidents. 
F. 1.3. 7. 1 Abnormal Events. Abnormal Events are unplanned or improper events which 
result in little or no consequence. Abnormal events include industrial accidents and accidents during 
normal operations such as skin contamination with radioact ive materials, spills of radioactive liquids, 
or exposure to direct radiation due to improper placement of shielding . The occurrence of these 
unplanned events has been anticipated and mit igat ive procedures are in place which promptly detect 
and eliminate the events and limit the effects of these events on ind ividuals . As a result . there is little 
hazard to the general population from these events . Such events are considered to occur in the 
probability range of I to 10" per year. The probability referred to here is the total probability of 
occurrenCl .nd includes the probability the event occu rs (e.g., plane crash) times other probabilities 
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required for the consequences . For accidents included in this range, results are presented for both the 
50% meteorological condition (average meteorology) and the 95% meteorological condition. 
F. 1.3.7.2 Design Basis Accident Range. Accidents which have a probability of 
occurrence in the range of 10" to 10" per year are included in the range called the Design Basis 
Accident Range. The terminology "design basis accident," which normally refers to facilities to be 
constructed, also includes the "evaluation" basis accident which applies to existing facilities. For 
accidents included in this range, results are presented for both the 50% meteorological condition 
(average meteorology) and the 95% meteorological condition. Risk calculations for accidents in this 
range utilize the consequences associated with 95% meteorological conditions. 
F. 1.3. 7.3 Beyond Design Basis Accidents. This range includes accidents which are less 
likely to occur than the design basis accidents but which may have very large or catastrophic 
consequences . Accidents included in this range typically have a total probability of occurrence in the 
range of 10" to 10" per year. Accidents which are less likely than 10" per year typically are not 
discussed since it is expected they do not contribute in any substantial way to the risk. For these 
beyond design basis accidents, consequences are presented for 50% and 95% meteorological condi-
tions. Risk calculations for accidents in this range utilize the consequences associated with 95% 
meteorological conditions . 
F.1.3.B Evaluation of Impacted Area 
The impacted area surrounding a facility following an accident was determined for each 
scenario evaluated. The impacted area was defined as that area in which the plume deposited 
radioactive material to such a degree that an individual standing on the boundary of the fallout area 
would receive approximately 0 .01 mremihr of exposure. If this individual spends 24 hours a day at 
this location, that person would receive about 88 mrem per year from the ground surface shine. This 
is within the 100 mremlyear limit of IOCFR20 . 
To best characterize the affected areas for each casualty , a typical 50% meteorology was 
chosen (pasquill-Gifford Class D, wind speed 10 mph) and applied to each accident scenario. The 
RSAC-5 resul ts for ground surface dose were interpolated to determine the distance downwind where 
the centerline dose had dropped to approximately 88 mrem per year based on 24 hours per day 
exposure. For the wind class chosen. the plume remai ns within a singe 22.5-degree sector. The area 
affected by the plume is determined as the entire sector contami nated to the calculated downwind 
distance. Table F.1.3 .8-1 lists each facility accident analyzed and the contaminated footp rint 
associated with the accident. 
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F.1.3.S-1. Footprint estimates for facility accidents. 
Sites with Footprint 
Footprint Length Footprint Area* Beyond Facility 
Accident Scenario (miles) (acres) Boundary 
Drained Water Pool 0.29 II Norfolk, Oak Ridge, 
Portsmouth 
Critical ity 0.25 8 Norfolk, Oak Ridge, 
Portsmouth 
Wet Storage <0.06 <0.5 none 
Mechanical Damage 
Wet Storage <0.06 <0.5 none 
Airplane Crash 
Dry Storage <0.06 <0.5 none 
Mechanical Damage 
Dry Storage 0.91 106 Pearl Harbor, 
Airplane Crash Norfolk, Oak Ridge, 
Portsmouth 
Dry Cell <0.06 <0.5 none 
Mechanical Damage 
HEPA Filter Fire <0.06 <0.5 none 
Dry Cell 1.27 207 Oak Ridge 
Airplane Crash 
*Based on contamination of a single sector. 
Although the plume would be contained within a single sector, the direction of the wind is 
unknown. Therefore, each site was examined for impacts in all directions around the facility site out 
to a distance equal to the footprint length . Since the accidents do occur over a short duration of time, 
the acreage of the sector quoted is still an accurate indication of the total contaminated area . 
Identification of the potential impacts for each site is contained in Tables F .1.3 .8-2 through -II. 
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Table F.1.3.8-2. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard . 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National Environmental 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense Contamination 
Decreasing 
Severity 
I . Dry I . A total of 
Storage A small approximately 
Plane Crash number of 106 acres might 
The water individuals r~uire cleanup. 
used for may Contamination 
drinking and experience could extend 
industrial temporary job Naval vessels at about 0 .6 miles 
purposes is loss due to the shipyard beyond the 
Plants and monitored temporary could be closest site 
animals on and use may restrictions on temporarily boundary . 
the site and be temporari- farming. contaminated 
Puget Sound around the Iy suspended fishing and during the 2. Contamination 
Naval 2. Drained site will during other support accident. might occur up to 
Shipyard Water Pool experience cleanup activities near Cleanup the nearest ship-
no long operations . the facility operations yard boundary 
term Some during would restore but would be 
impacts . recreational cleanup these ships to limited to approx-
activities may operations . full readiness . imately 
also be Some costs \ 0 acres total. 
temporarily would also be 
suspended . incurred for 3 . Contamination 
No enduring the actual would be within 
3. Criticality impacts are cleanup the shipyard 
and all other expected. operation. boundaries. 
radiological Table F.\.3.8-\ 
accidents lists the area that 
could be 
contaminated . 
Endangered Land Treaty 
Species Use Rights 
The facility Access to 
accident some areas 
would not may be 
result in the temporarily 
extermina- restricted 
tion of any until 
species. cleanup is 
Nor would completed. 
it effect the The total No enduring 
long term area impacts 
potential for restricted 
survival of would be no 
any species . greater than 
A listing of the areas 
endangered identified 
species can under "En-
be found in vironmental 
Section Contamina-
4 .1.1 of this tion". 
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Tahle F.1.3.8-3. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard , 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National Environmental 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense Contamination 
Decreasing 
" Severity 
A small 
number of 
The water individuals 
1. Dry used for may 1. A total of 
Storagc drinking and experience approximately 
Plane Crash industrial temporary job Naval vessels at 106 acres might 
purposes is loss r1ue to the shipyard require cleanup. 
Plants and monitored temporary could be Contamination 
animals on and use may restrictions on temporarily could extend 
the site and be temporari- fanning, contaminated about 0 .4 miles 
Pearl Harbor around the Iy suspended fishing and during the beyond the clos-
Naval site will during other support accident. est site boundary. 
Shipyard cxperience cleanup activities near Cleanup 
no long operations . the facility operations 2 . Contamination 
tenn Some during would restore would be within 
2 . All other impacts . recreational cleanup these ships to the shipyard 
radiological activities may operations . full readiness . boundaries. 
accidents also be Some costs Table F. I.3 .8-1 
temporarily would also be lists the areas that 
suspended . incurred fo r could be contami-
No enduring the actual nated . 
impacts arc cleanup 
expected . operation . 
Endangered Land Treaty 
Species Use Rights 
The facility Access to 
accident some areas 
would not may be 
result in the temporarily 
extennination restricted 
of any until 
species. Nor cleanup is 
would it completed. 
effect the The total No enduring 
long tenn area impacts 
potential for restricted 
survival of would be no 
any species. greater than 
A listing of the areas 
endangered identified 
species can be under "En-
found in vironmental 
Section 4 .1.4 Contamina-
of this tion" . 
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Table F.1.3.8-4. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense 
Decrea~ing 
Severity 
I . Dry 
Storage A small 
Plane Crash number of 
The water individuals 
used for may 
drinking and experience 
industrial temporary job Naval vessels at 
purposes is loss due to the shipyard 
Plants and monitored temporary could be 
animals on and use may restrictions on temporarily 
the site and be temporari- farming. contaminated 
Norfolk around the Iy suspended fishing and during the 
Naval 2. Drained site will during other support accident. 
Shipyard Water Pool experience cleanup activities near Cleanup 
and Criticality no long operations . the facility operations 
term Some during would restore 
impacts . recreational cleanup these ships to 
activities may operations . full readiness. 
also be Some costs 
temporarily would also be 
1 . All other suspended . incurred for 
radiological No enduring the actual 
accidents impacts are cleanup 
expected . operation . 
Environmental Endangered Land Treaty 
Contamination Species Use Rights 
I . A total of 
approximately 
106 acres might 
require cleanup. The facility Access to 
Contamination accident some areas 
could extend would not may be 
about 0.8 miles result temporarily 
beyond the cIos- in the restricted 
est site boundary. extermination until 
of any cleanup is 
2. This accident species. Nor completed . 
might contami- would it The total No enduring 
nate about 10 effect the area impacts 
acres which could long term restricted 
extend beyond the potential for would be no 
nearest site survival of greater than 
boundary by any species. the areas 
about 0.1 miles A listing of identified 
endangered under "En-
3. Contamination species can he vironmental 
would be within found in Contamina-
the shipyard Section 4.1.2 tion. " 
boundaries. of this 
Table F.1.3 .8-1 Appendix. 
lists the areas that 
could be 
contaminated . 
Table F.1.3.8-S. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National Environmental Endangered Land Treaty 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense Contamination Species Use Rights 
Decreasing 
Severity 
1. Dry I . A total of 
Storag A small appro,umately 
Plane Cr4sh number of 106 acres 
The water individuals might require The facility Access to 
used for may cleanup. accident some areas 
drinking and experience Contamination would not may be 
industrial temporary job Naval vessels at could extend result temporarily 
purposes is loss due to the shipyard about 0.6 in the restricted 
Plants and monitored temporary could be miles beyond extermina- until clean-
animals on and use may restrictions on temporarily the closest site tion of any up is com-
the site and be temporari- farming. contaminated boundary. ~pecies . pleted. The 
Portsmouth around the Iy suspended fishing and during the Nor would total area No enduring 
Naval 2. Drained site will during other support accident. 2. Contamina- it effect the restricted impacts 
Shipyard Water Pool experience cleanup activities near Cleanup tion might long term would be no 
no long operations . the facility operations occur up to the potential for greater than 
term Some during would restore nearest survival of the areas 
impacts . recreational cleanup these ships to shipyard any species. identified 
activities may operations . full readiness. boundary but A listing of under "En-
also be Some costs would be endangered vironmental 
temporarily would also be limited to species can Conse-
suspended . incurred for approximately be found quenccs" . 
No enduring the actual 10 acres total. Section 
3. Criticality impacts are cleanup 4. t .J of this 
and all other expcctd. operation . 3 . Contamina- Appendix . 
radiological tion would be 
accidents within the 
shipyard 
boundaries . 
Table 
F.1.3.8-1 lists 
the areas that 
could be 
contaminated . 
< 9-
c 
3 
C1> 
:> 
"0 
"0 
C1> 
::J Q. 
>< 
o 
." 
I 
~ 
o 
Table F.1.3.S-6. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Oak Ridge Reservation. 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense 
Decreasing 
Severity 
I . Dry Cell 
Air Plane 
Crash 
A small 
The water number of 
used for individuals 
drinking and may 
industrial experience 
purposes is temporary job 
Plants and monitored loss due to 
animals on and use may temporary 
the site and be temporari- restrictions on 
Oak Ridge 2. Dry around the Iy suspended fanning. No 
Reservat ion Storage Plane site will during fishing and impacts 
Crash experience cleanup other support 
no long operations . activ ities near 
tenn Some the facility 
impacts . recreational during 
activities may cleanup 
also be operations. 
temporarily Some costs 
3 . Drained suspended . would also be 
Water Pool No enduring incurred for 
and Criticality impacts are the actual 
expected . cleanup 
operation . 
4. All other 
radiological 
accidents 
Environmental Endangered Land Treaty 
Contamination Species Use Rights 
I . A total of 
approximately 
207 acres might 
require cleanup. 
Contamination The facility Access to 
could extend accident some areas 
about 1.1 miles would not may be 
beyond the clos- result temporarily Some 
est site boundary . in the restricted temporary 
extennination until restrictions 
2. This accident of any cleanup is on access 
could contaminate species. Nor completed . may be 
about 106 acres would it The total required until 
and would extend effect the area rest ric- cleanup is 
beyond the long tenn ted would completed . 
nearest site potential for be no No enduring 
boundary by survival of greater than impacts are 
about 0 .7 miles . any species . the areas expected. 
A listing of identified 
3 . About 10 acres endangered under "En-
might become species can be vironmen!al 
cont.aminated found in Conse-
extending about Section 4.5 of quenees" . 
0 .1 miles offsite. this 
Appendix. 
4 . Contamination 
would remain 
within the site 
boundaries . 
Table F. 1.3 .8-1 
Lists the areas that 
could be contami-
nated . 
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Table F.1.3.8-7. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Savannah. River Site. 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National 
Acc idents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense 
Decreasing 
Severity 
A small 
The water number of 
used for individuals 
drinking and may 
industrial experience 
purposes is temporary job 
monitored loss due to 
Plants and and use may temporary 
animals on be temporari- restrictions on 
Savannah All the site and Iy suspended fanning. 
River Site Radiological around the during fishing and No 
Accidents site will cleanup other support impacts 
experience operations . activities near 
no long Some the facility 
tenn recreational during 
impacts . activities may cleanup 
also be operations . 
temporarily Some costs 
suspended . would also be 
No enduring incurred for 
impacts are the actual 
expected . cleanup 
operation . 
Environmental Endangered Land Treaty 
Contamination Species Use Rights 
The facility 
accident 
would not 
result Some 
Contamination in the Access to temporary 
would remain extennination some areas restrictions 
within the site of any may be on access 
boundaries. species . Nor temporarily may be 
Table F. \.3 .8-1 would it restricted required until 
lists the a reas that effect the unt il cleanup is 
could be contami- long tenn cleanup is completed . 
nated . potential for completed . No enduring 
survival of impacts are 
any species. expected. 
A listing of 
endangered 
species ean be 
found in 
Section 4.3 of 
this 
Appendix. 
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Table F.1.3.8-8. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Nevada Test Site. 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National 
Accidents in Resources Resourees Impacts Defense 
Decreasing 
Severity 
A small 
number of 
individuals 
The water may 
used for experience 
drinking and temporary job 
industrial loss due to 
Plants and purposes is temporary 
animals on monitored restrictions on 
Nevada Test All the site and and use may support 
Site Radiological around the be temporari- activities near No 
Accidents site will Iy suspended the facility impacts 
experience during during 
no long cleanup cleanup 
term operations . operations. 
impacts . No enduring Some costs 
impacts are would also be 
expected . incurred for 
the actual 
cleanup 
operation . 
Environmental Endangered Land Treaty 
Contamination Species Use Rights 
The facility 
accident 
would not 
result Some 
Contamination in the Access to temporary 
would remain extermination some areas restrictions 
within the site of any may be on access 
boundaries. species. Nor temporarily may be 
Table F.1.3.8-1 would it restricted required until 
lists the areas that effect the until cleanup is 
could be contami- long term cleanup is completed. 
nated. potential for completed. No enduring 
survival of impacts are 
any species. expected. 
A listing of 
endangered 
species can be 
found Section 
4.6 of this 
Appendix. 
Table F.1.3.8-9. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National Environmental Endangered Land Treaty 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense Contamination Species Use Rights 
Decreasing 
Severity 
A smaU 
The water number of 
used for individuals The facility 
drink.ing and may accident 
industrial experience would not 
purposes is temporary job result Some 
monitored loss due to Contamination in the Access to temporary 
Plants and and use may temporary would remain extermination some areas restrictions 
animals on be temporari- restrictions on within the site of any may be on access 
Idaho All the site and Iy suspended support boundaries. species. Nor temporarily may be 
National Radiological around the during activities near No Table F.1.3 .8-1 would it restricted required until 
Engineering Accidents site wiU cleanup the facility impacts lists the areas that effect the until cleanup is 
Laboratory experience operations. during could be contami- long term cleanup is completed. 
no long No enduring cleanup nated . potential for completed . No enduring 
term impacts are operations . survival of impacts are 
impacts . expected . Some costs any species . expected. 
would also be A listing of 
incurred for endangered 
the actual species can be 
cleanup found Section 
operation. 4.2 of this 
Appendix. 
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Table F.1.3.S-10. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Hanford Site. 
Site Significant Biotic Water Economic National 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense 
Decreasing 
Severity 
The water A small 
used for number of 
drinking and individuals 
industrial may 
purposes is experience 
monitored temporary job 
and use may loss due to 
Plants and be temporari- temporary 
animals on Iy suspended restrict ions on 
All the site and during support 
Hanford Site Radiological around the cleanup activities near No 
Accidents site will operations . the facility impacts 
experience Some recrc- during 
no long atioroal acti"i- cleanup 
term ties may also operations. 
impacts . be temporari- Some costs 
Iy suspended . would also be 
No enduring incurred for 
impacts alT the actual 
expected . cleanup 
operation . 
Environmental Endangered Land Treaty 
Contamination Species Use Rights 
The facility 
accident 
would not 
Contamination result 
would remain in the 
within the site extermination Some 
boundaries . of any Access to temporary 
Table F. \.3.8-1 species . Nor some areas restrictions 
lists the areas that would it may be on access 
could be contami- effect the temporarily may be 
nated. hng term restricted required until 
potential for until cleanup is 
survival of cleanup is completed . 
any species. completed. No enduring 
A lis:ing of impacts are 
endangered expected . 
species can be 
found Section 
4.4 of this 
Appendix. 
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Table F.1.3.8-11. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Kenneth A. Kesselring Site. 
Site Signilicant Biotic Water Economic National Environmental 
Accidents in Resources Resources Impacts Defense Contamination 
Decreasing 
Severity 
I. Dry The water A small I . Contamination 
Storage used for number of is expected right 
Plane Crash drinking and individuals up to the nearest 
industrial may site boundary but 
purposes is experience limited to 
monitored temporary job approllimately 
and use may loss due to 106 acres total. 
Plants and be temporari- temporary 
animals on Iy suspended restrictions on 
Kenneth A. the site and during support 2. Contamination 
Kesselring around the cleanup activities near No would remain 
Site 2. Drained site wIll operations . the facility impacts within the 
Water Pool experience Some recre- during shipyard 
and no long ational activi- cleanup boundaries . 
all other term ties may also operations . Table F .1.3.8-1 
radiological impacts . be temporari- Some costs lists the areas that 
accidents ly suspended . would also be could be contami-
No enduring incurred for nated . 
impacts are the actual 
expected . cleanup 
operation. 
Endangered Land Treaty 
Species Use Rights 
The facility 
accident 
would not 
result 
in the Some 
extermination Access to temporary 
of any some areas restrictions 
species . Nor may be on access 
would it tempoarily may be 
effect the restricted required 
long term until until 
potential for cleanup is cleanup is 
survival of completed. completed . 
any species. No endur-
A listing of ing impacts 
endangered are 
species can be expected . 
fo und Section 
4 .1.5 of this 
Appendix. 
F.1. 3.9 Emergency Preparedness and Mitigative Measures. 
F. 1.3. g. 1 Emergency Preparedness Emergency plans are in effect at shipyards and 
prototype sites to ensure that workers and the public would be properly protected in the event of an 
accident . In addition, emergency plans are in effect for accidents involving the transportation of 
radioactive materials. These response plans include the activation of emergency response teams 
provided by the site and a si te emergency control center, as well as activation of a command and 
control network with Naval Reactors Headquarters and supporting laboratories. The long standing 
emergency planning program that exists within the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program includes the 
ability to utilize the comprehensive and extensive emergency response resources of each naval site and 
provides for coordination with appropriate civil authorities . In addition to the Naval Nuclear 
Propulsion Program resources, extensive federal emergency response resources are available as 
needed to support State or local response . 
Emergency response measures include provisions for immediate response to any emergency at 
the shipyard or prototype site, identification of the accident conditions, and communications with civil 
authorities providing radiological data and recommendations for any appropriate protective actions. 
In the event of an accident involving radioactive or toxic materials, workers in the vicinity of the 
accident would promptly evacuate the immediate area. Th is e"acuation can typically be accomplished 
within minutes of the acc ident and would reduce the hazard to workers . 
Regularly scheduled exercises are conducted periodically at each site in order to test each 
si te's abi lity to respond to accidents. These exercises include realistic tests of people, equipment , and 
communications involved in al l aspects of the pl ans, and the plans are regularly reviewed and 
modified to incorporate experience gained from the exercises. These exercises also periodically 
include steps to veri fy the adequacy of interactions with local hospitals and emergency personnel and 
state officials . 
F. 1.3.9.2 Mitigative Factors. For members of the general public resid ing at the site 
boundary or beyond, no cred it is taken fo r any preventive or mitigat ive actions that would limit their 
exposure. These individuals are calcul ated as being exposed to the entire contaminated plume as it 
travels downwind from the accident site. Similarly no action is taken to prevent these people from 
continuing thei r normal day·to-day rout ine and ingestion of terrestrial food and animal products 
continue on a yearly basis. As discussed in Section F.I .3. action would be taken to prevent the 
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public from exceeding a Protective Action Guideline, if needed. No reduction of exposure due to 
these actions are accounted for in th is analys is . The public is assumed to spend approximately 30% 
of the day within their homes or other buildings and the exposure to ground surface radiation is 
therefore reduced appropriately on a yearly basis. 
Individuals that reside or work on site, or those that may be traversing the site in a vehicle 
would be evacuated from the affected area within 2 hours. This is based on the availability of 
security personnel at all locations to oversee the removal of residents, collocated workers, and 
travelers in a safe and efficient manner. Periodic training and evaluation of the security personnel is 
conducted to ensure that correct actions are taken during an actual casualty. Therefore, residents, 
collocated workers, and travelers would be exposed to the entire contaminated plume as it travels 
downwind for a period not to exceed 2 hours. Similarly, the radiation shine from the deposited 
radioactive materials would be limited to a 2·hour period . No ingestion of contamination is calculated 
for these individuals. 
Facility workers all undergo training to take quick, decisive action during a casualty . These 
individuals quickly evaruate the area and move to previously defined "relocation" areas on the facility 
si te. Workers could be exposed to a full 5 minutes of the radioactive plume as they move to the 
"relocation" centers. Once the immed iate threat of the plume has moved off-site and downwind, the 
workers would be instructed to walk to vehicles waiting to evacuate them from the site. An 
additional 15 minutes would be required to evacuate the workers from the contaminated area and 
therefore the workers receive a total of 20 minutes of ground shine. No ingestion of contamination is 
calculated for these individuals. 
The following summary provides the individual exposure times utilized in the accident 
analyses presented in Section F. 1.4.2. 
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fstimated Time an Individual Might be Exposed 
Collocated Worker Individual at 
(MCW) and Nearest Nearest Site 
Worker (100 m) Public Access (NPA) Boundary (MOl) 
100% of release 100% of release 
To Plume 5 min. time up to lime 
120 min . 
To Fallout on Ground 20 min. 120 min. 0.7 yr 
Surface 
To Food N/A N/A I yr 
F. 1.3. 10 Perspective on Calculations of Cancer Fatalities and Risk 
The topics of human health effects caused by radiation and the risks associated with normal 
operations or postulated accidents associated with spent nuclear fuel management are discussed many 
times throughout this Environmental Impact Statement. It is imponant to understand these concepts 
and how they are used in order to understand the information presented in this document. It is also 
valuable to have some frame of reference or comparison for understanding how the risks compare to 
the risks of daily life. 
The method used to calculate the risk of any impact is fundamental to all of the evaluations 
presented and follows standard accepted practices. The first step is to determine the probability that a 
specific event will occur. For example. the probability that a routine task. such as operating a crane. 
will be performed sometime during a year of normal operations at a facility would be I. That means 
that the action would cenainl y occur. The probability that an accident might occu r is less than 1.0. 
This is true because accidents occur only occasionally and some of the more severe accidents. such as 
a catastrophic earthquake. might occur at any location only once in hundreds. thousands. or millions 
of years. 
Once the probability of an event has been determined. the next step is to predict what the 
consequences of the event being considered might be. One imponant measure of consequences 
chosen for this EIS is the number of human fatalities from cancer induced by radiation. This was 
chosen because this document deals with radioactive materials. The number of cancer fatalities that 
might be caused by any routine operation or any postul ated accident can be calculated usi ng a 
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standard technique based on the amount of radiation exposure that might occur from all conceivable 
pathways and the number of people who might be affected (refer to Section F. I.3.3). 
A couple of examples should serve to illustrate the calculation of risk. In the first , the 
lifetime risk of dying in a mo:or vehicle accident can be computed from the likelihood of an 
individual being in an automobile accident and the consequences or number of fatalities per accident. 
There were 10,000,000 motor vehicle accidents during 1992 in the United States resulting in about 
40,000 deaths (NSC 1993). Thus, the probability of a person being in an automobile accident is 
10,000,000 accidents divided by approximately 250,000,000 persons in the United States, or 0.04 per 
year. The number of fatalities per accident, 0.004 (40,000 deaths divided by 10,000,000 accidents), 
is less than I since many accidents do not cause fatalities. Multiplying the probability of the accident 
(0.04 per year) by the consequences of the accident (0.004 deaths per accident) by the number of 
years the person is exposed to the risk (72 years is considered to be an average lifetime) gives the risk 
for any individual being ki lled in an automobile accident. From this calculation, the overall risk of 
someone dying in a motor vehicle accident is about I chance in 87 over their lifetime. 
A second example illustrates the calculation of risk for another event which occurs daily . 
Fossil fuels , such as natural gas or coal, contain naturally occurring radioactive material that is 
released into the air during combustion. This radioactivity in the air finds its way into our bodies 
through our food and the air we breathe. This radioactivity has been estimated to produce about 0.5 
millirem of rad iat ion dose to the average American each year (NCRP 1987). The probability of this 
happening is essentially 1.0 since these fuels are burned every day all over the country. The number 
of fatal cancers from exposure to 0.5 millirem per year is calculated by taking 0.5 millirem per year 
times the 72 years considered to be an average lifetime times the 0.0005 fatal cancers estimated to be 
caused by each rem (0.5 millirem per year x 72 years x 0.0005 fatal cancers per rem = 0.000018 
fatal cancers per individual lifetime). The risk is the probability (1.0) times the consequences 
(0.000018 cancer fatalities) which equals about I chance in 55,000 of death from this cause over a 
lifetime. 
These risks and others from everyday life can be used to gain a perspective on the risks 
associated with the alternatives in this EIS. As illustrated . the risk of death from cancer from the 
radioactivity released daily from combustion of fossil fu els is about I chance in 55,000 for the 
average American. As a funher comparison. the naturally occurring radioactive materials in 
agricultural fenilizer contribute about I to 2 millirem per year to an average American's exposure to 
radiation (NCRP 1987). A calculation similar to the one in the preceding paragraph shows that the 
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use of fenilizer to produce food crops in the United States results in a risk of death from cancer 
between I chance in 12 ,500 and I chance in 25,000. Finally, the average American's risk of dying 
from cancer from all causes is I chance in 5 over his or her lifetime. These risks can be compared, 
for example, to the average individual risk of less than I chance in I billion for a resident in the 
vicinity of the INEL developing a fatal cancer due to normal operations at the Expended Core Facility 
(see the data in Section F. 1.4.1). 
A frame of reference for the risks from accidents associated with spent nuclear fuel manage-
ment alternatives can be developed in the same way. For an average resident in the vicinity of the 
INEL, the individual risk of death from cancer caused by the water leaking from the Expended Core 
Facility after a large eanhquake would be approximately I chance in 9 billion . This individual risk 
was determined by dividing the risk value to the population within 50 miles (1.7 x 10" fatalities per 
year per accident from Table F-3) by the total population of 115,690 and mult iplying by an average 
life span of 72 years . This risk can be compared to the risks of death from other accidental causes to 
gain a perspective. For example, the risk of death in a motor vehicle accident was calculated earlier 
to be about I chance in 87. Similarly, the risk of death for the average American from fires is 
approximately I chance in 500, and for death from accidental poisoning the risk is about I chance in 
1000 (Crouch 1982). 
F .1.4 Analysis Results 
F. 1.4 . 1 Normal Operations. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the hypothetical health 
effects on workers and the public due to routine handling of naval spent nuclear fuel. Radioactive 
releases from facilities involved in routine handling of naval spent nuclear fuel are small and less than 
those of comparable DOE and commercial nuclear facilities. Records of routine releases due to 
operations at ECF were used as source terms for all locations to estimate what effects these types of 
releases have on workers and the public. Site-specific meteorological and population data were used 
at each of the locations analyzed. For normal operations at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF and 
Oak Ridge), exposure to the nearest public access (NPA) individual is not estimated due to the ~hon 
period of time that such an individual would spend on-site while driving on the public access road . 
At Hanford _ the NPA is located at the Washington Public Power Supply System Plant . and at 
Savannah River at the U.S. Forestry Service Office. The NPA at shipyard locations is defined in 
Section F.I.3 .2. 
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F_ 1.4 _ 1. 1 Water Pool Examination and Storage Source Terms. The evaluation of 
normal water pool operations was performed us ing two different source terms. In one analysis, a 
source term was ut ilized which included both the incremental release of radioactive materials due to 
the alternative spent nuclear fuel storage actions and the release from other ongoing Naval Reactors 
activities. Identical source terms were used for the evaluation of radiation exposure due to the release 
of radioactive materials during normal operations of wet storage and spent fuel examinations . The 
1991 annual airborne release from the INEL-ECF was used to evaluate these operations. Since the 
INEL-ECF releases are extremely low, this upper limit approach is not unduly conservative for the 
wet storage option which is expected to have a lower release. Table F. 1.4. 1.1-1 shows the 1991 
INEL-ECF release rate, the current release rate at Kesselr;ng and NRF (including both INEL-ECF 
and prototypes), and the release rate representing Naval Reactors operations at naval shipyards . The 
release rate representing naval shipyards is based on upper bound data from Navy operations 
contained in Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) Repon 1'<1-94-1 (NNPP 1994). With no 
current Naval Reactors facilities at Savannah River, Hanford , Oak Ridge. or the Nevada Test Site. the 
current release for each of these sites is zero for this analysis. 
Table F.L4_LI-L Airborne releases from current Naval Reactors operations. 
Location Annual Releases (Ci t year) 
INEL-ECF H-3 9 .35 x 10" Y-90 5.5 x 10" 
C-14 7.0 x 10" 1-131 4.82 x 10" 
Sr-90 5.5 x 10" Kr-85 3.0 x 10" 
NRF H-3 9 .35 x 10" Sr-90 2.45 x 10" 
C-14 8.0 x 10" Y-90 2.45 x 10" 
Ar-41 2.7 x 10" 1-131 6.3 x 10" 
Co-60 1.6 x 10" Cs- 137 6.3 x 10" 
Kr-85 3.0 x 10" 
Kesselring H-3 1.0 x 10" Kr-85 1.0 x 10" 
C-14 4.0 x 10" 1-131 5.0 x 10~ 
Ar-41 1.4 Cs- 137 5.0 x IO~ 
Co-60 1.0 x 10" 
Savannah River_ Hanford. none 
Nevada Test Site. Oak Ridge 
Ponsmouth, Norfolk H-3 1.0 x 10" Kr-87 5.0 x 10" 
Puget Sound , C-14 1.0 x 10" Kr-8S 2.0 x 10" 
Pearl Harbor Ar-41 4. 1 x 10" Xe l31m 5.0 x 10" 
Co-60 1.0 x 10" Xel33m 1.0 x 10" 
Kr-83m 2.0 x 10" Xe-133 2.1 x 10" 
Kr-85m 2.4 x 10" Xe-135 2.5 x 10" 
Kr-85 1.0 x 10" 
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The evalualion of conlinuing Naval ReaClOrs aClivilies combined wilb Ibe proposed allerna-
lives for naval spenl nuclear fuel is based on Ibe combined ai rborne release source lerms shown in 
Table F.1.4.1.1-2. This lable presenlS a summalion of Ibe INEL-ECF source lerm and Ibe currenl 
Naval Reaclors operalions source lerms from Table F.1.4.1. 1-1 for each localion. Beginning in 
1995. wilb Ibe Shuldown of Ibe S5G prolOlype. Ibe NRF releases will only resull from Ibe 
INEL-ECF. and Ibis condilion is shown in me lable. 
The olber analysis ulilized Ibe same source lerm al all localions. The INEL-ECF source lerm 
of Table F.1.4.1.1-1 was used 10 compare Ibe incremenlal heaJlb effeelS due 10 providing waler pool 
slOrage or examinalion facil ities al each localion. 
801b analyses also considered Ibe impacl on heallb effeclS of direcl radialion levels from a 
waler pool facilily and Ibe deposilion of radionucl ides onlo Ibe ground and inlO waler supplies as 
discussed in Seelions F.1.3 .6.4 and F.1.3 .6.5. 
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Table F.L4_LI-2. Airborne releases used in Ibe analysis of waler pool aClivilies plus ongoing 
Naval Reaclors operalions. 
Localion Annual Releases (Ci/year) 
NRF. Savannah River. H-3 9.35 x 10" Y-9O 5.5 x 10" 
Hanford . Nevada Tesl Sile. C-14 7.0 x 10" 1-131 4.82 x 10" 
Oak Ridge Sr-90 5.5 x 10"' Kr-85 3.0 x 10" 
Kesselring H-3 1.935 x 10" Sr-9O 5.5 x 10" 
C-14 1.1 Y-9O 5.5 x 10"' 
Ar41 1.4 1-131 5.0 x 10~ 
Kr-85 3.0 x 10" Cs-137 5.0x I~ 
Co-60 1.0 x 10" 
POrlSmoulb. Norfolk H-3 9.45 x 10" Kr-88 2.<r x l<r' 
Pugel Sound. C- 14 8.0 x 10" Sr-90 5.5 x 10" 
Pearl Harbor Ar41 4.1 x 10" Y-90 5.5 x 10" 
Co-60 1.0 x 10" 1-131 4.8 x 10" 
Kr-83m 2.0 x 10" Xe l31m 5.0 x H)"' 
Kr-85m 2.4 x 10" Xel33m 1.0 x 10" 
Kr-85 3.0 x 10" Xe-133 2.1 x 10" 
Kr-87 5.0 x 10" Xe-135 2.5 x 10" 
F. 1.4 . 1.2 Dry Storage Source Terms. Anolber operalion analyzed was Ibe slOrage of 
naval spenl nuclear fu el in shipping comainers or slOrage casks in a safe arrayal NRF. Ibe naval 
shipyards . and Kesselring localions. II is poslulaled Ihal shielding and physical boundaries are 
eslablished in accordance wilb exisling regulal ions 10 prOlecl facilily workers . There are expecled 10 
be no rouline airborne or waler releases from Ibe dry slorage aClivi ly . The source will consisl of an 
array of filled slorage conlainers. Supplemenlary shielding would be provided as needed 10 ensure 
Ibal Ibere would be no measurable increase in radialion levels al Ihe peri meIer of Ibe induslrial area 
and Ibal radialion levels wilbin Ibe industrial area bUI oUlside Ibe slorage area would nOI require 
occupalional radial ion exposure moniloring fo r workers . Each local ion analyzed would have a 
differenl number of slorage casks. As conlai ners are received over lime. shielding will be provided 
10 limil radial ion exposure rales as discussed above. Dislance falloff for radial ion levels was 
delermined using SPAN compuler calculalions as discussed in Seclion F.I .3.6.4. 
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F. 7.4. 7.3 Dry Cell Facility Source Terms. The normal airborne release source terms 
utilized for the dry cell facility analyses are identical to the INEL-ECF rel eases in Table F .1.4.1-1. It 
is expected that these values bound the actual releases from the proposed facility. A source term 
different from the water pool analysis was utilized for the direct radiation calculations. This source 
term is based on the proposed facility design, expected fuel examination capacity, and shielding 
calculations. Like the airborne releases, source terms for water deposition were identical to those 
util ized in the water pool analysis . 
F. 7.4. 7.4 Water Pool Storage. This section presents tabulated radiation exposure results 
for the wet storage option. The following summary provides an indication of the incremental change 
at each location due to the addition of an ECF·type facility . 
Summary or Exposure Calculation Results 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination or Storage only 
At All Sites 
Worker EDE (rem) 
MOl EDE (rem) 
NPA EDE (rem) 
Total EDE 
(person-rem) 
Number of Fatal 
Cancers 
, MOl (Barnwell Plant) 
•• MOl (FMEF) 
Volume I, Appendix D 
INELlNRF 
7.1 x 10-' 
2.5 x 10-' 
N/A 
1.7 x 10-' 
8.5 x 10-' 
Savannah 
River Hanford 
9. 1 x 10-' 8.9 x 10-' 
4.8 x 10-' 2.4 x 10-' 
3.8 x 10"'" 4.4 x 10-' " 
2.1 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
3.6 x 10-' 8.0 x 10-' 
1.8 x 10-' 4.0 x 10"" 
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Puget Pearl 
Sound Harbor 
9.4 x 10-' 1.1 x 10-' 
8.7 x 10-' 2.0 x 10-' 
6.2 x 10-' 5.2 x 10-' 
1.3 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-' 
6.5 x 10-' 7.0 x 10-' 
Nevada 
Norfolk Portsmouth Kesselring Test Site Oak Ridge 
Worker EDE (rem) 6.9 x 10-' 7.7 x 10-' 8.5 x 10-' 4.6 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 
MOl EDE (rem) 1.1 x 10-' 4.4 x 10-' 6.8 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
NPA EDE (rem) 6.8 x 10-' 3.3 x 10-' N/A N/A N/A 
Total EDE 2.8 x 10-' 4.5 x 10-' 8.2 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
(person-rem) 
Number of Fatal 
Cancers 1.4 x 10-' 2.3 x 10-' 4.1 x 10-' 9.0 x 10-' 5.0 x 10-' 
Evaluations of environmental impacts at DOE sites are presented in Volume I , Appendices A, 
B, C, and F. The radiological impacts at these sites are quite low in that fatal cancer projections to 
the population with in SO miles from normal operat ions are well below 1.0. Further, impacts at naval 
shipyards and prototype sites are addressed in Appendix D and also are well below 1.0. Hence, the 
addition of the above small values to those which already exist at a site result in total values which 
are also quite small . 
The following summary provides the exposure calculation resul ts for water pool storage or 
examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations at each site. 
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Summary or Exposure Calculation Results 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination or Storage 
plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At all sites 
Worker EDE (rem) 
MOl EDE (rem) 
NPA EDE (rem) 
Total EDE 
(person-rem) 
Number of Fatal 
Cancers 
* MOl (Barnwell Plant) 
** MOl (FMEF) 
Worker EDE (rem) 
MOl ~DE (rem) 
NPA EDE (rem) 
Total EDE 
(person-rem) 
Number of Fatal 
Cancers 
INELlNRF 
7.1 x 10-5 
2.5 x 10-7 
N/A 
1.7 x 10-3 
8.5 x 10-7 
Norfolk 
8.4 x 10-5 
1.2 x 1~ 
7.4 x 10-5 
3.4 x 10-1 
1.7 x 10-4 
Savannah 
River Hanford 
9.1 X 10-5 8.9 X 10-5 
4.8 X 10-7 2.4 X 10-7 
3.8 x lQ-6* 4.4 x 10-7.-
2. 1 x 10-8 1.3 x 10-8 
3.6 X 10-2 8.0 X 10-3 
1.8 X 10- 5 4.0 x IQ-6 
Portsmouth Kesselring 
9 .7 X 10-5 1.4 x 1~ 
5.0 X 10-5 1.2 X 10-5 
3.5 x I~ N/A 
5.5 X 10-2 1.4 X 10- 1 
2.7 X 10-5 7.2 X 10-5 
Puget Pearl 
Sound Harbor 
1.2 x 1~ 1.4 x 1~ 
1.0 x 1~ 2.3 X 10-5 
7.2 x I~ 5.8 x 1~ 
1.5 X 10-1 1.7 X 10-1 
7.6 x 10-5 8.5 X 10-5 
Nevada 
Test Site Oak Ridge 
4.6 X 10-5 1.2 X 10-4 
3.4 X 10-7 1.0 X 10-4 
N/A N/A 
1.8 x I~ 1.0 X 10-1 
9.0 x 10-8 5 .0 X 10-5 
Tables F. 1.4. 1.4- 1 th rough -10 present the detailed results of using the source terms of Table 
F . 1.4.1-2 to determine the radiation exposures . These tables thus depict the result if an ECF-type 
examination operation is added to existing, current , continuing Naval Reactors operations at DOE 
sites and Navy shipyards. 
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Table F.1.4.1.4-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resul ts . 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
Atl NEL 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7. 1 x 10"' 2.8 x 10"' 
MCW 4.2 x 10"' 1.7 x IO" IJ 
MOl 2.5 x 10"' 1.3 x 10"10 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115,690 1.7 x 10"' 8.5 x 10"' 
Table F. 1.4.1.4-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Savannah River 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9. 1 x 10"' 3.6 x 10"' 
MCW 1.4 x 10-' 5.6 x 10"1. 
MOl (New ECF)" 4.8 x 10"' 2.4 x 10"10 
--------------- --------- ------ ----- ---------------
MOl (Barnwell Plant)"" 3.8 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-* 
NPA 2.1 x 10-' 1.1 X IO- IJ 
Exposure to Population with in Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579,541 3.6 x 10"' 1.8 x 10"' 
" MOl (New ECF) appl ies if spent fuel fac il ity is constructed on the Savannah River Site. 
"'MOl (Barnwell Plan!) applies if spent fu el faci lity is constructed at Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant. 
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Table F.1.4.1.4-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Hanford 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.9 x 10"' 3.6 x 10"' 
MCW 1.6 x 10-' 6.4 x 10"10 
MOl (New ECF)" 2.4 x 10"' 1.2 x 10"1. 
------------------------ ----------- ---------------
MOl (FMEF)"" 4.4 x 10"' 2.2 x 10"1. 
NPA 1.3 x 10"' 6.5 x 10"" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375,860 8.0 x 10"' 4.0 x 10-' 
" MOl (New ECF) applies if spent fuel fac il ity is constructed at the 200 area on the Hanford Site. 
"'MOl (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facil ity is constructed at the Fuels and Materials Examination 
Facility . 
Table F .1.4.1.4-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Puget Sound 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.2 x 1 0~ 4.8 x 10-' 
MOl 1.0 x 1 0~ 5. 1 x 10-' 
NPA 7.2 x 10~ 3.6 x 10"' 
Exposure to Population withi n Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
2,975,810 1.5 x 10-1 7.6x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.1.4-S. Summary of Exposure Calculat ion Resul ts . 
For Normal Operations · Water Pool Storage plus al l ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Pearl Harbor 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.4 x 10-' 5 .6 x 10-' 
MOl 2 .3 x 10-' 1.1 x 10-' 
NPA 5 .8 x 10-' 2 .9 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Rad ius (person·rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817.385 1.7 x 10-' 8.5 x 10-' 
Table F.1.4.1.4-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Norfolk 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Locat ion (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.4 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 
MOl 1.2 x 10-' 6 . 1 x 10-' 
NPA 7.4 x 10-' 3.7 x . 0-' 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
SO-mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
1.539.002 3.4 x 10- ' 1.7 x 10-' 
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Table F .1.4.1.4-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At PortSmouth 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9 .7 x 10-' 3.9 x 10-' 
MOl 5 .0 x 10-' 2 .5 x 10-' 
NPA 3.5 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2,432,627 5 .5 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 
Table F.1.4.1.4-H. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Kesselr ing 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.4 x 1 0~ 5.6 x 10-' 
MOl 1.2 x 10- ' 5 .8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population with in Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
7.2 x 10-' 1, 148,587 1.4 x 10-' 
Volume I . Appendix 0 F-60 
Table F.1.4.1.4-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Nevada Test Site 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.6 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
Mf~W 3.7 x 10-" 1.5 x 10-" 
MOl 3.4 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-10 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13 ,792 1.8 x 104 9.0 X 10-' 
Table F.1.4.I.4-tO. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Oak Ridge 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.2 x I~ 4.8 x 10-' 
MCW 1.3 X 10-' 5.1 x 10-" 
MOl 1.0 x I~ 5.1 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
k 5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871 ,531 1.0 x 10-' 5.0 x 10-' 
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F. 7.4 . 7.5 Dry Stolage. This section presents tabulated radiation exposure results for the 
dry storage option at INEL. Navy shipyard sites, and the Kesselring Site. Dry storage at Hanford, 
Savannah River, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge is not included in this section as it is discussed 
in EIS Volume I, Appendices A, C. and F, respectively. The following summary provides an 
indication of the incremental change at each location due to the addition of dry storage areas . The 
health effect due 10 dry storage of spent fuel is largest at the Navy shipyards and is extremely small at 
all DOE locations. 
Summary of Exposure Calculation Results 
For Normal Operations· Dry Storage only 
AI all siles 
INEL Puget Sound 
Worker EDE 
(rem) 1.1 x 10·' 5.4 x 10-' 
MOl EDE 
(rem) 6.5 x 10-" 8.9 x 10-' 
NPA EDE 
(rem) N/A 7.4x 10-' 
Total EDE 
(person-rem) 1.7 x 10- 11 2.4 x 10-' 
Number of 
Fatal 
Cancers 8.6 x 10-" 1.2 x 10'" 
Pearl 
Harbor Norfolk Ponsmouth Kesselring 
2. 1 x 10-' 5.8 x 10·' 2.7 x 10-' 6. 1 x I~ 
1.5 x 10'" 2.9 x 10·' 5.6 x 10-' 5.2 x 10-" 
2.3 x 10·' 2.9 x 10-' 2.2 x 10· ' N/A 
1.9 x 10-' 4.3 x 10·' 4.6 X 104 8.2 x 10-' 
9.3 x 10-' 2.1 x 10-' 2.3 X 10-' 4. 1 x 10-" 
Tables F.1.4.1.5-1 through -6 present the results if a dry storage area is added to existi ng. 
current , continuing Naval Reactors operations at all locations. 
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Table F.1.4.1.5-1 . Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
AtlNEL 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.1 x 10-' 4.4 x 10-" 
MOl 1.1 x 10-10 5.5 X 10-1• 
NPA 6.5 x 10-1• 3.3 X 10-1' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115,690 1.7 x 10-1' 8.6 X 10-1• 
Table F.1.4.1.5-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Puget Sound 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5 .4 x 10-' 2.2 x 10'" 
MOl 1.1 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-' 
NPA 7.5 x 10-' 3.8 x 10-" 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2,975,810 3.6 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.1.5-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . . 
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Pearl Harbor 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 x 10-' 8 .5 x 10-' 
MOl 5 .3 x 10-" 2 .7 x 10-' 
NPA 2.3 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rerr.) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
3.3 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-' 817 ,385 
Table F. 1.4.l.S-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . . 
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operatIOns 
At Norfolk 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.8 x 10-' 2.3 x 10'" 
MOl 2.9 X 10-' 1.5 x 10'" 
NPA 2.9 x 10-' 1.5 x 10'" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
9 .7 x 10-' 4.9 x 10-' 1,539 ,002 
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Table F.1.4.1.S-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Portsmouth 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.7 x 10-3 1.I x 10-<' 
MOl 6.3 x 10-' 3.1 x 10-' 
NPA 2.2 x 10-' 1.I x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Popul ation of 
2.432,627 9.2 x 10-3 4.6 x 10-<' 
Table F.1.4.1.S-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations 
At Kesselring 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 6.6 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 
MOl 5.1 x 10'" 2.6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1.148,587 5.7 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
F-65 Volume I, Appendix D 
F. 1.4 . 1.6 Dry Cell Operstions. This section presents tabulated radiation exposure results 
for the dry cell operations option. Since a facility like the proposed dry cell would only be 
constructed for the alternatives which include examination of all naval spent fuel, this analysis was 
only performed for the INEL, Savannah River, Hanford, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge 
locations . The following summary provides an indication of the incremental change at each location 
due to the addition of a dry cell facility . The calculated health effect to the general population is 
roughly proportional to the surrounding population with Oak Ridge being the worst and Nevada Test 
Site being the best. 
Summary or Exposure Calculation Results 
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operations 
At all sites 
Worker EDE (rem) 
MOl EDE (rem) 
NPA EDE (rem) 
Total EDE 
(person-rem) 
Number of Fatal 
Cancers 
• MOl (Barnwell Plant) 
• • MOl (FMEF) 
Savannah 
INELlNRF River 
6.3 x 10-' 8.3 x 10-' 
2.5 x 10-' 4.8 X 10-' 
3.8 x 10 ... • 
N/A 2. 1 x 10-
' 
1.7 x 10-' 3.6 x 10-' 
8.5 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
Hanford 
8. 1 x 10-' 
2.4 X 10-' 
4.4 X 10-' " 
1.3 X 10-
' 
8.0 X 10-3 
4.0 x 10'" 
Tables F.I .4.1 .6-1 through -5 present the detailed analysis results. 
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Nevada 
Test Site Oak Ridge 
3.5 x 10-' 1.1 x 10-' 
3.4 X 10-' 8.9 x 10-' 
N/A N/A 
1.8 x 10-' 1.0 X 10-' 
9 .0 X 10-1 5.0 x 10-' 
.-
Table F.1.4.1.6-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resulrs . 
For Nonnal Operations - Dry Cell Operations 
AtlNEL 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 6.3 x 10-' 2.5 x 10-' 
MCW 4.2 x 10-' 1.7 xlO-il 
MOl 2.5 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-'· 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5~mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115,690 1.7 x 10-' 8.5 x 10-' 
Table F.l.4.1.6-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resulrs . 
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operat ions 
At Savannah River 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.3 x 10-' 3.3 x H,' 
MCW 1.3 x 10-" 5.3 x 10-'· 
-~-~~-~~~-!:~~]:------- 4.8 x 10- ' 2.4 X 10-'· 
----------- ---------------
MOl (Barnwell Plant)"" 3.8 x 10'" 1.9 x 10-" 
NPA 2. 1 x 10-' 1.1 1. 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
~mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579,541 3.6 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
" MOl (New ECF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed on the Savannah River Site. 
"'MOl (Barnwell Plant) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant. 
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Table F. .4.1.6-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resulrs. 
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operations 
At Hanford 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8. 1 x 10-' 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW 1.5 x 10-" 6. 1 x 10-'· 
-~g~-~I'!~~-!:~~]:------- 2.4 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-'· ----------- ---------.---- --
MOl (FMEF)"" 4.4 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-'· 
NPA 1.3 x 10-' 6.5 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375,800 8.0 x 10-' 4.0 x 10-" 
" MOl (New ECF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 area on the Hanford Site. 
"'MOl (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the Fuels and Materials Examinat ion 
Facility. 
Table F.1.4.1.6-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resulrs. 
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operations 
At Nevada Test Site 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.5 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 
MCW 3.7 x 10-' l.5 xlo-" 
MOl 3.4 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-'· 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5~mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13.792 1.8 x 10-' 9.0 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.1.6-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Normal Operations · Dry Cell Operations 
At Oak Ridge 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker l.l x 10-· 4.4 x 10-' 
MCW l.l X 10-' 4.6 x 10-" 
MOl 8.9 x 10-' 4.S x 10 .... 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871 ,S31 1.0 x 10-' S.O x 10-' 
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F. 1.4.2 Accident Evaluation. The analysis of airborne «leases from hypothetical a«idents is 
evaluated with RSAC·S. Unless stated otherwise. the following conditions were used when perform· 
ing calculations with RSAC·S . In most cases. these conditions are taken directly as defaults from the 
code. 
Meteorological Data 
• Wind speed. direction. and Pasquill stability are taken from SO% and 9S% 
meteorology . See Section F.I .3 .S for a discussion of meteorological conditions. 
• The release is calculated as occurring at ground level (0 m) . 
• Mixing layer height is 400 meters (1320 feet). Airborne materials freely diffuse in 
the atmosphere near ground level in what is known as the mixing depth . A stable 
layer ex ists above the mixing depth which restricts vertical diffusion. 
• Wet deposition is zero (no rain occurs to accelerate deposition and reduce the area 
affected). 
• Dry deposition of the cloud is modeled. During movement of the radioactive plume. 
a fraction of the plume is deposited on the ground due to gravitational forces and 
becomes available for exposure by ground surface radiation and ingestion. 
• The quantity of deposited radioactive material is proportional to the material size and 
speed. The foll owing dry deposition velocities (m/s) were used : 
solids = 0.001 halogens = 0.01 nohle gases = 0 .0 
cesium = 0.001 ruthenium = 0 .001. 
• If radioactive releases occur through a stack. th<n additio nal pl "",.- Jispersion can he 
accounted for by calculating a iet plume rise . In this anal ) IS. iet plume rise is 
ignored. 
• When relpased gases have a heat content . the plu me can disperse more qu i<kly. In 
this calculation. buoyant pluloe effects are ignored . 
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Inha lation Data 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Breathing rate is 3.33 x 10"' cubic meters per second (cu m/s) for worker, MCW, and 
NPA; 2 .66 x 10" cu mls for people at site boundary and beyond . 
Particle size is 1.0 micron. 
The internal exposure period is 50 years for individual organs and tissues which have 
radionuclides committed . 
Exposure to the entire plume for the general public. The worker , MeW, and NPA 
are exposed as discussed in Section F. 1.3.9. 
Inhalation exposure factors based on ICRP 30. 
Ground Surratt Exposure 
• 
• 
Ingestion Data 
• 
• 
Exposed to contaminated soi l for I year for the general public. See Section F. 1.3.9 
for additional details . 
Build ing shielding factor is 0 .7 which exposes the individual to contaminated soil for 
16 hours a day . 
Ingestion numbers will be reduced by a factor of 10 to account for only 10% of the 
food consumed being grown locally (such as in a person's garden). 
The following changes from RSAC·5 defaults were used : 
Annual Dietar) Consumption Rates: 
177 Kg/yr Stored Vegetables (produce) 
18.3 Kg/yr Fresh Vegetables (leafy) 
94 Kg/yr Meat 
112 Llyr Milk . 
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F. 1.4.2. 1 Water Pool Storage. In the analysis of a spent fuel storage pool, a number of 
possible disrurbances and minor accidents have been posrulated. A prerequisite for a large release of 
radioactive material to the environment under more severe accident conditions is the damage of the 
cladding of a fairly large amount of stored fuel , with an accompanying release of gaseous and 
airborne particles of radioactive material from the fuel. Several conceivable mechanisms which might 
lead to this siruation are the possibility that the fuel overheats so that the fuel cladding loses its 
integrity or there is a mass ive mechanical impact on the stored fuel. 
The only way for the fuel to overheat would be to lose enough pool water such that cooling of 
the stored fuel ceases and the fuel temperarure increases to fis5ion product release temperarures due to 
decay heat . The pool water could be lost by leakage at a rate in excess of U,e makeup system 
capability. Unless a catastrophic event like an earthquake causes severe damage to the strucrure of 
the water pool, loss of water from the pool strucrure would be a slow phenomenon with only 
gradually increasing severity for which corrective measures can be taken in due time. Additionally, a 
thermal analysis was conducted to demonstrate that fuel overheating is not possible in the event of a 
drained water pool. 
The circumstances in which an event could lead to severe mechanical loading of the fuel have 
been identified as: 
• accidents during handling of heavy items, such as a li fti ng device failu re 
• external events (earthquake, tornado, flood, ai rcraft crash, etc.) which could cause 
strucrural failure . 
Prevention of inadvertent, uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions is generally assured by the 
design of the racks for the fuel, primarily by diminishing the chances for a chain reaction by spacing 
the fuel element bundles far enough apart to eliminate the poss ibility. Special attention is given to the 
risk of accidental criticality which might be experienced in fuel transport and handling operations. 
Uncontrolled nuclear reaction is prevented during fuel handling by applying the principle of 
transferring one fuel element , module , or container at a time. In addition, fuel handling rules are 
developed to ensure that critical ity cannot occur. The double accident criterion is applied to ensure 
that crit icality would not occur foll owing two severe, concurrent, unrelated accidents. Thus , three 
fuel handling accidents are required to reach an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction. 
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F. 1.4.2. 1. 1 Drained Water Pool. 
F. 1.4.2. 1. 1. 1 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a 
catastrophic event, like an earthquake, causes severe damage to the structure of the water pool, 
resulting in a complete loss of pool water. A thermal analysis of spent fuel in a water pool was 
conducted to demonstrate that clad failure or fuel melting is not possible in the event of an 
accidentally drained water pool. Air circulation through the fuel racks and fuel units was shown to be 
sufficient to prevent clad failure in the unlikely event of complete loss of pool water. However, the 
loss of water could result in increased direct radiation and a release of corrosion products. 
follows: 
F. 1.4.2. 1. 1.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
300 naval fuel units would be in the water pool. 
The thermal analysis demonstrates that no fission product release would occur during 
the accident. 
The amount of corrosion products on the fuel units is based on best estimate values. 
The release to the environment would occur at a constant rate over a 15-minute 
period . 
One percent of the original corrosion products from the fuel units might be relea<ed to 
the atmosphere due to thermal air currents. Additionally. 10'% of the corrosion 
products could be released to the environment with the pool water. 
The following amounts of corrosion product nucl ides might be released to the 
atmosphere. As noted above. the release to the water environment is 10' times these 
values . This listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the exposure. 
No filtrat ion by High Efficiency Paniculate Air (HEPA) filters is assumed . 
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Co-{i() 3.6 
Fe-55 6.6 
Co-58 1.3 
Mn-54 2.2 x 10" 
Fe-59 1.9 x 10" 
F. 1.4 .2 . 1. 1.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that might result from the hypothetical drained water pool accident at each 
location . The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period. "Risk" is 
defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The results are presented 
for the design basis accident with 50'% and 95% meteorology. For INEL. the evaluation basis 
eanhquake results in a 0'.24 g peak ground acceleration at the ECF (Rizzo 1994). Tnis is based on 
the event being initiated at the Howe eanhquake epicenter and involving a surface rupture length of 
34 kilometers. Using the medium response spectra, which is appropriate for a risk oriented analysis. 
the analyses of the structures at the INEL-ECF indicate that damage sufficient to cause the pool to 
drain would not occur if the pool is filled , but that, if several sections of the water pool were empty, 
a crack could develop in the area between the wall and floor of some of the older sections of the 
water pool. However, the INEL-ECF water pools are nearly always filled . Sections of the pool are 
only drained if maintenance work is necessary within the pools . Taking into account the probability 
of the initiat ing seismic event (I x 10-< per year to 4 x IO'~ per year) and the probability the 
eanhquake will occur with a se~tion of the pool drained. the total probability of occurrence of an 
event leading to draining of the pool is estimated to be in the range of 10" to 10'-6 per year. A value 
of 10" was used to develop the risk results in the table. 
A beyond design basis seismic event was also considered . For INEL, this beyond design 
basis eanhquake is based on a scenario that results in a peak ground acceleration at the INEL-ECF of 
0' .40 g (Rizzo 1994). Analysis of this event has shown that some cracks could develop. The 
probability of this beyond design basis event is estimated to be in the range of 10-6 to 10" per year 
based on the probability of the initiating seismic event (2 x 10" to 6 x 10-'). and the probability of 
failure of the mitigative actions that would be taken to prevent the pool from draining. A value of 
10-6 was selected to calculate risk for this beyond design basis event. Any cracks developed as a 
result of either a design ba,is or a beyond design basis seismic event are expected to be small and 
mitigative actions could be taken to stop the pool from draining. Analysis has shown that air cooling 
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is sufficient to maintain fuel integrity if the pool was drained . No overheating of fuel would occur; 
hence, no fission products would be released even if the pool were completely drained . The 
consequences calculated stem from the release of radioactive corrosion products within the pool water 
and would be the same for the design basis and beyond design basis seismic events. Since the 
consequences are the same, the following table uses the accident probability for the design basis 
seismic event since that results in the larger risk. 
For locations other than INEL, water pools might need to be constructed . For these 
locations, it was expected that the design approaches would be similar to or better than were used in 
the construction of the INEL-ECF. Therefore, a probability value of 10" per year was also used at 
these locations for the total probability that a design basis seismic event would lead to draining of a 
water pool. Consequences were based on site specific population data and meteorology. 
Drained Water Pool Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-site No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 1.7 x 10" 1.7 x 10" 1.7 x 10" 
Savannah River 1.6 x 10" 1.1 X 10" 1.1 x 10-6 
Hanford 6 .3 x 10"' 4 .7 x 10" 4.7 x 10" 
Puget Souod 1.4 5.1 x 10" 5 . 1 x 10-6 
Pearl Harbor 7.9 x 10"' 1.1 1.1 x 10" 
Norfolk 3.0 6.0 x 10" 6 .0 x 10-6 
Portsmouth 1.6 3.4 x 10" 3.4 x 10-6 
Kesselring 2.9 x 10" 2.5 X 10" 2.5 x 10-6 
Nevada Test Site 3.3 x 10" 1.9 x 10" 1.9 X 10" 
Oak Ridge 5 .2 1.8 x 10" 1.8 x 10-6 
The risk for th is hypothetical accident is generally more severe at Navy shipyards than at the 
DOE sites. At all sites, this accident results in the highest risk of the wet storage accidents evaluated. 
For the hypothetical drained water pool scenario, the radioactive plume might result in 
contaminat ion of the ground to a downwind distance of 0.29 mile. This would yield a total area 
impacted by the accident of approximately II acres. The calculated downwind distance would be 
contained within the boundaries of all sites under evaluation with the exception of Oak Ridge and 
Norfolk . 
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Table F . I.4.2. I.I-I. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At INEL 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.5 x 10-' 3 .0 x 10-' 
MCW 6.9 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 
NPA 3.9 x 10-' 2.0 x 10-' 
MOl 2.8 x 10-' 1.4 x 10'" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115690 6.7 3.3 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2. 1 8.3 x 10~ 
MCW 7.6x 10-' 3.0 x 10'" 
NPA 2.3 x 10-' 1.2 x 10'" 
MOl 1.7 x 10-' 8.5 x 10'" 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1.7 x 10-' 115690 3.5 x 10' 
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Table F.1.4.2.I.I-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Savannah River 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.4 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
MCW 2.0 x 10"' 7.9 x 10"" 
NPA 2.5 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
MOl (New ECF) 3.5 x 10-' 1.8 x 10"" 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.3 x 10"' 6.3 x 10"" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 2.4 x 10' 1.2 X 10"' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 8.3 x 10-' 
MCW 2.5 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
NPA 4.3 x 10"' 2.1 X 10-6 
MOl (New ECF) 1.6 x 10"' 8.0 x 10"" 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.4 x 10"' 7.2 x 10"' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 2.2 x 10' 1.1 x 10"' 
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Table F.1.4.2.l.t-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Hanford 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.4 x 10"' 1.3 x 10-' 
MCW 2.6 x 10"' 1.0 x 10"' 
NPA 3.0 x 10" 1.5 X 10"' 
MOl (New ECF) 8.3 x 10" 4.2 X 10"' 
MOl (FMEF) 1.7 x 10"' 8.6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2.4 x 10"' 375860 4.8 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 8.3 x 10" 
MCW 1.6 X to-I 6.6 x to-' 
NPA 4.8 x to-' 2 .4 X to-6 
MOl (New ECF) 6.3 x to-' 3.2 x to-6 
MOl (FMEF) 2.2 x to-' 1.1 x to-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
4 .7 x 10-' 375860 9.4 x 10' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.1-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Puget Sound 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.8 x 10-' 7.3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.2 x 10-' I I x IO~ 
MOl 1.2 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 1.7 x 10' 8.2 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Locat ion (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2. 1 8.3 x I~ 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.6 1.3 x 10-' 
MOl 1.4 7.2 x I~ 
Exposure to Popu lation within Number of 
50-mile R2dius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
297581 0 1.0 x 10' 5. 1 x 10- ' 
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Table F.1.4.2.I.I-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Pearl Harbor 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.5 x 10-' 3.0x I~ 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.9 x 10-' 9.7 x 10-' 
MOl 2.0 x 10-' 9.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 8.0 x 10' 4.0 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2. 1 8.3 x 10~ 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 6 .3 3. 1 x 10-' 
MOl 7.9 x 10-' 3.9 x 10~ 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 2.2 x 10' 1.1 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.1-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Norfolk 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.8 x 10-' 7.4 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.6 x 10-' 2.3 x 10-' 
MOl 2.8 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 1.5 x 10' 7.7 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 8.3 x 10-" 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 5.3 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-" 
MOl 3.0 1.5 x 10-] 
Exposure to Population with in Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 1.2 x 10' 6.0 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.1-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Portsmouth 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.8 x 10-' 7.3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.4 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MOl 1.3 x 10-' 6.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 6.5 x 10' 3.2 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2. 1 8.3 x 10-" 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 9.8 x 10-' 4.9 x 10-" 
MOl 1.6 7.9 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 6.7 x 10' 3.4 x 10- ' 
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Table F . t.4.2. t.I-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Kesselring 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.8xlO-' 7 .4 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 2.0 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person·rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 7. 1 x 10' 3.6 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 8.3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 2.9 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 5.0 x 10' 2.5 x 10-' 
F-83 
C::;&f 
Volume I. Appendix 0 
Table F. t.4.2.t.1 -9. Summary of Exposure Calculat ion Results . 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Nevada Test Site 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.2 x 10-' 4.8 x 10-' 
MCW 9.3 x 10-' 3.7 x 10-' 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 1.5 x 10-' 7.5 x 10-' 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 3.2 x 10-' 1.6 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2. 1 8.3 x 10-' 
MCW 5.4 x 10-' 2.2 x 10'" 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 3.3 x 10-: 1.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 3.7 1.9 x 10-' 
Volume I. Appendix 0 F-84 
Table F.1.4.2.1.1-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool 
At Oak Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.5 x 10"' 3.0 x 10-" 
MCW 2.0 x 10"' 7.9 x 10'" 
NPA 2.6 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-" 
MOl 8.2 x 10"' 4.1 x 10-" 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 7.1 x 10' 3.6 x 10"' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 8.3 x 10-" 
MCW 1.2 x 10-' 4.8 x 10"' 
NPA 1.6 8.2 x 10-" 
MOl 5.2 2.6 x 10"' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 3.5 x 10' 1.8 x 10"' 
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F. 1.4 .2 . 1.2 Accidental Criticality. 
F. 1.4.2 . 1.2. 1 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, an 
accidental uncontrolled chain reaction producing I x 10" fissions is postulated . The crit icality occurs 
in the water pool which is not emptied by the event and does not subsequently empty . Release of 
fission products includes those specified in Regulatory Guide 3.34 (NUREG 1979b) from the 
critical ity, plus fission products remaining in the fuel as a result of the original use. Removal of 
fission products by the pool water is included. 
F. 1.4.2. 1.2.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as 
follows: 
• The fraction of the fission products released to the building is 100% of the noble 
gases, 25% of the halogens, 0.1 % of the ruthenium (Elder et al . 1986), and 0.05% of 
the cesium and remaining solids. 
• The original inventory of fission products from two naval fuel units are available for 
release in addition to those created by the criticality event. 
• A High Efficiency Particul ate Air (HEPA) filter removes 99.9% of the solid fission 
products from the plume. 
• The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a IS-minute period . 
This is conservative as compared to the 8·hour release allowed in Regulatory Guide 
3.34. 
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Nuclide 
Te-133 
1-134 
1-135 
Cs-138 
Rb-89 
Pu-238 
Br-84 
1-133 
Sr-91 
5r-92 
Ba-139 
Ba-141 
1-129 
1-131 
H-3 
Cs- 134 
Ba-14O 
1-136 
Cs-137 
C.-I44 
Nb-95 
Rb-9O 
The following amounts of radionuclides are released to the environment. This listing 
includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure. 
Curies Nuclide Curies 
3.4 x 10' 1-132 1.7 x 10" 
3 .5 x 10' Sr-9O 1.94 x 10" 
1.2 x 10' Y-91m 4.3 x 10" 
1.6 x 10"' Rb-88 1.7 x 10" 
6 .05 x 10"' Y-91 1.1 x 10"' 
3 .7 x 10"' Cs-139 7.3 x 10-' 
2.3 x 10' Ba-142 4.8 x 10"' 
2.4 x 10" Y-93 1.3 x 10" 
5 .4 x 10" Ba-137m 1.9 x 10" 
2.4 x 10"' Ru-I06 7.6 x 10" 
6 .9 x 10-6 Zr-95 1.4 x 10" 
8.8 x 10"' Sr-89 7.01 x 10" 
5 . 1 x 10"' Eu-154 1.3 x 10" 
3.2 x 10"' 
1.42 x 10' 
1.5 x 10" 
2.5 x 10"' 
1.1 x 10' 
2.0 x 10"' 
4.5 x 10"' 
2 .7 x 10"' 
2.2 x 10"' 
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F. 1.4 .2. 1.2.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical criticality accident at each location. The 
number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as the 
number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. An accidental criticali ty during spent 
nuclear fuel handling operations is extremely unlikely. There are no known events of this type which 
have occurred during handling of fuel modules either in or out of water. Due to the need for a 
neutron moderator. extremely large quantities of naval fuels would be required to achieve criticality in 
a dry state. Fuel handling procedures in water in conjunction with required physical barriers ensure 
that a double accident criterion is met. This criterion specifies that the fuel will not anain a crit ical 
condition even if any two unlikely and unrelated accidents occur at the same time. The DOE 
criticality control requirement is a double contingency criterion which specifies that a second unlikely 
and unrelated accident would be required for a critical condition to result . To satisfy the NNPP 
double accident criterion. naval fuel handling operations are conducted in the fo llowing manner: 
• No more than one module is to be h"ndled in one area at a time. 
• If two modules are capable of achieving a cr itical condition. separation must be 
maintained by a positive barrier between them which is locked in place. 
• If three modules are required to achieve criticality. a physical barrier which does not 
need to be locked is required to be placed between them. 
• If four or more modules are neooed to achieve criticality. no harriers are required. but 
modules are to remain separated . 
Based on the above requ irements. at least three dist inct errors are needed to achieve accidental 
criticality. For example. bringing two or more modules in close proximity is always prohibited . 
Failure to maintain separation constitutes an error. Secondly. failure to recognize and use physical 
barriers when required also constitutes an error. A human error rate of 10" per operation (Swain and 
Gunman 1983) is taken as the probability of error for trained personnel. Further. because all fuel 
handling operations must be checked by an independent verifier. an additional facto r of 10"' may be 
taken for a probability of 10~ for each independent error . For naval fuel handli ng. an error in which 
two modules are brought together is a violation of a fundam ental requirement. Compliance with this 
requirement alone ensures that a subcrit ic.1 state is mai ntained. Therefore. the bringing of two or 
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more modules together error is considered separate and independent of all other errors. Because a 
second error must occur to cause accidental criticality, an additional reduction in the probability is 
warranted . For example, failure to recognize the need to install a barrier when required is such an 
error. Because this mistake is independent of the first error and has been checked, a second value of 
IQ4 is appropriate for a total value of 10" per year. This probability is taken as the likelihood of a 
criticality for movement of a single module. Based on an estimated 1,000 fu el handling operations a 
year, a value of 10" per year has been used in the risk assessment of accidental criticality. 
Accidental Criticality Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-site No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 9 .2 x 10" 6.4 x 10" 6 .4 x 10" 
Savannah River 9.4 x 10" 4.5 x 10" 4.5 X 10" 
Hanford 2.8 x 10" 1.6 x 10"' 1.6 x 10"' 
Puget Sound 1.3 2.8 x 10"' 2.8 x 10"" 
Pearl Harbor 6 .7 x 10" 6 .0 X 10"' 6 .0 x 10"" 
Norfolk 2 .7 3.5 x 10" 3 .5 x 10"" 
Portsmouth 1.4 1.5 x 10"' 1.5 x 10"" 
Kessel ring 2.3 x 10"' 1.1 x 10"' 1.1 x 10~ 
Nevada Test Site 2 .0 x 10-' 7.0x 10-' 7.0 x 10-' 
Oak Ridge 4 .7 8.8 x 10-' 8.8 x 10-' 
The risk for this hypothetical accident is more severe at Navy shipyards than at the DOE 
sites. At all sites, this accident results in the second highest risk of the wet storage accidents 
evaluated. 
For the hypothetical criticality acc ident scenario, the radioact ive plume might cause contami-
nation of the ground to a downwind distance of 0 .25 mile. This would yield a total area impacted by 
the accident of approximately 8 acres. The calculated downwind distance would be contained within 
the boundaries of all sites under evaluation with the exception o f Oak Ridge and Norfolk . 
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Tahle F.1.4,2 ,1.2-1. Summary of Exposure Calcul at ion Results . 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At INEL 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likdihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.0 1.2 x 10-' 
MCW 1.3 x 10-' 5. 1 x 10-' 
NPA 5.9 x IO~ 2.9 X 10-' 
MOl 2 .0 x 10-' 1.0 X 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Numher of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
2. 8 x 10-' 115690 5.5 
95% MET EOROLCG Y 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW 1.3 x 10- ' 5.0 X 10-" 
NPA 2.8 x 10- ' 1.4 x 10-' 
MOl 9 .2 x 10- ' 4 .6 x 10" 
Exposure to Population within Numhcr of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fat31 CanL:ers 
Population of 
115690 1.3 x 10' 6.4 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.2-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Savannah River 
50~ METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.3 5.3 x 10-'" 
MCW 6.8 x 10'" 2.7 x 10'" 
NPA 7.4 x 10"'" 3.7 x 10'" 
MOl (New (ECF) 3.3 x 10'" 1.6 x 10-" 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.2 x 10'" 5.9 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 2.2 x 10' 1.1 x 10'" 
95~ METEOROLOGY 
Likel ihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10'" 
MCW 7.9 x 10'" 3. 1 x 10"'" 
NPA 6.4 x 10'" 3.2 x 10-" 
MOl (New ECF) 9.4 x 10'" 4.7 x 10-< 
MOl (Barnwell) I I x 10'" 5.3 x 10'" 
Exposure to Po . 1",:1011 1,1, Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 8.9 x 10' 4.5 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2_1.2-3. Summary of Expos"re Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Hanford 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.3 5.3 x 10"'" 
MCW 8.9 x 10'" 3 .5 x 10'" 
NPA 6.6 x 10 .... 3 .3 x 10'" 
MOl (New (ECF) 4.7 x 10"'" 2.4 x 10'" 
MOl (FMEF) 1.3 x 10-' 6.7 x 10'" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1.1 x 10-' 375860 2.2 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW 4.9 X 10'" 2.0 x 10 .... 
NPA 6 .9 x 10-' 3 .5 x 10'" 
MOl (New ECF) 2.8 x 10'" 1.4 x 10-< 
MOl (FMEF) 1.2 x 10-' 6 .1 x 10'" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1.6 x 10-' 375860 3. 1 x 10' 
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Table F.1.4.2 .1.2-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Puget Sound 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.2 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
MCW NIA N/A 
NPA 7.7 x 10-' 3.8 x 10-' 
MOl 1.1 x 10-' 5 .6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 2.3 x 10' 1.1 X 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 8.8 4 .4 x 10-' 
MOl 1.3 6 .3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population with in Nu mber of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 5.6 x 10' 2.8 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.2-S. Summary of Exposure Czlculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Pearl Harbor 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.0 1.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 7.0x 10-' 3.5 x 10'" 
MOl 1.8 x 10-' 8.9 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 5.6 x 10' 2.8 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.2 x 10' 2.2 x 10-' 
MOl 6 .7 x 10-' 3.4 x 10'" 
Exposure to Population with in Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 1.2 x 10' 6.0 x 10-' 
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'fah le F.1.4.2. 1.2-6. Summary of Exposure Calcu lalion Results . 
For W<l Slorage - Accidental Crilicalily 
Al Norfolk 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
TOlal EDE of Falal 
Localion (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.4 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.6 x 10- ' 8.2 x 10-' 
MOl 2.7 x 10- ' 1.3 x 10~ 
Exposure 10 Popu lalion wilhin Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Falal Cancers 
Populalion o f 
1539002 1.6 x 10' 8. 1 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOG Y 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Falal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.8 8.8 x 10-' 
MOl 2.7 1.4 x 10-' 
Exposure 10 Populalion within Numh<r o f 
50-mile Radi us (person-rem) Falal Cancers 
Populalion of 
1539002 7.0 x 10' 3.5 X 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.2-7. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results. 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Portsmouth 
50% METEOROLOGY 
-
Likel ihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Locat ion (rem) Cancer 
Wocker 7 .2 x 10-' 2 .9 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.5 x 10-' 7.7 x 10-' 
MOl 1.2 x 10-' 5.9 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 7 .9 x 10' 4 .0 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
TOlal EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 3.3 1.6 x 10-' 
MOl 1.4 7.0x 104 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50·mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 2.9 x 10' 1.5 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2. I.2.,<1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Kesselring 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.4 x 10-' 2 .9 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 1.9 x 10-' 9.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 5.6 x 10' 2.8 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 2.3 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 2.2 x 10' 1.1 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.2-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Nevada Test Site 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likel ihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4 .8 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-' 
MCW 2.1 x 10-' 8.0 x 10-' 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 1.5 x 10-' 7.3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 4.3 x 10-' 2 .2 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cdncer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW 8. 1 x 10-' 3.3 x 10 .... 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 2.0 x 10-' 9 .9 x 10 .... 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
7.0 x 10~ 13792 1.4 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.2-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality 
At Oak Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.0 1.2 x 10-' 
MCW 6.6 x 10-' 2.6 x 10-' 
NPA 9.1 x 10-' 4.6x I~ 
MOl 7.6x 10-' 3 .8 x I~ 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 7.4 x 10' 3.7 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.0 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW 3.6 x 10-' 1.4 x I~ 
NPA 5.6 2.8 x 10-' 
MOl 4.7 2.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population withi n Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 1.8 x 10' 8.8 x 10- ' 
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F. 1.4 .2. 1.3 Mechanical Damage from Operator Error, Crane Failure, or Similar 
Accidents 
F. 1.4. 2 . 1.3 . 1 Description of Conditions. Accidental mechanical damage to spent fuel 
was eval uated . The hypothetical accident included damage to one fuel unit . allowing fission products 
within the elements to escape th rough the clad failures . All gas and some volatile and solid nuclides 
were cllculated to be released to the pool. The release fractions are consistent with severe accident 
analyses and Regulatory Guide 1.4. Due to the presence of pool water. no solids would be released 
into the air inside the facility . 
fo llows: 
F. 1.4.2. 1.3.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as 
• One fuel unit is damaged because only one fJel unit would be handled at a time and 
the storage facility design prevents damage to stored units from such events . 
• One percent of the fuel is damaged and those fission products are available for 
release. 
• All (100%) of the noble gases are released to the environment. 
• Approximately 25 % of the halogens are released to the pool and 90% of these fission 
products are absorbed in the water as they rise through the pool water. Therefore. 
2.5% of the halogens are released to the ai r inside the facility . 
• Due to the gaseous nature of the released fi ss ion products. installed HEPA filters 
would not remove them once they are released to the air in the building . 
• The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a IS·minute period . 
• There is no particulate fission product release to the atmosphere due to the presence of 
pool water. 
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• The following amounts of radionudides could be released to the environment. This 
listing indudes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure. 
~ 
H-3 
1-129 
1-131 
~ 
1.42 
2.52 x 10" 
5 .37 x 10" 
F. 1.4.2. 1.3.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical mechanical damage accident at ead, 
location. The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is 
defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probabili\y of the 
Occurrence of fuel damage is small based on the conservative fu el handling rules. At the INEL-ECF, 
it is recognized that the drop of a heavy container into a storage rack could crush the rack and the 
stored fuel and so heavy casks are never moved over the storage rack area. The heavy containers are 
brought only into an empty receiving area to discharge a single fuel unit. The spent fuel is removed 
from the receiving area before the next fuel unit is brought into the receiving area. Therefore, two 
errors must occur before damaged fu el is possible. The first is that fuel is improperly left in the 
discharge station while the heavy cask is moved over the discharge station. The second is that the 
cask must accidentally fall from the overhead crane or the crane must fail. The probabili ty of failure 
associated with crane failu re has been taken as 10" per year. Further, the crane failu re must also 
occur in the right location and the drop must be high enough that sufficient energy is available to 
damage both the discharge stat ion structurals and the fuel inside. An additional factor of 10" has 
been taken for this event. giving the total probability of 10~ for the drop of the cask in the right 
location. Allowing a fuel unit to remain in the stand requires an operator error because fuel handling 
procedures cal l for the fuel unit to be removed from the stand and taken to an underwater storage 
location away from the receiving area. In addition, because independent overchecking is required for 
all fuel movement. an error by a verifier is also required . Therefore. based on operator error rates 
(Swain and Guttman 1983), the likelihood of this error is taken as 10" per year. Hence, the 
combined probability of cask drop on a fu el unit is taken as 10" per year per fuel movement. Then , 
taking an estimated rate of 1.000 fuel movemenl> per year, the overall probability is taken as 10" 
events per year. 
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Wet Storage Mechanical Damage Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-site No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 2.6 x 10" 5.3 x 10" 5 .3 x 10''' 
Savannah River 2.2 x 10" 2.0 x 10" 2.0 x 10" · 
Hanford 9 .8 x 10" 8 .6 x 10" 8.6 x 10'" 
Puget Sound 1.7 x 10< 7.2 x 10" 7 .2 x 10"· 
Pearl Harbor 9 .3 x 10" 1.5 x 10< 1.5 x 10" 
Norfolk 3.5 x 10~ 8.0 x 10" 8.0 x 10"· 
Portsmouth 1.9 x 10< 5.6 x 10" 5.6 x 10"· 
Kesselring 3.6 x 10" 6 .0 x 10" 6.0 x 10"· 
Nevada Test Site 4.6 x 10" 5.6 X 10" 5.6 x 10'" 
Oak Ridge 5.9 x 10" 3.4 x 10" 3.4 x 10"· 
The risk for this hypothetical accident is generally more severe at Navy shipyards than at the 
DOE sites. At all sites , this acc ident results in the lowest or next to the lowest risk of the wet storage 
accidents evaluated . 
For the hypothetical wet storage mechanical damage accident scenario. the radioactive plume 
might cause contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of less than 0.06 mile. This would 
yield a total area impacted by the accident of less than 0 .5 acre . The calculated downwind distance 
would be contained within the boundaries of all sites under evaluation. 
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Table F.1.4.2 .1.3-1. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results . 
For WeI Slorage - Mechanical Damage 
~IINEL 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Falal 
Localion (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.9 x 10-< 7.6 x 10-< 
MCW 2.5 x 10-' 9 .6 x 10-" 
NPA 1.5 x 10-' 7 .4 x 10-" 
MOl 5 .7 x 10-' 2 .9 x 10-'· 
Exposure 10 Populalion within Number of 
5<J..mile Radius (person-rem) Falal Cancers 
Populalion of 
115690 5.0 x 10-' 2.5 x 10-<' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
TOlal EDE of Falal 
Localion (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5 .2 x 10~ 2.1 x 10-' 
MCW 2.4 x 10-<' 9.6 x 10-'· 
NPA 8.3 x 10- ' 4 .2 x 10-'· 
MOl 2 .6 x 10 .... 1.3 x 10-' 
Exposure 10 Populalion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Falal Cancers 
POpulalion of 
115690 1.1 x 10-' 5 .3 x 10-<' 
F- IO) 
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Table F_1.4.2.1.3-2. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results. 
For WeI Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Savannah River 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.4 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 
MCW 5.2 x 10-<' 2.1 x 10-' 
NPA 9.1 x 10-' 4.5 x 10-" 
MOl (New ECF) 3.9 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-'· 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.5 x 10 .... 7.4 x 10-'· 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
5<J..mile Radius (person-rem) F alai Cancers 
Population of 
579541 7 .1 x 10-' 3.5 x 10-<' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Falal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10-< 2 . 1 x 10-' 
MCW 6.7 x 10-' 2.6 x 10-' 
NPA 1.4 x 10 .... 7.2 x 10-'· 
MOl (New ECF) 2 .2 x 10 .... 1.1 x 10-' 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.8 x 10-' 9 .0 x 10-' 
Exposure 10 POpulalion within Number of 
5<J..mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populalion of 
579541 4. 1 x 10-' 2.0 x 10-' 
Volume I. Appendix D F- I04 
.;)F;q 
Table F.1.4.2.1.3-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Hanford 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.4 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 
MCW 7.1 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
NPA 1.0 x 10-' 5.1 x 10-" 
MOl (New (ECF) 1.3 x 10-' 6.5 x 10-" 
MOl (FMEF) 2.4 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-'· 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375860 9.4 x 10-' 4.7 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10-' 2.1 x 10-' 
MCW 4.4 x 10-' 1.8 X 10-' 
NPA 1.6 x 10-" 7.9 x 10-'· 
MOl (New ECF) 9.8 x 10-' 4.9 x 10-'· 
MOl (FMEF) 3.1 x 10-" 1.5 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Popu I at ion of 
375860 1.7 x 10-' 8.6 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.3-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Puget Sound 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.6 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 5.5 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 
MOl 1.3 x 10-' 6.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 6.0 x 10-' 3.0 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10-' 2. 1 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 6.5 x 10-' 3.2 x 10-' 
MOl 1.7 x 10-' 8.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
7.2 x 10-' 2975810 1.5 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.I.J-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Pearl Harbor 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.9 x 10--" 7.6 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.9 x 10-' 2.4 x 10-' 
MOl 2.3 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 I I x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5 .2 x 10--" 2.1 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.6 x 10-' 7 .9 x 10-' 
MOl 9.3 x 10-' 4.6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 3. 1 x 10-' 1.5 x 10--" 
Volume I , Appendix D 
Table F.1.4.2.1.J..6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Norfolk 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.6 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.2xlO-' 6 .0 x 10-' 
MOl 3.2 x 10-' 1.6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 1.4 x 10-' 7 .0 x 10-" 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10'" 2.1 X 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.4 x 10'" 7.0 x 10-' 
MOl 3.5 x 10'" 1.7 X 10-' 
Exposure to Population withi n Number of 
50-mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 1.6 x 10-' 8.0 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.3-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Portsmouth 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.6 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.1 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 
MOl 1.5 x 10-' 7.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 3.8 x 10-' 1.9 x I~ 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10-' 2.1 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.5 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
MOl 1.9 x 10-' 9.3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 1.1 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 
F-I09 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.3-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Kesselring 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of F.tal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4 .6 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 3.2 x I~ 1.6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 4.7 x 10-' 2.3 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10-' 2.1 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 3.6 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 1.2 x 10- ' 6.0 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.3-9. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Mechan ical Damage 
At Nevada Test Site 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.0 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 
MCW 3.0 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-" 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 3.8 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-1• 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 4.5 x 10-' 2.3 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10-' 2. 1 x 10-' 
MCW 1. 8 x 10-' 7. 1 x 10-1• 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 4.6 x 10-' 2.3 x 10-" 
Exposure to Populat ion with in Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 I I x 10-] 5.6 x 10-' 
F- III 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.3-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Oak Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.9 ~ 10-' 7.6 x 10-' 
MCW 5.4 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-" 
NPA 6.6 x 10-' 3.3 x 10-' 
MOl 9.3 x 10-' 4.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 2.0 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.2 x 10 .... 2.1 x 10-' 
MCW 3.3 x 10-' 1.3 x lO-' 
NPA 4.2 x 10 .... 2.l x lO-' 
MOl 5.9 x 10 .... 3.0 x 10- ' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 6.7 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 
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F. 7.4 .2 . 7.4 Airplane Crash. 
F. 7.4.2 . 7.4 . 7 Description o( Conditions. Impacl inlo waler pools by aircraft willl 
resulling damage 10 lIle naval fuel uni lS slored inside lIle pool was evaluated. Based on lIle 
probabilily of occurrence, as discussed in Seclion F .3, specific analyses were only performed for 
Savannah River. lIle Nevada Tesl Sile, Oak Ridge, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk, and Kesselring localions. 
AI olller localions, lIle likelihood of occurrence is less lIlan 10" per year. The hypolllelical accidenl 
included damage 10 all fuel unilS slored alllle waler pool. Fission produclS and corrosion produclS 
are released from lIle fuel unilS inlo lIle waler pool; however, lIle pool waler is nOI rel=ed 10 lIle 
environmenl. An airplane crash into a waler pool would nOl produce enough force 10 cause lIle pool 
10 leak because lIle walls of lIle waler pool are conslrucled of lIl ick, reinforced concrele willl earlh 
surrounding lIlem, making lIlem very slrong. In addilion, il was judged unl ikely lIlal an airplane 
would impacl lIle waler pool al an angle Sleep enough 10 expose lIle fl oor of lIle pool or lIle walls of 
lIle pool below lIle waler level to lIle direcl impact. The presence of pool waler resul lS in only a 
release of gaseous fi ssion produclS 10 lIle almosphere. 
follows: 
F. 7.4.2. 7.4 .2 Source Term. Condilions used in developing lIle source lerm are as 
• One percent of lIle fission produclS from each of lIle fuel un ilS slOred inside lIle pool 
is available for release. 
• Of lIle avai lable fission producls, 100% of lIle noble gases and 25% of lIle halogens 
are released 10 Ihe pool waler. Due 10 lIle presence of pool waler, a reduclion of lIle 
halogen release by a faclOr of 10 prior 10 release 10 lIle almosphere occurs. 
• No solid fission products or corrosion products are released to the environment due to 
lIle conlinued presence of pool waler. 
• The release 10 lIle environmenl occurs al a conslanl rale over a 15-minule period . 
• 300 naval fuel unils would be in lIle waler pool. 
• No fillration by HEPA fillers is assumed . 
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• The following amounlS of radionuclides could be released 10 lIle environment . This 
lisling includes nuclides lIlal resull in al least 99% of lIle possible exposure. 
~ ~ 
1-129 7.59 x IO~ 
1-13 1 1.61 x 10" 
H-3 4.28 x 10' 
F. 7.4.2. 7.4 . 3 Results. The following table summarizes the public heallll risk 10 lIle 
general populalion lIlal would resull from lIle hypolllelical airplane crash accidenl al each localion. 
The number of falal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as 
lIle number of fatal cancers limes lIle probabilily of occurrence. 
Waler Pool Airplane Crash Summary 
Maximally exposed No. of falal 
Probabilily of off·s ile cancers 
Sile accident per year individual (MOl) if accidenl occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
Savannah River 2 x 10~ 6.4 x 10~ 6. 1 x 10" 1.2 x 10" 
Pearl Harbor 2 x 10" 2.8 x 10" 4 .6 x 10" 9.2 X 10" 
Norfolk 4 x 10" 1.1 X 10" 2.4 x 10" 9 .6 x 10" 
Kesselring 2 x 10" 1.1 x 10" 1.8 x 10" 3.6 x 10" 
Nevada Tesl Sile 4 x 10" 1.3 x 10" 1.7 x 10~ 6 .8 X 10·1\ 
Oak Ridge I x IO~ 1.8 X 10" 1.0 x 10" 1.0 X 10" 
The risk for lIlis hypolllelical accidenl is mosl severe al Pearl Harbor. For lIle siles willl 
crash probabilities less lIlan 10" per year, consequences were nOl calculaled since il is expected lIlal 
lIley would nol subslanlially contribule 10 lIle risk. 
For lIle hypolllel ical airplane crash inlo a weI slOrage facilily accident scenario. lIle radioac-
live plume might resull in conlamination of lIle ground 10 a downwind dislance of less lIlan 0.06 mile. 
This would yield a 10lal area impacled by lIle accidenl of less lIlan 0.5 acr.. The calculaled 
downwind dislance would be contained wilhin lIle boundaries of all siles lIlal are al risk for lIlis 
accidenl. 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.4-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resul ts . 
For Wet Storage · Airplane Crash 
At Savannah River 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.5 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
MCW 1.6 x 10-' 6.3 x 10-' 
NPA 2.8 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-' 
MOl 1.1 x 10-' 5.5 x :0-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 2.2 1.1 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10-' 6.3 x 10-' 
MCW 2.0 x 10-' 8.0 x 10-" 
NPA 4.3 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MOl 6.4 x 10-' 3.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 1.2 x 10' 6. 1 X 10-' 
F- 115 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.4-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Pearl Harbor 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.7 x 10-' 2.3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.5xlO-' 7.3 x 10-" 
MOl 6.9 x 10-' 3.5 x 10--
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 3.3 x 10' 1.7 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10-' 6.3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.7 x 10-' 2.4 x 10~ 
MOl 2.8 x 1(,' 1.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Popul ation within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 9.2 x 10' 4.6 x 10-' 
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Table F .1.4.2.1.4-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash 
AI Norfolk 
50% METEOROLOGY 
- -
Likel ihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.4 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-" 
MeW N/A N/A 
NPA 3.6 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-" 
MOl 9.6 x 10-' 4.8 x 10-" 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 4.2 2. 1 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10-' 6 .3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.2 x 10-' 2.1 x 10-' 
MOl 1.1 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
1539002 4.8 x 10' 2.4 X 10-' 
F-1I7 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.4-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Kesselring 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.4 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-" 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 9.5 x 10'" 4.8 X 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 1.4 x 10' 7 .1 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10-' 6.3 x 10-' 
t,ICW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl I I x 10-' 5.4 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 3.6 x 10' 1.8 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2. I.4-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Nevada Test Site 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9.0 x 10-' 3.6 x 10-" 
MCW 9_1 x 10-" 3_7 x 10-' 
NPA N/A N /A 
MOl 5.5 x 10-' 2_8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 1_3 x 10-' 6.5 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10-' 6.4 x 10-' 
MCW 5.3 x 10--' 2 .2 x 10-' 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl L3 x 10-' 6.5 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
13792 3_3 x 10-' L7 x 10--' 
F-119 
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Table F .1.4.2.1.4-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Oak Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.7 x 10-' 2_3 x 10-' 
MCW 1.6 x 10-' 6.5 x 10-' 
NPA 2.0 x 10-' 9 .9 x 10--" 
MOl 2.8 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 6 _0 3_0 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10-' 6_3 x 10-' 
MCW 9_9 x 10-' 3_9 x 10" 
NPA 1.3 x 10-' 6_3 x 10-' 
MOl 1_8 x 10-' 8_9 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 2 _0 x 10' 1.0 x 10-' 
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F.I .4.2. 1. 5 HEPA Filter Fire. 
F. I .4.2. 1.5. 1 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a fire in 
the ECF High Efficiency Paniculate Air (HEPA) filter banks is postulated. This accident could be 
initiated by the ignition of a flammable mixture released upstream of the system or by an external, 
unrelated fire that spreads to this system. Although the risks associated with this accident are 
relatively minor, it was analyzed to bound the higher probability, lower consequence type accident 
category. The airborne release fractions associated with this accident were conservatively chosen so 
that a HEPA filter failure by crushing or impact was also bounded. 
F. I .4.2. 1.5.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as 
follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The original inventory of fission products in the filters is based on the total estimated 
unabated ECF releases over a 5-year period. 
One percent of the radionuelide inventory present on the filters becomes airborne 
during the fire . Release fractions for HEPA filters are small because the filters are 
constructed of material containing glass fibers which would melt during a fire and trap 
panieles in the medium . Measurements from experiments show that one one-hun-
dredth of I % of the material in HEPA filters could be released during a fire, but 1% 
has been used in these analyses to allow for uncertainties in the final results of an 
individual fire . 
The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a IS-minute period . 
There is no increase in direct radiation due to this accident . 
The following amounts of radionuelides could be released to the environment. This 
listing ineludes nuelides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure. 
• No fi ltration by HEPA filters is assumed . 
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Nuclide Curies Nuelide Curies 
Cs-137 1.46 x 10" Co.{i() 2 .09 x 10" 
Cs-134 2 .04 x 10~ 5r-90 8.90 x 10" 
Ba-137M 6.26 x 10-<> Y-9O 8.90 x 10" 
Fe-55 2 .32 x 10" Eu-154 9 .80 x 10" 
Ni-{i3 2 .98 x 10" 
F. 1.4 .2 . 1.5 .3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical HEPA filter fire accident at each location. 
The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk " is defined as 
the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probability of a fire in a HEPA 
filter is estimated based on the probability of other fires spreading to the HEPA filter system. As 
discussed in section F.2.4 .2, a probability of 5 x 10" is assigned to chemical fires . The probability 
of HEPA fires is considered less than a chemical fire since chemicals would not be stored in the 
immediate vicinity of the HEPA filter system. Additionally, HEPA filters are not inherently volatile 
or explosive. It is est imated that the probability for an existing chemical fire to spread to the HEPA 
filters is less than 0 .1. This results in a probability of less than 5 x 10· for a HEPA filter fire. A 
value of 5 x IO~ was used to develop the risk results in the table. 
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HEPA Filter Fire Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-site No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 2.5 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-' 2.7 x 10" 
Savannah River 2.1 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-< 6.5 x 10" 
Hanford 7.0 x 10-- 5.3 x 10" 2.7 x 10" 
Puget Sound 1.6 x 10-' 6.4 x 10~ 3.2 x 10" 
Pearl Harbor 8.7 x 10-< 1.2 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 
Norfolk 3.3 x 10-' 6.9 x 10-< 3.5 x 10" 
Ponsmouth 1.7 x 10" 3.9 x 10~ 2.0 x 10-' 
Kesselring 3.5 x 10~ 3.3 x 10~ 1.7 x 10-' 
Nevada Test Site 4.3 x 10" 5.7 x 10-- 2.9 x 10" 
Oak Ridge 5.7 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-< 1.1 x 10-' 
The risk for this hypothetical accident is generally more severe at the Navy shipyards than at 
the DOE sites . 
For the hypothetical HEPA filter fire accident scenario, the radioact ive plume might cause 
contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of less than 0.06 mile. This would yield a total 
area impacted by the accident of less than 0.5 acre. The calculated downwind distance would be 
contained within the boundaries of all si tes under evaluation. 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.5-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire 
At INEL 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.7 x 10-' 3.5 x 10-' 
MCW 7.9 x 10-' 3.2 X 10-10 
NPA 4.5 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-1• 
MOl 9.9 x 10-" 5.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115690 7.6 x 10-' 3.8 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9.6 x 10-' 
MCW 8.8 x 10-' 3.5 x 10-' 
NPA 2.7 x 10'" 1.4 x 10-' 
MOl 2.5 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115690 1.1 x 10-1 5 .3 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.5-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire 
At Savannah River 
50% MET OROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal Locaiion (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.9 x 10-< 1.5 x 10-' 
MCW 2.3 x 10-' 8.8 x 10-" 
NPA 2.9 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-" 
MOl (New ECF) 7.2 x 10-" 3.6 x 10-" 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.7 x 10-' 8.6 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 4.1 x 10-' 2.0 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9.6 x 10-' 
MCW 2.9 x 10-< I.J x 10-' 
NPA 4.9 x 10-" 2.5 x 10-' 
MOl (New ECF) 2.1 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.6 x 10-< 8. 1 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 5O-mile Radius (person. rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 2.5 x 10- ' 1.3 x 10-< 
F-125 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.S-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fir< 
At Hanford 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Lucation (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.9 x 10-" 1.5 x 10-' 
MCW 3.0 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-" 
NPA 3.5 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-'· 
MOl (New ECF) 9.6 x 10-' 4.8 x 10-'· 
MOl (FMEF) 1.9 x 10-" 9.7 x 10-'· 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375860 6.7 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9 .6 x 10-' 
MCW 1.9 x 10-4 7.5 x 10-' 
NPA 5.5 x 10'" 2.7 x 10-' 
MOl (New ECF) 7.0x 10-' 3.5 x 10-' 
MOl (FMEF) 2.4 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Popul ation within Number of 
5(}.mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375860 1.1 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-' 
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Table F. I .4.2.1 .5-4. Summary of Exposure Calculat ion Results. 
For We!. Storage - HEPA Filter Fire 
At Puge!. Sound 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2. 1 x 10-< 8.4 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.5 x 10-< 1.2 x 10-' 
MOl 1.4 x 1(,' 6.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5{}.mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 3.4 x II,' 1.7 x 10-< 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9.6 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.9 x 10-' 1.5 x I~ 
MOl 1.6 x 10-' 8.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 1.3 6.4 x 10-< 
F-127 
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Table F.1.4.2.I.5-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire 
At Pearl Harbor 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.7 x 10-< 3.5 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.2 x 1 0~ 1.1 X 10-' 
MOl 2.2 x 10-< 1.1 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
4.5 x 10-< 817385 9.0 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9.6 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 7.2 x 10-' 3.6 X 10-" 
MOl 8.7 x 10-< 4.3 x 10-' 
Expo~ure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1.2 x 10-' 817385 2.4 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.5-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage· HEPA Filter Fire 
At Norfolk 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 x 10-" 8.5 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 5.3 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 
MOl 3.2 x 10-" 1.6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5().mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 2.3 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-" 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
T0ta1 EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 • 10-' 9 .6 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 6.2 x 10-" 3.1 x 10-' 
MOl 3.3 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5().mile Radius (person·rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 1.4 6 .9 x 10-" 
F·129 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.5-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage· HEPA Filter Fire 
At Portsmouth 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 x 10-" 8.4 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 5.0 x 10-' 2.5 x 10-' 
MOl 1.4 x 10 .... 7.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50·mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 1.2 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9.6 X 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.1 x 10-' 5.6 X 10-' 
MOl 1.7 x 10-' 8.7 X 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 7.9 x 10-' 3.9 x 10 .... 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.5-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire 
At Kessel ring 
50~ METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.1 x 10-' 8.5 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N /A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 5.5 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5Q.mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 2.0 x 10-' 9 .8 x 10-' 
95~ METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9 .6 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 3.5 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (ptrson-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
11 48587 6.7 x 10- ' 3.3 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.5-9. Summary of Exposure Calculat ion Results . 
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire 
At Nevada Test Site 
50~ METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker l.4x 10-' 5 .5 x 10-' 
MCW 1.1 x 10-' 4 .2 x 10-" 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 8.5 x 10-' 4.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population with in Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 7.6 x 10-' 3 .8 x 10'" 
9S~ METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9 .6 X 10-' 
MCW 6.2 x 10'" 2.5 x 10-' 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 4.3 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 1.1 x 10-' 5.7 x 10'" 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.5-IO. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire 
At Oalc Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.7 x 10-' 3.5 x 10-' 
MCW 2.3 x 10-' 8.8 x 10-' 
NPA 3.0 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 
MOl 9.0 x 10-' 4.5 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 1.2 x 10-' 6.0 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.4 x 10-' 9.6 x 10-' 
MCW 1.4 x 10-' 5.6 x 10-' 
NPA 1.9 x 10-' 9.4 x 10-' 
MOl 5.7 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-< 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
87153 1 4.3 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
F-133 
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F. 7.4.2. 7.6 Minor Water Pool Leakage. 
F. 7.4.2. 7.6. 7 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a minor 
leak develops in the water pool resulting in a gradual discharge to the environment. There is no 
danger of uncovering any spent nuclear fuel in the water pool. since the leak is so small that it is 
undetected and water level is maintained in the water pool. Since a strict accounting of water added 
to and removed from the water pool is maintained, the magnitude of this leak would be less than 
4,400 gallons per year . The 4,400 gallons per year value is the maximum amount of water which 
might leak out of the water pool before periodic review of the water balance would detect a leak. 
F. 7.4.2 . 7.6.2 Source Term. There is no airborne release above normal levels in this 
hypothetical accident scenario. The radionuclide inventory in the leaking water is based on radioac-
tivity analysis of ECF water pool water. The isotopes that were analyzed for but not detected could 
exist at the minimum detection limit. 
IOCFR20 
Nuclide Sample Results Effluent limit Annual Releases 
(pCi/ml) (pCi/ml) (Ci/year) 
H-3 2.0 x 10~ 1.0 x 10" 3.3 x 10" 
Mn-54 2.5 x 10-' 3.0 x 10-' 4.1 X 10" 
Fe-55 1.0 x 10" • 1.0 x 10~ 1.6 x 10-' • 
Co-58 7.0 x 10" 2.0 x 10-' 1.1 x 10" 
Co~ 1.6 x 10" 3.0 x 10" 2.6 x 10" 
Ni-{i3 2.3 x 10-' 1.0 x IO~ 3.8 x 10" 
Sr-9O 4.0 x 10-' 5.0 x 10-' 6.5 x 10-' 
Y-9O 4.0 x 10" 7.0 x 10" 6 .5 X 10-' 
1-129 4.0 x 10" • 2.0 x 10-' 6.5 x 10" • 
Cs-137 4.2 x 10" 1.0 x 10" 6.9 x 10-' 
• These radionuclides were not detected in the ECF water. The numbers quoted reflect the 
detection limit of the analysis. 
It should be noted that the sample results for the water pool indicate that the nuclide levels are 
all below the Code of Federal Regulations limits for liquid effluent in IOCFR20 with the exception of 
Co~. The level of 1- 129 used in the calculations was based on the minimum detection limit of the 
sample. This level exceeds the effluent limit: however. 1-129 was not actually detected in the water 
sample. Since Sr-9O has comparable water solubility to 1- 129 and exists in spent nuclear fuel at about 
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a factor of 1.0 x 10' higher than 1-129, it is inferred from the detected level of Sr-90 that the actual 
level of 1-129 is well below the IOCFR20 effluent limit. 
F.1.4.2. 1.6.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public heal th risk to the 
general population that might result from the hypothetical minor water pool leak at each location . 
The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as 
the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probabil ity of a leak developing 
is 10·' per year. 
Minor Water Pool Leakage Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-s ite No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 2.5 x 10·' 1.3 x 10·' 1.3 x 10·' 
Savannah River 7.9 x 10·'· 1.3 x 10-' 1.3 x 10·'· 
Hanford 9.9 x 10·" 1.7 X 10·'· 1.7 X 10·" 
Puget Sound 3.2 x 10·'· 4.2 x 10·' 4.2 X 10·" 
Pearl Harbor 1.3 x 10·" 4.6 X 10·'· 4.6 X I(}" 
Norfolk 2.7 x 10-'· 1.8 x I(}' 1.8 x 10·'· 
Ponsmouth 1.3 x 10-'· 1.4 x 10·' 1.4 X 10·'· 
Kesselring 6.0 x 10-' 8.5 x 10" 8.5 X 10-'· 
Nevada Test Site 2.5 x 10·' 1.4 x 10·' 1.4 X I(}'· 
Oak Ridge 1.5 x 10" 3.9 x 10-' 3.9 x I(} '· 
At al l sites except the Nevada Test Site, this accident results in the lowest or next to lowest 
risk of the wet storage accidents evaluated. 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.6-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage 
At INEL 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker NIA N/A 
MCW 1.6 x 10-" 6.4 x 10-" 
NPA 1.6 x 10-" 8.0 x 10-" 
MOl 2.5 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5(}.mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2.6 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 115690 
Table F.1.4.2.1.6-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage 
At Savannah River 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW 4.8 x 10-" 1.9 x 10-" 
NPA 4.8 x 10-" 2.4 x 10-" 
MOl 7.9 x 10-'· 4.0 x 10-" 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2.5 x 10-" 1.3xlO-' 579541 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.6-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Wei. Storage· Minor Water Pool Leakage 
At Hanford 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW 8.3 x 10-" 3.3 xlO-il 
NPA 8.3 x 10-" 4.2 XlO-il 
MOl 9 .9 x 10-" 5 .0 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375860 3.3 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-'· 
Table F.1.4.2.1.6-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resul ts . 
For Wei. Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage 
At Pugel. Sound 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.2 x 10-11 6.0 x 10-" 
MOl 3.2 x 10-'· 1.6 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
29758 10 8.4 x 10-" 4.2 x 10-' 
F-137 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.6-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage 
At Pearl Harbor 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.8 x 10-" 2.4 x 10-" 
MOl 1.3 x 10-'· 6.5 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
4.6 x 10-'· 817385 9.2 x 10-' 
Table F.1.4.2.1 .6-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage 
At Norfolk 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 9.9 x 10-" 5.0 x 10-" 
MOl 2.7 x 10-10 1.4 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 3.6 x 10-" 1.8 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2 .1.6-7. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results. 
For We!. Slorage - Minor Water Pool LeaJcage 
At Portsmouth 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.8 x 10-" 2.4 x 10-" 
MOl 1.3 x 10-'· 6.5 x 10-" 
Exposure 10 Population within Number of 
5(}.mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 2.7 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-' 
Table F.1.4.2.1.6-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For We!. Storage - Minor Water Pool LeaJcage 
At Kesselring 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 6.0 x 10-' 3.0 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5(}.mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 1.7 x 10-' 8.5 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.1.6-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool LeaJcage 
At Nevada Test Site 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Locati0n (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW 1.6 x 10-" 6.4 x 10-" 
NPA 1.6 x 10-" 8.0 x 10-" 
MOl 2.5 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-" 
Exposure to Populalion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 2.7 x 10-' 1.4 x 10-' 
Table F.l .4.2.1.6-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage 
AI Oak Ridge 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker N/A N/A 
MCW 9.4 x 10-" 3.8 x 10- 16 
NPA 9.4 x 10-" 4.7 x 10-16 
MOl 1.5 x 10-' 7.5 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
3.9 x 10-' 871 531 7.7 x 10" 
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F. 1.4 .2.2 Dry Storage. 
F. 1.4 .2.2. 1 Wind·driven Missile Impact into Storage Casks with Mechanical 
Damage. 
F. 1.4.2 .2. 1. 1 Descrip tion o( Conditions. In this hypothetical accident, no fu el damage 
would result from any impact because of the strength of the containers used . Dry storage containers 
could experience a major wind storm or tornado which could propel a large object into a storage 
container causing the container seal to be breached . However, container analysis for this si tuation 
shows that the container is strong enough to prevent crushing of the spent nuclear fuel and release of 
fission products. 
Winds produced by tornados are higher than hurricane winds and thus the impacting missi le 
would be travelling with higher velocity and would have higher kinetic energy. Even at this higher 
velocity, analysis has shown that the missile would not penetrate the container. The probability of 
penetration at the lower velocity of a hurricane (212 miles per hour) would be even smaller than the 
probability of penetration for a missile propelled by the winds of a tornado (travelling at 360 mph). 
While hurricanes can have high winds, hurricane winds normally cannot generate the very large, very 
fast missi les analyzed for tornados. While hurricanes may occur more frequently than tornados, the 
overall risk from a hurricane is lower because the container would not be penetrated . 
The analysis of wind damage using miss iles propelled by the winds of tornados is the same as 
is done for design of nuclear power plants . Hurricanes very infrequently have winds that could 
generate such miss iles, so the analyses provided for tornados provide an upper limit for the effects of 
hurricanes. Examination of damage caused by recent severe hurricanes shows that robust structures 
can withstand hurr icanes . 
follows : 
F. 1.4 .2 .2.1.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as 
• The source term is based on best estimate spent nuclear fuel corrosion products . 
• One percent of the original corrosion products associated wi th the fu el could be 
released from the cask to the atmosphere . This is based on experimental 
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• 
• 
• 
measurements of the fraction of corrosion products loosened from naval spent nuclear 
fuel by shock and vibration and the fact that a wind-driven missile would not penetrate 
the container or damage the fuel inside. Only loose corrosion products would be 
available for r"lease from the container, and any release from the container would 
have to occur via a convoluted path through the damaged seal. 
The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a 15-minute period. 
There is no increase in direct radiation due to this accident. 
The following amounts of radionuclides could be released to the environment. This 
listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99 % of the possible exposure. 
~ ~ 
Co-{)() 9 .58 x 10" 
Fe-55 1.76 x 10" 
Co-58 3.54 x 10" 
Mn-54 5.98 x 10') 
Fe-59 5 . 11 x 10~ 
F. 1.4.2.2. 1.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public heal th risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical wind-driven missi le accident at each 
location. The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period. "Risk " is 
defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probability of 
container damage is small due to the very strong container design. The dry storage containers are 
expected to be designed as well as sh ipping conta iners so that they would not be penetrated by 
environmentally caused missi les and the fuel would not be affected . However. an analysis was 
performed for a case in which the impact of a tornado miss ile might topple a container on a railcar 
and cause unseating of the container seal and thus release radioactive material in the fo rm of 
corrosion products. 
The probability of the occurrence of a tornado was obtained using the data in document 
WASH- 1300 (AEC 1974). The maximum likelihnod of a tornado occurrence at all storage locations 
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being evaluated in the continental United States is 10" per year, The probability of a missile 
generated by the tornado striking a container and causing the damage analyzed has been estimated to 
be less than 10-'. Thus. the total probability of a wind-driven missile damaging a container is less 
than 10-'. and a probability of 10-' per year was used in the risk assessment. 
Dry Storage Mechanical Damage Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-site No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 4.6 x 10-< 4.9 x 10-< 4.9 x 10-' 
Savannah River 4.9 x 10~ 3.0 x 10" J.U , 10" 
Hanford 1.7 x 10-< 1.3 x 10" 1.3 X 10" 
Puget Sound 3.9 x 10" 1.7 x 10" 1.7 x 10" 
Pearl Harbor 2.1 x 10" 3.0 x 10" 3.0 x 10" 
Norfolk 8.1 x 10" 1.8 x 10" 1.8 x 10" 
Ponsmouth 4.2 x 10" 1.0 x 10" 1.0 x 10" 
Kesselring 8.1 x 10-' 7 .4 x 10" 7.4 X 10-' 
Nevada Test Site 8.8 x 10~ 5.3 x 10-' 5.3 x 10"· 
Oak Ridge 1.4 x 10-' 5 .1 x 10" 5 .1 X 10" 
The risk for this hypothetical accident is generall y more severe at Navy shipyards than at the 
DOE sites. This accident results in the lowest risk of " two dry storage accidents evaluated. 
For the hypothetical wind-driven missile accident scenario. the rad ioactive plume might cause 
contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of less than 0.06 mile. This would yield a total 
area impacted by the accident of less than 0.5 acre. The calculated downwind distance would be 
contained within the boundaries of all sites under evaluation. 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.1-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At INEL 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.0 x 10-' 8.0x I~ 
MCW 1.8 x 10-' 9 .2 x 10-' 
NPA 1.0 x 10-' 5 .2 x 10-' 
MOl 8.0 x 10-' 4.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population with in Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1.2 x 10-' 115690 2.3 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW 2 .0 x 10-' 1.0 x 10-' 
NPA 6.3 x 10-' 3.1 X 10-' 
MOl 4.6 x 1 0~ 2.3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115690 9.8 x 10-' 4.9 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.1-2. Summary of Exposure Calculat ion Results. 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Savannah River 
50 \11, METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.9 x 10-' 3.6 x 10-' 
MCW 5.3 x 10-" 2. 1 x 10-' 
NPA 6.7 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-" 
MOl (New ECF) 1.6 x 10-" 8. 1 x 10-' 
MOl (Barnwell) 4.0 x 10-" 2.0 x 10- ' 
Exposure to Popul ation within Number of 
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 9.4 x 10-' 4.7 x 10-" 
95\11, METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW 6.7 x 10-' 2.6 x 10-' 
NPA 1.1 x 10~ 5.7 x 10-' 
MOl (New ECF) 4.9 x 10-" 2.5 x 10-' 
MOl (Barnwell) 3.9 x 10-' 2.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5O-mile Rad ius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Popul. tion of 
579541 6. 1 3.0 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.1-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Hanford 
50 \11, METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.9 x 10-' 3.6 x 10-' 
MCW 7.0x 10~ 2.8 X 10-' 
NPA 8.1 x 10-6 4. 1 x 10-' 
MOl (New ECF) 2.3 x 10-' 1.1 x 10-' 
MOl (FMEF) 4.6 x 10-' 2.3 x Woo, 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375860 l.4x Woo, 7.0 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW 4.4 x 10-' 1.8 x 10-6 
NPA 1.3 x IO~ 6.3 x Woo, 
MOl (New ECF) 1.7 x 1 0~ 8.4 x 10-' 
MOl (FMEF) 5.9 x 10-" 2.9 x Woo, 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375860 25 1.3 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.14. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Puget Sound 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.9 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-<' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 5.7 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-" 
MOl 3.5 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-<' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile R>dius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 1.2 x 10' 5.8 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 6.8 x 10-' 3.4 x 10-' 
MOl 3.9 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2975810 3.4 x 10' 1.7 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2_2_I-S_ Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Pearl Harbor 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.0 x 10-' 8.0 x 10-<' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 5.2 x 10-' 2.6 x 10-<' 
MOl 5.3 x 10-' 2.7 x 10-<' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 2.2 x 10' 1.1 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
. 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.7 x 10-' 8 .4 x 10-' 
MOl 2. 1 x 10-' 1.1 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 5.9 x 10' 3.0 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.I-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Norfolk 
SO% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.9 x 10-' 2.0 x 10-" 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.2 x 10-' 6 .2 x 10-' 
MOl 7.8 x 10-' 3 .9 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
IS39002 7.4 3.7 x 10-' 
9S% METEOROL()GY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker S.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.4 x 10-' 7.1 x 10-" 
MOl 8. 1 x 10-' 4.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
IS39OO2 3.S x 10' 1.8 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.1-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Portsmouth 
SO% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.9 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-" 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.2 x 10-' S.8 x 10-' 
MOl 3.S x 10-' 1.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 4.2 2.1 x 10-' 
9S % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker S.6 x 10- ' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.6 x 10- ' 1.3 x 10-' 
MOl 4.2 x 10- ' 2. 1 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
2432627 2.0 x 10' 1.0 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.1-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Kesselring 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 4.9 x 10-' 2.0 x 10-" 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 8.8 x 10-' 4.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 3.3 1.7 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 8. 1 x 10-' 4.0 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population wilJ1in Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 1.5 x 10' 7.4 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.1-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Nevada Test Site 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.2 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-" 
MCW 2.5 x 10-" 9.6 x 10-'· 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 4.5 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 1.5 x 10-' 7.3 x 10-" 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.6 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MCW 1.4 x 10-' 5.8 x 10-' 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 8.8 x 10-' 4.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 1.1 x 10-' 5.3 x 10-' 
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Table F.l.4.2.2.1-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage 
At Oak Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.0 x 10-2 8.0 x l~ 
MCW 5.3 x 1(14 2.1xlO-' 
NPA 6.9 x 10-3 3.4 x 1~ 
MOl 2.2 x 10-2 1.1 X 10-5 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 2.8 1.4 x 10-3 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5 .6 x 10-2 2 .2 X 10-5 
MCW 3.2 X 10-3 1.3 x 1~ 
NPA 4.4 x 10-2 2 .2 X 10-5 
MOl 1.4 x 10-1 6 .9 X 10-5 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 1.0 x 101 5 .1 X 10-3 
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F.1.4.2.2.2 Airplane Crash. 
F. 1.4.2.2.2. 1 Description of Conditions. A hypothetical aircraft accident scenario was 
developed for the dry storage option. Based on the probability of occurrence, as discussed in Section 
F.3, specific analyses were only performed for Savannah River , Oak Ridge, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk, 
Ponsmouth, and Kesselring locations. At other locations, the likelihood of occurrence is less than 
10" per year. The accident is postulated to cause damage to a single storage cask. This is based on 
the fact that containers used to store naval spent nuclear fuel would be very rugged so that only the 
rotor shaft from one of an airliner's jet engines would be strong enough and possess enough energy to 
have a chance of penetrating a container. From analyses of existing container designs, the rotor of a 
large jet engine, including those from the largest aircraft such as a Boeing 777, Russian Antonov 
An-225, or a Lockheed C-5, would not penetrate a container during an airliner crash , but, for the 
purposes of evaluation, calculations were performed for one container damaged to the extent that 
fiss ion products and corrosion products might be released . Due to the severity of the shock, the cask 
seal might be breached resulting in damage to the fuel. The severe mechanical shock results in the 
release of corrosion products to the environment. The release of fi ssion products also occurs due to 
the impact and resultant fire . The fission product release factors are based on overheating testing 
performed on the naval fuel systems . 
follows: 
F.1.4.2.2.2.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as 
• One percent of all of the fuel units stored inside the cask are damaged either by the 
impact or the resullant fi,e and those fission products are available for release. 
• Of the available fission products, 100% of the noble gases, 3% of the halogens , 1.1 % 
of the cesium, and 0.1 % of the remaining solids are released to the environment. 
• The rr \ease Co the environment occurs at a constant rate over a 15-minute period . 
• Ten percent of the original corros ion products from the fu el units are released from 
the cask to the atmosphere. 
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• The followi ng amount of radionuclides could be released to the environment. This 
listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure. 
N!!£lilk ~ 
Cs-134 2.57 x 10' 
Cs-137 3.56 x 10' 
Pu-238 5.90 x 10" 
Ba-137M 3.07 
Sr-90 3.12 
Ce-l44 7.17 
Nb-95 4.37 
Y-90 3.12 
Ru-l06 6 . 11 x 10" 
F.1.4.2.2.2.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical airplane crash accident at each location. 
The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as 
the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. 
Dry Storage Airplane Crash Summary 
Maximally exposed No. of fatal 
Probability of off-site cancers 
Site accident per year individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
Savannah River 3 x 10" 4.7 X 10" 2.8 8.4 x 10" 
Pearl Harbor I x 10" 19 26 2.6 x 10" 
Norfolk I x IO~ 72 16 1.6 x 10" 
Portsmouth I x 10" 38 9.0 9 .0 x 10" 
Kesselring I x 10" 7.7 7.5 7.5 x 10" 
Oak Ridge 3 x 10" 120 4.7 1.4 x 10~ 
The risk for this hypothetical acc ident is most severe at Pearl Harbor and Norfolk . It is also 
the highest risk for any hypothetical acc ident evaluated at Pearl Harbor and Norfolk. For the sites 
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with crash probabilities less than 10" per year, consequences were not calculated since it is expected 
that they would not substantially contribute to the risk. 
For the hypothetical airplane crash into a dry storage cask accident scenario, the radioactive 
plume might cause contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of approximately 0.9 mile. 
This would yield a total area impacted by the accident of about 106 acres. The calculated downwind 
distance would be contained within the boundaries of the Savannah River and Kesselring sites. The 
contaminated plume would extend beyond the boundaries of Oak Ridge and the shipyards that are at 
risk for this accident. 
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Table F_L4_2.2_2-L Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Savannah River 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.5 x 101 5.9 x 10-' 
MCW 8.7 x 10-1 3.5 x 10-' 
NPA 1.1 x 10-' 5.5x I~ 
MOl 1.8 x 10-1 8.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 9.6 x 10' 4.8 x 10-1 
95% MET!:OROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9 .2 x 101 7.4 x 10-' 
MCW 1.1 x 101 4.4 x 10-' 
NPA 1.9 x 10-1 9.5 x 10-' 
MOl 4.7 x 10-1 2.3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 5.5 x 10' 2.8 
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Table F.1.4.2.2 .2-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Pearl Harbor 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.3 x 10' 2.7 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 8.6 4.3 x 10-' 
MOl 4 .7 2.3 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
817385 2.0 x 10' 9.8 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9 .2 x 10' 7.4 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.8 x 10' 2.8 x 10- ' 
MOl 1.9 x 10' 9.3 X 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2.6 x 10' 817385 5.2 x 10' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.2-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Norfolk 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.2 3.3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.0 1.0 x 10-' 
MOl 6.9 3.4 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 6.5 x 10' 3.2 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9.2 x 10' 7.4 X 10-2 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 2.4 x 10' 2.4 x 10-' 
MOl 7.2 x 10' 7.2 X 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1539002 3. 1 x 10' 1.6 X 10' 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.2-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resul ts. 
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Ponsmouth 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.1 3.2 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 1.9 9 .6 x 10-' 
MOl 3. 1 1.6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 3.7 x 10' 1.9 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9 .2 x 10' 7 .4 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA 4.3 x 10' 4 .3 x 10-' 
MOl 3.8 x 10' 3.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to ?opulation within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
2432627 1.8 x 10' 9 .0 
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Table F .1.4.2_2_2-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash 
At Kesselring 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 8.2 3.3 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 1.3 6 .6 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 4.8 x 10' 2.4 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9.2 x 10' 7.4 x 10-' 
MCW N/A N/A 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 7 .7 3.8 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
1148587 1.5 x 10' 7.5 
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Table F.1.4.2.2.2-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash 
At OaJc Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.3 x 10' 2.7 X 10-' 
MCW 8.7 X 10-' 3.5 x 10-" 
NPA 1.1 x 10' 5.7 x 10-' 
MOl 1.9 x 10' 9.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 2.9 x 10' 1.4 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EOE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9.2 x 10' 7.4 x 10-' 
MCW 5.3 2.2 x 10-' 
NPA 7.2 x 10' 7.2 x 10-' 
MOl 1.2 x 10' 1.2 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person· rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 9.5 x 10' 4.7 
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F.1.4.2.3 Dry Cell Operations. 
F. 1.4.2.3. 1 Inadvertent Cutting into Fuel Region or Mechanical Damage. 
F.1.4.2.3. 1. 1 Description of Conditions. Mechanical damage due to handling during 
examination. such as accidentally cutting into the fuel region of an element. was assessed. This 
hypothetical accident results from inadvenent cutting across the fuel region when cropping off the 
Zircaloy ends of a fuel unit. All noble gas isotopes within the vicinity of the cut might be released to 
the facility building and escape to the environment. The majority of the volatile and 5 lid nuclides 
are likely to be retained in the fuel or the facility exhaust filters . The resulting airborne release to the 
environment was evaluated. The possible exposure to the workers. individuals living on the site 
boundary. and the general population was evaluated . 
follows: 
F. 1.4 .2.3. 1.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as 
• One percent of the fission products in the fuel element being handled are close enough 
to the cut site to be available for release. 
• All (100%) of the noble gases available for release are released to the atmosphere. 
• Twenty-five percent of the halogens available for release are released . 
• One percent of the paniculate fission products could be released and 99.9% of these 
are removed by normally installed HEPA filters . 
• Cs and Ru would behave like paniculate fissi<,o products . 
• The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a 15·minute period. 
• There is no increase in direct radiat ion due to this accident. 
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• The following amounts of radionuclides could be released to the environment. This 
listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99 % of the possible exposure. 
~ ~ 
Pu-238 7.2 x I(t' 
Cs-134 2.9 x 10-' 
Cs-137 4 x 10" 
1-129 2.5 x 10" 
Sr-9O 3.9 x 10" 
Ce-l44 9.0 x 10" 
Nb-95 5.4 x 10" 
1-131 5.4 x 10~ 
H-3 1.42 
Y-90 3.9 x 10" 
Ba-137m 3.8 x 10" 
Ru- I06 7.6 x 10~ 
Zr-95 2.9 x 10" 
Y-91 2. 3 x 10" 
Eu- 154 2.7 x 10~ 
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F. 1.4.2.3. 1.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical mechanical damage accident at each 
location . The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk " is 
defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probability of damage 
to fuel during handling is small. The work on fuel at the INEL-ECF includes removal of the 
non-fueled portions at each end of the fuel unit. This is done in a sawing operation. To cut into the 
fuel , there must be operator error in positioning the spent fuel in the cutting appar"tus and error in 
selecting the saw cut positioning gage. The combined operator and independent checker ermr 
probability for cutting of the fuel has been evaluated to be less than 10-' per cut (Swain and Guttman 
1983). Using a conservative number of 10' saw cut operations per year results in a fuel cutting 
probability of less than 1O~ per year which has been used in the risk evaluation. 
Ory Cell Mechanical Damage Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-site No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 2.2 x 10~ 3.5 x I~ 3.5 x 10-' 
Savannah River 2.4 x 10~ 1.4 x 10" 1.4 X 10" 
Hanford 7.1 x 10" 5.3 x 10~ 5.3 x 10" 
Nevada Test Site 4 .0 x 10~ 3.7 x 10" 3.7 x 10" 
Oak Ridge 5.8 x 10" 2.5 x 10" 2.5 x 10" 
The risk for this hypothetical accident is roughly proportional to the surrounding population 
with Oak Ridge being the worst and the Nevada Test Site being the best. 
For the hypothetical dry cell mechanical damage accident scenario . the radioactive plume 
might result in contamination of the ground to • downwind distance of less than 0.06 mile. This 
would yield a total area impacted by the accident of less than 0.5 acre. The calculated downwind 
distance would be contained wi th in the boundaries of all OOE sites under evaluation. 
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Table F.1.4.Z.3 . I-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Damage 
At INEL 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.7 x 10-' 1.5 x 10"' 
MCW 3.4 x 10"' 1.4 x 10"' 
NPA 1.9 x 10"' 9.5 x 10"' 
MOl 6.2 x 10"' 3. 1 x 10"' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115690 3.9 x 10"' 1.9 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Werker 1.0 x 10"' 4. 1 x 10"' 
MCW 3.7 x 10-' 1.5 x 10"' 
NPA 1.1 x 10-' 5 .7 x 10"' 
MOl 2.2 x 10-' 1.1 x 10"' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115690 7.0 x 10"' 3.5 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.I-Z. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Dam.ge 
At Savannah River 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10"' 6 .6 x 10-" 
MCW 9.6 x 10-' 3.8 x 10"' 
NPA 1.2 x iO"' 6 .1 x 10"' 
MOl (New ECF) 1.0 x 10-' 5.1 x 10-' 
MOl (Barnwell) 2.0 x 10 .... 1.0 X 10"' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 6.2 x 10"' 3 .1 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.0 x 10"' 4. 1 x 10"' 
MCW 1.2 x 10"' 4.9 x 10-" 
NPA 2.1 x 10-' 1.0 x 10"' 
MOl (New ECF) 2.4 x 10-' 1.2 x 10"' 
MOl (Barnwell) 1.7 x 10"' 8.4 x 10"' 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
579541 2.8 1.4 x 10- ' 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.1-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Damage 
At Hanford 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10--' 6.6 x 10-" 
MCW 1.3 x 10--' 5.1 x 10--' 
NPA 1.5 x 10--' 7.4x 10-' 
MOl (New ECF) 9.8 x 10-" 4.9 x 10--' 
MOl (FMEF) 2.0 x 10--' 9.9 x 10--' 
Exposure to Population with in Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
6 .2 x 10--' 3. 1 x 10--' 375860 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.0 x 10--' 4. 1 x 10--' 
MCW 8.0 x 10--' 3.2 x 10-" 
NPA 2.3 x 10-' 1.2 x 10--' 
MOl (New ECF) 7. 1 x 10--' 3.6 x 10--' 
MOl (FMEF) 2.5 x 10~ 1.2 X 10--' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375860 1.07 5.3 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.1-4. Summary of Exposure Calculat ion Results. 
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Damage 
At Nevada Test Site 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.8 x 10--' 2.3 x 10-" 
MCW 4.5 x 10-" 1. 8 x 10--' 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 4 .7 x 10--' 2.3 x 10--' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
SO-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Popul ation of 
13792 3.6 x 10--' 1.8 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.0 x 10-' 4.1 x 10-' 
MCW 2.6 x 10~ 1.0 X 10-' 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 4.0 x 10~ 2 .0 X 10--' 
Exposure to Popul at ion withi n Number of 
SO-mil e Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 7.4 x 10-' 3.7 x 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.3. I-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanioal Damage 
At Oak Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 3.7 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-' 
MCW 9.6 x 10-" 3.8 x 10-' 
NPA 1.3 x 10-' 6.3 x 10-" 
MOl 9.3 x 10-' 4.6 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 1.9 9.5 x 10-" 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.0 x 10-' 4.1 x 10-' 
MCW 5.9 x 10-' 2.4 x 10-" 
NPA 8.0 x 10-' 4.0 x 10-' 
MOl 5.8 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
87153 1 5.1 2.5 x 10-' 
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F. 7.4.2.3.2 Partial Loss of Shielding Due to Earthquake. 
F. 7.4.2.3.2. 7 Description of Conditions. A hypothetical earthquake causes the proposed 
Dry Cell Facility to lose some portion of its concrete shielding . Direct radiation exposure to the on-
site work force and the general public has been calculated. 
F. 7.4 .2.3.2.2 Source Term. The conditions used to calculJte the dry cell direct radiation 
levels are as follows : 
• For calculational purposes, a total of 50% of the high-density concrete dry cell 
shielding might be removed due to the earthquake. More realistic damage from an 
earthquake would result in cracks or small openings in the shielding. This bounds 
anticipated damage to the facility . 
• Building containment and ventilation systems remain in operation. Therefore, there is 
no airborne release to the environment. Calculations have already been performed in 
Section F. I.4 .2. 1. 1 for a drained water pool hypothetical accident which bound any 
anticipated airborne releases from the dry cell facility should the building containment 
and ventilation systems fail. 
F. 7.4 .2.3.2.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical loss of shielding accident at each location. 
The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as 
the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. As discussed in Section 
F.1.4.2.1.1.3 , the probability of this hypothetical accident is estimated to be 10" per year. 
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Dry Cell Panial Loss of Shi~lding Summary 
Maximally exposed 
off-site No. of fatal cancers 
Site individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
INEL 9.3 x 10'" 3.0 X 10-" 3.0 x 10'" 
Savannah River 6 .7 x 10-" 3.0 x 10-" 3.0 x 10-" 
Hanford 3.3 x 10-" 4.9 x 10'''' 4 .9 X 10'" 
Nevada Test Site 6.3 x 10-" 3.7 x 10-" 3.7 x 10~2 
Oak Ridge 1.2 x 10-' 7.5 x I~ 7.5 X 10'" 
At all sites, the risks associated with this accident are the lowest of any accident evaluated . 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.2-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Cell Operations - Panial Loss of Shielding 
At INEL 
Likelihood 
Receptor Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.2 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
MCW 7.5 x 10-" 3.0 x 10-" 
MOl 9 .3 x 10-" 4.7 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
115,690 5.9 x 10-" 3.0 X 10-" 
Table F.1.4.2.3.2-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Cell Operations - Partial Loss of Shielding 
At Savannah River 
Likelihood 
Receptor Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.2 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
MCW 2.7 x 10'" 1.1 x 10-' 
MOl (New ECF) 6.7 x 10-" 3.4 X 10-11 
MOl (Barnwell Plant) 2.4 x 10'" 1.2 x 10-' 
NPA 7.9 x 10-" 4.0 x 10-'" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579,541 5.9 x 10-" 3.0 x 10-" 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.2-3. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results. 
For Dry Cell Operations· Panial Loss of Shielding 
At Hanford 
Likelihood 
Receptor Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7. 2 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
MCW 2.7 x 10-" 1.1 x 10-" 
MOl (New ECF) 3.3 x 10-" 1.7 x 10-'" 
MOl (FMEF) 6.7 x 10-" 3.4 x 10.11 
NPA 3.9 x 10-" 2.0 x 10-" 
Exposure to Populat ion within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
375.860 9.7 x 10-" 4.9 x 10-" 
Table F.I.4.2.3.2-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Cell Operations - Partial Loss of Shieldi ng 
At Nevada Test Site 
Likelihood 
Receptor Total EDE of Fatal 
l ,<>cation (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.2 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
MCW 7. 1 x 10-" 2.8 xlO-il 
MOl 6.3 x 10-" 3.2 x 10-1' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Populat ion of 
12. 159 8.7 x 10-" 4.4 x 10-'" 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.2-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Cell Operations - Panial Loss of Shielding 
At Oak Ridge 
Likelihood 
Receptor Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 7.2 x 10-' 2.9 x 10-' 
MCW 5.5 x 10-' 2.2 x 10-" 
MOl 1.2 x 10-' 6 .0 x 10-" 
NPA 1.4 x 10"' 7.0 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
87 1,53 1 1.5 x 10-' 7.5 x 10" 
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F. 1.4.2.3.3 Airplana Crash Into Dry Cell Facility. 
F. 1.4.2.3.3. 1 Description of Conditions. A hypothetical aircraft accident scenario was 
developed for dry cell operations. Based on the probability of occurrence, as discussed in Section 
F.3, specific analysis was only performed for Savannah River, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge. 
The accident was postulated to cause major damage to the building, resulting in the loss of contain· 
ment and filtered exhaust systems. The fuel units inside the dry cell could also be damaged due to 
mechanical impacts and potential fire. The fission products which might be released are based on 
factors derived from overheating testing performed on the naval fuel systems. The mechanical impact 
also could result in the release of corrosion products to the environment. 
F.1.4.2.3.3.2 Source Term. The development of the radioactive source term for this 
scenario is based on the following : 
• 
• 
One percent of the fuel units stored inside of the dry cell might be damaged by either 
the impact or resultant fire and those fission products would be available for release. 
Of the fission products available for release, 100% of the noble gases, 3% of the 
halogens, 1.1 % of the cesium, and 0. 1 % of the remaining solids could be released to 
the environment. 
• The release to the environment would occur at a constant rate over a 15-minute 
period . 
• 10% of the available corrosion products could be released to the environment. 
• A portion of the concrete shielding is destroyed; however, the resultant rubble 
provides a minimum of 6 inches of concrete shielding. 
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• The following amount of radionuclides could be released to the environment. This 
listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure. 
~ ~ 
Cs-134 4.5 x 10' 
Cs-137 6.23 x 10' 
Pu-238 1.03 x 10" 
BA-137M 5.37 
Sr-90 5 .46 
Ce-l44 1.25 x 10' 
Nb-95 7.65 
Y-90 5.46 
Ru- l06 1.07 
F. 1.4.2.3.3.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the 
general population that would result from the hypothetical airplane crash into the dry cell at the 
Savannah River Site. The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period. 
"Risk " is defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. 
Maximally exposed No. of fatal 
Probability of off-site cancers 
Site accident per year individual (MOl) if accident occurs Risk per year 
(rem) 
Savannah River 2 x 10~ 8.2 X 10" 4.8 9.6 x 10~ 
Nevada Test Site 4 x 10" 1.6 1.8 x 10" 7.2 x 10" 
Oak Ridge I x 10~ 350 8.4 8.4 x 10~ 
This accident results in the highest risk for any hypothetical accident evaluated at Savannah 
River, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge. 
For the hypothetical airplane crash into a dry cell accident scenario , the radioactive plume 
might cause contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of approximately 1.3 miles. This 
would yield a total area impacted by the accident of about 207 acres. The calcul ated downwind 
distance would be contained within the boundaries of Savannah River and the Nevada Test Site, but 
not Oak Ridge. 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.3-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Cen Operations - Airplane Crash 
At Savannah River 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 2.6 x 10' 2.1 X 10-' 
MCW 1.6 6.2 x 10-" 
NPA 1.9 x 10-' 9 .6x I~ 
MOl 3. 1 x 10-' 1.5 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 1.6 x 10' 8.1 x 10-' 
95 % METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10' 1.3 x 10-' 
MCW 1.9 X 10' 7.8 x 10-' 
NPA 3.3 x 10-' 1.7 x 10-" 
MOl 8.2 x 10-' 4.l x lo-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
579541 9.6 x 10' 4 .8 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.3-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results . 
For Dry Cen Operations - Airplane Crash 
At Nevada Test Site 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 9.2 3.7 x 10-' 
MCW 7. 1 x 10-' 2.9x I~ 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 2.5 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 2.1 x 10' 1.1 x 10-' 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10' 1.3 x 10-' 
MCW 4.2 x 10-' 1.7 x 10'" 
NPA N/A N/A 
MOl 1.6 8.0 x 10-" 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
13792 3.5 x 10' 1.8 X 10-' 
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Table F.1.4.2.3.3-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results. 
For Dry Cell Operations - Airplane Crash 
At Oak Ridge 
50% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 5.8 x 10' 4.7 x 10-' 
MCW 1.5 6.2 x 10-' 
NPA 2.2 x 10' 2.2 x 10-' 
MOl 1.7 x 10' 1.7 x 10-' 
Exposure to Population within Number of 
50-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 5.2 x 10' 2.6 
95% METEOROLOGY 
Likelihood 
Total EDE of Fatal 
Location (rem) Cancer 
Worker 1.6 x 10' 1.3 x 10-' 
MCW 9 .3 4.7 x 10-3 
NPA 1.3 x 10' 1.3 x 10-' 
MOl 3.5 x 10' 3.5 x 10-' 
Exposure to Popul ation within Number of 
5O-mile Radius (person-rem) Fatal Cancers 
Population of 
871531 1.7 x 10' 8.4 
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F. 1.4.3 Impact of Accidents on Close-in Workers. An evaluation has been made of the impact 
to close-in workers involved in naval spent nuclear fuel management that might occur due to the 
various radiological accidents postulated in spent fuel handling. This evaluation focused on the 
radiological consequences of the accident. Clearly, a limited number of fatalities may occur which 
are related to spent fuel handling only in a secondary manner; i.e., the worker who happened to be in 
the facility may be killed due to a plane crash, seismic event, crane failure, etc. These secondary 
effects are not discussed in the following . Rather, only radiological consequences are considered. 
F. 1.4.3. 1 Wet Storage. 
F. 1.4.3. 1. 1 Drained Water Pool Due to Seismic Event. No fatalities to workers close 
to the scene of the accident would be expected due to radiological consequences. This is because 
drainage of the large amount of water in a water pool is expected to take several days which provides 
ample time for workers to leave the facility. 
F. 1.4.3 . 1.2 AccidentBl Criticality in. Water Pool Due to Human Error. It is likely no 
fatalities would occur. At most, two or three workers may receive some appreciable radiation 
exposure. This is because the criticality would occur under approximately 20 feet of water. 
Shielding by the water would be sufficient to prevent exposure of nearby workers . Expulsion of a 
cone of water above the critical ity might lead to significant exposure to any workers who were 
directly above the location of the criticality. 
F.1.4.3.1.3 Mechanical Damage to Fuel in a Water Pool Due to Operator Error or 
Crane Failure. No fatalities to workers would be expected from radiological consequences. This is 
because the release of the source term is underwater. Attenuation by the water would occur for most 
products, but release of noble gases would cause 3 direct radiation exposure to workers in the area. 
Upon releases fro m the surface of the water pool. radiation alarms would sound requiring evacuation 
of nearby workers . Timely evacuation would prevent suhstantial radiation exposure. 
F. 1.4.3. 1.4 Airplane Crash into Water Pool Storage. No fatalities to workers would be 
expected from rad iological consequences . This is because any release of radioactive products would 
be underwater and radiation alarms would sound requiring evacuation of nearby workers . Timely 
evacuation would prevent substantial radiation exposure. 
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F. 7.4 .3 .2 Dry Storage. 
F. 7.4.3 .2. 7 Wind·driven Missile Impact on Storage Casks. It is likely there would be 
no fatal ities to workers from radiological consequences . This is because there usually would be no 
nearby workers except for brief periods when a container is being placed in the dry storage array . 
Since a wind.<Jriven miss ile is not expected to penetrate a dry storage container, direct radiation 
exposures even to nearby workers would not be expected . The container seal could be breached and 
some airborne products released . At most, two or three nearby workers may receive some radiation 
exposure from inbalation of airborne radioactivity . 
F.7.4.3.2.2 Airplane Crash into Dry Storage. It is not likely that any fataliti es would 
occur to nearby workers due to the radiological consequences of this accident. As in Section 
F. I .4.3.2. 1 above. workers are usually not in the dry storage array except when a container is being 
placed into the array. At most, two or three nearby workers might receive significant radiation 
exposure from inbalation of airborne radioactivity s ince the container seal may be breached. The low 
probability of the airplane crash itself. coupled with the probability that workers would be close 
enough to be affected, coupled with the probability that the wind would be blowing in the direction of 
the workers. makes it very unlikely that any worker would receive substantial radiation exposure. 
F. 7.4 .3.3 Dry Cell Operations. 
F. 7.4 .3 .3 . 7 Inadvertent Cutting into Fuel or Mechanical Damage. No fatal ities to 
workers would be expected from the radiological consequences of this accident. This is because the 
ventilat ion systems' exhaust from a dry cell is di rected to the outside of the building in which a dry 
cell is constructed and away from nearby workers. 
F. 7.4. 3.3.2 Partial Loss of Shielding of a Dry Cell. It is li kely that no fatalities would 
occur among nearby workers from he radiologicai consequences of this accident. This is because 
there is still substantial shielding of radiation from material inside the cell even wi th the assumed 
5(}.percent loss of the high.<Jensity concrete. How.ver. one or twu nearby workers may receive some 
exposure from radiation streaming through a crack in the dry cell if th is is the mode of fai lure. 
Workers are trai ned to evacuate quickly when rad iation alarms sound . 
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F. 7.4.3.4 Other Accidents. 
F. 7.4.3.4. 7 HEPA Filter Fire. No fatalities would be expected among nearby workers 
from the radiological consequences of a fire in a HEPA filter. This is because HEPA filters are not 
located in an area where workers are likely to be working. In addition, the release of radioactivity 
involved in a HEPA filter fire is not large. 
F.7.4 .3.4.2 Small Leaks from Water Pools. No fataliti es are expected among nearby 
workers from the radiological consequences of a small leak from a water pool. The leak would be 
expected to be into the ground through the water pathway. Drinking water supplies would not be 
immediately impacted . In addition, the typical concentration of radioactivity in the water is low. 
F. 7.4.4 Evaluation of Shipboard Fire Involving Shipping Containers. 
F. 7.4.4 . 7 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a fire 
onboard a ship that is transporting naval spent nuclear fuel in shipping containers from Pearl Harbor 
to Puget Sound is postulated . This accident could be initiated by a collision with another ship. The 
collision and subsequent fire are postulated to occur in Puget Sound in the center of the shipping lane 
at a distance of approximately 2 miles from Seattle. The consequences of a similar accident at Pearl 
Harbor would be less because of the smaller population and the fact that Pearl Harbor is a restricted 
area and is very close to the sea on the south side, limiting the number of people who might be 
exposed . Th is section addresses the radiological consequences of this postulated accident scenario. 
The tox ic chemical consequences related to the burning fu el oil aTe presented in Section F.2.4.2.2. 
During shipment, the containers are well protected from direct mechanical damage should a 
ship coll ision occur. The rugged nature of the shipping container and the naval reactor 's fuel system 
is demonstrated by the analys is of airp lane crashes which showed that a jet engine rotor would not 
penetrate the conta iner or rupture the fuel. A severe fi re is necessary to potent ially cause fai lure of 
the container seals and overheat the spent fuel suffiCientl y to release fiss ion products. Coll is ions of 
this severity are extremely unlikely. During the hypothetical accident, the fire would need to burn 
intensely in the hold for several hours to cause release of fission products or corrosion products to the 
environment . 
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F. 1.4.4 .2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
Ten percent of all fuel unit cladding inside of two shipping containers is ruptured and 
the contained fission products are available to be released from the fuel units. 
Of the available fission products. 100% of the noble gases. 3% of the halogens. 1.1 % 
of the cesium. and O. I % of the remaining solid fission products are assumed to be 
released to the container. 
Ten percent of all fission products released to the container are released to the 
environment and the remainder are adherent on the fu el and cask surfaces . 
• Ten percent of the original corrosion products from the fuel units are released from 
the cask to the environment. 
• The following amount of radionucl ides could be released to the environment . This 
listing includes nuclides from one container that result in at least 99% of the possible 
exposure . 
~ ~ 
Cs·134 2.57 x 10' 
Cs·137 3.56 x 10' 
Pu·238 5.90 x 10" 
Ba· 137M 3.07 
Sr'9O 3.12 
Ce- l44 7. 17 
Nb·95 4.37 
Y·9O 3. 12 
Ru·l 06 6. 11 x 10" 
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F. 1.4 .4.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the general 
population that would result from the hypothetical shipboard fire accident . The number of fatal 
cancers would be expected to occur over a 50·year period . "Risk" is defined as the number of fatal 
cancers times the probability of occurrence. 
The probability of occurrence of this hypothetical shipping accident is 6.7 x 10" per year or 
less. and was obtained as follows. The probability of a single pon entry accident is 1.6 x let< 
(DOE 1994). The probability of a fire. given the occurrence of an accident. is 8 x 10" (DOE. 1994). 
Combining these two probabilities with the pon entry frequency of 21 naval spent nuclear fuel 
shipments spread over 40 years results in a probability of 6.7 x 10" per year. Due to the rugged 
nature of the naval fuel and likely effectiveness of fire fighting over a several hour period. the 
probability of fission product release to the environment would be even less . 
DOE guidance (DOE 1993b) provides that the consequence of an accident which has a 
probability of occurrence of less than I x 10" per year need not be calculated . However. in view of 
interest in th is accident expressed in several public comments. the foll owing table is provided listing 
both the consequence and the risk. 
Sh ipboard Fire Involving Shipping Containers 
In Puget 
Sound Shipping 50% Meteorology 95 % Meteorology 
Lane 
Maximally Total EDE Likelihood of Total EDE Likelihood of 
Exposed Off· (Rem) Fatal Cancer (Rem) Fatal Cancer 
site Individual 
(MOl) 9.3 x 10" 4.7 x 10" 1.8 9 .2 x let< 
General Exposure Numher of Exposure Number of 
Population (person· Rem) Fatal Cancers (person-Rem) Fatal Cancers 
with in 50-mile 
Radius 2.27 x 10' 11.4 1.03 x 10' 51.5 
Risk per year 7.6 x 10" 3.5 x 10" 
The risk fo r this hypothetical accident is slightly lower than that for the most severe facility accident 
anal yzed at Puget Sound . 
For the hypothetiCal shipboard ti re accident. the radioacd ve plu me might cause contamination to a 
downwind distance of less than I mile . However. s ince this area is entirely over water. the 
contamination would be quickly diluted by tidal fl ow anJ turbulence. 
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F.1.S Analysis of Uncertainties 
The analyses of the impacts of normal operations and hypothetical accidents associated with 
management of naval spent nuclear fuel presented in this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) are 
based on conservative calculations. This is necessary because virtually all of the events analyzed have 
never occurred and most of the impacts of routine operations are so small that they cannot be 
measured. The use of calculations introduces the possibility that the actual impacts may differ from 
those calculated due to various kinds of uncertainties, such as differences between actual behavior and 
the theoretical models or equations and the variability of the values of factors used in the calculations. 
In order to ponray the effects of such variability and uncenainty, the analyses performed for this 
appendix have been divided into four components: the probability that an event. such as an accident, 
could occur; the amount of rad ioactive material or radiation that might be released by the event; the 
calculation of the potential for exposure to human beings from the release; and the conversion of the 
radiation exposure to detrimental health effects . Each of these components is discussed separately in 
the following sections for both routine operatior.s and accidents. 
Each of these components has been analyzed for both routine operations and accidents . The 
discussion in the following sections focuses on accident analyses, but it should be understood that the 
analysis of uncertainties for routine operations is the same, with a few exceptions . First, routine 
operations are cenain to occur, so the "probability" of such events is effectively 1.0. Second . the 
source terms used for the analyses of routine operations are based on monitoring of current operations 
at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program facilities such as the Expended Core Facility at INEL. 
Consequently. the estimates of the amount of rad iation or radioactivity involved are expected to be 
close to those which might actually occur under the alternatives evaluated in this EIS . It is possible 
that there would be some variations among faci lities and that future effons to keep exposures to 
workers as low as reasonably achievable might reduce the source terms further . but the values used in 
the analyses in this EIS are expected to be little different from those actually encountered . The 
effects of routine operations and accidents have been calculated using similar analytical methods and 
models for determination of radionuclide movement in the envi ronment, pathways to humans. and 
conversion of exposure to health effects. Therefore. the discussion of uncenainties in Sections 
F. I .S.3 and F. I .S.4 applies to the results of analyses of routine operations, as well as to postulated 
accidents. 
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F. 7.5. 7 Probabilities of Events. The probabil ity that an accident might occur has been determined 
for a number of events which might reasonably be postulated. These probabilities are used in this 
appendix to calculate the risk. defined as the product of the probability times the consequences, for 
each postulated accident. 
The best methods available have been used to estimate the probabilities for the events selected 
for analysis. For example, a methodology developed by Sandia Laboratories (Sandia 1983) was used 
to compute the probability that an aircraft might crash into naval spent nuclear fuel facilities. This 
method uses actual aircraft crash statistics obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration and was 
developed by Sandia to reproduce the observed frequencies as closely as possible. Probabilities for 
seismic events were derived from published studies of the frequencies of seismic activity and 
represent the best available estimates, but these probabilities are subject to some uncenainty due to the 
relatively few events which have occurred at the sites evaluated under the alternatives in this EIS . 
The probabilities of a range of accidents which might be caused by human error have also 
been included . Such events include accidental criticality caused by handling errors, dropping of fuel 
modules, improper operation of cranes, and incorrectly performing machining procedures. For 
human error, a probability of one error in one thousand operations (a frequency of 10"' events per 
year) is used for operations performed by a single trained operator following a written procedure. If 
the procedure requires verification of the action by a second trained operator, this frequency is 
lowered to I<t'. These probabilities are derived from the methodology used by the Nuclear Regulato-
ry Commission for assessment of human reliability (Swain 1983). 
In many instances, the probabilities assigned to the events reflect the likelihood that a 
panicular event. such as an earthquake or an aircraft crash . might occur. However. for the purpose 
of the analyses, the resulting accident was assumed to have quite severe consequences. The 
probability of such severe consequences is smaller than the probability that the initiating event might 
occur, with consequences as severe as used in the analyses possibly occurring only one time in 10 or 
100 occurrences of the initiating event. The probabilities for most of the analyses in this appendix 
used only the probability of the initiating event and did not include the further reduction in the 
probability of the postulated severe consequences resulting f:om the severity used . This was done, in 
pan, because the severe consequences assumed . and in some cases the initiati ng events themselves. 
occur very infrequentl y, or have never occu rred . so little data on their frequency is ava il able. 
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For example. one accident analyzed is the impact on a spent fuel container of a missile 
produced by a tornado or other high winds. The sequence of events analyzed included breaching the 
container seal in order to release radioactive material . In reality. the missile would have to be large 
enough and traveling at high enough speed to cause the postulated damage. Similarly, it would have 
to contact the container at the correct location and at the correct angle in order to damage the seal. 
The probability assigned to this accident is 10" per year, the probability that a wind-driven missile 
might strike a container. and does not include any factor to account for other elements in the sequence 
required to actually damage the seal . Therefore. the probability of the consequences calculated for 
this accident would be much smaller than the probability of 10" per year used in the analysis . 
A second example is provided by the analysis of aircraft impact on shipping containers used 
for storage of naval spent nuclear fuel. In this accident analysis, the impact was assumed to cause a 
shipping container to be penetrated if the container were contacted by the aircraft . However, naval 
spent nuclear fuel shipping containers are of very rugged design. and structural analysis of the 
container showed that a naval shipping container is very unlikely to be penetrated by an aircraft crash, 
even by the hardest parts of the airplane . Consequently . the probability that the naval spent nuclear 
fuel could be damaged and that fission products might be released is much. much less than the crash 
probability alone, which is the probability assigned to these consequences in this appendix . 
A third example is seen in the ship fire accident. In this analysis, it is assumed that if a ship 
carrying naval spent nuclear fuel shipping containers were involved in a very severe collision and a 
fire occurred . the fire would include the cargo hold where the naval spent nuclear fuel containers are 
carried. the fire would not be extinguished hy the redundant systems provided . and it would burn long 
enough at sufficient intensity to damage the shipping container and the spent nuclear fuel inside and 
cause release of radioactive materials from the containment provided . Given that a severe collision 
occurred . the probability that all of the necessary condit ions would occur and a fire of the required 
intensity and duration would occur in the cargo hold is clearly far less than the probability of the 
collision. 
As can be see from these examples. the actual prohability of the cunsequences result ing from 
the analyses are smaller than the values presented in this appendix , at least in part because these 
probabilities do not incl ude an additional factor to refl ect the accident severity used in the analyses. 
As a result , the risks stated in this appendix for most acc idents are believed to be at least 10 to 100 
times larger than what would actually occur. However. the same probabilities have been used in the 
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evaluation of all of the alternatives considered and all of the risks are small, so the approach used is 
adequate for the purposes of this EIS . 
F.7.5.2 Release of Radioactive Material or Radiation (Source Term). Since the source terms 
used in the accident analyses are typically for accidents which have never occurred, there is greater 
room for uncertainty . All of the accidents analyzed in this EIS are intended to be accidents which 
produce consequences which are unlikely to be exceeded by any reasonably foreseeable accident. As 
a result, the accidents themselves and the sequences of events during the accidents have been chosen 
to maximize the source term. For example, systems such as high effiCiency particulate filters have 
been considered to be inoperative in all cases where the accident might have an opportunity to disable 
them. 
The source terms for the hypothetical accident analyses are dependent upon a number of 
factors . For there to be an accidental release of radioactivity to the environment, there must be 
damage to the storage facility or containment structure. Furthermore, naval spent nuclear fuel must 
be damaged as well in order for there to be any release of fission products since all fission products 
are fully contained within naval nuclear fuel. The amount of damage to the external containment or 
the fuel is dependent upon the severity and the nature of the accident. In the accidents analyzed, 
there are assumptions concerning the containment or the extent of damage to the fuel units which 
were made to provide a conservative, bounding evaluation whose results would not be exceeded by 
reasonably postulated accidents of a similar type. 
One example of this is the evaluation of the dry storage container impacted by a wind-driven 
missile . Damage to the container by the missile is not expected to occur, but for the analysis in this 
EIS, the seal is assumed to be damaged by the missile impact and corrosion products within the 
container are assumed to be released through the damaged seal. The uncertainty on the resultant 
release is one-sided since the probability of a release larger than in the calculation (resulti ng in a 
higher calculated dose) is essentially zero while the possibility of a release of less radioactive material 
is large (for example, no release if the container seal is not broken) . The range of variat ion. or the 
uncertainty interval , in the source term for this accident is between +0% and · 100%. 
Another example is the plane crash into a dry processing facility for naval spent nucl ear fuel. 
The dry processing facility includes a thick concrete shielded cell in which a few naval spent nuclear 
fuel units are processed at a time. The mass ive concrete shield is provided to protect operating 
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personnel from radiation but it has the secondary benefit of protecting the fuel units being processed 
from missiles caused by natural or man-made phenomena. In the unlikely event that an airplane 
crashed into the facility, it is expected that no damage to the spent fuel would result . Even so, for 
evaluation of this accident in this EIS , it is assumed that I % of the fuel in the dry cell could be 
damaged and that sufficient jet fuel could enter the dry cell to cause a fire which could cause the 
release of fission products from the damaged fuel and destroy the filtration system. Again, the 
uncenainty range is one-sided since no damage to fuel is expected, causing the variability or 
uncenainty to range from +0% to -100% . 
All of the source terms used for the evaluation of the accidents were developed in a similar 
fashion . Thus, the expected outcome for all of the accidents is that a lower release to the environ-
ment is expected than is used in the analysis, representing a range of variation of +0% to -100%. 
F. 1.S.3 Exposure to Humans. Exposure to the individuals and the general population is evaluated 
by integrated computer programs. The methods used model the movement of airborne, ground , and 
water contamination resulting from the postulated release using five types of pathways to the 
population. These pathways include exposure directly to the radiation from the material in the plume, 
direct exposure to radiation from contaminated sailor water, inhalation of air containing gases or 
panicles, and ingestion of contaminated water or food. The analyses in this appendix used parameter 
values which were the best available estimates or, when best estimate values were not available, are 
conservative. 
The Gaussian plume model used in these analyses to represent airborne movement of 
radioactive material is the standard used in virtually all evaluations of environmental effects. 
Comparison of distributions calculated using the Gaussian plume model with test data has shown that 
the results may differ by as much as a factor of 5 in some circumstances. In order to ensure that 
exposures would be as high as could occur under any set of conditions, in most of the analyses a 
ground level release was used and no reduction in the airborne concentrations was included for either 
turbulence caused by buildi ngs or the effect of wi nd meander which occurs naturally at the low wind 
speeds accompanying the worst case meteorological conditions. 
One intentional choice of parameters to ensu re that the results would be conservative is the 
use of the worst case meteorological conditions in the tabulations of the risks and consequences for all 
alternatives provided in Chapters 3 and 5. The results for both the most likely meteorological 
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conditions and for the worst case are provided in detailed tables in this attachment and show that the 
worst case meteorological conditions produce exposure estimates which are 2 to 10 times higher than 
those for the most likely conditions (depending upon local meteorological conditions). Overall , the 
net effect is that the Gaussian plume model might introduce an uncenainty of a factor of 5 or less in 
either direction, but the use of the worst case meteorological conditions would essentially offset any 
underestimation of effects. 
The direct radiation from the cloud is calculated using a conservative representation of the 
plume as a finite cloud, and , as a result , little uncenainty is introduced in this pan of the analysis . 
Direct radiation from contamination which results from panicles from the plume deposited on the 
ground surface depends upon the deposition parameters which are input as best-estimate values. 
Faster deposition would result in more material on the ground and increased exposure to those closer 
to the accident location but less material on the ground and decreased exposure for those farther from 
the accident site. Any effects of uncertainty in this parameter would depend upon the population 
distribution around the postulated accident scene. 
The possible exposure to direct radiation from material in surface water and associated 
sediments as a result of accidental release directly to the water or fallout from an airborne release was 
estimated for people involved in activities such as professional fishing, maritime operations, 
swimmio&, and boating. The calculations took no credit for dilution by river currents or tidal 
movement and the concentrations in the air were not reduced by the amount of material deposited in 
the water. Due to the conservative concentrations used in the calculations and an assumption that 
every member of the population in the area would be exposed to direct radiation from surface waters, 
exposure from this pathway is very likely overest imated. 
The inhalation pathway evaluation is based on average breathing rates and uptake consistent 
with the recommendations by the ICRP (ICRP 1977 and ICRP 1979). Obviously, higher values for 
these parameters would increase the estimated exposures and lower values would decrease the 
estimates. There appears to be little controversy concerning these parameters and the same parame-
ters are used for evaluat ion of all of the alternatives in this appendix . 
The ingestion pathway includes meat, seafood, dairy and crop products, and drinking water. 
Best-estimate parameters are used to evaluate the contamination levels in food and water when ready 
for consumption . Consumption rates for individuals are based on observed eating habits. The 
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analysis also includes the assumption that a conservative 10% of the entire diet of the affected 
population consists of contaminated products . The uncertainties associated with these pathways can 
obviously affect the estimated impacts, but the range of variation is not large and the same values for 
a given site were used for evaluation of all alternatives. 
The drinking water contribution to the ingestion pathway was calculated by assuming that a 
portion of the radioactive material would become dissolved in the drinking water supply. At si tes 
where fresh surface water provides drinking water, any contamination of the water was assumed to 
occur promptly and no decreases due to radioactive decay were used . At sites where aquifers are a 
source of drinking water, consumption of water from the aquifer was delayed for the time required 
for the contamination to reach the aqui fer and then to reach the nearest drinking water source. As an 
example, for a postulated leak from the Expended Core Facility, it was assumed that 20 years would 
pass before water carrying the radioactive material would reach a well drawing from the aquifer and 
that I percent of material released would enter the aquifer each year. Maximum exposed individuals 
were conservatively assumed to drink only water from the contaminated source and to drink 2 liters 
of water per day. For the population in general, a conservative fraction of the population was 
assumed to drink I li ter of water per day from affected sources. The concentrations in these 
calculations are considered to be higher than expected because no reduction of the concentration by 
dilution was included and the fraction of the population exposed to the affected drinking water is 
conservatively high . 
At sites where irrigation is used, contamination of food crops, livestock, and local game was 
analyzed . The same concentration of rad ioactive material as in drinking water was used in the 
irrigation water. Affected crop;, livestock, and game were assumed to receive all water from the 
contaminated water source and applicable biological accumulation factors were used . Human 
consumption rates for the crops, livestock, and game were used to calculate the exposure from this 
source. The uncertainty from this source is associated with the concentration of contaminants in the 
irrigation water, the amount of such foods consumed , and the fractio n of the population which ingests 
the affected food . 
The population used to determine the effects of postulated accidents in this appendix is the 
entire population within the 22 .5-<1egree sector at each distance within 50 miles downwind of the 
accident. The spread of the plume for the worst case meteorology does not cover the entire sector . 
The result is that there is a conservatism of more than a factor of 2 in the application of the 
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calculations to the evaluation of the dose to the population. The population data used were obtained 
from the 1990 U. S. census, so population growth or decreases in a region could introduce small 
changes, but the same population distributions were used for a specific site for evaluation of all 
alternatives. 
Considering all of the factors which might have an appreciable effect on the results of the 
analyses , any tendency of the Gaussian plume model to underestimate concentrations would be offset 
by the use of other parameters which are known to be conservative. Examples of such conservative 
factors include the general use of the meteorological conditions which would produce the most severe 
effects and the use of the entire population of a 22.5-<1egree sector. Consequently, this portion of the 
analyses would appear to contribute linle in the way of uncertainty which could cause the results to be 
greater than presented in this appendix . 
F.7.5.4 Conversion of Exposure to Health Effects. The conversion of amounts of radiation or 
radioactive material trans mined to an individual or to population groups requires the calculation of the 
exposure or dose received by humans caused by inhaling or ingesting radioactive material or by being 
in a radiation field. Such calculations are based on a number of factors , including the nature and rate 
of human metabolic processes, such as respiration or excretion, the type of radiation involved, the 
sensitivity of various organs, and the age of the individuals involved . The rates of human metabolic 
processes are well characterized at this time and the energies, half-l ives, and similar properties of 
radioactive material or radiation have been measured extensively and are not subject to great debate. 
Consequently, these factors introduce linle uncertainty into the calculations in this EIS . 
However , the number of detrimental health effects which might result from exposure of a 
large group of people to low levels of radiation has been the subject of debate for many years. The 
National Academy of Sciences has conducted several investigations of this maner and its full 
commentary on page 181 of its latest study of the heal th effects of exposure to low levels of radiation, 
frequently identified as BEIR V (NAS 1990), states: 
Finally, it must be recognized that derivation of risk estimates for low doses and dose rates 
through the use of any type of risk model involves assumptions that remain to be validated . 
"' t low doses, a model dependent interpolation is involved between the spontaneous incidence 
and the incidence at the lowest doses for which data are available. Si nce the comminee' s 
preferred risk models are a linear function of dose. linle uncertainty should be introduced on 
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this account. but depanure from linearity cannot be excluded at low doses below the range of 
observation. Such depanures could be in the direction of either an increased or decreased 
risk. Moreover. epidemiologic data cannot rigorously exclude the existence of a threshold in 
the millisieven dose range. Thus. the possibility that there may be no risks from exposures 
comparable to ex .. rnal natural background radiation cannot be ruled out. At such low dose 
rates. it must be acknowledged that the lower limit of the range of uncenainty in the risk 
estimates extends to zero. 
The National Academy of Sciences considers that the uncenainty in the lifetime total excess cancer 
monality risk estimates calculated using the linear extrapolation. no threshold models it has designated 
as preferred. which is consistent with the model used in this EIS . is approximately a factor of 2 in 
either direction (an interval of 0.5 to 2 times the calculated estimates). 
The calculations of health effects performed in this Environmental Impact Statement use the 
relation recommended by the International Council on Radiation Protection because it is well-
documented and kept up to date by the Council. It is also consistent with the preferred model 
identified by the National Academy of Sciences in the BEIR V repon and is widely accepted by the 
scientific community as representing a method which produces e.<timates of health effects which will 
not be exceeded. However. there are some who bel ieve that exposure to low levels of radiation can 
produce more health effects than would be estimated using the International Council on Radiation 
Protection relat ion. On the other hand . a growing number of researchers believe that the International 
Council on Radiat ion Protection relation overestimates the number of detrimental health effects 
produced by low levels of rad iation and . in fact. the possibility of no effect cannot be excluded 
(CIRRPC 1992). 
Clearly. using a relation developed by one or the other of these groups would produce a 
larger or smaller estimate of the number of heal th effects than the values presented in this EIS . but a 
factor of 2 change in the smal l risks calcul ated for all of the alternatives would still leave them as 
small risks . All of the resul ts of analyses of normal operations and hypothetical accidents in 
Appendix 0 include the calculated exposure in addition to the number of health effects in order to 
permit independent calculations usi ng any relation between rad iation exposure and health effects 
judged appropriate. 
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F.1.S.S Summary of Uncertainties. As discussed in the preceding ponions of this section. the 
calculations in this EIS have generally been performed in such a way that the estimates of risk 
provided are unlikely to be exceeded during either normal operations or in the event of an accident. 
For routine operations. the results of monitoring of actual operations provide clearly realistic source 
terms. which. when combined with conservative estimates of the effects of radiation. produce 
estimates of risk which are very unlikely to be exceeded. The effects for all alternatives have been 
calculated using the same source terms and other factors . so this EIS provides an appropriate means 
of comparing potential impacts on human health and the environment. 
The analysp.s of hypothetical accidents provide more opponunities for uncenainty. primarily 
because the calculations must be based on sequences of events and models of effects which have not 
occurred . In this appendix. the goal in selecting the hypothetical accidents analyzed has been to 
evaluate events which would produce effects which would be as severe or more severe than any other 
accidents which might reasonably be postulated. The models have attempted to provide estimates of 
the probabilitip.<; . source terms. pathways for dispersion and exposure. and the effects on human health 
and the environment which are as realistic as possible. However. in many cases, the very low 
probability of the accidents postulated has required the use of models or values for input which 
produce estimates of consequences and risks which are higher than would actually occur because of 
the desire to provide results which will not be exceeded . In summary. it is judged that the risks 
presented in this appendix are believed to be at least \0 to 100 times larger than what would actually 
occur . 
The use of conservative analyses is not an imponant problem or disadvantage in this EIS since 
all of the alternatives have been evaluated using the same methods and data. allowing a fair compari-
son of all of the alternatives on the same basis . Funbermore. even using these conservative analytical 
methods. the risks for all of the alternatives are small , which greatly reduces the Significance of any 
uncenainty analysis parameters . 
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F.2 TOXIC CHEMICAL ISSUES AT NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
EXAMINATION AND STORAGE SITES 
The INEL·ECF is a large laboratory facility used to receive, examine, and ship naval nuclear 
fuel and irradiated test specimen assemblies. In order to accompl ish these tasks, some chemicals 
classified as toxic are involved in a variety of operations and thus a potential ex ists for releases of 
toxic chemicals due to human error and failure or malfunctioning of equipment. 
This section provides the resul ts of an evaluation of both normal operations and accidents that 
could result in toxic chemical releases. This section describes how facilities and operations were 
selected for anal ysis , discusses the computer codes used in the analys is. presents the weather 
cond itions and atmospheric dispersion. defines the hypothetical accidents which would produce the 
most severe consequences, and estimates the potent ial health effects . Each alternate location's specific 
population and meteorology were used to produce est imated consequences for each operation and 
accident . 
F.2.1 Toxic Chemical Inventory 
Some chemicals classified as toxic are routinely used in a variety of operations at the 
INEL-EC F. Table F.2-1 prov ides the INEL-ECF Chemical Inventory. Th is inventory wa.< 
developed from the Naval Reactors Fac il ity Superfu nd Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) 
Section 312 chemical inventory (INEL 1993). Those chemicals specifically stored and used at 
INEL-ECF as well as those used for fac il ity suppon (e.g .. fuel o il , diesel fuel. sulfuric acid , and 
sodium hydrox ide) were included . Chemicals at INEL-ECF that were (a) in excess of 500 pounds, or 
(b) in excess of reponable quantit ies (usually I pound) on the EPA Titl e '" List of Lim (EPA 1992a) 
were eval uated . The chemicals in the EPA Tit le '" List of Lists are the hazardous chemicals defined 
in: 
• SARA Sect ion 302 Extremely Hazardous Substances (CFR 1992a) 
• CERCLA Hazardous Substances (CFR 1992b) 
• SARA Section 313 Toxic Chemicals (CFR 1Y92c) 
• RCRA Hazardous Wastes (CFR 1992d) 
• EPA list of 100 extremely hazardous chemicals (FR 1993). 
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Table F.2-1. INEL-ECF chemical inventory. 
CAS No. Chemical Name 
Chemicals Used for Water Pool Operations 
60-00-4 
75-71 -8 
Ethylenediaminetetraacetic Acid (EDTA) 
(reagent for water analyses) 
Dichlorodifluoromethane (CFC-12) 
(refrigerant in coolers for pool water) 
Chemicals Used for Examination Coerations 
60-29-7 
67~3-{} 
123-31 -9 
144-55-8 
302-{}1-2 
7664-41 -7 
7727-37-9 
Ethyl Ether 
Isopropyl Alcohol 
Hydroquinone (photographic film developer) 
Sodium Bicarbonate 
Hydrazine 
Ammoni a'2 
Diatomic Nitrogen 
Chemicals Used for Facility Suppon 
107-21- 1 
115-{}7-1 
1310-73-2 
7664-93-9 
68476-33-5 
68476-34~ 
72623-83-7 
Ethylene Glycol (anti -freeze and paint additive) 
Propylene (Propene) 
Sodium Hydroxide (bo iler water pH control) 
Sulfuric Acid 
(boiler and cooling tower water pH control) 
Fuel Oil #5 
Diesel Fuel #2 
H ydrotreated Lubricating Oil 
Chemical Used for Nuclear Poison 
I 332-77-{} Potassium Tetraborate 
Weight 
Total 
(oounds) 
46.3 
30.0 
5.7 
100.6 
65.5 
198.0 
3.7 
2.8 
643 
516. 1 
om 
43260 
96427 
7762 10 
14316 
882.6 
17000 
Weight 
Unit ' 
(oounds) 
1.1 
30.0 
5.7 
6.6 
3.3 
99.0 
1.8 
0.28 
125 
514.0 
0.005 
43260 
96427 
204270 
10735 
4 13 
10 
I The quantities in this column represent the amount of chemical stored in the largest single container as 
identified in the INEL-ECF chemical invt:ntory. 
1 The ammonia is present as ammonium hydroxide. 
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In order to evaluate the alternate locations, the same inventory of chemicals at the INEL-ECF 
was used at the DOE sites; namely, the Savannah River Site. the Hanford Site. the Nevada Test Site. 
and the Oak Ridge Reservation. In addition , the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (hereafter referred to as 
the Barnwell Plant). which is adjacent to the Savannah River Site. was evaluated along with the DOE 
sites . Since the shipyards would not be involved with examination operations (except for Puget 
Sound). of the chemicals listed, only diesel fuel would be available in a substantial quantity, in the 
form of fuel stored at the shipyards. Although several of the chemicals listed in Table F .2-1 are 
water treatment chemicals associated with water pool operations and small water pools may be needed 
at the shipyards for fuel storage and inspection, the shipyard would already have on-hand similar 
water treatment chemicals for other operations at the shipyard. Therefore, an increase in the 
quantities or types of chemicals at the shipyards was considered to be very small and thus did not 
require evaluation. In addition. even though the Kenneth A. Kesselring Site is not a shipyard , this 
f.cility would also not be involved with examination operations. Therefore, this facility was 
evaluated in the same manner as the shipyards. 
F.2.2 Computer Modeling to Estimate Toxic Chemical Exposures 
Factors such as locations of affected persons. terrain. meteorological conditions, release 
condit ions, and characteristics of the chemical inventory are requi red as input parameters for 
calculations to determine human exposure from airborne releases of tox ic chemicals. This section 
describes the computer models used to perform exposure estimates . Specific input parameters used in 
the analyses are summarized in the appropriate subsection for normal operations and accident 
conditions. The EPlcode was used to evaluate toxic chemical releases resulting from accidents. and 
the ISC2 code was used to evaluate releases fro m normal operations. 
F.2 .2. 1 EPlcode~. The Emergency Prediction Informat ion Computer Code (EP lcode~) is the 
computer code chosen for estimating airborne concentrations result ing from most releases of toxic 
chemicals (Homann 1988). Like RSAC . EPlcode uses the well-established Gauss ian Plume Model to 
calculate the airborne toxic chemical concentrations usually at the same downwind locations as RSAC. 
The EPlcode library contai ns information on over 600 toxic substances listed by the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists in the EPlcode Manual. EPlcode also allows user 
description of substances not included in the library. A step-by-step flow chan of the main EPlcode 
features (up to the output options) is shown in Figure F.2- 1. 
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Enter sun conditions 
and wind speed -
EPlcode delermines 
stability class 
Figure F .2-1. Flow sheet for EPlcode (Homann 1988) . 
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As shown in Figure F .2-1 , thl! I.:ontinuous release modds require specification of the source 
term as an ambient concentration and a release rate. For releases over a specific time interval (i.e .. 
term releases). the user specifies the release duration and the total quantity of material released . 
Area continuous and area term releases are useful in calculating the effects of a release from 
pools of spilled volatile liquids. Th. us.r must enter the radius of the circle encompassing the spill 
area. Also entered is the temperature of the pool and ambient temperature to establish release rate 
from a liquid spill. An upwind virtual point source. which results in an initial lateral diffusion equal 
to the effective radius of the area source. is used to model an area release. 
By specifying a release quantity . release duration. and release area. the user effectively 
proposes a release rate per unit spi ll ar.a. The release quantity is defined as a source term (Q) or 
fraction of the material at risk. The concepts and defined terms are the sam. as for radiological 
calculations. EPlcode confirms that the volatility of the spilled substance can support such a release 
rate . If the proposed release rate exceeds the saturation conditions at the release temperature, 
EPlcode calculates a low.r release rate and a corresponding longer r.lease time . 
In calculating effective release height, the actual plume height may not be the physical r.l.ase 
height. e.g. , the stack height. Plume rise can occur because of the velocity of a stack emission and 
the temperature differential between the stack efflu.nt and the surrounding air. EPlcode calculates 
both the momentum plume rise and the buoyant plume rise and chooses the greater of the two results . 
Since this .ffective incr.as. in r.lease height I.ads to lower concentrations at the ground lev.1. the 
physical r.leas. heights were used to calculate the concentrations that the general public may b. 
exposed to during accidental releases of toxic substances . This approach will always yield conserva-
tive estimates . 
In th is application. the standard terrain calculation of EPlcode is always used . Downwind 
concentrat ions were calculated using both 95% and 50% meteoro logical conditions (Section F. I .3.S) . 
The elevat ion of the aff.cted p.rson is always ground I. vel (0 meters) and. as in RSAC-S. the mixing 
layer height is always 400 mete' s (1 320 feet). The deposi tion v. loc ities used (Section F.2.4 .2. 1.3) 
are somewhat d ifferent than those of RSAC -S. but they are still conservatively low. 
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As described in its user manual (Homann 1988), EPlcode also includes the following steps: 
• Treating a release as instantaneous vs. continuous depending upon the plume length at 
the specific downwind location being considered 
• Correcting the concentration for sampling time 
• Adjusting the wind sp.ed for release height 
• Depleting the plume as a function of downwind distanc. 
• Adjusting the standard deviations of the crosswind and vertical concentrations for brief 
releases. 
As oUlput, EPlcode can generate data plots of mean toxic chemical concentration (during a 
specified averaging time) as a function of downwi nd distance. From these graphs and numerical 
oUlput, the concentrations for the worker at 100 meters (330 feet) (the shortest distance for which 
EPlcode calculates), for the nearest public access (NPA). for the maximum off-site individual (MOl), 
and for nearby communities are determined and evaluated for health effects. 
EPlcode was selected as the computer code for release analysis of chemicals amenable to 
Gaussian modeling after comparison with a number of codes. primarily CHARM and ARCHIE . It 
was judged more applicable for this applicat ion than either the CHARM cod. or the comparable 
ARCHIE code. 
F.2.2.2 ISC2 Code. The Industrial Source Complex (ISC2) model is a widely used. publicly 
ava ilable, and accepted EPA regulatory model which employs straight lin. (i .... uniform wind field) 
Gaussian diffusion to estimate pollutant dispersion (EPA 1992b). ICS2 is an appropriate model for 
industrial complexes in rural or urban areas with transport distances less than SO kilometers 
(30 miles). This model employs a standard meteorological data set requiring single point hourly wind 
speed . wind direction, ambient air temperature. atmospheric stability, and vertical mixing height 
values . Also. the ISC2 model is abl e 10 account for variations in pollutant concentrations due to the 
influence of nearby structures . 
F-201 Volume I . Appendix D 
08(0 
In addition to the ISC2 model. the MESOPUFF II model was also eval uated . MESOPUFF II 
is a regional (mesoscale) scale model that takes into account a varying wind fi eld . Past trajectory 
analyses at the INEL have demonstrated that plumes may undergo many changes in direction due to 
the varying winds common to the INEL vicinity. The number of changes is partially dependent on 
rel«lSe time and transport duration . The plume transport and estimation of pollutant concentration 
beyond 12 miles (20 kilometers) is best modeled using spatially varying wind data. Although not 
used as a basis for determining or enforcing compliance with regulations, it is used on a case-by-case 
basis . The model is also read ily availahle to the puhlic. 
Upon review of the ISC2 and MESOPUFF II models, the decision was made to utilize ISC2 
for the dispersion analysis of pollutants emitted from stationary sources. ISC2 is able to reasonably 
and accurately predict downwind pollutant concentrations within 30 miles (50 kilometers) by taking 
into account multiple point and area emission sources, evaluating hourly meteorological data, and 
determining the effects of nearby structures. 
F.2.3 Health Effects 
Tox ic constituents dispersed during an accident could induce adverse health effects among 
exposed individuals. This possible impact is assessed by comparing the airborne concentrations of 
each substance at specified downwind locations to standard accident exposure guidelines for chemical 
toxicity . 
Where available. Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) values are used for this 
comparison. ERPG values are estimates of airborne concentration thresholds above which one can 
reasonably anticipate observing adverse effects (Rusch 1993). ERPG values are specific for each 
substance. and are derived for each of three general severity levels: 
• Exposure to concentrations greater than ERPG-I values results in an unacceptable 
likelihood that one would experience mild transient adverse health effects , or perception 
of a clearly defined objectionable odor. 
Volume I , Appendix D F-202 
• Exposure to concentrations greater than ERPG-2 values results in an unacceptable 
likelihood that one would experience or develop irreversible or other serious health 
effects, or symptoms that could impair one's ability to take protective action. 
• Exposure to concentrations greater than ERPG-3 values results in an unacceptable 
likelihood that one would experience or develop life-threatening health effects. 
Where ERPG values have not been derived for a toxic substance, other chemical toxicity 
values are substituted, as follows : 
• For ERPG-I, Threshold Limit Value, Time-Weighted Average (TLV-TWA) values 
(ACGIH 1993) are substituted: The TWA is the time-weighted average concentration for 
a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which nearly all workers may be 
repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect. 
• For ERPG-2 , Level of Concern values (equal to 0.1 of Immediately Dangerous to Life 
or Health) are substituted : Level of Concern is defined as the concentration of a 
hazardous substance in air, above which there may be serious irreversible health effects 
or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time (EPA 
1987). 
• For ERPG-3 , Immediately Dangerous to Life or Heal th (IDLH) values are substituted: 
IDLH is defined as the maximum concentration from which a person could escape within 
30 minutes without a respirator and without experiencing any effects which would impair 
the ability to escape or irreversible side effects (NIOSH 1990). 
Possible health effects associated with exceeding an ERPG-2 or -3 value are specific for each 
substance of concern , and must be characterized in that context. When concentrations are found to 
exceed an ERPG or substitute value. the specific toxicological effects for the chemicals of concern are 
considered in describing possible health effects associated with exceed ing a threshold value. 
ERPG values are based upon a I-hour exposure of a member of the general population. In 
this EIS. exposures resulting from the release of toxic chemicals during an accident condition were 
postulated to occur over a period of I hour or less to allow for a direct comparison to the ERPG 
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values. This approach provides an additional element of conservatism in the evaluation of accidents 
with releases that last much less than I hour. 
In addition to comparing the airborne concentrations of each substance to standard accident 
exposure guidelines, each substance was evaluated to determine if it has the potential for future 
carcinogenic health impacts. If a particular substance has this potential, the Integrated Risk Informa-
tion System (IRIS) (TOXnet 1993) was reviewed and if sufficient toxicological informat ion was 
available, a future potential likelihood of developing cancer was determined . If sufficient information 
from IRIS was not available, alternative evaluation methods, including comparison to ambient air 
quality criteria, were substituted. 
The impact of normal operations was also evaluated . This impact was assessed by comparing 
the airborne concentrations of each substance at specified downwind locations to the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) assigned for each substance . NAAQS consist of national primary 
and secondary ambient air quality standards (CFR 1991 ). National primary ambient air quality 
standards define levels of air quality which the EPA judges are necessary, with an adequate margin of 
safety, to protect the public health . National secondary ambient air quality standards define levels of 
air quality which the EPA judges are necessary to protect the public welfare from any known or 
anticipated adverse effects of a pollutant. As a result , the immediate as well as cumulative impact of 
normal operat ions was evaluated by comparing the ai rborne concentrat ions of each substance to the 
NAAQS. 
F.2.4 Analysis Description and Results 
The analysis resul ts for both normal operations and accident conditions are reponed for each 
location anal yzed . Detailed estimated concentrations and ERPG levels, expressed in milligrams per 
cubic meter (mg/m'). are reponed in tabular form for a worker, maximally exposed collocated worker 
(MCW), maximally exposed off-site ind ividual (MOl), and maximally exposed individual at the 
nearest public access (NPA). A complete description of these individuals is provided in Section 
F. 1.3.2. 
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F.2.4.7 Normal Operations. 
F.2.4. 7. 7 Source of Emissions. Emissions resulting from normal operations involving 
tox ic chemicals listed in Table F.2-1 were evaluated. It was determined that the burning of Number 5 
fuel oil in the facility's boilers and the burning of Number 2 diesel fuel in the facility's emergency 
diesel generators represented the largest sources of emissions under normal operations and thus 
provide the conditions producing the most severe consequences for evaluation. These normal 
operations result in the release of oxides of nitrogen (90% nitric oxide and \0% nitrogen dioxide), 
sulfur dioxide, particulates (PM-IO), lead, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). The airborne 
release of these chemicals was evaluated for effects on the on-site workers, MCW, NPA, and MOl. 
The emissions that occur due to normal operations at the INEL-ECF were evaluated using the 
ISC2 code. These releases were also used at the alternate locations (Hanford, Savannah River, 
Nevada Test Site, Barnwell Plant, and Oak Ridge) for evaluation purposes . Heating boilers and 
emergency diesel generators already exist at the alternate shipyard locations and thus selection of 
these alternate locations would not result in a measurable increase in emissions. Therefore, routine 
releases from shipyard locations were not considered. 
F.2.4 . 7.2 Conditions end Key Parameters. 
• Number 5 fuel oil was burned in facility boilers for space heating . 
• Number 2 diesel fuel was burned in facility emergency diesel generators. 
• Source term was based on the INEL repon on routine yearl y releases (NRF 1993) which 
included: 
• 1.02 tons per year of carhon monoxide released 
• 9.04 tons per year of oxides of nitrogen released 
• 33.7 tons per year of sulfur diox ide 
• 1.54 tons per year of panicul ates 
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• 5 .86 x 10~ tons per year of lead 
• 0 . 18 tons per year of volatile organic compounds. 
• Fony percent of the total boiler and emergency diesel generator use for the Naval 
Reactors Facility was attributed to the INEL-ECF. 
• Three point sources (one representing boilers and two representing emergency diesel 
generators) were used . 
• Stack diameters of 1.07 meters (3.5 fee!) for boilers and 0.305 meter (I foot) for 
emergency diesel generators were used. 
• Stack gas exit velocities of 21.8 meters per second (72 feet per second) for boilers and 
44.2 meters per second (145 feet per second) for emergency diesel generators were used. 
• Stack gas exit temperatures of 505 °K for boilers and 794°K for emergency diesel 
generators were used . 
• Worker concentrations were based on 16 sector polar grids. Other affected locations 
were defined as discrete points. 
• DOE site meteorological data were used for eval uat ions at the Naval Reactors Facility, 
Hanford , Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge. Meteorological data from the closest 
National Weather Service Station were used for evaluations at Savannah River and the 
'1arnwell Plant. 
F.2.4 . 1.3 Results. The airborne concentrations, averaged over the duration of each 
exposure, were calculated by ISC2 for the worker, MCW, NPA, and MOl using normal meteorology . 
Tables F .2.4. 1-1 through -6 list the downwind concentrations at various locations . The airborne 
concentrations were compared to respective NAAQS values where available. The NAAQS are as 
follows: 
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Carbon monoxide. The national primary ambient air quality standards for carbon monoxide 
are 10 mglm' for an 8-hour average concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year, and 
40 mglm' for a I -hour average concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year. 
Sulrur oxides. The nat ional primary ambient air quality standards for sulfur oxides that are 
measured as sulfur dioxide are 0.08 mglm' as an annual arithmetic mean and 0.365 mglm' as a 
maximum 24-hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year. The national secondary 
ambient air quality standards are 1.3 mglm' as a maximum 3-hour concentration not to be exceeded 
more than once per year. 
Nitrogen dioxide. The national primary and secondary ambient air quality standard for 
nitrogen dioxide is O. I mglm' as an annual arithmetic mean. 
Lead. The national primary and secondary ambient air quality standard for lead and its 
compounds that are measured as elemental lead is 1.5 x 10" mglm' as a maximum arithmetic mean 
averaged over a calendar quaner. 
Particulate matter. The national primary and secondary ambient air quality standard for 
paniculate matter is 0 .05 mglm' as an annual arithmetic mean and 0 .15 mglm' as a !'laximum 
24-hour concentrat ion. 
A comparison of the downwind concentrations provided in Tables F.2.4. I-1 through -6 with 
the NAAQS identified above indicates that no NAAQS is exceeded for normal operations. 
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Table F.2.4.1-1. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at the INEL Expended Core Facility. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m3 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead VOC 
Worker 4.6 x 10-' 5.5 X 10-4 1.9 X 10-4 2.1 X 10-' 9.0 X 10-11 1.9 X 10-' 
MCW 3.7 x 1(J6 9.5 x Io-~ 2.6 x IO-~ 2.9 x IO~ 2.0 X 10-9 8.5 X 10-7 
MOl 7.7 x 10.1 2.3 X 10-' 5.8 x 10-<> 6.4 X 10-' < 1.0 X 10-9 1.6 X 10-1 
NPA 7.7 x 10- 2.3 X 10-' 5.8 X 10-<> 6.4 X 10-1 < 1.0 xlO-il 1.6 x 10-
Table F.2.4.1-2. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at Hanford. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m3 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead VOC 
Worker 2.9 x IO-~ 1.5 X 10-4 1.3 X 10-4 1.0 x IO-~ 3.0 X 10-11 I.l x IO-~ 
MCW 1.6 X 10-' 2.1 X 10-4 9.6 X 10-' 1.1 X 10-' 5.0 X 10-11 4.7 X 10-6 
MOl (New ECF)* 1.0 x 10-<> 3.2 X 10-) 8.0 x 10-<> 8.9 x 10- 1.0 X 10"" 2.0 x 10 
MOl (FMEF)** 1.4 x 10-<> 4.0 x IO-~ 1.1 x IO-~ 1.2 X 10-<> 1.0 X 10-11 3.0 X 10-7 
NPA 1.3 x 10-<> 4.1 X 10-' 1.0xlO-' I. I x 10-<> 1.0xlO-1I 2.6 X 10-' 
*MOI (New ECF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford Site. 
**MOI (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility. 
Table F.2.4.1-3. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at Savannah River. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m3 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead VOC 
Worker 1.5 x IO-~ 6.4 x IO-~ 6.4 x IO-~ 7.1 x 1(J6 1.0 x 10-9 6.2 x 1(J6 
MCW 9.4 x 1(J6 1.6 x 10-4 5.7 X 10-' 6.3 x 1(J6 3.0 x 10-9 2.8 x 1(J6 
MOl 1.8 x 1(J6 4.8 x IO-~ 1.3 x IO-~ 1.4 x 1(J6 1.0 x 10-9 3.8 X 10-7 
NPA 8.6 x 10-7 2.4 X 10-' 6.3 x 10-<> 7.0 X 10-7 < 1.0 X 10-9 1.9 X 10-7 
PM-IO 
2.7 x 10-' 
4.6 x 1(J6 
I.l X 10-<> 
I.l X 10-<> 
PM-IO 
1.4 x IO-~ 
1.5 X 10-' 
1.5 x 10-<> 
1.9 X 10-<> 
1.9 x 10-<> 
PM-IO 
5.9 x 1Q-6 
8.7 x 1Q-6 
2.3 X 10-<> 
1.1 X 10-<> 
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Table F.2.4.1-4. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at the Nevada Test Site. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ 
- , b Car on Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead VOC 
Worker 9.0 x lO-~ 3.6 x IQ-4 4.0 x lO-4 4.5 X lO-' 7.0 x 1(J9 3.8 x lO-' 
MCW 2.5 x lO-7 7.3 X lO-(I 1.9 X lO-(I 2.1xlO- < 1.0 x 10-9 5.2 X 10-1 
MOl 7.9 x lO- 2.3 x lO-' 5.9 x lO-<> 6.6 X 10-7 < 1.0 X 10-9 1.6 X 10-7 
Table F.2.4.1-S. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at Oak Ridge. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ 
I Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead VOC 
Worker 6.4 x lO-' 3.0 X lO-4 2.8 X 10-4 3.1 x 10-' 5.0 X 10-9 2.6 X lO-' 
MCW 1.6 x 10-<> 2.6 x 10-' 9.6 X 10-(1 1.1 x 10-<> < 1.0 xlO-il 5.0 x 10-
MOl 1.4 x 10-' 2.5 X 10-4 8.8 x lO-' 9.8 X 10-(1 4.0 X 10-9 4.3 x 1 Q-<I 
NPA 1.9 x 10-' 3.1 X 10-4 l.l X 10-4 1.2 x 10-' 5.0 X lO-9 5.6 x 10-<> 
Table F.2.4.1-6. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at the Barnwell Plant. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead VOC 
Worker 1.5 x 10-' 6.5 X 10-' 6.4 x lO-) 7.1 X 10-(1 1.0 x 1(J9 6.2 x 10-<> 
MCW 1.9 x 10-(1 4.7 x IO-~ 1.3 X 10-' 1.5 x 1 ()-6 1.0 X 10-9 4.5 X 10-7 
MOl 5.9 x 10-6 1.4 X 10-4 4.0 x 10-' 4.5 x 1()-6 2.0 x 10-'1 1.5 x 1 Q-<I 
NPA 5.9 x 10-6 1.4 X 10-4 4.0 x IO-s 4.5 X IO-<i 2.0 X 10-9 1.5 x 1 ()-6 
PM-lO 
4.lxlO-' 
3.5 X 10-' 
1.1 x 1()-6 
PM-IO 
2.7 X 10-' 
1.5 x lO-<> 
1.4 X lO-' 
1.7 x 10-' 
PM-lO 
5.9 x 1()-6 
2.3 X lO-6 
7.0 X lO-(I 
7.0 x 1()-6 
F.2.4 .2 Accidents. Spillage of chemicals with a subsequent fire was evaluated for the bounding 
accident involving toxic chemicals . The toxic chemicals that could be involved in the postulated 
accident are described in Section F.2 . 1. As was noted in that section, the extens ive listing of 
chemicals provided in Table F .2-1 would be applicable only at sites involved with fuel examination. 
The bounding accident evaluated for spent nuclear fuel storage in water pools at shipyard locations 
was a diesel fuel spill and fire. A diesel fuel fire involving spent nuclear fuel shipping containers 
aboard a ship at sea in Puget Sound was also evaluated . 
Evaluation of the chemical spill with fire accident (excluding diesel fuel) at the alternate s ites 
(INEL-ECF, Hanford, Savannah River , Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge, and the Barnwell Plant) where 
naval spent nuclear fuel examinations may be conducted is presented in Section F.2 .4.2 . 1. Evaluation 
of J iesel fuel fires at shipyards and aboard ship in Puget Sound, as well as at INEL-ECF, Hanford , 
Savannah River, Nevada Test Site, Barnwell Plant, and Oak Ridge, is described in Section F .2.4 .2 .2 . 
These accidents incorporate spillage of the entire amount of a given chemical accompanied by 
a fire . The initiating event might be, for example, an airplane crash or ship collision . Such an 
accident bounds simpler chemical spills , such as handling accidents involving limited or unit (see 
Table F .2-1 ) amounts of a chemical , wh ich were also considered . Consequently, only results for the 
fire accident are provided. The analyses utilize meteorological (see Section F.1.3 .S) and demographic 
parameters specific to the evaluated location. 
The toxic chemicals evaluated in the accident analyses would be used and stored in a number 
of different areas within the faci lity. Fuel oils , sulfuric acid , and sodium hydroxide would be 
expected to be located outside facility buildings in storage tanks . Other chemicals used for facility 
support and operation would likely be stored in a variety of locations within facility buildings such as 
tool rooms, laboratories, craft shops, equipment rooms, chemical mix ing areas, hot cells, and 
flammable cabinets . The probability of releasing all o r most of these chemicals in a s ingle accident 
such as an airplane crash would be quite low, less than 10" per year, as supported in Section F.3.S. 
However, the probability of releasing an individual or limited number of chemicals is expected to be 
greater than this level and include a cons ideration of storage locations, types, s izes, and numbers of 
containers , and types and frequencies of initiating events . For acc idents that could result in a toxic 
chemical release, a probability of 5 x 10" per year (Ganti and Krasner 1984) was cons idered to be a 
reasonable upper level. This level was based on the probabil ity that a structurally damaging industrial 
fire could occur. 
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F. 2 .4. 2. 1 Chemica' Spil/and Fire. 
F.2.4.2. 1. 1 Accident Description. An accident might occur which caused toxic 
chemicals to spill , dispersed powdered toxic chemicals, and accelerated the vaporization of the toxic 
chemicals with a subsequent fire . The airborne release resulting from the involvement of the entire 
available amount of the toxic chemicals was evaluated with respect to the on-site workers , MCW, 
NPA, and MOl. 
F.2.4.2. 1.2 Source Term. The toxic chemicals involved in this hypothetical accident are 
provided in Table F.2-1. The entire amount of the toxic chemical might be involved due to the 
catastrophic nature of this accident. 
F.2.4.2. 1.3 Conditions and Key Parameters. 
(I) Gases 
• 
• 
• 
• 
100% of the gas was released to the atmosphere. 
Release period was 10 minutes. 
Release was a point source. 
Deposition velocity was 0 . 1 centimeter per second . 
(2) Liquids 
(3) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
100% of the liquid was released to the atmosphere. 
The liquid was released inlo a pool of O. I-inch depth. 
The liquid was at its boiling point. 
The release period was the longer of the calculated evaporation time or 10 
minutes . 
Release area was equal to the pool area. 
Deposition veloc ity was 0 . 1 centimeter per second . 
Solids 
• 
• 
I % of the solid was dispersed into the atmosphere as PM- IO. 
Release period was 10 minutes. 
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(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
• Release was a point source. 
• Deposition velocity was 1.0 centiml!ter per seC(lnd . 
Specific Chemicals 
• 
• 
• 
CFC-12 could break down at elevated temperatures into hydrochloric acid 
(10%) and phosgene (I %) with the remaining (89%) released as CFC-12 . 
The hypothetical sulfuric acid spill would be contained by a berm r""ulting in a 
pool release area of 443.2 square feet . 
The hypothetical spill of sodium hydroxide was in the form of an aqueous 
solution and was contained by a berm resulting in a pool release area of 374 
square feet . A IO-minute perie<! was used for this release. and the sodium 
hydroxide was dispersed as a particulate. 
Meteorology 
• Wind speeds and atmospheric stability classifications used for the calculations 
were based on both 50% and 95 % meteorology (Section F. 1.3 .5) to estimate 
downwind concentrations . The 95% meteorology included atmospheric stability 
classes A through F and wind sp'eeds from 1.1 to 30 miles per hour. 
General 
• 
• 
• 
Standard rural terrain was used since this most closely resembles the sites being 
evaluated . 
Release was calculated to occur at ground level. 
No evacuation of downwind populations was included. in order to obtain maxi-
mum estimates of effects; therefore. exposures were not reduced to account for 
this actIon. 
• No credit was taken for buildir,g comainment or filtration. 
• Biological effects of exposure to each chemical were treated separately. This 
was done to account for a lack of a current methodology to evaluate the effects 
resulting fro m simultaneous mult iple chemical exposures. 
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• 
• 
To determine health impacts, the estimated concentrations were compared 
against the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) levels I, 2, and 3 
concentration limits or alternates. 
To determine the likelihood of developing cancer from exposure to hydrazine, a 
slope factor of 1.7 x 10' per mg/kg-<Jay obtained from IRIS (TOXnet 1993) was 
used . In addition, the exposure time was based on the duration of the release. 
and individual breathing rates and sizes were the same as those used in Section 
F.I for radiological accident evaluations using the Radiological Safety Analysis 
Computer Program (RSAC-5) (Wenzel 1993). 
F.2.4 .2. 1.4 Results. The airborne concentrations, averaged over the duration of each 
exposure, were calculated using EPlcode for the alternate locations for the worker, MCW, NPA , and 
MOl for both 50% and 95% meteorology. The airborne concentrations were compared to respective 
ERPG values where available. However, ERPG values have not been derived for some of the 
chemicals. The effects of these substances were assessed by comparison with other appropriate values 
for toxic effects as discussed in Section F.2.3 .3. 
Tables F.2.4.2-1 through -12 list the downwind concentrations at various locations and 
corresponding ERPG values (or equivalent if TL V -TWA and IDLH concentrations are available). 
Hydrochloric acid and phosgene. from decomposition of CFC-12, sulfuric acid. and sodium 
hydroxide dominate the toxic chemical effects for on-site personnel. Concentrations of these 
chemicals above ERPG-3 levels might result in life-threatening effects. However, in no case is an 
ERPG-3 level exceeded for any member of the general public except for Oak Ridge where sulfuric 
acid concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 level> under both 50% and 95% meteorological conditions 
and sodium hydroxide concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 levels under 95 % meteorological 
conditions. For the on-site workers . collocated workers , and any member of the general publ ic that 
could be exposed to toxic chemicals at levels above ERPG-3, it is expected that actual toxic chemical 
exposures would be much less due to the mit igative measures that would be impl emented (Section 
F.2. 4.3). 
Addi tional info rmation on the tox ic propert ies for the chemicals that dominate the tox ic effects 
is provided below. 
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Hydrochloric acid is a irritant to the respiratory tract, skin, eyes, and mucous membranes. 
More severe exposures result in pulmonary edema, and often laryngeal spasm. A concentration of 
53 mg/m3 causes irritation of the throat after short exposure. Concentrations of 75-150 mg/m3 are 
tolerable for 1 hour; concentrations of 1,500-3,000 mg/m3 are dangerous, even for brief exposures 
(fOXnet 1993). 
Phosgene, also known as carbonyl chloride, is a highly toxic, corrosive liquid with a low 
boiling point. It is toxic from intakes by inhalation, ingestion, and dermal absorption. Effects from 
exposure may include contact burns to the skin and eyes, shortness of breath, chest pain, severe 
pulmonary edema, and death. At low vapor concentrations, it smells like musty hay. At higher 
concentrations, it has a sharp and pungent odor. It is a severe irritant to the eyes and respiratory tract 
and can be fatal if inhaled, even for short durations and at low concentrations. Exposure to 12 
mg/cm3 can result in immediate irritation of the respiratory tract. 80 mg/m3 may cause lung injuries 
within 2 minutes; 100 mg/m3 for as little as 30 minutes is very dangerous; and 360 mg/m3 is rapidly 
fatal for exposures of 30 minutes or less (fOX net 1993). 
Sulruric acid mist can be strongly irritating to the skin, eyes, mucous membranes, and 
respiratory tract. Odor may be detected at concentrations of 1 mg/m3; irritating effects may occur at 
concentrations of 1.1 mg/m3. Inhalation of concentrations near 3 mg/m3 may cause constriction of the 
air passage and choking sensations. At higher concentrations and durations of exposure, inhalation 
can cause pulmonary edema, emphysema, and permanent changes in pulmonary function 
(fOXnet 1993). 
Sodium hydroxide dust can be irritating to the upper respiratory system. Irritating effects 
may occur at concentrations of 2 mg/m3. At higher concentrations and durations of exposure, 
inhalation can cause extreme irritation of the respiratory tract nd permanent changes in pulmonary 
function (fOXnet 1993). 
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Table F.2.4.2-1. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the INEL Expended Core Facility. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 50% METEOROLOOY 
EIIIy ..... Ioopropyl /i)drodIIoric SWfurie 
GIy<>oI H)dJu'" Ak<>boI 
-
CFC· 12 Acid 1'Il00...,. Acid ~ 
ERPG-I 127 ERPG-I 0.1l ERPG-I 98) ERPG-I I. ERfG.1 49jC) ERfG.1 • .$ ERfG.1 0 .• ERfG.1 2 ERPG-I 2 
ERfG.2 • ERfG.2 10 ERPG-2 29jO ERPG-2 1«1 ERfG.2 ~7~ ERPG-2 lO ERPG-2 0.8 ERPG-2 10 ERfG.2 • 
ERPG-) • ERPG·) 100 ERPG-) 29jCX) ERPG-) 100 ERfG.) ~7~ ERfG.J I~ EJlPG·) • . 0 ERPG-) lO ERfG.) • 
Worker 3300 49 890 38 400 45 4.5 2300 6.4 
MCW 2.3 1.6 x 10-2 0 .45 1.2 x 10-2 0 .12 1.3 x 10-2 1.3 x 10-1 1.4 9.3 x I~ 
MOl I.S 1.0 x 10-2 0.29 7.9 x 10-1 7.7 x 10-2 8.5 X 10-3 8.5 x I~ 0.86 5.9x I~ 
NPA 1.6 1.1 x 10-2 0.30 8.3 x 10-' 8.1 X 10-2 9.0 X 10-' 9 .0 x 10~ 0.91 5.9x I~ 
7' Table F.2.4.2-2. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the INEL Expended Core Facility. 
N 
VI 
< £. 
c: 
3 
~ 
Worker 
MCW 
MOl 
NPA 
EIIIy ..... 
GIy<>oI H)d,.. ... 
ERPG-I 127 ERPG· I 0 .1) 
ERPG·2 • ERPG·2 10 
ERPG·) • ERPG·) 100 
4400 58 
7.6 4.8 x 10-2 
3.6 2.3 x 10-2 
3 .6 2.3 x 10-2 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ - 95% METEOROLOOY 
IocpnJpyI H)dtoc!>Jori< SWfurie 
Alcohol 
-
CFC· 12 Acid 1'Il00...,. Acid 
EJlPG· 1 98) ERPG-I I' ERPG-I 49~ ERPG-I U ERPG-I 0 .• ERfG.1 2 
ERPG·2 29jO ERfG.2 1«1 ERPG·2 ~7~ ERPG-2 lO ERPG-2 0.8 ERPG-2 10 
ERPG·) 29jCX) ERPG-) 100 ERPG-) ~7~ ERfG.J I~ ERPG-) U ERfG.) lO 
2200 150 1600 180 18 2800 
2.6 8.3 x 10-2 0.80 8.9 x 10-2 8.9 X 10-3 3.9 
1.1 3.2 X 10-2 0.30 3.4 x 10-2 3.4 X 10-' 1.9 
1.1 3.2 x Io-J 0.30 3.4 x 10-2 3.4 X 10-3 1.9 
> 
"0 
"0 g *IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined. 
Q. 
>C . 
o 
~oo 
~ 
ERPG-I 2 
ERfG.2 • 
ERfG.) • 
7.7 
2.2 x 10-1 
8.8 x 10~ 
8.8x I~ 
SocIi .... 
It)druUdo 
ERfG.1 2 
ERfG.2 II 
ERfG.) ~ 
2300 
0.60 
0 .39 
0.39 
SocIi .... 
It)druUdo 
ERfG.1 2 
ERfG.2 II 
ERfG.) ~ 
2700 
1.5 
0 .58 
0 .58 
Table F.2.4.2-3. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Savannah River. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 50% METEOROLOOY 
ru.,. ..... Itopropyl Il)dtocbIori< ~ Sodhm 
Glycol Ifrdruino AIccboI Anmco!ia eFe· 12 A<C Pboo ..... A<C ~ II)odroUIo 
EJlPG.I 127 ERPG·I 0. 13 ERJ'G.I 983 ERJ'G.I 18 EJlPG.I 49j() ERJ'G.I 4.' EJlPG.I 0 .4 EJlPG.I 2 EJlPG.I 2 EJlPG.I 2 
EJlPG.2 • ERPG·2 10 ERJ'G.2 29jI) EJlPG.2 140 ERJ'G.2 247jO ERJ'G.2 jO EJlPG.2 0.8 EJlPG.2 10 EJlPG.2 • EJlPG.2 2j 
ERPG·) • ERPG·) 100 ERJ'G.) ~ ERJ'G.) 700 EJlPG.) 247jOO ERJ'G.) ljO ERJ'G.) 4.0 EJlPG.3 30 EJlPG.3 • EJlPG.3 2jO 
Worker 1500 19 370 14 150 16 1.6 1000 2.9 1200 
MCW J2 0.25 6.6 0 .19 1.9 0.21 2.1 x 10-2 20 3.6 X 10"-2 22 
MOl 1.3 8.7 X 10-3 0.24 6 .7 x 10-3 6.4 X 10-2 7.2 X 10-3 7.2 x I~ 0.88 7.2 x I~ 0.47 
NPA 1.3 8.7 x 10-) 0.24 6.7 x 10-3 6 .4 x 10-2 7.2 X 10-3 7.2x I~ 0.88 7.2x I~ 0.47 
7' Table F.2.4.2-4. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Savannah River. 
N 
0\ 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ - 95% METEOROLOOY 
Ethy ..... Itopropyl Il)dtocbIori< ~ Sodhm 
Glycol Ifrdruino AIccboI AImo1ia ere·12 A<C Pboo ..... A<C ~ II)odroUIo 
EJlPG-1 127 ERPG· I 0. 13 ERJ'G.I 983 ERJ'G.I 18 ERJ'G.I 49jO ERJ'G.I 4.S ERPG-I 0.4 ERJ'G.I 2 EJlPG.I 2 EJlPG.I 2 
ERJ'G.2 • ERPG-2 10 ERJ'G.2 29jI) ERJ'G.2 140 EJlPG. 2 247jO ERJ'G.2 30 ERPG·2 0.8 EJlPG.2 10 EJlPG.2 • EJlPG.2 2j 
ERJ'G.) • ERPG·3 100 ERPG·) ~ ERJ'G.) 700 ERJ'G.) 247jOO ERPG· ) IjO ERPG·) 4.0 EJlPG.) 30 EJlPG.l • EJlPG.) 2jO 
Worker 4400 58 2200 150 1600 180 18 2800 7.7 2700 
MCW 220 1.6 85 4.0 39 4.3 0.43 120 0.12 n 
MOl 4.9 3.0 x 10-2 1.6 4.7 x 10-2 0.44 4.9 x 10-2 4.9 x 10-3 2.5 1.3 x 10-3 0.85 
NPA 4.9 3.0 x 10-2 1.6 4.7 x 10-2 0.44 4.9 x 10-2 4.9 X 10-3 2.5 1.3 x 10-3 0 .85 
*IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined. 
,Lj0/ 
Table F.2.4.2-S. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Hanford. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ - 50% METEOROLOGY 
Eabylco< Ioq>ropyl If)dtodlJoric: Sulfuric 
GIya>I Il)odruibo AIooboI Ammoni.o CFC· 12 Acid Phoo_ Acid 
EIlPG· 1 117 EIlPG-1 0. 13 EltPG-1 983 EltPG-1 18 EltPG-1 ~ EJlPG-1 • ..s EltPG-1 0.' EJlPG-1 2 
ERPG-~ • EIIPG·2 10 EltPG-2 29SO EltPG·2 140 EJlPG.. 2 2.',., EIlPG-2 lO EIlPG-2 0.1 EJlPG-2 10 
EltPG-J • EltPG-) 100 EltPG-) 29SOO EltPG· ) m EIlPG-) 2A7~ EIlPG-) ISO EltPG-) ' .0 EIlPG-) lO 
Work~r 1500 19 370 14 150 16 1.6 1000 
MCW 46 0.36 9.6 0 .28 2.7 0.30 3.0 x 10-' 28 
MOl (New ECF)·· 0.73 5.1 x 10-) 8.1 X 10-' 3.9 X 10-1 3.8 X 10-' 4.2 X 10-) 4.2 X 10-4 0.44 
MOl (FMEF)··· 0.97 7.1 x 10-) 0 .19 5.4 x 10-3 5.2 x 10-' 5.8 X 10-) 5.8 X 10-4 0.96 
NPA 1.5 9.9 x 10-) 0 .29 7.9 x 10-3 7.6 X 10- ' 8.5 X 10-3 8.5 X 10-4 0.86 
'Tl 
N Table F.2.4.2-6. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Hanford. 
-.J 
-< 
2-
c:: 
3 
~ 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 95% METEOROLOGY 
Ethylene Ioq>ropyl If)dto<bIoric I Sulfuric 
Glyrol H)'CIruinc AkohoI Ammonio CFC· 12 Add PhooIC"D Acid 
EltPG-1 IZ7 ERPG·I 0.1) Eltpr~1 983 EIIPG-I 18 EIIPG· I 49SO EIIPG· I 4.S ERPG-I 0.' EltPG-1 2 
EIIPG·2 • ERPG·2 10 EIIPG-2 ::9SO ERPG·2 14() ERPG· 2 2A7SO EltPG-2 lO EltPG-2 0 .1 EltPG-2 10 
EltPG·) • EIIPG·) 100 EltPG-) 29~ EltPG·) m EltPG·) 2A7~ EltPG-) ISO EltPG·) ' .0 EJlPG-) lO 
Worker 4400 58 2200 150 1600 180 18 2800 
MCW 150 l.l 55 2.5 24 2.7 0.27 78 
MOl (New ECF)·· 2.1 \.3 x 10-' 0.47 1.3 x 10-2 0 .13 1.4 x 10-2 1.4 x 10-3 1.1 
MOl (FMEF)··· 5.5 3.5 x 10-' 1.8 5.4 x 10-' 0 .51 5.7 x 10-' 5.7 x 10-3 2.8 
NPA 5.3 3.3 x 10-2 1.7 5.1 x 10-' 0 .48 5.4 x 10-' 5.4 X 10-3 2.7 
• IDLH conc.!ntrations are not available; therefore, corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined. 
··MOI (New ECF) appJies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford Site. 
···MOI (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the Fuels and Mat.erials Examination Facility. 
-~ If)dtoljde 
EJlPG-1 2 EJlPG-1 2 
EltPG-2 • EJlPG-2 2j 
EJtPG·) • EIlf'G.J 2$0 
2.9 1200 
4.1 x 10-' 26 
2.3 x 10-' 0.16 
7.8 x 10-' 0.51 
7.3 x 10-' 0.49 
-~ If)dtoljde 
EJlPG-1 2 EltPG-1 2 
EltPG-2 • EJlPG-2 2j 
EJlPG-) • EIlf'G.) 2$0 
7.7 2700 
7.6 x 10-' 45 
4.1 x 10-' 0.28 
1.5 x 10-1 0.99 
1.4 x 10-3 C1 .94 
< £. 
c 
3 
(I> 
> 
"0 
"0 
(I> 
~ 
Co ;< . 
o 
." , 
N 
00 
Table F.2.4.2-7. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the Nevada Test Site. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 50% METEOROLOOY 
EII". ..... ~I H)d.-Joric s..Ifuric 
Glycol H,dtuino AIoohoI ............ CfC·12 Acid Pboo_ Acid 
EIlPG· 1 127 EJlJIG.I 0 .1l EJlJIG.I 98) EIlPG-1 18 EJlJIG.I 49j() EJlJIG.I 4 . .1 EIlPG-1 0 .4 EJlJIG.I 2 
EIlPG·2 • EIlPG-2 10 EJlJIG. 2 29.!0 EJlJIG.2 1«1 EIlPG-2 2A7.!O EIlPG-2 )0 EIlPG-2 0 .8 EJlJIG.2 10 
EIlPG-) • EIIPG·) 100 r UG-) 29.!00 EIIPG·) 100 EIIPG-) 2A7.!OO EIIPG-) I.!O EIlPG· ) 4.0 EIIPG-) )0 
Worker 530 6 .8 130 5.1 53 5.9 0.59 820 
MCW 0.22 I.S x 10-' 4.1 x 10--' 1.1 x 10-' 1.1 x 10--' 1.2 x 10-' 1.2 x 10-' 0 .12 
MOl 0.74 5.4 x 10-' 0.14 4.0 x 10-' 3.8 x 10" 4.4 X 10-' 4.4 x 10~ 0.97 
Table F.2.4.2-S. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the Nevada Test Site . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 95% METEOROLOOY 
Ell".1c .... bopnJpy l 1I)d.-Joric s..Ifuric 
Glycol 1I)d ..... ;". AIoohoI 
"""""""' 
Cf<:·12 Arid Phoo""", Acid 
Ek PG· I 127 EIIPG-I 0 .1) EIlPG· I 98) EIIPG-I 18 ERPG·I 49.!O EIlPG· I 4..! EIlPG· I 0.4 EJlJIG.I 2 
EIl PG·2 • EJlPG-2 10 EIlPG·2 29.!O EIIPG-2 1«1 EIIPG·2 ZA7.!O EJlPG·2 )0 EIlPG·2 0.1 EJlJIG.2 10 
EIIPG·) • ERPG-) 100 EIIPG·) 29.!OO EIIPG·) 100 EIIPG·) 2A7.!OO EIlPG·) I.!O ERPG·) 4.0 EJlJIG.) )0 
Worker 4400 58 2200 150 1600 180 18 2800 
MCW 5.9 3.7 x 10-2 1.9 5.8 x 10" 0.55 6 .2 x 10"' 6.2 x 10-' 3.0 
MOl 7.3 4.6 x 10--' 2.5 7.8 x 10" 0.76 8.4 x 10"' 8.4 x 10-' 3.8 
·IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be detennined. 
Sodi.." 
~ H~ 
EJlJIG.I 2 EJlJIG.I 2 
EJlJIG.2 • EIlPG·2 2.! 
EIIPG-) • EIlPG·) 2.!0 
1.2 490 
2.1 x 10-' 0.14 
7.0 x 10-' 0 .46 
! Sodi.." 
~ Il)draUclo 
EIIPG· ! 2 ERPG-I 2 
EJlJIG.2 • EJlJIG.2 2.! 
EJlJIG.) • ERPG-) 2.!0 
7.7 2700 
1.6 x 10-' 1.1 
2.2 x 10-' 1.4 
Table F.2.4.2-9. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Oak Ridge. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/ml - 50% METEOROLOOY 
EdIy ..... Iocptopyl II)'dtocbIori< Sulfuric 
Glycol 1I)od, AIooboI AImIaaio CfC· 12 Arid 
"""'-
Arid 
ERPG· I 121 EJlPG.1 0.1) ERPG· I 913 EJlPG.1 II EJlPG.1 ~ EJlPG.1 4..S EJlPG.1 0 .4 EJlPG.1 1 
ERJlG.l • EJlPG.l 10 EJlPG.l :mel EJlPG.2 14) ERPG·2 lA750 ERPG·l 30 EJlPG.2 0 .1 EJlPG.l 10 
ERPG·) • EJlPG.) 100 ERJIG.) :moo EJlPG.) "XXI ERJIG.) lA 7500 ERJIG.) 150 ERJIG.) • . 0 ERJIG.) 30 
Worker 3300 49 890 38 400 45 4.5 2300 
MCW 34 0.27 7.1 0.21 2.0 0.22 2.2 lC 10-' 21 
MOl 310 2.8 68 2.1 21 2.4 0.24 190 
NPA 440 4.3 100 3.2 32 3.7 0.37 280 
7' Table F.2.4.2-10. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Oak Ridge. 
N 
~ 
< 2-
c: 
3 
n> 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 95% METEOROLOOY 
Ethy ..... Iocptopyl H)<ItoehIoric Sulfuric 
Glycol II)odrulno AIocboI Ammonia CFC· I~ Arid """' ..... Ad:! ERJlG. I 121 ERJlG.I 0.1) ERJlG.I 913 ERJIG. . I. ERPG· I ~ ERJlG.I .., ERJlG.I 0 .• ERJlG.I 1 
ERJlG.2 • ERJlG.2 10 ERJlG.2 :mel ERJlG.2 14) ERJlG.l lA750 ERJlG.2 30 ERJlG.2 0.1 ERJlG.2 10 
ERPG·] • ERPG·) 100 ERPG·) :moo ERPG·) "XXI ERJIG.) lA7500 ERPG·) 150 ERJIG.' • 0 EIIJ1G.) 30 
Worker 4400 58 2200 150 1600 180 18 2800 
MCW 110 0 .75 41 1.9 18 2.0 0.20 58 
MOl 930 11 .4 400 22 220 24 2.4 S40 
, 
NPA 1300 13 S90 33 340 38 3 .8 790 
·IDLH concentration are not available; therefore, corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined. 
SaIiI.m 
~ II)odraUIo 
ERJIG.I 1 ERJIG.I 1 
ERJIG.1 • ERJIG.1 1$ 
ERJIG.) • ERJIG.) 250 
6 .4 2300 
3.0 l( 10-' 19 
0.38 210 
0.60 310 
Sodhan 
~ II)odraUIo 
ERJIG.I 2 ERPG· I 2 
EJlPG.2 • ERJIG.2 1$ 
ERJIG.) • EJlPG.) 250 
7.7 2700 
S.4 x 10-' 32 
0.82 410 
1.3 630 
<: 
o 
C 
3 
(I> 
> 
"0 
"0 
(I> 
::I Q. )C . 
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Table F.2.4.2-11. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the Barnwell Plant. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m3 - 50% METEOROLOGY 
EdI)' ..... Ioapropyl If)droo:hloric SuIf\Iric 
GIywI If)dtuino AIoohoI ........... eFe·12 Arid Pboo ..... Arid 
EItJ'G. I I V E1tPG-1 0.13 EItJ'G. I 913 E1tPG-1 II EltJ'G.I ~ EItJ'G.! 4.5 EltJ'G.I 0.4 EltJ'G.I 2 
E1tPG-2 • E1tPG-2 10 EltPG-2 ~ E1tPG-2 1«1 EltJ'G.2 24730 EltJ'G.2 1O EltJ'G.2 0.8 EltJ'G.2 10 
EItJ'G.) • E1tPG-) 100 EltJ'G.3 29lOO E1tPG-) 1Q) E1tPG-) 247D E1tPG-3 130 EItJ'G.) 4.0 EItJ'G.) 1O 
Worker 1500 19 370 14 150 16 1.6 1000 
MCW 0 .89 6.4 x 10-' 0. 17 4.9 x 10-3 4.6 x 10-2 5.2 x 10-' 5.2 x 10-' 0.83 
1./01 6.1 4.3 x 10-2 1.2 3.4 X 10-1 0.32 3.6 x 10-2 3.6 x 10-1 4.9 
NPA 6.1 4.3 x 10-2 1.2 3.4 x 10- 2 0.32 3.6 x 10-1 3.6 x 10-1 4.9 
71 Table F.2.4.2-12. Summary of chemical concentrations for ch4!mical spill and fire at the Barnwell Plant. 
IV 
IV 
o 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 95% METEOROLOGY 
EdI)' ..... Ioapropyl H)'CItoehIotk SUlf1aok 
GIywI Il)'CInuino Aklohol AmmonIa ere· 12 Arid 
"""'Ii<"" Arid 
EltPG· 1 IV E1tPG-1 0.1) r RPG-1 98) E1tPG-1 II E1tPG· 1 4930 EltPG-1 4.5 EltJ'G.I 0.4 ERPG· I 2 
E1tPG·l • EIIPG-2 10 ERPG·l 2930 EIIPG·l 1«1 E1tPG·2 24730 E1tPG·2 1O EltJ'G.2 0.1 EIIPG·2 10 
E1tPG·) • EIIPG·) 100 ERPG·) 29D E1tPG·) 1Q) UlPG·) 247D E1tPG-) 130 E1tPG-) 4.0 ERPG·) 1O 
Worker 4400 58 2200 150 1600 180 18 2800 
MCW 11 6.4 X 10-2 3.5 0 . 13 1.3 0 .14 1.4 x 10-2 5.4 
MOl 28 0.18 10 0.41 3.9 0 .44 4.4 x 10-1 15 
NPA 28 0. 18 10 0 .41 3.9 0.44 4.4 x 10-1 15 
·IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be detennined. 
l..J05 
Sodnm 
~ If)dnaido 
EltJ'G.I 2 EltJ'G.I 2 
EltlG-2 • EltPG-2 25 
EItIG-) • EltPG-) 230 
2.9 1200 
9.0 x 10-' 0.59 
4.9 x 10-' 3.2 
4.9 x 10-1 3.2 
Sodnm 
• .,. ,+=nco If)dnaido 
EltlG-I 2 EltJ'G.I 2 
EltJ'G.2 • EltJ'G.2 25 
EItJ'G.) • ERPG-) 230 
7.1 2700 
3.2 x 10-1 2 .0 
1.1 x 10-2 6.9 
1.1 x 10-2 6.9 
In addition to comparing the airborne concentrations to their respective ERPG or other 
appropriate values, each substance was evaluated to determine if it has the potential for future 
carcinogenic health impacts. It was determined that exposure to hydrazine could result in an 
increased likelihood for developing cancer. Tables F.2 .4.2-13 and F.2 .4.2-14 provide the future 
potential likelihood for developing cancer from exposure to hydrazine for the worker, MCW, and 
MOl at the alternate locations under 50% and 95% meteorological conditions, respectively. 
Table F .2.4.2-13. Future potential likelihood for developing cancer from hydrazine -
50% meteorology . 
INEL Nevada 
Expended Savannah Test Oak 
Core Facility River Hanford" Site Ridge 
Worker 9.3 x 10" 3 .6 x 10" 3.6 x 10" 1.3 x 10" 9.3 x 10" 
MCW 3.0 x 10" 4.8 x 10" 6 .8 x 10" 2.8 x 10" 5. 1 x 10" 
MOl 1.5 x 10" 1.3 x 10" 7.6 x 10" 8.1 x 10" 4.2 x 10" 
Table F.2.4.2-14. Future potential likelihood for developing cancer from hydrazine -
95 % meteorology. 
INEL Nevada 
Expended Savannah Test Oak 
Core Facility River Hanford" Site Ridge 
Worker 3.8 x 10" 3.8 x 10~ 3.8 x 10~ 3.8 x 10" 3.8 x 10~ 
MCW 2.0 X 10" 6.7 x 10" 4.6 x 10" 1.6 X 10" 3 .2 x 10" 
MOl 7.8 x 10" 1.0 x 10" 4.4 x 10" 1.6 x 10" 2.9 x 10" 
Barnwell 
Plant 
3.6 x 10" 
1.2 x 10" 
6 .4 x 10" 
Barnwell 
Plant 
3.8 x 10~ 
2.7 X 10" 
6 .1 X 10" 
• MOl shown applies to new ECF if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford 
Site. A future potential carcinogenic risk of 1.1 x 10" (50% meteorology) and 1.2 x 10" (95% 
meteorology) applies to a spent fuel facility constructed at the Fuels and Materials Examination 
Facility. 
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F.2.4.2.2 Fire Involving Diesel Fuel. 
F.2.4.2.2.7 Accident Description. A catastrophic failure of the diesel fuel storage tank 
facility was postulated to occur. This could result in the spilling of the entire quantity of diesel fuel 
and a subsequent fire. The airborne release of toxic chemicals resulting from the fire was evaluated 
with respect to the on-site workers, MCW , NPA, and MOl as applicable for the accident site. 
F.2.4.2.2.2 Source Term. The material involved in this accident was diesel fuel with the 
fire generating the following toxic chemicals due to combustion: 
• Carbon monoxide 
• Oxides of nitrogen (90% nitric oxide and 10% nitrogen dioxide) 
• Lead 
• Sulfur dioxide. 
F.2.4.2.2.3 Conditions and Key Parameters. 
• For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Pl ant , the diesel fuel was stored in bulk 
storage tanks . 
• For shipyards, the diesel fuel was stored in a portable diesel power unit . 
• For the ship accident, the diesel fuel was stored in large tanks adjacent to the hold . 
• For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Plant , 1950 gallons of diesel fuel could be 
spilled. 
• For shipyards, 3 15 gallons of diesel fuel could be spilled. 
• For the ship accident, 121,000 gallons of diesel fuel could be spilled . 
• For all facilities, the entire quantity of diesel fuel was spilled and ignited in open air . 
• For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Plant , the spill area was 26 1 square feet. 
• For shipyards, the spill area was 66 square feet. 
• For the ship accident , the sp ill area used was 4812 square feet. 
• For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Plant, the entire amount of diesel fu el was 
consumed by the fire over a 2-hour period. 
• For shipyards, the entire amount of diesel fuel was consumed by the fire over a I-hour 
period. 
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• For the ship accident, the entire amount of diesel fuel was consumed by the fire over a 
6-hour period . 
• For all facilities, the releases per gallon of fuel burned were as follows : 
Carbon monoxide = 0.34 pound 
Oxides of nitrogen = 1.58 pounds 
Lead = 4.2 x 10" pound 
Sulfur dioxide = O. \05 pound. 
• For alternate DOE sites, the Barnwell Plant, and shipyards, the airborne release of toxic 
chemicals occurred at ground level. 
• For the ship accident, the airborne release of toxic chemicals occurred at 48 feet above 
the sea (i.e., at the middle of the flame height above the cargo hatch) for evaluation of 
land-based exposures. For shipboard exposures, a release height of zero was used. 
• For all facilities, standard rural terrain was used and building wake effects were not 
considered . 
• For all facilities, wind speeds and atmospheric stability classifications were based on 
both 50% and 95% meteorology (Section F. I.3 .5). 
• For all facilities, no evacuation of downwind populations occurred and the biological 
effects of chemical exposure act uniquely and do not affect the individual in a cumulative 
way. 
• For all facilities, to determine the health impacts, the estimated concentrations were 
compared against the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) levels I, 2, and 
3 concentrat ion limits or alternates. 
F.2.4 .2.2 .4 Results. The ai rborne concentrations. averaged over the duration of each 
exposure, were calculated using EPlcode for the combustion products resulting from the fire for the 
worker. MCW. NPA. and MOl (as applicable fo r the accident site) under both 50% and 95% 
meteorology. The airborne concentrations were compared 10 respective ERPG values where 
available. However. ERPG values have not been derived for some of the constituents listed . The 
effects of these constituents were assessed by comparison with other appropriate values for toxic 
effects as discussed in Section F .2.3.3. 
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Tables F .2 .4.2-15 through -38 list the downwind concentrations at various locations and 
corresponding ERPG (or equivalent) values. Results for the diesel fuel fire at fuel examination sites 
indicate that the toxic chemical concentrations for sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen may exceed 
ERPG-3 levels for the worker. At Savannah River and Hanford , the MCW also may be exposed to a 
nitric oxide concentration exceeding ERPG-3 levels under 95% meteorological conditions. The NPA 
and MOl exposures at all the fuel examination sites would be expected to be below ERPG-2 levels 
except for Oak Ridge. At this location under 95% meteorological conditions, the NPA and MOl may 
be exposed to concentrations of sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen that exceed ERPG-3 and 
concentrations of carbon monoxide that exceed ERPG-2. Under 50% meteorological conditions at 
Oak Ridge, the NPA and MOl may be exposed to concentrations of nitric oxide that exceed ERPG-3 
and concentrations of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide that exceed ERPG-2 . Results for the diesel 
fuel fire at shipyards show that for the worker and NPA categories , the toxic chemical concentrations 
for sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen may exceed ERPG-3 levels . For the MOl , however . these 
concentrations are expected to be less than the ERPG-3 levels with the exception that under 95% 
meteorological conditions the ERPG-3 level for nitric oxide may be exceeded at the Norfolk shipyard. 
Results for the ship diesel fuel fire show that sh ipboard (worker) ,'oncentrations of carbon monoxide, 
sulfur dioxide, and oxides of nitrogen may ex~eed ERPG-3 levels, but the shore (MOl) concentrations 
are expected to be less than ERPG-3 levels. For the individuals on board the ship that might be 
exposed to toxic chemicals at levels above ERPG-3. it is expected that actual toxic chemical exposures 
would be much less due to the mitigative measures that would be implemented (Sect ion F .2.4.3). 
Additional information on the toxic properties for the chemicals that dominate the toxic effects 
is provided below. 
Sulfur dioxide is a colorless gas with a pungent odor. It is a poison. and it is also an eye. 
skin. and mucous membrane irritant. It chiefl y affects the upper respiratory tract and bronchi and at 
higher concentrations, sulfur dioxide causes respiratory paralysis (TOXnet 1993) . 
Nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide occur together in dynamic equilibrium. Nitric oxide is a 
colorless gas. and nitrogen dioxide is a reddish brown gas. Both chemicals are eye. skin. and mucous 
membrane irritants and primaril y affect the respiratory system. Exposure to 47 mg/m' of nitrogen 
dioxide can cause respiratory irritat ion and chest pain. 93 mg/m' can cause lung injur ies. and 
187 mg/m' can be fatal (TOXnet 1993). 
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In addition to comparing the airborne concentrations to their respective ERPG or other 
appropriate values, each substance was evaluated to determine if it has the potential for future 
carcinogenic impacts. It was determined that exposure to lead could result in an increased likelihood 
for developing cancer. However, sufficient information to quantify this likelihood was not avai lable 
in IRIS. Therefore, the concentrations of lead result ing from the accident were compared against the 
NAAQS value for lead. For the lead concentrations provided in Tables F.2.4.2-15 through 
F .2.4.2-38, no NAAQS is exceeded. 
F.2.4.3 Miti~tive Me.su,es fo, Toxic Chemic.'s. Mitigative measures for potential releases of 
toxic materials involve administrative controls for personnel protection and emergency response. For 
personnel protection, controls involve safety review commillees for planned activities that establish 
requirements , safe work permits, and procedures for required clothing (rubber boots, gloves, face 
shields, eye protection) that can mitigate the effects of potential releases of toxic materials. 
Procedures may also require provisions for prestationing mitigative devices such as eyewash stations 
and emergency showers. All of the alternate facil ities being evaluated employ emergency response 
programs to mitigate impacts of potential toxic chemical accidents to workers and the public. 
Emergency planning. emergency preparedness, and emergency response programs are in place and 
involve established resources such as warning communications, fire departments , and emergency 
command centers. The cargo ships used for naval spent nuclear fuel have smoke detection and fire 
fighting equipment on board. They also have fire suppression systems in their holds which use inert 
gas to smother fireS. In addition, less freely available oxygen in the ship's cargo hold would tend to 
slow the combustion rate of the diesel fuel. Port facilities would also have available additional fire 
fighting equipment, p\lblic warning systems, and emergency response programs. 
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Table F.2.4.2-1S. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at the INEL 
Expended Core Facility. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 501\\ METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide lad 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 480 ISO 2000 220 3.9 x 10-' 
MCW 0.25 7.7 x 10-' 1.0 0.11 9.5 x 10-' 
MOl 0.15 4.8 x 10-' 0.65 7.3 x 10-' 6.1 x 10-' 
NPA 0.16 5.0 x 10-' 0.69 7.7 x 10-' 6. 1 x 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-16. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at the INEL 
Expended Core Facility. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 951\\ METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lud 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 1200 370 5100 560 4.6 x 10-' 
MCW 1.45 0.45 6.1 0.68 3.0 x 10-' 
MOl 0.66 0.20 2.7 0.30 4.7 x 10-' 
NPA 0.66 0.20 2.7 0.30 4.7 x 10-' 
• ERPG-2 level nol assigned since one-Ienlh the IDLH level would be less Ihan the ERPG- I level. 
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Tab~ F.l.4.2-17. Summary of chemical concenlralions for fire involving diesel fuel al 
Savannah River. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' ·50% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG·I 29 ERPG·I 0.79 ERPG·I 31 ERPG· I 5.6 ERPG- I 0_15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 200 62 850 94 2.0 • 10-' 
Mew 3.6 1.1 15 1.7 3.6 • 10-' 
MOl 0. 13 4.1 x 10-1 0.55 6.1. 10-' 7.5. 10-' 
NPA 0.13 4. 1 • 10-' 0.55 6. 1 • 10-' 7.5 x 10-' 
Tab~ F.2.4.2-1S. Summary of chemical concenlralions for fire involving diesel fuel al 
Savannah River. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' ·95% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dio}l;ide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG- I 0.79 ERPG- I 31 ERPG- I 5.6 ERPG- I 0.15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 1200 370 5100 560 4.6. 10-' 
Mew 49 15 200 23 6.9 • 10-' 
MOl 0.90 0 .28 3.8 0 .42 1.1 x 10-' 
NPA 0.90 0.28 3.8 0.42 1.1 • 10-' 
• ERPO-2 level DOt as.siped since ooe-tenth the IDLH level wou ld be less than the ERPG-J level. 
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Table F.2.4.2-19. Summary of r.hemical concenlralions for fire involving diesel fuel al 
Hanford . 
CHEM ICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' - 50% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG- I 29 ERPG-I 0 .79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
1720 
Worker 200 62 840 94 2 .0. 10-' 
Mew 5.2 1.6 21 2.4 4. 1 • 10-' 
MOl (New ECF)" 8.3 • 10-' 2.4. 10-' 0.34 3.7.10-' 2.5 • 10-' 
MOl (FMEF)'" 0. 11 3.3 • 10-' 0.44 4.9. 10-' 8. I • 10-' 
NPA 0. 16 4.8 • 10-' 0.65 7.3. 10-' 7.6. 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-20. Summary of chemical concenlralions for fire involving diesel fuel al 
Hanford . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' - 95% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0.15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
1720 
Worker 1200 370 5100 560 4.6 • 10-' 
Mew 32 9.7 130 15 3.9. 10'" 
MOl (New ECF)" 0 .34 0. 10 1.4 0. 15 4.9. 10 .... 
MOl (FMEF)'" 1.0 0.32 4.3 0 .48 1.5 • 10-' 
NPA 0.78 0.24 3.2 0 .36 5.0 • 10-' 
• ERPG-2 level not assigned since one-Ienth the IDLH level would be II:!SS than the ERPG-I lev,cl. 
MOl (New ECF) applies if spent fuel facility IS constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanfo,rd ~Ile . . . 
MOl (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed al the Fuels and Materials E:umIRatlon FaCIlity. 
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Table F.2.4.2-21. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involv ing diesel fuel at the 
Nevada Test Site. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 50% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG·I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG·t 0. t5 
ERPG·2 172 ERPG·2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG·2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG·3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG·3 123 ERPG·3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 73 22 300 34 8.3 x 10-' 
Mew 2.3 x 10-' 7.0 x 10-' 9.6 x 10-' I.I x 10-' 2.2 x 10-' 
MOl 8.0 x 10-' 2.4 x 10-' 0.33 3.7 x 10-' 7.3 x 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-22. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at the 
Nevada Test Site. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' ·95% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Ni trogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG·! 29 ERPG-t 0.79 ERPG·I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG·2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG·3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG·3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 1200 370 5100 560 4.6 x 10-' 
Mew I.I 0.34 4.6 0.52 1.7 x 10-' 
MOl 1.4 0.43 5.9 0.65 2.7 x 10-' 
• ERPG·2 leve l not ass igned since one-tc:nth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG-I level. 
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Table F .2.4.2-23. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Oak Ridge. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 50% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG· I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG·2 7.9 ERPG·2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG·3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 480 150 2000 220 3.9 x 10-' 
MCW 3.8 1.2 16 1.8 3.0 x 10-' 
MOl 37 II 150 18 3.3 x 10-' 
NPA 54 17 230 26 5.0 x 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-24. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Oak Ridge. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtro' - 95% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG· I 0.79 ERPG·I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG· I 0.15 
ERPG·2 172 ERPG·2 7.9 ERPG·2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 1200 370 5100 560 4.6 x 10-' 
Mew 24 7.3 98 II 2.6 x 10-' 
MOl 230 70 950 110 S.) x 10-' 
NPA 340 100 1400 160 8.7 x 10-' 
• ERPG-2 level not assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG-I level . 
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Table F.2.4.2-2S. Summary of chemical concentrations ior fire involving diesel fuel at the 
Barnwell Plant. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m] - 50 % METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide l.ead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG·2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 200 62 B40 94 2.0 x 10-] 
MCW 9.5 • 10-' 2 .9 x 10-' 0.40 4.4 I !0'"2 9.3 x 10-' 
MOl 0.65 0.20 2.7 0.30 5.0 x 10-' 
NPA 0 .65 0.20 2.7 0 .30 5.0 x 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-26. Summary of chemical concentrat ions fo r fire involving diesel fuel at the 
Barnwell Plant . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 95 % METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide l.ead 
ERPG- I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG- I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9 .4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 1200 370 5100 560 4.6 x 10-' 
MCW 2.0 0.62 8.4 0 .94 5.4 x 10-' 
MOl 5.8 1.7 24 2.7 3.2 x 10-' 
S PA 5.S 1.7 24 2.7 3.2 • 10-' 
• ERPG-2 level not assigned since one- tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG-I level. 
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Table F .2.4.2-27. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m] - 50% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur I Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide l.ead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG- I 0.79 ' ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 44 13 ISO 20 4.8 x 10-' 
MOl 0.25 7.7 x 10-' 1.0 0. 11 2 .3 x 10-' 
i NPA 0.25 7.7 x 10-' 1.0 0.11 2.3 x 10-' 
Table F .2.4.2-2S. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel al 
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m] - 95% METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Ni:rogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide l.ead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG- I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG- I 0 .15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 1.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9 .4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 500 150 2100 230 1.9 x 10-] 
MOl 3.9 1.2 17 1.8 3.1.10-' 
NPA 3.9 1.2 17 1.8 3. 1 x 10'" 
• ERPG-2 level Dot assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG- I level. 
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Table F.2.4.2-29. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Norfolk Naval Sh ipyard . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' · 50 % METEOROLOGY 
Carbo. Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG· I 29 ERPG· I 0.79 ERPG· I 31 ERPG·I 5 .6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG·2 172 ERPG·2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG·2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG·3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 44 13 180 20 4.8 . II}-' 
MOl 4.3 1.3 18 2.0 4.7. 10-' 
NPA 4.3 1.3 18 2.0 4.7.10-' 
Table F .2.4.Z-30. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 95 % METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG' I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG· I S.6 ERPG-I O. IS 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG·2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 500 ISO 2100 230 1.9.10-' 
MOl 47 14 200 22 2.8. II}-' 
NPA 47 14 200 22 2.8. II}-' 
• ERPG·2 level not assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG-J level. 
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Table F.2 .4.2-31. Summary of chemical concentrat ions for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtro' - SO% METEOROLOGY 
Carbo. Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG·I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG· I 31 ERPG-I S.6 ERPG-I 0 .15 
ERPG·2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG·3 700 
Worker 200 61 830 92 1.6.10-' 
MOl 3.3 1.0 J3 J.5 1.7. 10-' 
NPA 12 3.6 49 5.4 1.4. II}-' 
Table F.2.4.2-32. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 95 % METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG-I 0 .79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG- I 5.6 ERPG· I 0 .15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG·3 94 ERPG·3 700 
Worker 500 ISO 2100 230 1.9. 10-' 
MOl II 3.4 47 5.3 1.4 • 10- ' 
NPA 500 ISO 2100 230 1.9. 10-' 
• ERPG-2 level not assigned since one-tenth the lOLH level would be less Ihan the ERPG-t leve l. 
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Table F .2.4.2-33. Summary of chemical concentralions for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - SO'll METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide lead 
ERPG- I 29 ERPG· I 0.79 ERPG- I 31 ERPG· I S.6 ERPG- I O. IS 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG·2 9.4 ERPG·2 70 
ERPG·3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG·3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG·3 700 
Worker 33 10 140 IS 3.6 x 10-' 
MOl 1.7 O.SI 7.0 0.78 1.7 x 10-' 
NPA 2.7 0.83 II 1.2 3.0 x 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-34. Summary of chemical concentralions for fire involvil.g diesel fuel at 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' ·95'11 METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Diox ide Oxide Dioxide lead 
ERPG-I 29 ERPG- I 0.79 ERPG- I 31 ERPG- I 5.6 ERPG- I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 500 ISO 2 100 230 1.9 x 10-' 
MOl 24 7.2 99 II 3.7 x 10-' 
NPA 73 22 300 34 1.7 x 10-' 
• ERPG·2 level not &5!iened 5ince one-tenth the IOLH level would be tess than the ERPG- I level. 
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Table F.2.4.2-35. Summary of chemical concentralions for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - SO'll METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide lead 
ERPG- I 29 ERPG-I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG-I 5.6 ERPG-I 0.15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
Worker 33 10 140 IS 3.6 x 10-' 
MOl I.S 0.47 6.3 0.71 1.5 x 10-' 
NPA 13 4.0 S4 6.1 1.4 x 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-36. Summary of chemical concenlrations for fire involving diesel fuel at 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 9S 'II METEOROLOGY 
Carbon Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG- I 29 ERPG- I 0.79 ERPG-I 31 ERPG- I 5.6 ERPG-I 0. 15 
ERPG-2 172 ERPG-2 7.9 ERPG-2 • ERPG-2 9.4 ERPG-2 70 
ERPG-3 1720 ERPG-3 39 ERPG-3 123 ERPG-3 94 ERPG-3 700 
W orker 500 ISO 2 100 230 1. 9 x 10-' 
MOl 21 6.5 89 9 .8 3.2 x 10 .... 
NPA 200 61 830 92 5.8. 10 .... 
• ERPG-2 level not assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG- l level. 
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Table F.2.4.2-37. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel aboard ship in 
Puget Sound . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' • 50jl; METEOROLOGY 
Carbo. Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG· I 29 ERPG·I 0.79 ERPG·I 31 ERPG· I 5.6 ERPG· I 0.15 
ERPG·2 172 ERPG·2 7.9 ERPG·2 • ERPG·2 9 .4 ERPG·2 70 
ERPG·3 1720 ERPG·3 39 ERPG·3 123 ERPG·3 94 ERPG·3 700 
Worker 900 280 3800 420 9.9 x 10-' 
MOl 4.0 1.2 17 1.9 4. 1 x 10-' 
Table F.2.4.2-38. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving d iesel fuel aboard ship in 
Puget Sound . 
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm'· 95jl; METEOROLOGY 
Carbo. Sulfur Nitric Nitrogen 
Monoxide Dioxide Oxide Dioxide Lead 
ERPG·I 29 ERPG· I 0.79 ERPG· I 31 ERPG·I 5.6 ERPG·I 0.15 
ERPG·2 172 ERPG·2 7.9 ERPG·2 • ERPG·2 9.4 ERPG·2 70 
ERPG·3 1720 ERPG·3 39 ERPG·3 123 ERPG·3 94 ERPG·3 700 
Worker 9900 3100 41000 4600 3.8 x 10-' 
MOl 28 8.8 120 13 1.7 x 10-' 
• ERPG-2 level not assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than Ihe ERPG-l level. 
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F.3 AIRCRAFT CRASH PROBABILITIES 
F.3.1 Introduction 
The probability of an airplane crashing into a fuel storage area or a fuel examination facility 
at the various alternate site locations is presented in this section. An airplane crash into these regions 
is of concern since it might result in the release of corrosion products from the stored fuel or the 
release of radioactive fission products from the fuel. The method outlined in "A Methodology for 
Calculation of the Probability of Crash of an Aircraft into Structures in Weapon Storage Areas" 
(Sandia 1983) has been used to predict the crash probabilities for this analysis. This calculat ional 
methodology takes into consideration the crash probabilities associated with landing and takeoff 
operations at nearby airports and crashes during in· flight operations. 
The aircraft crash probability analysis presented herein is based on the examination of large 
civilian aircraft and military aircraft crossing the space within a 10·mile rad ius of each site. The 
crash probability of general aviation aircraft is not included in this assessment since aircraft of this 
type generally do not possess sufficient mass or attain sufficiently high velocities to produce a serious 
radiological threat in the event that they crash into a fuel storage area or a fuel examination fac il ity. 
Further, the crash probability contribution due to air travel beyond 10 miles was determined to be 
very small based on the models and conditions used in this analysis, and therefore has been omitted . 
F.3,2 Methodology 
The Sandia report provides the methodology which has been used for this assessment (Sandia 
1983). In this report, the following expressions are given for calculating the crash probability 
associated with takeoff and landing operations at a given airport runway, and in· flight operations 
along a given airway : 
Volume I , Appendix 0 F·238 
Pit = L Nk • Pni! • A • c(if) • e · j dQ j/l(.l.iO 
where: subscript "to" refers to airport takeoff operations 
subscript "I" refers to airport land ing operations 
subscript "if" refers to in-flight operations 
Ni • the number of runway operat ions per year 
Nt • the number of in-flight operations per year 
Pn • the crash probability per operation given in Table F.3-1 
Xi • the perpendicular distance from the centerline of the runway to the target in miles 
x~ • the perpendicular distance from the airway to the target in miles 
Yi • the perpendicular distance from the end of the runway to the target in miles 
c(a) • crash density constant given in Table F.3-2 
c(if) • crash density constant given in Table F.3-3 
8(x,a) • crash density constant given in Table F.3-2 
8(y,a) • crash density constant given in Table F.3-2 
8(x,if) • crash densi ty constant given in Table F.3-3 
A • effective crash area in square mi les. 
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Table F ,3-1. Crash parameter Pn . 
Operation Military High Performance 
to 
if 
Table F .3-2, Crash density constants. 
1.6 x 10-" 
3. 1 x 10-" 
3.9 x 10"/mile 
Military High Performance 
Zone (I) Operation 
c(a) 8(x,a) 8(y ,a) 
I to 0.043 3.0 3.0 
I 0. 11 1.0 3.0 
II to 0 -- -
I 0.006 1.0 3.0 
(1) Refer to Figure F.3·1 for crash zones. 
Table F,3-3, Crash dens ity constants. 
Military High Perfo rmance 
Operation 
c(if) I 8(x,if) 
if 0.5 I 1.0 
Volume I, Append ix 0 
Large Civilian and Military 
0 .6 x 10-" 
2.3 x 10" 
0.5 x to-'/mile 
Large Civilian and Military 
c(a) 8(x ,a) 8(y,a) 
0.28 0 .7 1.4 
0.28 0.7 1.4 
0 -- - -
0.014 0.7 1.4 
Large Civil ian and Military 
c(if) I 8(x ,if) 
0.8 I 0.63 
-2 
I 
I 
figure F.3-l. Crash lones. 
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Using these relationships, the crash probability for takeoff, landing, and in-flight operations is 
the product of the number of operations per year, times the crash probability per operat ion per year, 
times the effective crash area per square mile, times the crash probability density per square statute 
mile. To determine the crash probability associated with a given site requires the repeated application 
of these relationships for each airport runway and for each airway . These individual crash compo-
nents are then summed to arrive at a total overall crash probability for a site. 
In the Sandia report, the effective crash area is identified as the sum of the effective skid area 
of the plane, the effect ive plan view associated w ith the target, and the effective shadow area of the 
crash (Sandia 1983). The following expression relates these terms and is val id for crash anitude 
angles greater than zero. If the crash anitude angle is zero, an airplane would be flying along parallel 
to the ground at an alt itude equal to or greater than the heig t of the target; therefo re, the airplane 
would clear the object and there would be no crash. 
A = (L + A. ) • (W + S, + H • cot ~) 
where: L target length dimension 
W target width dimension 
H target height 
A. aircraft wingspan 
~ crash attitude angle 
s,. . aircraft skid distance . 
F.3.3 Site Specific Information 
The existence and location of airports and .. rways with in 10 statute miles of a site have been 
obuined from Sectional Aeronaut ical Maps published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). and from detai led site specific maps which ident ify nearby airport~ 
(NOAA 1993a; NOAA 1993b; NOAA 1993c; NOAA 1993d; NOAA 1993e; NOAA 1993f; 
NOAA 1993g; USGS 1983a; USGS 1983b). These same sources of information were also used to 
obtain the disUnces from airport runways and airways to the si tes of interest . Information regarding 
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ai r traffic along airways within this region was obtained from the Federal Aviation Administrat ion 
(FAA). Airplane holding patterns and approach and departure routes that were identified by the FAA 
were converted into equivalent airways for th is analys is. Information regarding the number of takeoff 
and landing operations at each airport runway was obtained from the cognizant airport officials (i.e .• 
airport manager or base commander). or from the FAA. Tables F.34 and F .3-5 summarize the 
airport and airway traffic information that was obtained . 
Table F 3-4 Airport landings and takeoffs per site location per year. 
Sile Location Airport Large Civilian Aircraft Large Mmlary Aircraft Military High 
Performance Aircraft 
No. No. No. No. No. 
Landings Takeoffs Landings Takeoffs Landings 
Barnwell Plant Barnwell 0 0 0 0 0 
County 
Hanford 200 Area None 
400 Area Richland 0 0 0 0 0 
County 
lNEL 156 150 0 0 0 
Kesrelring Saratoga 0 0 0 0 0 
County 
Nevada Test Site None 
No rfolk Norfolk 21200 21200 0 0 0 
Inti 
Chambers 850 850 6600 6600 11100 
Oak Ridge None 
Pearl Harbor Honolulu 101300 101300 5750 5750 8650 
Inti / 
H ickam 
Air Force 
Base 
Barbers 0 0 20500 20500 856 
Poinl NAS 
Ford 0 0 0 0 0 
Island 
Portsmouth Pease Inl1 16400'll 16400" 2450" 2450'" 2450'" 
l ittle· 0 0 0 0 0 
brook 
Puget Sound Bremerton 4'·' 4,01 4'·' 4,41 .« 
Natl 
Ape:< 0 0 0 0 0 
Port 0 0 0 0 0 
Orchard 
Savannah River None 
," FAA lesllng or new commeraal alrcrart at NOAA lower. 
(2) SpUI between aircran types is estimated to be equal. Precise breakdown nOI rumishcd by airport . 
In Operations based on tolal civilian aircra rt. Breakdown o r only large aircrart not rumished by airport. 
If) Operat ions base~ on this ai rcraft type being available only during annual air show. 
No. 
Takeoffs 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 100 
8650 
850 
0 
2450'" 
0 
.,. 
0 
0 
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Table F.3-S. Airway air traffic per site location per year. 
Site Location Large Civilian Large Military Military High Performance 
Barnwell Plant 5900 2600 3300 
Hanford 200 Area 2200 0 0 
400 Area 3200 100 0 
INEL 0 0 0 
Kesselring 98600 144 0 
Nevada Test Site 22000 9000 19000 
Norfolk 17000 350 550 
Oak Ridge 86900 5900 4700 
Pearl Harbor 0 0 1750 
Portsmouth 11000 0 0 
Puget Sound 12800 0 0 
Savannah River 5900 2600 3300 
The effective crash area associated with various types of fuel storage at shipyards and 
prototypes was based on the storage facil ity footprints ident ifi ed in Table 0·1 of Anachment D. 
Length and width dimensions associated with the target area were calcul ated from these footprints by 
treating the storage area as square (i.e . . equal length and width dimensions). The height of the dry 
storage containers was based on that of an existing M·I40 shipping container, and the height of the 
water pool facility superstructure was ba.<od on the approx imate height of the Expended Core Facility 
at INEL. For the water pool fac ility, a crash into the building might damage the fu el either by the 
airplane directly str iking it or by the airplane caus ing sufficient damage to the building to cause part 
of the building structure to collapse and str ike the fuel. The crash anitude angle used was 15 degrees , 
based on the recommended value identified in the Sandia report (Sandia 1983) . A reduced aircraft 
skid distance of 300 feet was used . Th is skid distance is based on a rev iew of the proposed site 
locations and refl ects the fact that nearby buildings. dry docks. or retaining walls will generally limit 
the length of the ai rcraft skid to 300 feet or less prior to impact. 
The effective crash area associated with fu el examination at the Expended Core Facility at 
INEL or similar facilities to be constructed at the Barnwell Plant . Hanford . Oak Ridge. the Nevada 
Test Site, or Savannah River was based on the vulnerable part of the fac il ity being 667 feet long, 194 
feet wide. and 60 feet high. Th is represents the portion of the Expended Core Faci lity that contains 
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the combined dry cell , shielded cell , and water pool as identified in Anachment B. For these 
facilities, a crash into the building might damage the fuel either by the airplane directly striking it or 
by the airplane causing sufficient damage to the building to cause part of the building structure to 
collapse and strike the fuel. The effective crash area associated with dry storage or shipping 
containers waiting to be handled at these fuel examination facilities is based on the height and width 
of an existing M- I40 shipping container and the modeling approach that two such containers could be 
located outside of the fuel processing facility and separated by a reasonably large distance. The crash 
anitude angle that was used was 15 degrees_ For these facilities and containers, airplane skid 
distances of 2200 feet for military high performance aircraft and 1600 feet for large military and large 
civilian aircraft were used. These skid distances correspond to the maximum expected skid distance 
based on the informat ion presented in the Sandia report (Sandia 1983)_ 
F.3.4 Aircraft Specific Information 
Aircraft wingspans which are representative of large civilian aircraft. military high perfor-
mance aircraft (i.e., tactical fighter and tactical fighter trainer), and large military aircraft (i.e .• cargo, 
transport, refueling, and bomber) have been taken into account separately in computing the overall 
crash probabilities for each site. Wingspans for these three class of aircraft have been based on 
average values computed from individual planes within each class. Data from " Aviation Week & 
Space Technology" served as the basis for determining these wingspans (AWST 1992). The 
calculated average wingspans were: 40 feet for mil itary high-performance aircraft, 131 feet for large 
military aircraft , and 135 feet for large civilian aircraft. For large mili tary and civilian ai rcraft. an 
effective wingspan that was 75% of the average wingspan was used in the probability calculat ions . 
Th is effective wingspan refl ects the fact that onl y the region between the most outboard wing-mounted 
engines has the potential to seriously damage a fuel storage area or a fuel examination faci lity . 
F.3.5 Results 
Tables F.3-6 and F.3-7 present the crash probabili ty results for the four methods of fue l 
storage at shipyards and prototypes and for fuel examination fac ilities. The probabilities listed within 
these tables represent the combined takeoff. landing. and in-flight crash probabilities assoc iated wi..h 
each method of fu el storage at each site. Following the DOE NEPA oversight guidance. 
consequences for beyond design basis acc idents are calcul ated where the probability is 10-' or greater 
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per year . These consequences are discussed in Section F. 1.4 of this anachment. For cases less likely 
than 10"' per year, calculations of consequences are not included . 
The prcbability calculated for airplane crashes at different facilities located within a panicular 
DOE site may vary somewhat. This situation exists at INEL where low altitude testing of commercial 
jet airliners has been conducted near the NOAA lOwer. This tower is located about 1.5 miles from 
ICPP, and 2.3 miles from ECF. As a result of this difference in distance, the crash probabilities are 
expected to be about a factor of two higher atlCPP than at ECF. Further, two different methodolo-
gies have been in general use for determination of aircraft accident probabilities . In addition to the 
Sandia methodology used in this appendix, a technique developed by the NRC in the 1970's has been 
applied at some facilities . Comparison of the two methods has shown that results can differ by a 
factor of two to four, with the NRC method generally producing higher probabilities than the Sandia 
method . This difference stems from the somewhat more detailed nature of the Sandia method . 
Therefore, calculated aircraft crash probabilities at ICPP are expected to be about a factor of four to 
eight higher than those calculated for ECF. 
Crash probabilities fall in the design basis range (i.e., probability of occurrence 2. 10"" per 
year) at Pearl Harbor for all types of fuel storage, at Norfolk for fuel storage in shipping containers 
on railcars, and at Oak Ridge and Savannah River for the fuel examination facility dry cell and water 
pool. The radiological consequences associated with an airplane c"lSh into these areas are addressed 
in detai l in Section F. 1.4. 
Crash probabi lities fa ll in the beyond design basis range (i.e., probability of occurrence 
between 10"" and 10"' per year) at Norfolk fo r fuel storage in immobi le dry storage containers, 
shipping containers on a concrete pad, and in the water pool facility , at Kesselring for fuel storage in 
shipping containers on railcars and in the water pool facili ty, at Portsmouth for shipping containers on 
railcars, at the Nevada Test Site for the fuel examination faci lity dry cell and water p ol, and the fuel 
examination facility dry storage containers at Oak Ridge and Savannah River. The radiological 
consequences associated with an ai rplane crash into these areas are also addressed in deta il in Section 
F.1.4. 
Crash probabilities with a likelihood of occurrence less than 10"' per year are not ev':uated 
since it is expected that they would contribute very very linle to the risk . This is the case for 
immobile dry slOrage and shipping containers on a concrete pad at Kesselring and Portsmouth , the 
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water pool facility at Portsmouth, all types of fuel storage at Puget Sound, the fuel examination 
facilities at Barnwell , Hanford, and INEL, and the fuel examination facility dry storage containers at 
the Nevada Test Site. 
Table F.3-6. Crash probabilities for various fuel storage options per site location per year. 
Immobile Dry Shipping Shipping 
Storage Co ,tainers on Containers on Water Pool 
Site Location Containers C, 'crete Pad Railcars Facility 
Kesselring 9 x 10"' x 10" I X 10"' 2 x 10"' 
Norfolk 6 x 10"' , x 10"' I x 10"" 4 x 10"' 
Pearl Harbor I x 10"' I x \0" N/A 2 x 10"' 
Portsmouth 6 x \0" 6 x \0" i X 10" 7 x 10"' 
Puget Sound 3 x 10"' 3 x \0" 8 x 10"' 3 x 10"' 
Table F.3-7. Crash probabilit ies for fuel examination facilities per site location per year. 
Sh ielded Cell, 
Dry Cell, and 
Site Location Water Pool Dry Storage Containers 
Barnwell Plant 9 x \0" I x 10" 
Hanford 200 Area 6 x \0". 2 X \0". 
400 Area 4 x \0" I x \0" 
INEL (ECF) 7 x \0" 2 x \0" 
5 x \0" (1) 
Nevada Test Site 4 x \0" 5 x \0" 
Oak Ridge I x 10" 3 X 10" 
Savannah River 2 x 10" 3 X 10" 
( I) Crash probabil ity based on 582 dry storage containers stored in a square array several hundred 
yards away from ECF. Array footprint is 168,800 square feet. 
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F.4 FUGITIVE DUST 
The INEL-ECF is a large laboratory facility used to receive, examine, and ship naval nuclear 
fuel and irradiated test specimen assemblies. This section provides the results of an evaluation of 
fugitive dust emissions that could be generated during the construction of a similar laboratory facility 
at an alternate location (Hanford, Savannah River, the Nevada Test Site, the Barnwell Plant, or Oak 
Ridge) . 
F.4.1 Computer Modeling to Estimate Fugitive Dust Emissions 
Factors such as locations of affected persons , terrain, meteorological conditions, release 
conditions, and grain size distributions are required as input parameters for calculations to determine 
particulate concentrations from fugitive dust emissions during construction activities. This section 
describes the computer model used to perform fugitive dust concentr.tion estimates. Specific input 
parameters used in this analysis are summarized in Section F.4.2. 
The Fugitive Dust Model (FOM) was the computer code chosen to evaluate fugitive dust 
emissions from construction activities at an alternate DOE location. FOM is a computerized air 
quality model specifically designed for estimating fug i,tive dust emissions from point, line, or area 
sources (EPA 1992c). 
FOM is designed to work with properly prepared meteorological data such as the EPA 
RAMMET program or card Images of meteorological data in either hourly or Stability Array (STAR) 
format . FOM is based on the well-known Gaussian plume formulation for computing concentrations, 
but the model has been specifically adapted to incorporate an improved gradient transfer deposition 
algorithm. Emissions for each source are apportioned by the user into a series of particle size 
classes . A gravitational settling velocity and a deposition velocity are subsequently calculated by 
FDM for each class , and dust concentrations and depositions are then calculated for locations selected 
by the user. 
FOM is the preferred model for estimating conditions resulting from particulate matter 
emissions from fug itive sources such as excavation and soil handling . The ISC2 Code (Section 
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F.2.2.2) can also be used for this purpose; however, FOM was judged to be superior to the ISC2 
Code for this evaluation. 
F.4.2 Conditions and Key Parameters 
• Construction area was 30 acres. 
• Construction activities occurred over a 3- to 5-year period . 
• An emission factor of 2.0 tons per acre-month was used. 
• Grain sizes used were as follows : 
Average Diameter (urn) 
1.25 
3.75 
7.5 
12.5 
20.0 
~ 
3 
5 
15 
10 
67 
• Meteorological conditions used were the 5-year average STAR data sets. 
• Roughness heights were 2 centimeters for Hanford and Nevada Test Site and 
30 centimeters for Savannah River , the Barnwell Plant , and Oak Ridge. 
F.4.3 Results 
The fugitive dust concentrations were calculated using FOM for the worker. MCW. NPA, 
and MOl using normal meteorology. Table FA- I lists the fugitive dust concentrations at various 
locations. These airborne concentrations were compared against the TL V -TWA concentration for 
pm iculates . The TLV-TW A concentration of 10 mg/m' was not exceeded at any of the specified 
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locations for fugitive dust that could be generated during construction activities at the alternate 
locations. Since these concentrations were extremely low, it can also be concluded that similar results 
would be expected for the alternate shipyard locations since the facilities to be constructed would be 
smaller. 
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Table F.4-l. Summary of fugitive dust concentrations for construction activities at alternate Ivr.ations. 
Fugitive Dust Concentration mg/m3 
Nevada 
Savannah River Hanford* Test Site Oak Ridge Barnwell Plant 
Worker 2.7 3.5 1.6 3.1 2.7 
MCW 3.6 x 10.2 7.3 X 10-2 8.1 x IO-~ 2.9 X 10-3 5.2 x l~ 
MOl 2.8 x I~ 1.3 x 10" 2_9 x 10" 0.22 3.2 x 10-3 
NPA lAx l~ 2.2 x 10" Not applicable 1.6 3.2 x 10-3 
'TI ·MOI shown is for a new spent fuel facility constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford Site. The MOl concentration is 3.0 x l~ mg/m3 
I 
~ for a new spent fuel facility constructed at the Fuels and Material~ Examination Facility. 
<: 
o 
C 
3 
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F.S OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS 
Occupational accidents can occur in the workplace during the construction or operation of any 
industrial facility . In order to assess the possible extent of occupational accidents during construction 
and non-<:onstruction operations at naval spent nuclear fuel facilities. projections of the number of 
fatalities and injuries or illnesses were made for each alternative. The projections are presented in 
th is section. The projections are based on average occupational fatality and injury incidence rate data 
published by the DOE (DOE 1993a) for DOE and DOE contractor operations. The incidence rates 
that were used in the analyses are provided below. A more detailed discussion of the basis for these 
incidence rates is presented in Volume I. 
Average occupational injury/illness and fatality rates") 
DOE and 
Contractors(o' 
All Labor Categories 
Total 
Injuryllilness Fatalities 
3.2 0.0032 
(. ) All incidence rates are given per 100 worker-years 
(0, 1988-1992 averages (DOE 1993a) 
Construction Workers 
Total 
Injury/Illness 
6 .2 
Fatalities 
0.011 
The term 'injury/ill ness' as used in th is analysis corresponds to the DOE defi nition of a 
recordable injury illness. Specifically. an inju ry or illness case represents any work-related death, 
iIIn .... or any work-related injury which would result in !oss of consciousness, restriction of work or 
motion. transfer to another job. or medical treatment beyond first aid. 
F.S.1 Accident Evaluation 
F.5. t. t Cons/ruction. The average number of construction-related fatalities and injury or illnesses 
and the 4O-year total were calculated . The methods of calculating construction-related fatalities and 
injuries or illnesses are presented below. 
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The number of construction workers that would be required to construct or modify each naval 
spent nuclear fuel storage and examination facility was calculated for every year that construction 
would take place during the period 1995 through 2035. The sum of these workers represents the total 
number of construction workers. The 4O-year total of construction fatalities was obtained by 
multiplying the total number of construction workers by the construction fatality rate for DOE and 
DOE contractors. 
The annual average number of construction workers for each facility was obtained by dividir.g 
the total number of construction workers by the number of years that construction would take place. 
The product of the annual average number of construction workers and the construction fatality rate 
for DOE and DOE contractors was calculated to provide the annual average number of construction 
fatalities . 
The annual average and 4O-year total construction injuries or illnesses were calculated in the 
same manner as construction fatalities except that the c nst ruction injury or illness accident rate for 
DOE and DOE contractors. 
F.5. 1.2 Storage and Examination Facili/y Opera/ions. The average number of fatalities and 
injuries or illnesses and the 40-year total fatalit ies and injuries or illnesses were calculated for 
operation of naval spent nuclear fuel storage and examination facilities . The methods of calculatin~ 
the operational fatalities and injuries or illness are presented below. 
The accident rates for DOE and DOE contractor operations other than construction were used 
because examination and storage facility operations would more likely be performed by DOE and 
DOE contractor personnel (or Navy personnel in the case of shipyards). The number of workers that 
would be required to operate each naval spent nuclear fuel storage and examination facili ty was 
calculated for every year during the period 1995 through 2035 and summed over the 4O-year period 
to obtain the total number of workers. The 4O-year IOtal of fatalities was obtained by multiplying the 
total number of workers by the DOE fatali ty rate. 
The annual average number of workers for each facility was obtained by dividing the total 
number of workers by the number of operational years (40 years). The product of the annual average 
number of workers and the DOE fatality rate represents the annual average number of operational 
fatalities . 
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The annual average and 4O-year total esti mated injuries or illnesses associated with facility 
operations were calculated in the same manner as fatalities associated with faci lity operations except 
that the DOE injury or illness accident rate was used . 
F.S.2 Results 
This section presents tabulated results of calculations of construction and operating fatalities 
and injuries or illnesses for each alternative. Table F .5-1 provides the proje tions of occupational 
fatalities and injuries or illnesses for construction activities and storage and examination operations for 
each alternative. Tables F.5-2 through F.5-5 present the results of calculations of occupational 
fatalities and injuries or illnesses for construction activities and storage and examination operations at 
naval sites. The results of all calculations show that the number of fatalities and injuries or illnesses 
for construction activities and storage and examination operations would be low for any alternative. 
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Table F.S-l. Occupational fatalit ies and injuries/illnesses by alternative - construction activities and storage and examination 
facility operations. 
Fatalities Injuriesnllnesses 
Alternative Construction Operations Construction Operations 
Annual 4O-Year Annual 4O-Year Annual 4O-Year Annual 4O-Year 
Average Total Average Total Average Total Average Total 
1. No Action 3.9 x to-l 6.9 x to·J 2.5 x to·) 9.8 x 10.2 2.2 3.9 2.5 9.8 x 101 
2. Decentralization'" 
• No Exam 3. 1 x to·2 2.2 x 10"1 6.6 X 10') 2.6 X 10"1 1.8 X tol 1.2 x 1()2 6.6 2.6 x 1()2 
• Limited Exam 4.2 x to·: 2.5 x 10"1 8.3 x to·J 3.3 x to· I 2.4 x 101 1.4 x 1()2 8.3 3.3 x 1()2 
• Full Exam 3.4 x to-2 2.2 x to·1 2.1 x to-2 8.3 x to· I 1.9 x 101 1.3 x 1()2 2.1 x 101 8.3 x 1()2 
3. 1992/ 1993 Planning 2.6 x 10') 5.3 X 100J I. 7 x to-2 6.6 x to· I 1.5 3.0 1.7 x 101 6.6 x 1()2 
Basis 
4. Regionalization 
• INEL 2_6 x to- 5.3 x to·) 1. 7 x to-2 6.6 x to-I 1.5 3.0 1.7 x 101 6.6 x 1()2 
• Nevada Test Site 4.7 x too: 3.3 x to·1 1. 7 x to-2 6.7 x 10"1 2.7 X 101 1.9 x 1()2 1.7 x 101 6.7 x 1()2 
• Oak Ridge 4.7 x to-2 3.3 x 10"1 1. 7 X 10-2 6.7 x to· I 2.7 x 101 1.9 x 1()2 1.7 x 101 6.7 x 1()2 
5. Centralization 
• INEL 2.6 x IO-J 5.3 X 10"3 I. 7 x to-2 6.6 x 10"1 1.5 3.0 1.7 x 101 6.6 x 1()2 
• Hanford 4.7 x to-
2 3.3 x to-I 1.7 x to-2 6.7 x to-I 2.7 x 101 1.9 x 1()2 1.7 x 101 6 .7 x 1()2 
• Savannah River 4.7 x 10-2 3.3 x to-I 1.7 x 10-2 6.7 x to· I 2.7 x 101 1.9 x 1()2 1.7 x to l 6.7 x 1()2 
• Nevada Test Site 4.7 x to-
2 3.3 x 10"1 I. 7 X 10-2 6.7 X 10"1 2.7 X to l 1.9 x 1()2 I. 7 x 101 6.7 x 1()2 
• Oak Ridge 4.7 x to-
2 3.3 x 10"1 1.7 x to-2 6.7 x 10-1 2.7 X 101 1.9 x 1()2 1.7 x 101 6.7 x 1()2 
The water pool storage mode was used 10 the calculalton Smce tbe maxImum number ot construclton and 0 pe rahonaJ wor ers would be IOvolved. 
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ECF Puget Sound Pearl Harbor Portlmouth Norfolk 
> 
"0 
"0 
C1> 
::l 
Q. 
>< 
o 
Storage 
Storage Modes 
I. Railcar Storage 
2. Shipping 
Containera on 
Concrete Pads 
3. Immobile Storage 
Containera 
4. Wal~r Pool 
Storage 
Examination Modes 
I. Full Exam 
2. Limited Exam 
Annual 
Average 
2 .6 x 10" 
4O-Year Annual 4O-Year 
Total Average Total 
7.7 x 10" 2.3 x 10-' 
3 .3 x 10" 6 .6 x 10" 
3.3 x 10" 6.6 x 10" 
8.1 x 10" 5.7 X 10' 
5.3 x 10" 
1.1 x 10 ' 3 .2 x 10" 
Annual 4O-Year Annual 4O-Year Annual 4O-Year 
Average Total Average Total AveralC Total 
7.7 x 10"' 7 .7 x 10" 7.7 x 10" 7.7 x 10" 7.7 x 10" 2.3 x 10" 
3 .3 x 10" 6.6 x 10"' 3.3 x 10" 6.6 x 10" 3.3 x 10"' 6 .6 x 10"' 
3 .3 x 10" 6.6 x 10" 3.3 x 10" 6.6 x 10" 3 .3 x 10"' 6 .6 x 10"' 
5.3 x 10" 3.7 X 10-' S.3 x 10" 3.7 X 10-' 7 .7 x 10" 5.4 X 10-' 
t/4/ 
Keuelri", 
Annual 4O-Year 
AveralC Toc.al 
7 .7 x 10" 7.7 x 10" 
3.3 x 10" 6.6 x 10" 
3.3 x 10" 6.6 x 10"' 
4 .9 x 10-' 3 .• x 10-' 
"T1 
I 
!'oJ 
VI 
-..J 
< £. 
c: 
3 
(tI 
> 
'0 
'0 
(tI 
::I Q. 
)C 
0 
Table F.5-3. Occupational fatalities for storage and examination facility operations at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites . 
ECF Puget Sound Pearl Harbor Porumouth Norfolk Kcaaelrilll 
Annual 4().Year Annuli 4().Year Annual 4O-Year Annual 4(). Year Annual 4O-Year Annual 4O-Year 
Storage Average Total Average Total Average Total Average Total Average Total Average Total 
Storage Modes'" 
l. Railcar Storage 1.9 x 10" 7.7 x 10" 1.9 x 10"' 7.7 x I~ 1.9 x 10-' 7.7 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-' 7.7 x 10" 1.9 x 10-' 7.7x I~ 
2. Shipping 2.7x 10" 1.1 x 10" 2.0 x 10-' 8.0 x 10"" 2.0 x 10"' 8.0 x 10" 3.3 x 10-' 1.3 x 10-' 1.9 x 10-' 7.7 x 10" 
Containera on 
Concrete Pads 
3. Immobile Storage 2.2 x 10" 8.8 X 10" 1.2 x 10" 4.8 X 10-' 1.3 x 10" S.O X 10" 2.6 x 10"" 1.0 x 10"' 6.9 x 10"' 2.8 x 10-' 
Containers 
4. Water Pool 1.0 x 10"' 4.1 x 10" 8.0 x 10" 3.2 X 10" 8.1 x 10" 3.2 X 10" 9.S x 10"" 3.8 x 10" 6.3 x I~ 2.S X 10-' 
Storage 
Examination Modes 
1. Full Exam 1.7 X 10" 6.6 X 10'\ 
2. Limited Exam 1.8 X 10" 7.1 X 10-' 
01, Decentralization (No Exam) used for reprexntat;ve cax. 
I/i/Q 
< Table F.S4. Occupational injuries/illnesses for construction activities at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites. 
£. 
c 
3 
~ 
"T1 
I 
N 
VI 
00 
Anntal 
Storage Average 
Storage Modes 
I. lUilcu Storage 
2. Shipping 
Containers on 
Concrete Psd. 
3 . Immobile Storage 
Containers 
4 . Water Pool 
Storage 
EXl mination Mode! 
I. Full Exam 1.5 x 10" 
2 . limited Exam 
ECF PugetSound 
4O-Year AnnWlI 4O-Year 
Toe-I Average Toe-I 
4 .3 x 10-' 1.3 x 10" 
1.9 x 10" 3 .7 X 10" 
1.9 x 10"' 3 .7 x 10"' 
4 .6 x 10" 3 .2 x 10' 
3 .0 x 10" 
5 .9 x 10" 1.8 x 10' 
Pearl H.rbor Porumouth Norfolk 
AnnWlI 4O-Year AnnWlI 4O-Year AnnWlI 4O-Year 
Average Toe-I Average Toe-I Average Toe-I 
4 .3 x 10" 4 .3 X 10"' 4 .3 x 10" 4.3 X 10" 4.3 X 10"' 1.3 x 10" 
1.9 X 10" 3 .7 X 10" 1.9 X 10" 3.7 X 10" 1.9 X 10"' 3.7 x 10" 
1.9 x 10" 3 .7 X 10" 1.9 X 10"' 3.7 x 10" 1.9 X 10"' 3.7 x 10"' 
3.0 x 10" 2 .1 x 10' 3 .0x10" 2 .1 x 10' 4 .4 x 10" 3.1 x 10' 
ICc_Irina 
Annu.1 4O-Year 
Average Toe-I 
4.3 x 10"' 4 .3 x 10"' 
1.9 X 10"' 3.7 x 10" 
1.9 x 10"' 3 .7 x 10"' 
2.8 x 10" 1.9 x 10' 
." , 
N 
VI 
\0 
< ~ 
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Table F.S-S. Occupational injuries/illnesses for storage and examination faci.ity operations at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites. 
ECF Puget Sound P~rI Harbor Portamoulh Norfolk ICe_Irina 
AMual 4O-Y~r AMual 4O-Y~r AMual 4O-Y~r AMual 4O-Y~r AMulI 4O-Y~r Annual 4O-Y~r 
Storage Average TOll I Average TOlII Average TOlII Average TOlII Average TOlII Average TOlIl 
Storage Mode . ... 
1. JUilclr Storage 1.9 x 10"' 7.7 x 10"' 1.9 x 10"' 7.7 x 10"' 1.9xlO·' 7.7 x 10"' 1.9 x 10"' 7.7 x 10"' 1.9 x 10"' 7.7 x 10"' 
2. Shipping 2.7 x 10" t.t 2.0 x 10" 8.0 X 10" 2.0 x 10"' 8.0 x 10" 3.3 x 10"' 1.3 1.9 x 10"' 7.7 x 10"' 
Containen on 
Concrete Pad. 
3. Immobile Storage 2 .2 x 10"' 8.8 1.2 x 10"' 4.8 1.3 x 10"' S.O 2.6 x 10"' 1.0 x 10"' 6 .9 x 10"' 2.8 
Containen 
4. Water Pool 1.0 4.1 x 10' 8.0 X 10" 3.2 X 10' 8.1 X 10" 3.2 X 10' 9 .S X 10"' 3.8 x 10' 6.3 X 10"' 2.5 x 10' 
Storage 
Examination Modes 
1. Full Exam 1.7 x 10' 6 .6 x 10' 
2. Limited Exam 1.8 7.1 x 10' 
ell Decentraliution (No Exam) used for representative case . 
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ATTACHMENT G 
COMPARISON OF THE NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR 
FUEL STORAGE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
AND THIS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has prepared an environmental assessment of shon-
term storage of naval spent nuclear fuel until the environmental impact statement, of which this 
appendix is a pan, can be completed and an alternative for management of naval spent nuclear fuel is 
selected (Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 19,4051, January 8, 1994). The environmental assessment 
considered alternatives for storing, until June 1995, naval spent nuclear fuel removed from nuclear-
powered vessels and reactor prototypes at several naval sites. The environmental impact statement, 
which the appendix including this attachment is a pan, considers alternatives for the examination and 
storage of naval spent nuclear fuel during a 4O-year perind beginning in June 1995. 
Occasions may arise when comparison of the impacts for naval spent nuclear fuel described in 
Illese two documents may be desired. However, there are some differences between the environmen-
tal assessment and this appendix which should be recognized because they make such a comparison 
complicated. Failure to recognize these differences may lead to an erroneous conclusion that the two 
documents are inconsistent or contradictory. 
First, and most imponantly, the environmental assessment considered only a limited period, 
less than 2 years, needed to conduct the National Environmental Policy Act process required to reach 
a decision on the long-term management of Depanment of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel. This 
process includes preparation of th is environmental impact statement. The environmental impact 
statement, and therefore th is appendix , provides the evaluation of the alternatives to be us>!d for 
managing spent nuclear fuel for 40 years. As a result, ti>is environmental impact statement considers 
a wider range of al ternatives than the environmental assessment , panly because more alternatives are 
possible if a longer time is ava ilable to implement them and panly because some decisions which 
could be deferred for a shon period such as 2 years should not be deferred for a period as long as 
40 years . 
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The alternatives considered in the environmental impact statement also include more potential 
sites for management of naval spent nuclear fuel. This provides a wider range of choices, but, as a 
natural consequence, it also increases the number of potential destinations and the miles traveled by 
shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel under some alternatives. In the same manner, while the 
environmental assessment considered temporary storage of naval spent nuclear fuel at Newpon News 
Shipbuilding, storage at Newpon News is not included in the alternatives in the environmental impact 
statement because that shipyard is not federally owned. 
The alternatives considered in the environmental impact statement also include storage of 
naval spent nuclear fuel in water pools and immobile dry storage casks in addition to storage in 
shipping containers. There is also an evaluation of alternatives for examination of naval spent nuclear 
fuel in the environmental impact statement. These additional storage modes and examination 
alternatives were not considered in detail in the environmental assessment because the period covered 
by that document was shon and consequently, the implementation of some of the alternatives would 
have been impractical . For example, water pool storage facilities could not be funded and constructed 
at the shipyards in a period of less than 2 years. 
Also, as a natural result of the longer period considered in this environmental impact 
statement, a larger number of naval spent nuclear fuel assembl ies and additional types of naval fuel 
assemblies are included in the analyses . The increase in the amount of naval spent nuclear fuel 
occurs since a cenain number of naval reactors are refueled or defueled each year. so in a greater 
number of years more fuel becomes available for storage. Similarly, some newer designs for naval 
nuclear propulsion plants will not be refueled for the first time until some time after 1995, so those 
types of fuel are not treated in the environmec.!al assessment . 
The environmental impact statement addresses some impacts of normal operations and some 
accidents not discussed in the environmental assessment because the conditions or operation which 
might cause these effects would not occur under the alternatives considered in the environmental 
assessment. The environmental impact statement also addresses several types of impacts for each 
alternative in greater detail than the environmental assessment. Th is was done hecause more detailed 
treatment was judged to be appropriate wirh the broader scope of alternatives in the environmental 
impact statement. 
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The methods used to perform the analyses in the environmental impact statement have been 
refined in the time since the environmental assessment was prepared . This occurred partly because of 
the larger number of naval spent nuclear fuel assemblies analyzed and the wider scope of sites and 
methods of storage to be evaluated . and partly because additional time was available to implement the 
refinements. In addition to refinements in the methods for performing the calculations. some minor 
changes in the calculational models were made in order to establish a high degree of consistency with 
the analytical methods used for the other DOE sites that are part of the environmental impact 
statement. This consistency is appropriate in some cases in order to establish common grounds for 
comparison of al ternatives. The changes in the calculational methods make a direet comparison of the 
analytical results presented in the environmental assessment for naval sites with those in this appendix 
difficult. 
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activation 
activation products 
act ivity 
aggregates 
airborne emissions 
alloy 
aquifer 
archaeological areas 
average individual 
base fl ood 
benthic 
best estimate 
cladding 
GLOSSARY 
The process of making a material radioactive by exposing the material 
to neutrons. protons. or other nuclear particles . 
The radionuclides formed as a result of a material being activated. 
For example. cobalt-6> is an activation product resulting from neutron 
activation of cobalt-59. 
A measure of the rate at which a material is emining nuclear 
radiation. Activity is usually measured in terms of the number of 
nuclear disintegrations which occur in a quantity of the material over a 
period of time. The standard unit of activity is the curie (Ci). which 
is equal to 37 billion (3 .7 x 10'') disintegrations per second. 
Sand. gravel. or rock which is used in concrete or mortar mixes to 
achieve increased strength . 
Radioactivity in the form of radioactive particles. gases. or both that is 
transported by air. 
A mixture of two or more metals. 
A water-bearing stratum of permeable rock. sand. or gravel located 
beneath the surface of the earth . which is capable of yielding water to 
a well or spring. 
Areas of or relating to the scientific study of material remains (as 
fossil relics. artifacts. monuments) of past human life and activities . 
An iodividual who could consume items or occupy areas at rates 
which would be typical for the population of interest. 
A flood which has a l·percent chance of occurrence in any given 
year. Also referred to as a IOO·year fl ood. 
Pertaining to the bonom of the ocean. 
An estimate in which the factors used in determining the estimate were 
chosen such that the result approximately represents what would be 
expeeted . 
A metal casing that surrounds the nuclear fuel. 
GL· 1 Volume I. Appendix D 
coastal zone 
concentration factor 
conservative estimate 
containments 
core 
corrosion 
corrosion products 
corrosion· resistant 
alloy 
critical organ 
critical pathways 
cumulative effects 
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GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The region along the shore, adjacent to the ocean. A coastal zone is 
usually defined as the region within 3 nautical miles of a shorehne . 
A factor which is defined as the concentration of an elen.ent or 
radionuclide in an organism or its tissues divided by the concentration 
directly available from the organism's environment under equilibrium 
or steady-state conditions. 
An estimate in which the factors used in determining the estimate were 
chosen such that the result would be unlikely to be exceeded . 
Devices as complex as a glove box or as simple as a plastic bag 
designed to limit the spread of radioactive contamination to an area as 
close as possible to the source, and to break the chain of transfer to 
prevent contaminating other material. 
The central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the nuclear fuel. 
The process denoting the destruction of metal by chemical or 
electrochemical action. 
The substances produced by corrosion of a metal . Rust is a common 
corrosion product resulting from the corrosion of iron . 
An alloy which corrodes slowly compared to ordinary alloys. 
Stainless steel is an example of a corrosion-resistant alloy. 
The limiting organ for evaluating exposure to ionizing radiation . A 
critical organ is determined by the following criteria: (I) the organ 
that accumulates the greatest concentration of a radioactive material , 
(2) the necessity of the organ to the well being of the entire body, 
(3) the organ most damaged by the entry of a radionuclide into the 
body, and (4) the organ damaged by the lowest exposure. Usually , 
case (I) is the determining factor for choosing the critical organ . 
Those pathways which result in the most significant amount of 
exposure to radiation . 
The changes in the health of an individual(s) from the sum of all 
yearly exposures to radiation. 
GL-2 
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curie (ei) 
defueling 
design earthquake 
diffusion 
dispersion 
dose 
dose commitment 
dose commitment 
conversion factor 
dose equivalent 
dose rate 
dose rate conversion 
factor 
GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The curie is the COmmon unit used for expressing the magnitude of 
radioactive decay in a sample containing radioactive material . 
Specifically, the curie is that amount of radioactivity equal to 
3.7 x 10" (37 billion) disintegrations per second. This unit does not 
give any indication of the radiological hazard associated with the 
disintegration. 
Removal of all nuclear fuel from a nuclear-powered ship. 
The maximum intensity earthquake that might occur along the nearest 
fault to a structure. Structures are built to withstand a design 
earthquake. 
The process of spreading out or scattering from regions of higher 
concentration to regions of lower concentration. 
The process of scattering or distributing over a large region. 
A general term which denotes the quality of radiation or energy 
absorbed; usually expressed in rems for doses to man. 
The total radiation dose accrued by an individual over a specified 
period of time due to the exposure of the individual to radiation during 
a given interval of time. This includes the total time the radioactive 
material would reside in the body, if ingested or inhaled (usually 
expressed in rems). 
A factor which converts the quantity of radioactivity taken into the 
body to the dose to the individual (usually expressed in rems per 
curie). 
A quantity used to express all radiations on a common scale for 
calculating the effective absorbed dose. It is defined as the product of 
the absorbed dose and certain modifying factors and is expressed in 
rems. 
The amount of radiation dose delivered in a unit amount of time; for 
example, in rems per hour. 
A factor which converts the exposure to a given radiation level to the 
dose that an individual could receive. It is usually expressed in rems 
per hour per curie per cubic meter (or square meter). 
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dredge spoil 
ecosystem 
element 
endangered species 
envirolU1lellUl 
consequences 
epidemiological study 
exclusion area 
Expended Core 
Facility (ECF) 
exposure, external 
exposure, internal 
exposure, occupational 
exposure. radiation 
fauna 
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GLOSSARY (Cont) 
Bottom sediments or materials that have been excavated from a 
waterway. 
A community of plant and animal populations together with their 
physical environment. An organizational unit which can maintain its 
biological activities independent of other units. 
A chemical substance that cannot be divided into simpler substances 
by chemical means. A substance whose atoms all have the same 
atomic number. 
A species or subspecies which is in danger of extinction throughout all 
or a significant portion of its range. 
Changes to the environment as a result of the effects of radiation or 
radioactive materials. 
A scientific study that deals with the incidence, distribution, and 
control of disease in a specified population. 
An area where access would result in personnel exceeding radiation 
exposure limits in a very short time. 
A lar,e laboratory facility , located at the Naval Reactors Facility in 
Idaho, consistinll of water pools and shielded cells used to receive 
examine, and ship naval spent nuclear fuel and irradiated test ' 
specimen assemblies. Naval spent nuclear fuel is prepared at ECF for 
stor .. e and shipment to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
The subjecting of the outside of the body of an organism to ionizing 
radiation. 
The subjecting of the inside of the body of an organism to ionizing 
radiation. 
The subjecting of an individual to ionizing radiation in the course of 
employment. 
The subjecting of a material or organism to ionizing radiat ion. 
Animals. 
GL4 
fissile 
fission 
fission products 
floodplain 
floodplain/wetlands 
assessment 
flora 
fuel 
gamma ray 
geoJogy 
geophysical survey 
GLOSSARY (Cont) 
A material whose nucleus is capable of being split (fissioned) by 
neutrons of all energies. 
The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal parts 
which is accompanied by the release of a relatively large amount of 
energy and generally one or more neutrons. 
During operation of a nuclear reactor, heat is produced by the fission 
(splitting) of "heavy" atoms, such as uranium, plutonium, or thorium. 
The residue left after the splitting of these "heavy' atoms is a series of 
intermediate weight atoms generally termed "fission products. ' 
Because of Ibe nature of Ibe fission process, many fission products are 
unstable and, hence, radioactive. 
The lowlands which adjoin inland and coastal waters and relatively flat 
areas and floodprone areas of offshore islands which are covered with 
water from a I-percent or greater chance flood in any given year. 
An evaluation which consists of a description of a proposed action, a 
discussion of its effects on the floodplain/wetlands , and a 
consideration of alternatives. 
Plants. 
Fissionable material used or useable to produce energy in a nuclear 
reactor. It may also refer to a mixture, such as natural uranium, in 
which only part of the atoms are readily fissionable. 
[Symbol 'Y (gamma)J High-energy, short wavelength electromagnetic 
radiation. Gamma radiation frequently accompanies beta particle 
emissions. Gamma rays are very penetrating and are stopped most 
effectively by dense materials such as lead or uranium. They are 
essentially similar to x-rays but are usually more energetic and 
originate from the nucleus. Cobalt-60 is an example of a radionuclide 
that emits gamma rays. 
The study of the origin, history, materials, and structure of the earth . 
An examination of the condition, situation, or value of the earth using 
the physics of the earth including the fields of meteorology, 
hydrology, oceanography, seismology, volcanology, magnetism, 
radioactivity, and geology . 
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glaciation 
groundwater 
half-life, biological 
half-life, radioactive 
hazardous wastes 
health detriment 
health effect 
high-efficiency 
paniculate filter 
hydrology 
incident-free operations 
ion 
ionizing radiation 
irradiate 
Volume I, Appendix 0 
GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The act of having been subjected to glaciers, extreme cold, and ice. 
Water that exists or flows beneath the eanh's surface in the rone of 
saturation between saturated soil and rock . 
The time required for a biological system, such as an organ or tissue 
in an organism, to clear by natural (non-radioactive) processes, half 
the amount of a substance that has entered it. 
The time required for half of the atoms of a radioactive material to 
decay to another nuclear form. 
Excess chemical material that is dangerous to human health . 
The sum of all fatal cancers, a fraction of the non-fatal cancers 
proponional to the severity of the cancer types, and all genetic 
defects. 
The occurrence of a fatal cancer, a non-fatal cancer, or a genetic 
defect. 
A ventilation system device that can separate a panicle size of 
0.3 micron from the air into a filter medium at an efficiency of at 
least 99.97 percent. 
The study of the propenies, distribution, and effects of water on the 
eaM'S surface, in the soil and underlying rocks, and in the 
atmosphere. 
Routine, day-to-day operations without accidents or other unexpected 
or unusual occurrences. Synonymous and interchangeable with 
normal operations. 
An atom or molecule which has acquired an electrical charge by 
gaining or losing electrons. 
Any radiation which displaces electrons from atoms or molecules, 
thereby producing ions. Examples include alpha, beta, and gamma 
radiation. Exposure to ionizing radiation may produce skin or tissue 
damage. 
To expose to radiation. 
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AjO? 
isotope 
long-lived radioactivity 
maximally exposed 
individual (MEl) 
maximally exposed 
off-site 
individual (MOl) 
maximum individual 
maximum organ 
metric ton 
microcurie 
mil 
millicurie 
millirem 
GLOSSARY (Cont) 
One of two or more nuclides which have the same number of protons 
but have different numbers of neutrons in their nuclei. Therefore, the 
isotopes of an element have the same atomic number but different 
atomic weights. Isotopes usually have very nearly the same chemical 
propenies but somewhat different physical propenies. 
Radioactive nuclides which decay slowly, therefore having relatively 
long half-lives. 
A unit used to measure the radiation exposure to an entire group and 
to compare the effects of different amounts of radiation on groups of 
people. It is obtained by multiplying the average dose equivalent 
(measured in rems) to a given organ or tissue by the number of 
persons in the population of interest. 
A theoretical individual who receives the highest radiation exposure 
from the facility or activity in question. 
A theoretical individual located at the point on the DOE site or 
shipyard boundary nearest to the facility or activity in question. 
An individual who could consume items or occupy areas at rates 
which would be at a maximum for the population of interest. 
The organ which receives or could receive the largest amount of 
exposure to radiation. 
[Abbreviation MTJ A unit of mass which is equal to 1000 kilograms 
or approximately 2205 pounds. 
[Abbreviation I'Ci) A unit of activity which is equal to one-millionth 
(I x 10"') of a curie. 
A unit of length which is equal to one-thousandth (I x 10") of an 
inch . 
[Abbreviation mCi) A unit of activity which is equal to 
one-thousandth (I x 10") of a curie. 
[Abbreviation mrem) A special unit for measuring dose equivalents 
which is equal to one-thousandth (I x 10") of a rem. 
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radiation exposure 
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nuclear disintegration 
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nuclear reactor 
nuclear reactor accident 
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organism 
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GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The periodic or continuous determinat ion of lite amount of 
radioaClivil}' or radioactive conlamination present in a region. 
The IOIal amount of radiation from cosmic radiation emined by lite 
sun and Ibe radiation emined by natural minerals in Ibe ear!h's crust. 
Typically, an average annual exposure of 100 mrem to lite tolal body 
occurs from background radiation. 
A joint program of Ibe Department of Energy and lite Department of 
Ibe Navy which has as its objective lite design and development of 
improved naval nuclear propulsion plants having high reliability, 
maximum simplicity, and optimum fuel life for inslallation in ships 
ranging in size from small submarines to large combatant surface 
ships. The program is frequently referred to as lite Naval Reactors 
Program. 
An uncharged particle willt a mass slightly greater lItan Ibat of a 
proton, found in Ibe nucleus of every atom heavier Iban hydrogen . 
Neutrons sustain lite fission chain reaction in a nuclear reactor. 
A spontaneous nuclear transformation which is characterized by Ibe 
emission of particles andlor energy from lite nucleus of an atom. 
See fuel. 
A device in which nuclear fission is initiated and controlled to produce 
heat which is Iben used to generate power. 
An accident which results in release of fission products from Ibe 
nuclear fuel. 
An atomic form of an element which is distinguished by its atomic 
number, atomic weight, and Ibe energy state of its nucleus . These 
faClors determine Ibe ollter propenies of Ibe element, including its 
radioaClivil}' . 
A group of tissues which togellter perform one or more definitive 
funClions in a living body. 
Any living plant or animal . 
Material overlying a deposit of useful geological materials. 
Penaining to a very small piece or pan of a material . 
palltway 
percolate 
permeabilil}' 
pH 
picocurie 
prototype plants 
radiation 
radiat ion field 
radiation level 
radiation survey 
radiat ion worker 
GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The route or course alon, which radionuclides from defueled nuclear-
powered ships could reach man. 
To drain or seep through a material . 
The qualil}' or state of being able 10 diffuse or pass Ibrough a 
material . 
A measure of Ibe relative acidity or alkalinity of a solution. A neutral 
solution bas a pH of 7 , acids have pH's less Iban 7, and bases have 
pH's greater Iban 7. 
[Abbreviation pCil A unit of activity which is equal to one-triilionllt 
(I x 10''') of a curie. 
Land-based naval nuclear reaClor plants Ibat are typical of a first 
design for a naval warship and are used to test equipment and lite 
nuclear fuel prior 10 use on a shipboard nuclear plant. The prototype 
plants are also used to train naval officers and enlisted personnel as 
propulsion plant operators willt extensive watchstanding experience 
and a Iborough knowledge of all propulsion plant systems and lIteir 
operating requirements . 
The emission and propagation of energy IItrough maner or space by 
means of electromagnetic disturbances which display bollt wave-like 
and particle-like behavior. In litis context, lite ·particles· are known 
as photons. The term has been extended to include streams of fast-
moving particles such as alpha and beta particles, free neutrons, and 
cosmic radiations. Nuclear radiation is Ibat which is emined from 
alOmic nuclei in various nuclear reactions and includes alpha, beta, 
and gamma radiation and neutrons. 
A region where radiation is present. 
The measured amount of radiation in a region. 
The evaluation of an area or object wilb instruments to detect, 
identify, and quantify radioactive materials and radiation fields which 
may be present. 
A person specially trained and tested in bas ic information regarding 
radiation, its effects, and radiological control techniques and practices. 
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GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The deposition of radioactive material in any place where it may harm 
persons, invalidate experiments, or make products or equipment 
unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use. The presence of unwanted 
radioactive maner. 
The process of spont'neous transformation of a radioactive nuclide to 
a different nuclide or different energy state of the same nuclide. 
Radioactive decay involves the emission of alpha panicles, beta 
panicles. or gamma rays from Ille nuclei ot the atoms . If a 
radioactive nuclide is transformed to a stable nuclide, the process 
results in a decrease of the number of original radioactive atoms. 
Radioactive decay is also referred to as radioactive disintegration. 
Equipment and materials which are radioactive and for which there is 
11() further use. Radioactive wastes are generally classified as high-
level waste (those resulting from reprocessing reactor fuel or the used 
reactor fuel itself), as I"w-Ievel waste, or as low-level waste 
containing transuranic elem~nts or uranium-233 . 
The process of spontaneous decay or disintegration of an unstable 
nucleus of an atom; usually accompanied by the emission of ionizing 
radiation. 
An unstable isotope of an element that decays or disintegrates 
spontaneously and emits radiation. 
The changes to the environment or the health of a person(s) as a result 
of the effects of radiation exposure or radioactive materials. 
Atoms that exhibit radioactive properties. Standard practice for 
naming radionuclides is to use the name or atomic symbol of an 
element followed by its atomic weight (e.g., cobalt-60 or Co-60, a 
radionuclide of cobalt). 
A very strong, thick-walled steel structure which contains the nuclear 
fuel and cooling water under high pressure during reactor operations. 
A unit of measure used to indicate the amount of radiation exposure a 
person receives (an acronym for roentgen equivalent man). 
The product of the consequences of an event multiplied by the 
probability of that event. 
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river stage 
sediment 
seismicity 
shipping container 
short-lived radioactivity 
socioeconomics 
special nuclear material 
specific activity 
specimen 
steam generator 
survey meter 
tectonic 
threatened species 
GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The level of the surface of a river in relation to some reference 
elevation. 
Panicles of organic or inorganic origin that accumulate in loose form. 
The quality or state of shaking or vibrating caused by an earthquake. 
A specially designed large, stainless steel or lead-lined, steel-shelled 
cask that is transported in the vertical position on a well-type or 
depressed center railcar. The container is certified by the Department 
of Energy and the Department of Transportation for the shipment cf 
naval spent nuclear fuel. 
Radioactive nuclides which decay rapidly, therefore having relatively 
short half-lives. 
The welfare of human beings as related to the production , distribution. 
and consumption of goods and services. 
Materials containing nuclides such as plutonium-239, uranium-233, or 
uranium enriched to a higher percentage than normal in the 
uranium-235 isotope. 
The ratio between the amount of radioactive isotope present and the 
total amount of all other isotopes of that same element, both 
radioactive and stable. It is usually expressed in microcuries of 
radioisotope per gram of total element. 
A small sample of material (fuel or non-fuel) inserted into a reactor 
for testing to characterize the material's performance. Test specimens 
may be constructed of plant materials, reactor structural materials, or 
fuel materials. 
The portion of the nuclear power plant where the heat from the 
primary system is transferred to the secondary system without physical 
contact between the water in the two systems . 
Any portable instrument which is used to detect radiation and is 
especially adapted for surveying or inspecting an area to establish the 
existence and amount of radioactive material present. 
Pertaining to or designating the rock structures which result from the 
deformation of the earth 's crust. 
Any species or subspecies which is likely to become an endangered 
species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant 
port ion of its range. 
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GLOSSARY (Cont) 
The detailed physical description of the surface of a region. including 
the relative elevations of features. The graphical representation of the 
physical configuration of a region on a map . 
Relating to or caused by a toxin which is a poisono~s substance that is 
a specific product of the metabolic activities of a living organism and 
is usually very unstable when introduced into human tissues . 
A radioactive isotope of hydrogen with atoms that are three t.imes the 
mass of ordinary light hydrogen atoms . Tritium is present in the 
reactor coolant as the result of neutron interaction with naturally 
occurring deuterium present in the water. 
(Symbol UI A natural radioactive element with the atomic number 92 
and. as found in natural ores. an average weight of approximately 
238. The two principal natural isotopes are uranium-235 (0.7 percent 
of natural uranium) and uranium-238 (99.3 percent of natural 
uranium). Natural uranium also includes a minute amount of 
uranium-234. 
The unsaturated region of soil located between the ground surface and 
water table. 
Deep pools of water that are used to inspect and hold spent nuclear 
fuel modules. Storage racks are located below the water surface to 
support and position the fuel modules in place fo r handling and to 
prevent the formation of a critical mass . 
The upper surface boundary of an uncontrolled aquifer. below which 
groundwater occurs. It is usually defined by the levels at which water 
stands in wells that barely penetrate the aquifer. 
The region which drains into a river. ri ver system. or body of water. 
Those areas which are covered by water with a frequency sufficient to 
support a prevalence of vegetative or aquatic life that requires 
saturated or seasonally saturated soil conditions for growth and 
reproduction. Wetlands generally include swamps. marshes . bogs. 
and similar areas such as sloughs. potholes. wet meadows. river 
overflow. mudllats. and natural ponds . 
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x-rays 
GLOSSARY (Cont) 
Penet.rating electromagnetic radiations with wavelengths shorter than 
those of visible light. They are usually produced (as in medical 
diagnostic x-ray machines) by irradiating a metallic target with large 
numbers of high-energy electrons. In nuclear reactions. it is 
customary to refer to photons originating outside the nucleus as x-rays 
and those originating in the nucleus as gamma rays. even though they 
are the same. 
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AEA 
AEC 
ANL-E 
ANL-W 
ATR 
Btu 
BWR 
CAA 
CDE 
CEDE 
CERCLA 
CFA 
CFR 
cfs 
Ci 
cms 
CNS 
CWRM 
DEP 
DOD 
DOE 
EB 
ECF 
EDE 
EIS 
EPA 
ERPG 
FAA 
FMEF 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
Atomic Energy Act 
Atomic Energy Commission 
Argonne National Laboratory - East 
Argonne National Laboratory - West 
Advanced Test Reactor 
British thermal unit 
boiling water reactor 
Clean Air Act 
committed dose equivalent 
committed effective dose equivalent 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
central facil ities area 
Code of Federal Regulations 
cubic feet per second 
curies 
cubic meters per second 
Charleston Naval Shipyard 
Commission on Water and Resource Management 
Department of Environmental Protection 
Department of Defense 
Department of Energy 
Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics 
Expended Core Facility 
effective dose equivalent 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Emergency Response Planning Guideline 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Fuels and Materials Examination Facility 
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FWPCA 
HEPA 
ICPP 
ICRP 
IDLH 
INEL 
INEL-ECF 
INGL 
KAPL 
KSO 
kv 
kw 
kwh 
LET 
MCW 
MEl 
mg 
mgd 
MINS 
MMI 
MOl 
mph 
MVA 
MW 
MWh 
NAAQS 
NEA 
NEPA 
NES HAP 
NNPP 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Cont) 
Federal Water PolI.tion Control Act 
high-efficiency particulate air 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 
International Commission on Radiological Protection 
immediately dangerous to life and health 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Expended Core Facility 
Ingalls Shipbuilding 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 
Kesselring Site Operation 
kilovolts 
kilowatts 
kilowatt hours 
linear energy transfer 
maximally exposed collocated worker 
maximally (or maximum) exposed individual 
milligram 
million gallons of water per day 
Mare Island Naval Shipyard 
Modified Mercalli Index 
maximally exposed off-site individual 
miles per hour 
megavolt amperes 
megawatts 
megawatt hours 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
Nuclear Energy Agency 
National Environmental Policy Act 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
Volume I. Appendix 0 AA-2 
NNS 
NOAA 
NOR 
NPA 
NPDES 
NRC 
NRF 
NTS 
NYSDEC 
OECD 
ORNL 
ORR 
PAH 
PCB 
pCi 
PH NS 
PHWMA 
PNS 
PSNS 
PWR 
RCRA 
RWMC 
SA PS 
SARA 
SNF 
SRS 
SRS-ECF 
TEDE 
n 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Cont) 
Newpon News Shipbuilding 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
nearest publ ic access 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Naval Reactors Facility 
Nevada Test Site 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Oak Ridge Reservation 
polycyclic (or polynuclear) aromatic hydrocarbons 
polychlorinated biphenyl 
picocuries 
Pearl Harbor Naval Sh ipyard 
Pearl Harbor Water Management Area 
Ponsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
pressurized water reactor 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Radioactive Waste Management Complex 
Shippingpon Atomic Power Stat ion 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
spent nuclear fuel 
Savannah River Site 
Savannah River Site Expended Core Facility 
total effective dose equivalent 
transpon index 
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TLV-TWA 
TRA 
USFWS 
VOC 
WIPP 
WSO 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Cont) 
threshold limit value, time-weighted average 
test reactor area 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
volatile organic compound 
waste isolation pilot plant 
Windsor Site Operation 
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